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Foreword 
Little is known about institutions in the Soviet Union that Chinese 
radicals attended in the 1920s and 1930s, nor is much known about the 
activities within the Soviet Union of the ones among these radicals 
who subsequently played significant roles in political developments 
in China. 
To be sure, one knows a bit about Wang Ming and the "28 
Bolsheviks." One knows that they existed, that Wang Ming was 
prominent among them, and that, somehow, they apparently sought 
to gain control of the Chinese Communist Party. One knows of their 
loyalty to Stalin. But one does not know who they were, for the rare 
listings of them do not conform to one another. Nor does one know 
what sort of an entity the 28 Bolsheviks constituted, nor how that 
entity came into being. In fact, one really knows surprisingly little 
about these people, whose influence historians in Communist China 
invariably treat as the major force in the thirties and early forties that 
contested the policies of Mao Tse-tung. 
Nor is the issue of Wang Ming and the 28 Bolsheviks a closed one 
historically. For Wang Ming continued to be flayed by the Chinese 
Communist press prior to and during the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, and many Chinese Communist leaders who were purged 
in that Party convulsion were accused of having collaborated with 
Wang Ming. One reader reports that one could verify that Wang 
Ming was living in Moscow, and that he had lived there since the 
late 1950s. And then, in April, 1969, the Canadian Tribune, published 
in Toronto, carried a long diatribe by Wang Ming against Mao Tse-
tung, the most vitriolic attack against Mao I have read in any Com-
munist source. A story based on the diatribe was promptly filed by 
Tass and carried by Izvestia. Wang Ming, one of the 28 Bolsheviks, 
for years the Chinese Communist representative to the Comintern, is 
again openly doing battle with Mao Tse-tung, again, apparently, with 
Soviet blessings. 
The events of today, then, do seem a bit to be evoking shades of the 
past. That being the case, it becomes more important than ever, from 
a practical standpoint, to understand what happened in the past. Mr. 
Sheng Yueh's study (it is both a study and a memoir) of Sun Yat-sen 
University in Moscow and of the 28 Bolsheviks, who had their origins 
there, throws invaluable light on this aspect of the past. For he was 
one of the 28 Bolsheviks, he attended Sun Yat-sen University, and he 
lived, first as a member of the Chinese Communist Party and then of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in the Soviet Union from 
1926 through 1932. For a time in the mid-1930s, Mr. Sheng was a 
member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 
He left the Chinese Communist Party in 1935. 
But, of course, Mr. Sheng's work is useful not solely as a source 
of information about a Russian institution for Chinese radicals or a 
Chinese Communist power faction. Mr. Sheng makes the point that 
Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow had an impact upon the Koumin-
tang as well as upon the Chinese Communist Party, although he con-
cerns himself chiefly with its relationship to Communists. Neverthe-
less, one learns that Chiang Ching-kuo, the elder son of Chiang Kai-
shek, was a Trotskyite at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, which 
places the younger Chiang in a rather different light from the one 
in which he is generally placed. The younger Chiang's denunciation 
of his father in 1927 also is translated in this book; it does not exist, 
I think, in any other English-language source. There are fascinating 
bits of information about a number of people. 
In his introduction Mr. Sheng stresses the dearth of source material 
relevant to Sun Yat-sen University. As he points out, he has had to 
rely largely upon his own memory in writing this book. He does not 
regard it, I know, as a definitive study either of Sun Yat-sen University 
or of the 28 Bolsheviks, or of the other subjects he treats in passing, 
such as the Chinese Trotskyite movement. It is not, therefore, to be 
read as a definitive, scholarly work. It is to be read as the work of 
one man who was intimately caught up in many of the events he 
describes, who has unique knowledge of these events, and who writes 
about them as he wishes. In writing this book, Mr. Sheng has thrown 
a good deal of light on aspects of modern Chinese history which few 
others are in a position to provide. 
R. A. BURTON 
May, 1969 
Preface 
Among the problems one confronts in writing a study of Sun Yat-
sen University in Moscow is the dearth of written source material. 
The archives of the university are, presumably, in Moscow. I was not 
in a position to consult them, nor do I know that they would be made 
available to scholars seeking to consult them. Fragmentary informa-
tion about Sun Yat-sen University also exists in the Documents Divi-
sion of the CC of the KMT in Taiwan. At the time of writing, how-
ever, this material was not available for scholarly examination. Fur-
thermore, former students of Sun Yat-sen University, most of whom 
now live in Taiwan or in mainland China, have written few reminis-
cences of their experiences at that university, perhaps because circum-
stances in both places make it expedient for them to close that chapter 
of their lives. 
Further complicating research on Sun Yat-sen University were the 
almost covert circumstances under which it was established. Soviet 
publications, such as ?ravday make few references to it from 1925 
through 1930. So far as I can discover, moreover, there are no Russian-
language treatments of Sun Yat-sen University. 
The histories of the CCP published in mainland China that I have 
examined utterly ignore Sun Yat-sen University, although numerous 
Chinese Communists, many of them men of great Party influence at 
one time or another, attended the university.1 Nor have works pub-
lished under KMT aegis contributed much information on the sub-
ject, although they do provide bits and pieces of data. 
Thus, in writing this study I was forced to rely principally upon 
my own memory of my years at the university and of the 28 Bolsheviks, 
1 Among the works on the CCP published in mainland China that I have examined are: 
Wang Shih, Wang Ch'iao, Ma Ch'i-ping, and Chang Ling, Chung-kuo \ung-ch'an-tang li-shih 
chien-pien (A brief history of the Chinese Communist Party; Shanghai: Shanghai Jen-min 
Ch'u-pan She, 1958); Miao Ch'u-huang, Chung-kuo \ung-ch'an-tang chien-yao li-shih (A 
short history of the Chinese Communist Party; Peking: Hsueh-hsi Tsa-chih She, 1956); 
Hu Ch'iao-mu, Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China (Peking: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1951, 1952, 1954, and 1959); Ho Kan-chih," Chung-kuo hsien-tai \e-ming shih (A 
history of the modern Chinese revolution; Peking: Kao-tun Chiao-yu Ch'u-pan She, 1957); 
Huang Ho, Chung-kuo \ung-ch'an-tang san-shih-wu nien chien-shih (A short history of 
the Chinese Communist Party; Peking: T'ung-hsu Tu-wu Ch'u-pan She, 1957); Shih Chun, 
Chung-kuo \ung-ch'an-tang-ti ch'eng-li (The founding of the Chinese Communist Party; 
Peking: T'ung-hsu Tu-wu Ch'u-pan She, 1957); and Hu Hua, Chung-kuo hsin-min-chu 
chu-i ke-ming'shih (A history of the Chinese new democratic revolution; Peking: Jen-min 
Ch'u-pan She, 1952). 
of whom I was one. My memory, as is that of any man, naturally 
is fallible. But it seemed useful to record to the best of my ability 
what I felt able to record, simply because of the dearth of other sources. 
This is not to say that I had no assistance in refreshing my memory 
or no data other than my memory. I have been able to examine 
Russian-language publications of the period and Chinese-language 
publications. Much help was given to me in correspondence by friends 
who had studied at Sun Yat-sen University. I shall respect their wishes 
that they not be named, but I wish to stress my gratitude to them. 
Mr. David H. L. Tseng, especially, and Mrs. Xenia J. Eudin, and others 
at the Hoover Library were most gracious in helping me locate valuable 
material. 
This book could not have been written without the encourage-
ment and support given to me by the then Dean of International Pro-
grams at the University of Kansas, George M. Beckmann, and Dr. 
Thomas R. Smith, then Director of the Center for East Asian Studies 
at that university. I am greatly indebted, too, to Professor Robert A. 
Burton, of the University of Kansas, whose knowledge of modern 
China I much admire, for the many discussions we had on the material 
in this work and for technical assistance and advice in completing 
this manuscript. I shall long remember his assistance. Lastly, but by 
no means of least importance, I wish to thank a fellow student at Sun 
Yat-sen University, Ch'ing Man-yun, who is also my wife, for her 
tireless assistance. I don't suppose one usually thanks a person for 
having an incredibly retentive mind, but it has been my good fortune 
that she has such a mind and that she made her recollections available 
to me and functioned both as a healthy stimulus and as a check to my 
own recollections. Her contributions to the chapter on the Sixth Con-
gress of the CCP were especially notable, for she was in a position to 
furnish information about that Congress which few others could have 
furnished. 
So far as I know, this is the first attempt in any language to write 
a substantial study of Sun Yat-sen University. The work naturally 
contains many flaws. It is my hope that scholars with knowledge of 
the subject and former students at the university will not hesitate to 
acquaint me with these flaws or to suggest things that I have over-
looked so that, perhaps, I may some day write a more comprehensive 
study of the subject. But if this work provides students of Chinese and 
Soviet affairs with a few blocks on which they can build a more perfect 
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Introduction 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen was born November 12, 1866. On March 12, 1925, 
he died in Peking. Dr. Sun's death presented the Russian Communists, 
who were eager to convince China of their good will, with an op-
portunity to demonstrate their friendship. In commemoration of Dr. 
Sun, they opened Sun Yat-sen University for the Toilers of China at 
Moscow in the autumn of 1925. The life span of this university was 
short, for it was closed in the autumn of 1930. Nevertheless, it had a 
significant influence upon events in China, both Nationalist and Com-
munist, which lingers to this day. Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow 
is an integral part of the history of relations between China and 
Russia after 1917, just as it is an integral part of the history of relations 
between the KMT and the CCP in the 1920s. It is, furthermore, an 
integral part of the history of both the CCP and the KMT. 
Chinese who studied in the Soviet Union at Sun Yat-sen University, 
Communist University of Toilers of the East (KUTV), Lenin Acad-
emy, and various Soviet military institutions, have occupied important 
posts in the CCP. Every one of the 28 Bolsheviks, for example, grad-
uated from Sun Yat-sen University. More recently, of the ninety-five 
members of the CC elected by the Eighth National Congress of the 
CCP in 1956, for example, I can identify at least twenty-seven who 
studied in the USSR, and graduates of Sun Yat-sen University were 
prominent among them. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who became the Party's 
general secretary at that congress, was a graduate of Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity. Ch'en Po-ta, another member of the CC elected at the Eighth 
Congress, who was closely identified with Mao Tse-tung in the "Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution," also studied at Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity. At least three members of provincial committees of the Party in 
the mid-1960s attended that university. At the same time, at least 
sixteen people who held notable positions in the Central government in 
mainland China, such as Liu Shaoch'i, had studied in the USSR. Liu, 
of course, attended KUTV. I have mentioned only a few obvious ex-
amples; a great many more could be listed who are in the Party, the 
government, and the military. 
Chinese who studied in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, moreover, 
have played, and still play, significant roles in the KMT, a party which 
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in 1924 was reorganized along lines similar to the Communist model 
at the recommendation of Michael Borodin, its Soviet adviser. Here, 
too, a great many names could be listed, although I shall mention only 
a few. General Chiang Ching-kuo, a graduate of Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity, became Minister of National Defense in the government of the 
Republic of China in Taiwan in 1965 and is a member of the Standing 
Committee of the CEC of the KMT. In 1969 he became Vice-Premier 
of the Executive Yuan. His authority on Taiwan is reportedly second 
only to that of his father, Chiang Kai-shek. The late General Cheng 
Chieh-ming, a leading figure in the Nationalist intelligence service, 
also attended Sun Yat-sen University. As an assistant to the late Gen-
eral Tai Li, who headed the Investigation Bureau of the Military Com-
mittee of the National Government, Cheng was for many years in 
charge of Chiang Kai-shek's personal security. He was regarded as 
one of Chiang Kai-shek's most trusted aides. Mme. Chiang Kai-shek's 
competent assistant, P'i I-shu, is a Sun Yat-sen University graduate, as 
is her husband, Ku Cheng-ting, a prominent member of the Legislative 
Yuan. Ku Cheng-ting's brother, Ku Cheng-kang, a member of the 
Standing Committee of the CEC of the KMT, also attended that uni-
versity. Additional Sun Yat-sen University graduates in Taiwan in-
clude the Vice-Minister of the Interior, Teng Wen-i; General Liu Yun-
yao, who has held various important positions in the KMT and who 
at one time was in charge of personnel work in the National Army; 
Hsiao Tsan-yu and Wu Chia-yu, who are members of the Legislative 
Yuan; and Chang Hsiu-lan, a member of the Control Yuan. Ho 
Chung-han, former Minister of Communications, actually studied at 
Moscow Military Academy, but he maintained intimate ties with Sun 
Yat-sen University, which was nearby and at which he took his meals. 
P'u T'ao-ming, who died in 1964 in Taiwan, where he was director of 
the Institute of International Relations and was widely recognized as 
an authority on Soviet affairs, was a graduate of KUTV and later at-
tended Sun Yat-sen University. Wang Ch'ung-wu, another graduate, 
who on the mainland was mayor of Tsinan, became deputy director of 
the Institute of International Relations and is still one of its senior 
staff members. 
Without filling whole pages with the names of Chinese who studied 
in the Soviet Union in the twenties, I trust that I have mentioned 
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enough names to indicate that these students who returned from 
Russia played major roles in both the CCP and the KMT. I trust, too, 
that such names will suggest that although Sun Yat-sen University has 
been closed for many years, its influence in mainland China and in 
Taiwan is probably still discernible. 
Sun Yat-sen University also played a role in relations between the 
Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. For among the early 
factors that contributed to the conflict between Communist China and 
Russia one would have to include the first batch of Chinese whom the 
Russians trained, Chinese who pledged their allegiance to Soviet Russia 
and to the Comintern and who, when they returned to China, strove 
to gain leadership in the CCP. For some of them this power struggle 
continued for more than twenty years. In the end, Mao Tse-tung 
shunted aside cadres in whom the Russians, and especially Stalin, had 
taken a particular interest, such as Ch'en Shao-yu, Ch'in Pang-hsien, 
Ch'en Ch'ang-hao, and, later on, Chang Wen-t'ien, Yang Shang-k'uen, 
and others. And their eclipse, no doubt, was an ingredient in, as well 
as a symptom of, the deterioration of relations between Soviet Russia 
and Communist China. Furthermore, at the time of writing, Ch'en 
Shao-yu, now presumably in Moscow, continues his struggle against 
Mao Tse-tung. Four days before the Ninth National Congress of the 
CCP convened on April 1, 1969, at Peking, Izvestia published some 
details of a lengthy attack that Ch'en had recently made against Mao. 
Sun Yat-sen University also was the cradle of the Chinese Trotskyite 
movement, which initially was literally transplanted from Russia to 
China. The great majority of Chinese who initiated a Trotskyite move-
ment in China were students at Sun Yat-sen University. These in-
cluded Lu Yen, Liang Kan-ch'ao, Sung Feng-ch'un, Hsiao Pin-yang, 
and Li Mei-wu. Only a few of the early Chinese Trotskyites, such as 
Wang P'ing-i and Liu Jen-ching, came from other Soviet institutions. 
Trotsky himself was directly involved in the Trotskyite Opposition in 
Sun Yat-sen University and in the subsequent Chinese Trotskyite 
movement. 
There were, of course, other areas of activity in China that were 
probably influenced by Sun Yat-sen University. Some of the ped-
agogical techniques used in some mainland Chinese educational in-
stitutions, for example, closely paralleled methods of teaching used at 
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Sun Yat-sen University. It might be pointed out, too, that an early 
effort to reform the Chinese language was undertaken at Sun Yat-sen 
University by a group of Chinese students whom the Russians recruited 
especially for the task. The late Wu Yu-chang was one of these stu-
dents, as was I, and noticeable progress was made on the project. Wu 
Yu-chang was especially influential in developing a Latinized written 
form of Chinese. Later, after the Chinese Communists came to na-
tional power, it was Wu Yu-chang who headed the organization in 
mainland China that undertook the reform of the Chinese language. 
The influence of Sun Yat-sen University upon the introduction of 
Marxist ideas into China is also notable. For the university undertook 
a rather monumental translation project, which rendered into Chinese 
classics by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and others. Many Marxist works 
were translated into Chinese for the first time as a result of this project, 
and an attempt was made to standardize the Chinese equivalents of 
Marxist terms. Furthermore, a number of Sun Yat-sen University stu-
dents continued this important work of translating after they returned 
to China. Their undertakings contributed significantly to the thinking 
of a great many Chinese, especially Party cadres. Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity, meanwhile, had an impact on many other subsequent events in 
China, which I shall mention in the body of this study. 
Nor did Sun Yat-sen University have an impact upon China alone. 
The Russians obviously profited from experience gained in running 
both Sun Yat-sen University and KUTV, experience which doubtless 
was useful to them when they established the People's Friendship Uni-
versity in Moscow in the autumn of 1960. While Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity and KUTV differed from one another, and People's Friendship 
University differs from both of them, the last-named obviously has 
inherited the traditions of its two predecessors. When KUTV and Sun 
Yat-sen University were formed in the twenties, they reflected a mount-
ing Soviet interest in the national liberation movement in the East, 
especially in China. Somewhat similarly, by the 1960s, the focus of 
revolutionary undertakings had again settled upon the underdeveloped 
countries, not only in the East this time, but throughout the world. 
And People's Friendship University was established to accommodate 
students from all parts of the world. KUTV had the word "Commu-
nist" in its name, of course, and it enrolled only Communists. But Sun 
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Yat-sen University enrolled non-Communists, and it did not become 
"Communist University for the Toilers of China in Memory of Sun 
Yat-sen" until 1928, following the Communist split with the KMT. 
Since People's Friendship University enrolls non-Communists, I sup-
pose its lineage goes back most directly to the first three years of Sun 
Yat-sen University. Although the name of Patrice Lumumba, the late 
African revolutionary, has been added to the name of People's Friend-
ship University, Lumumba's ideas are not taught at the university. Nor, 
indeed, were the works of Sun Yat-sen ever taught at Sun Yat-sen 
University. But there is a significant difference in the curricula of the 
two institutions, suggesting, no doubt, the changes that have taken 
place in the years that separate them and the experience that the 
Russians gained from their earlier institutions. Only what might be 
classed as social sciences were taught at Sun Yat-sen University, includ-
ing, of course, "scientific socialism." At People's Friendship University 
in Memory of Patrice Lumumba, however, emphasis is placed upon 
the natural sciences. Yet, of course, KUTV, Sun Yat-sen University, 
and People's Friendship University do have something in common. 
In all three cases the Soviets obviously felt that their interests would 
be furthered by students who attended these institutions. I leave it to 
historians to assess the extent to which the Soviet position in this 




The Birth of Sun Yat-sen University 
THE DAWN OF A NEW ERA 
The 1911 Revolution seemed to bring China, a nation weakened by 
foreign invasions and internal upheavals and often scorned as the 
"invalid of the Far East," into a new era. The empire having been 
overthrown, a republic was established, the first of its kind in Asia. 
More important, the revolution roused the national spirit and thus 
prepared the way for advancement and a bright future. 
In November, 1912, Lenin, in a Pravda article entitled "Regenerated 
China," expressed his far-sighted evaluation of the Chinese Revolution 
and extended to this sleeping lion which possessed four hundred 
million people his warmest congratulations: 
Progressive and civilised Europe shows no interest in the regeneration of 
China. Four hundred million backward Asians have attained freedom, and 
have awakened to political life. One quarter of the world's population has passed, 
so to say, from torpor to enlightenment, movement and struggle.1 
The deep-seated influence of the 1911 Revolution on China and 
the tremendous changes that stemmed from it were self-evident and 
not Lenin's discovery. But Lenin certainly should be credited with 
producing an accurate analysis of the international significance of the 
revolution, a fact unfortunately ignored by most historians. His in-
terpretation of the 1911 Revolution strongly influenced the Bolshevik 
Party's policy toward China and other colonial countries after the 
Bolshevik Party seized power in Russia. 
As far back as July, 1912, Lenin, after reading Dr. Sun Yat-sen's ar-
ticle "On the Social Significance of the Chinese Revolution," wrote an 
essay entitled "Democracy and Narodism in China," which contained 
a detailed evaluation of the 1911 Revolution and Dr. Sun's political 
theory: 
In China, the Asiatic provisional President of the Republic is a revolutionary 
democrat, endowed with the nobility and heroism of a class that is rising, not 
declining, a class that does not dread the future, but believes in it and fights for 
it selflessly, a class that does not cling to maintenance and restoration of the past 
in order to safeguard its privileges, but hates the past and knows how to cast 
off its dead and stifling decay.2 
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To Lenin, Dr. Sun Yat-sen represented a rising progressive class. 
He also wrote: 
What has decayed is the Western bourgeoisie . . . . But in Asia there is still a 
bourgeoisie capable of championing sincere, militant, consistent democracy . . . . 
The chief representative, or the chief social bulwark, of this Asian bourgeoisie 
that is still capable of supporting a historically progressive cause, is the peasant.3 
The opinion expressed here formed the basis for the "Theses on 
the National and Colonial Question" drafted by Lenin and adopted at 
the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920. It also prepared the 
way for the future alliance of Dr. Sun with Soviet Russia. For the 
strategy of assisting the Chinese national revolution, on which this 
alliance was based, naturally followed from Lenin's evaluation that 
the bourgeoisie and peasantry of Asia constituted a historically progres-
sive force. 
Even after the 1911 Revolution, China, which had been ravaged by 
internal upheavals and humiliated by foreign incursions since the 
Opium War, did not enjoy a single day of peace or prosperity. The 
revolutionary spirit did not die, however. It was constantly rekindled 
until it reached a climax in the May Fourth Movement of 1919. This 
movement opened a new frontier for the Chinese revolution and 
brought new vitality to it. It sprang from a happy blending of China's 
awakening national consciousness and the impact of Russia's October 
Revolution. Harold Isaacs, in his book The Tragedy of the Chinese 
Revolution, judiciously summed up the importance of the May Fourth 
Movement as follows: 
The tide of May 4 engulfed the entire country. It ushered in the second 
Chinese revolution. It seemed to touch off waiting impulses of astonishing 
vigor. Traditional ideas and modes of conduct were crumbling and the echo 
of their fall sounded from one end of the country to the other. Young men and 
women in towns and villages began to break with the old authority of the family 
and the village elders. A fissure opened between the generations that was never 
again closed. The old ways of doing and thinking still governed much of Chinese 
life but they were now being mortally assailed. In the colleges and universities 
there was a great churning. The disillusionment with the West after the Ver-
sailles Conference turned popular attention among the students to the Russian 
revolution. This new current brought with it to China belated tributaries of 
all the main streams of European social thought, democracy, anarchism, syndical-
ism, and Marxism, opening up new horizons and stimulating a veritable revolu-
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tion in thought, morals, and literature, and rapidly deepening the channels of 
political change and social conflict. All classes of society entered the political 
arena. Old political organizations took on fresh life. New organizations came 
into being.4 
The policies and slogans of the Russian Communists increasingly 
attracted the attention of people in China, who had long suffered from 
foreign insults and atrocities. And Sun Yat-sen apparently was the 
first Chinese of any prominence to openly express sympathetic en-
thusiasm for the Russian October Revolution and to seek ways of 
establishing contacts with Soviet Russia. Thus, in 1918, Dr. Sun sent 
a telegram from Shanghai addressed to Lenin and the Soviet govern-
ment. In it he said that the Chinese and Russian revolutions had a com-
mon aim. He predicted that the Russian and Chinese revolutions would 
join forces to liberate all oppressed peoples.5 The telegram in effect 
expressed Dr. Sun's frustration in trying to deal with the West and his 
sympathy for the Russian Revolution. 
On August 1, 1918, Chicherin, as People's Commissar of Foreign 
Affairs of Soviet Russia, replied warmly to Dr. Sun's telegram of "a 
few months ago," deferentially referring to Dr. Sun as "Respected 
Teacher" and stressing the interdependence of the Russian and Chinese 
revolutions and the important destiny that they shared.6 Indeed, it 
may well be that these early communications between Sun Yat-sen and 
the Soviet Russian leadership influenced subsequent Bolshevik diplo-
matic moves in China. The famous Declaration of the Council of 
People's Commissars of the Soviet Government of July 25, 1919, signed 
by Karakhan, which renounced special Tsarist rights in China, for 
example, was addressed to "the Chinese people and to the governments 
of South and North China."7 Sun Yat-sen, of course, led the revolu-
tionary movement in South China at the time. Afterwards, contact 
between Dr. Sun and the Russian leadership continued and led to the 
joint statement of Dr. Sun and the Soviet official Adolf A. Joffe on 
January 27, 1923. In the same year Michael Borodin had arrived in 
Canton to serve as Dr. Sun's adviser in the reorganization of the KMT. 
The reorganization of the KMT in 1924 and the later cooperation be-
tween the KMT and the CCP were clear evidence that the influence 
of the Russian October Revolution on China was gradually gathering 
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momentum. This influence reached its zenith in the great revolution 
of 1925-1927. 
It took only five or six years to produce tremendous changes in the 
Chinese political situation, from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 
to the revolution of 1925-1927. In the 1925-1927 period Sun Yat-sen's 
three principal policies of alliance with Soviet Russia, cooperation with 
the Communists, and support of the workers and peasants became a 
dynamic revolutionary force. These policies were adopted because of 
frustrations from both within and without. The ignorance and selfish-
ness of the Western powers, evidenced in their policies toward China 
and their indifference to Dr. Sun's revolutionary movement, had 
forced him to turn to Soviet Russia for help. In a 1924 letter to Chiang 
Kai-shek, whom Sun had sent to the Soviet Union in 1923 for instruc-
tion, Sun wrote: "Our party's future revolution cannot be achieved 
without taking the Russians as our teachers."8 
Yet Chinese admiration for the October Revolution and the rejec-
tion of Sun's revolutionary aspirations by the West were not the only 
factors in Sino-Soviet cooperation. Another aspect was the growing 
interest that the Russian Bolsheviks had in the East. At the end of 
World War I a revolutionary wave swept Europe. However, this 
revolutionary wave quickly receded after the failure of the revolutions 
in Hungary and Germany. It was at this time that the Russian Com-
munists began to seriously look for allies in the East in order to break 
their isolation. China, with its revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen, was 
a natural target. In 1921 the Comintern dispatched its special envoy 
Maring to China, and on November 23, 1921, he met with Dr. Sun at 
Kweilin. Upon his return to Russia, Maring gave a detailed report to 
the ECCI on the contemporary political situation in China. Maring 
contended that alliance with Dr. Sun was far better than alliance with 
either of the warlords Wu Pei-fu or Ch'en Chiung-ming. Maring felt 
that Sun, due to his revolutionary record and thorough understanding 
of the theory of socialism, would be a most desirable ally for the 
Comintern. After the announcement of the joint statement of Sun 
and Joffe in 1923, the alliance of Dr. Sun and the Soviet Russians was 
officially established. Although founded after Dr. Sun's death, Sun 
Yat-sen University in Moscow was a product of this alliance between 
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Sun and the Soviet Russians and a logical result of the development 
of Sino-Soviet relations of the period. 
In addition to being a product of the historical development of 
Sino-Soviet relations, the founding and closing of the university rep-
resented the high and low tides of the Chinese revolution. Moreover, 
it represented the contemporary Chinese political society in miniature. 
The Chinese students at the university were part of all of the violent 
political struggles that marked the era. At the university there were 
CCP members of many inclinations, including Stalinists and Trotsky-
ites, and there were representatives of the KMT and all of the other 
groups and factions that made up the Chinese revolution. 
But Sun Yat-sen University was more than a reflection of the 
Chinese political scene. It was also part of the struggle between the 
leaders of Soviet Russia. Upon the death of Lenin in January, 1924, 
there ensued a bitter struggle for power among the Russians. Stalin 
and Trotsky, like two gamecocks, fought each other; and the China 
question constituted one of the focal points of the struggle. Each of 
them considered himself to be an authority on Chinese matters, and 
they competed for the position of spokesman for the Chinese people. 
Thus, the Chinese students of the university, in addition to playing 
a part in the Chinese revolution, were also hurled into the whirlpool 
of Soviet Russian politics. 
On a more individual level, the inauguration of Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity in the fall of 1925 marked an important milestone for Chinese 
students studying abroad. Formerly, most Chinese students pursued 
their advanced studies in Europe, America, or Japan. Indeed, the first 
students sent abroad by a Chinese government had, thirty of them, gone 
to the United States in 1872. But never had a Chinese government sent 
students to China's vast neighbor, Russia; nor had many Chinese gone 
to Russia to study, for it had been regarded as backward. Now, how-
ever, after fifty years, the situation sharply changed. With the estab-
lishment of an alliance between Sun Yat-sen's KMT and Soviet Russia, 
the Soviet Union became a highly favored place for Chinese youth to 
study—an indication in itself that Russia no longer was regarded, by 
many at least, as the intellectually backward country of earlier days. 
While in the period 1921 to 1924 only a few Chinese Communists had 
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gone to Russia to study at KUTV, in 1925 hundreds of Chinese began 
to flock to Russia to study at Sun Yat-sen University. 
However, the opening of Sun Yat-sen University brought more than 
a quantitative change for Chinese students. While students from 
Europe and the United States brought their class notes and books con-
taining "science" and "democracy" home with them, and dreams, per-
haps, those who studied in Russia brought back dreams of a new China 
plus political programs to realize them and party affiliations to support 
them.# And these students who had studied in Russia ultimately 
played a large part in shaping China's destiny. 
DR. SUN'S DEATH AND BORODIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FOUNDING 
OF SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY 
On November 13, 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, with a group of nineteen 
persons including Madame Sun and Wang Ching-wei, left Canton for 
Peking. The purpose of this northern trip was the realization of Sun's 
lofty aspiration of "the regeneration of China." This regeneration was 
to take place through consultation with Generals Tuan Ch'i-jui and 
Chang Tso-lin. Unfortunately, Dr. Sun and his mission did not reach 
Peking until December 31, as Dr. Sun was detained at Tientsin for 
almost a month with a recurrence of his liver trouble. 
At that time I was a student at the National University of Law and 
Political Science (kuo-li fa chen ta-hsueh) in Peking, and I vividly 
remember Dr. Sun's arrival. Two days before his arrival it snowed 
heavily in Peking, and all of the roads were frozen and quite treacher-
ous. In addition, the temperature had fallen below zero. Yet, in spite 
of the unfavorable weather, some one hundred thousand persons 
gathered at Peking's Front Gate Station to welcome Dr. Sun. A band 
from National Peking Institute of Arts started to play Chinese music 
as Dr. Sun stepped off his special train, and thousands of people 
shouted with excitement at the prospect of seeing and hearing him. 
But Dr. Sun was gravely ill; and he simply nodded to the welcoming 
crowd, stepped into his car, and went directly to the Hotel Peking. 
On the evening of Dr. Sun's arrival a lantern march was held. We 
* For security reasons, when the Chinese students crossed the border between China and 
Russia, Russian intelligence personnel searched them and stripped them of their books and 
class notes. 
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gathered at the square in front of the Tien-an Men and set out like a 
flaming dragon for Dr. Sun's temporary residence on Iron Lion Lane 
(t'ieh shih-tze hu-t'ung), which Tuan Ch'i-jui had made available to 
him. We were anxious to pay our respects to Dr. Sun and hoped that 
he would give a speech. But upon our arrival we found that Dr. Sun 
was still too ill to address us. Instead Wang Ching-wei, Sun's hand-
some Cantonese assistant, appeared and, on behalf of Dr. Sun, ex-
pressed his thanks to us. We then dispersed in disappointment. 
Sun Yat-sen's illness became even more critical as the days passed. 
Six or seven foreign doctors in Peking were consulted, but there was 
no evidence of improvement in Dr. Sun's condition. Finally, on Jan-
uary 4, 1925, a Russian liver specialist arrived from Moscow. However, 
every effort was in vain. At 9:30 A.M. on March 12 Dr. Sun died, 
leaving behind him a still struggling China with her suffering people. 
When Dr. Sun's illness had become extremely critical, a will was 
drawn up by Wang Ching-wei; and on February 24 Wang read it 
to Dr. Sun to get his approval. On March 11 Dr. Sun was finally 
asked by his comrades to sign this will, together with a message to the 
Soviet Union. The message was apparently composed in English by 
Eugene Ch'en. This message, made public only after Sun's death, 
became an important document in the history of Sino-Soviet relations. 
The full text of the message is as follows: 
Dear Comrades, 
Here on my deathbed my thoughts turn to you, as well as to the future 
destiny of my Party and of my country. 
You are at the head of the Union of free Republics, that heritage which the 
immortal Lenin has left to all suppressed peoples of the world. By means of this 
heritage, the victims of imperialism will inevitably win their emancipation from 
that social order which has always been based upon slavery, war, and injustice. 
I leave behind me a party which, as I always hoped, will be allied with you in 
its historical task of liberating China and other suppressed peoples from the 
yoke of imperialism. 
My charge to the Kuomintang party above all is that it shall continue to 
promote the cause of national revolutionary movement for the emancipation of 
China, which has been degraded by imperialism into a semi-colonial country. I 
therefore charge my party to maintain permanent contact with you. 
I cherish the firm belief that your support of my country will remain unaltered. 
In taking my last leave of you, dear comrades, I express the hope that the day 
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is approaching when the Soviet Union will greet a free and strong China as its 
friend and ally, and that the two states will proceed hand in hand as allies in the 
great fight for the emancipation of the oppressed of the whole world. 
With brotherly greetings, 
Sun Yat-sen9 
The day after the death of Sun Yat-sen, the CEC of the KMT sent 
an announcement of Sun's death to the chairman of the Comintern, 
Gregory Zinoviev, and to Stalin. In this announcement the KMT ex-
pressed its wish that cooperation between the KMT and the Russians 
would continue: 
The National revolutionary movement of China has today, with the death of 
Sun Yat-sen, lost its leader. The work of Sun Yat-sen, is not yet completed and 
will be continued by his party. We are still confronted with huge difficulties, for 
we are surrounded by counter-revolutionary forces which are allied with im-
perialism. We are convinced that you, as true disciples of Lenin, will fight along 
with us, the heirs of Sun Yat-sen.10 
The KMT's announcement and Sun's message were sent to Moscow 
simultaneously. The Soviet leaders joined the Chinese in mourning 
the loss of their revolutionary leader, who was also a great friend of 
the Soviet Union's. Stalin sent his condolences in a reply to the death 
announcement by the CEC of the KMT, the text of which follows: 
The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party mourns with you 
over the loss of the leader of the Kuomintang Party and the organizer of the 
National Emancipatory struggle of the workers and peasants of China for the 
freedom and independence of the Chinese people and the unity and independence 
of the Chinese State. 
The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party has not the least 
doubt that the great cause of Sun Yat-sen will not die with his death, but will 
live on in the hearts of the Chinese workers and peasants, in spite of their 
enemies, and that the Kuomintang Party will hold aloft the banner of Sun Yat-sen 
in the great fight for emancipation from imperialism and will carry it with 
honour up to the final victory over imperialism and its agents in China. 
Sun Yat-sen is dead. Long live the work of Sun Yat-sen! Long live the 
cause he had bequeathed!11 
Zinoviev, in his reply on behalf of the Comintern, reiterated the 
Comintern's stand to fully support the Chinese Revolution and the 
spirit of Sun Yat-sen: 
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The Executive Committee of the Communist International will do everything 
which lies in its power in order to make clear to the broad masses of all workers 
of all countries the great importance of the work of Sun Yat-sen.12 
Moreover, the ECCI, in memory of Sun Yat-sen, made public its 
"Letter to the Chinese People" and its "Letter to the World's 
Workers."13 Special articles of condolence were written by Zinoviev, 
Karl Radek, G. N. Voitinsky, and others. These contained favorable 
appraisals of Sun Yat-sen and of the Chinese revolution. Of these, 
Radek's article in Pravda was typical. In closing his article, which was 
entitled "The Heritage of Sun Yat-sen," he stated: "The greatness of 
Sun Yat-sen lies in his eternal progressiveness. After every defeat he 
suffered, he stood up again, re-evaluating his experience and studying 
more."14 Radek, who was to become the first rector of Sun Yat-sen 
University, had long been considered an expert on Chinese affairs. In 
this Pravda article he compared Sun Yat-sen to Hung Hsiu-ch'uan and 
the Chinese revolution to the Taiping Rebellion, and he also elaborated 
on some of Lenin's thinking with regard to the Chinese masses from 
his personal experiences: 
One day in 1916, at the time when the First World War was at its height, 
some Bolsheviks gathered together at Berne to discuss problems of self-determina-
tion of nations. Lenin, who was at the conference, suddenly made a proposal 
that the Bolsheviks unite with the Chinese Revolution in the future. His proposal 
at the time seemed to be an idiot's impossible dream! Just imagine, the Russian 
proletariat will join with millions of Chinese to fight! Among those five or six 
Bolsheviks present at the meeting, who among them imagined that if they had 
lived long enough, they would see this dream materialize. 
When Russia and China were separated by the Czechs, Socialist-revolution-
aries, and Kolchak in 1918, Lenin once inquired if among those Chinese 
laborers who had immigrated to Russia men of resolution could be singled out 
who would contact Sun Yat-sen. Now we have established contact with the 
Chinese people. Our mission with the Chinese revolutionaries today is to enlarge 
our contact with millions of people.15 
Apparently with Lenin's thoughts in mind, the leaders of the 
Soviet Union and the Comintern reached the conclusion that truly 
"the seeds sown by Sun Yat-sen are to blossom and bear fruit." After 
reaching this conclusion, the Soviet leaders decided to invest more 
capital in the Chinese revolution. The establishment of Sun Yat-sen 
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University in Moscow in the same year was one of the most important 
investments that the Soviet Union made. 
Soon after the death of Sun Yat-sen, the establishment of the Revolu-
tionary Nationalist government at Canton on July 1, 1925, opened new 
horizons for the Chinese revolution. This Revolutionary Nationalist 
government attracted new blood, consolidated revolutionary strength, 
and appealed to the masses for further revolutionary activity. In this 
highly favorable revolutionary situation the Soviet Union speeded up 
plans to bring into being the proposed Sun Yat-sen University in 
Moscow. 
Michael Borodin, Russia's special adviser to the KMT, formally 
announced the establishment of Sun Yat-sen University at the sixty-
sixth meeting of the Central Political Committee of the KMT on 
October 7, 1925. At this meeting Borodin also proposed that the KMT 
select the students to study at Sun Yat-sen University. This proposal was 
adopted, and a screening committee composed of Tan Yen-k'ai, Kuo 
Ying-fen, and Wang Ching-wei was organized. Borodin acted as 
adviser to this committee, and soon after its establishment the work 
of selecting students began in Canton, Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin. 
The news that students would be selected to study in Russia soon 
spread throughout the country. In Canton alone, more than one 
thousand youths registered to participate in the qualifying examination. 
As Canton was the chief revolutionary center in China at that time, 
a majority (180) of the 340 students selected by the screening committee 
were from that city. Ten students each were selected on the basis of 
their having some from Whampoa, Hsiang (Hunan), and Tien 
(Yunan) military academies, all of which were located at Canton. 
Fifty students were selected from Shanghai and fifty from the Peking-
Tientsin area. Furthermore, over thirty additional students were 
selected upon the special recommendation of Borodin. Those person-
ally recommended by Borodin were, in the great majority of cases, 
sons and brothers of influential members of the KMT. These specially 
selected students were exempted from the competitive examinations. 
Of those selected in Canton, 90 percent were members of the KMT, 
whereas the majority of those from Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin 
were Communists. 
The specific method of selection was a series of three examinations. 
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One of my classmates at Sun Yat-sen University, who took the ex-
aminations at Canton, described the procedure in the following 
manner: 
Public registration for selection of students was conducted in Canton in the 
fall of that year. The procedure was very simple. Just filling out a registration 
card at the Chinese Kuomintang Central Committee office (which was located 
at the former Provincial Assembly of Kwangtung) would complete the whole 
matter. One was not required to show one's diploma or any other kind of 
certificates. There was no age requirement either. Therefore those selected 
greatly differed in age and education; they were from fourteen or fifteen to forty 
or fifty years old and from almost illiterate to college graduates and returned 
students from abroad. They truly constituted a fantastic spectacle of "Three 
Generations in the Same Hall" and "The Learned and the Unlearned Are to 
Study the Same Subject!" The Nationalist Government gave special attention 
to this matter. After the candidates filled out their registration cards, the KMT 
Central Standing Committee appointed high-ranking officials (including T'an 
Yen-k'ai) to screen their qualifications and then to set a date for examinations. 
The examination took place at Kwangtung University. An essay on "What is 
National Revolution?" was the examination. No examination on other subjects 
or foreign language was required. It was truly very simple. After this written 
examination, the preliminary selected candidates were announced. Then after 
a considerable time, there was an oral examination over which high-ranking 
officials of the Kuomintang presided (Kan Nai-kwang, member of the Central 
Committee, was one of them). The oral examination emphasized the candidates' 
knowledge of current political events. So to be finally selected, one had to pass 
three examinations. It seemed easy, but in fact it was no simple matter. After 
the first screening, the written examination, and the oral test, nine-tenths of over 
a thousand original candidates were eliminated. The number selected was not 
very large.16 
Although I was selected at Peking and did not participate in the 
examinations held at Canton, I am quite sure that of the three phases 
in the screening procedure, the first was the most difficult. That is 
to say, one had to be approved by the screening committee as a loyal 
KMT member. As for the other phases of the examination, all one 
had to do was to show the ability to write a composition containing 
current revolutionary slogans and possess a little common knowledge 
of world affairs. 
An interesting point in regard to the selection of students was that 
Chiang Kai-shek, director of Whampoa Military Academy, officially 
prohibited graduates of the first and second classes from voluntarily 
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registering for the examinations. There are a number of possible ex-
planations for this order. First of all, it is possible that this prohibition 
was simply to cut down on the large number participating in the ex-
amination and to thus facilitate the screening procedures. However, 
possibly the best explanation is that the cadets of the first and second 
graduating classes had already entered the war and were quickly be-
coming the backbone of the new army. To allow them to leave their 
posts would thus be militarily inadvisable. 
In spite of the regulations a number of cadets from Whampoa 
Academy did go to Moscow to study. In fact, the CEC of the KMT 
actually set up a quota of ten students for each of the three military 
academies in Canton. Thus, Chiang's order was not strictly enforced 
and was highly flexible. Teng Wen-i, who was a cadet at Whampoa 
Academy at the time, in his book Yu-tsung wan-li (Around the 
world), throws some light on Chiang's motives and on how he him-
self was able to circumvent Chiang's orders and go to Moscow to study. 
The Kuomintang Central Committee took charge of screening students to 
study in Russia. I secretly registered for the examinations. First I went to see 
Wang Po-ling, Dean of Instruction at Whampoa, and reported to him that I 
had passed the examinations and told him of my aspirations. I explained to him 
although the Academy did not allow its students of the first and second classes 
to participate in the examination, I had passed. I asked him to give me special 
permission to go to Russia. His answer was: "No, you cannot go. You must 
obey the order of the Academy." This deeply grieved me. But after all, he had 
reasons. Later, I heard that one reason he decided to forbid me to go to Russia 
might have been that I did not join the Sun Yat-sen Society. He might have 
thought I was a Communist, and therefore have deliberately put obstacles in my 
way. At this time the Director of the Academy (Chiang Kai-shek) was at the 
front line of battle (Shan-t'u), and I was almost at the end of my wits. Only 
after repeated requests and explanations did I finally get the approval of the 
Director to go to Russia's Sun Yat-sen University to study as one specially 
selected by the Kuomintang Central Committee.17 
From what I have said above, some conclusions can be drawn. 
First, the initiative for the founding of Sun Yat-sen University came 
entirely from the Russians. Borodin, not the KMT, made the an-
nouncement about the creation of the university. Second, the com-
mittee for selection of students to study at Sun Yat-sen University was 
organized only after Borodin made his proposal. Third, the selection 
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of students was actually under the supervision of the Russians (Borodin 
and other Russian agents). Both the KMT and the CCP acted com-
pletely in accordance with the instructions of the "Russian advisers." 
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Chapter II 
The Pilgrimage to Red Mecca 
THE ROAD TO Moscow 
At the time that the first group of students was preparing to leave 
China for Moscow to study at Sun Yat-sen University, there were three 
main routes to the Soviet Union. First, one could go by way of Harbin. 
This route was not safe, however, because Manchuria was occupied 
by the warlord Chang Tso-lin, who was quite anxious to prevent 
Chinese radicals from studying in the Soviet Union. Second, one 
could go to the Soviet Union via Europe. This route was by far the 
safest but was quite expensive. As students taking this route would 
have had to pay their own expenses, it was almost out of the question. 
Probably the most practical route was the one used by the first group 
to leave Shanghai in 1925, which presumably arrived in Moscow in No-
vember of that year. This group assembled at Shanghai where it 
boarded a Russian ship and went straight to Vladivostok. This was 
also the route utilized by subsequent groups going to the Soviet Union 
from Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin. Those of us from Peking and 
Tientsin boarded ships at Tientsin and proceeded to the embarkation 
point at Shanghai. Travel arrangements for the students from Canton 
were much simpler; they merely boarded Russian ships at Canton 
for Vladivostok. 
While ship fare as well as train fare to the Soviet Union was pro-
vided to the students free, there was considerable variation in the 
amount of travel money available for students going to Sun Yat-sen 
University. Most of the wealthy KMT students from Canton had an 
average of 250 yuan to spend for clothes, food, and other incidentals. 
In addition, the CEC of the KMT gave them an allowance of 100 yuan. 
However, students from other parts of China had substantially less 
money at their disposal. The KMT and the CCP paid the fare to 
Shanghai for those students from Peking, Tientsin, and other cities 
in China. When I left for Russia in October, 1926, my travel expenses 
were paid by the CCP. I cannot recall the exact amount given to me 
for travel expenses, but it was substantially less than that given to 
KMT students from Canton. 
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Since northern China was at that time still dominated to a great 
extent by warlords, students leaving from Peking and Tientsin dared 
not make a show of their departure. Most of us secretly left our homes 
with only a few relatives and friends to see us off. As I was one of 
the leaders of the revolutionary student organization, I had long been 
wanted by the secret police of the Peking government. Therefore I 
disguised myself in order to evade the surveillance of the plain-clothes 
men. Fortunately, my disguise proved satisfactory, and I was able to 
depart for Shanghai without incident. 
The situation was entirely different for those sailing from Canton. 
Here students leaving for Moscow proudly walked through the city as 
if they were going out to conquer a foreign land. One of my class-
mates recalls: 
Before their [the students'] departure, the Kuomintang Central Committee held 
a farewell party and a meeting at the Party headquarters in Canton. Among 
the participants were Wang Ching-wei and Borodin. At the meeting, Wang 
urged that people from among the students be elected to maintain contact with 
the Kuomintang back in China. The departing students, however, came from 
different parts of the country and did not know one another, and so could not 
decide whom to elect. Finally, therefore, Wang Ching-wei appointed Lin Po-
sheng (his close associate) and Ch'en Ch'un-p'u (the brother of his wife) to 
maintain liaison with the Kuomintang.1 
The first group of students from Canton left for the Soviet Union 
toward the end of 1925. A second group of about fifty left shortly 
thereafter. This still left some one hundred students in Canton, and 
these students were delayed for quite a long time. One student 
describes the delay and its consequences as follows: 
There were about one hundred left in Canton waiting for further instruc-
tion. But who knew what date had been set for our departure? We were in 
extremely low spirits. When the authorities realized that it was bad to let these 
students idle away their time, they decided to rent two buildings at their own 
expense to serve as dormitories for students scheduled to go to Russia. We were 
furnished with free room and board. And several Russian ladies were em-
ployed to teach us the Russian language.2 
These women teachers were dependents of the Russian advisers in 
Canton and were selected and appointed by Borodin. The classrooms 
were in Kwangtung Hospital. These Moscow-bound students studied 
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Russian for about four or five months, but the results were far from 
satisfactory. It was not until the summer of the following year, 1926, 
that these one hundred students, comprising the third Canton group, 
boarded their ship for the Soviet Union. 
The first group from Canton arrived in Moscow in January or 
February of 1926. From one member of this group it is possible to 
gain some idea of when the first students arrived in Moscow. This 
student states: 
As soon as we entered the gate of the Sun Yat-sen University, we were sur-
rounded by a group of Chinese students, male and female. When they learned 
that we came from Canton, the headquarters of the Chinese Revolution, they 
were very enthusiastic. One question followed another, and we were almost 
unable to answer them all. Later we learned that they had arrived in Moscow 
from Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin only a month or two before we had.3 
Thus it seems that among the three hundred and forty students 
selected to study at Sun Yat-sen University, the earliest arrivals prob-
ably reached Moscow in November, 1925. Chiang Ching-kuo in his 
Wu-pai-ling-sze Hsiao-shih (Five hundred and four hours)4 tends to 
substantiate this date. He writes: "October 15, 1945, today is the 
twentieth anniversary of my departure from my country to Russia to 
study." Calculating two or three weeks for the entire trip, Chiang 
should have arrived in Moscow by November at the latest. Other 
groups of students arrived in Moscow in December, 1925, and in 
January, February, and later in the following year. 
Personally, when I learned that I had been selected by the Peking 
committee of the CCP to study in Moscow, I had many reservations. 
First, I had hoped to finish college in Peking before making any other 
plans. Second, in Peking I was engaged in revolutionary activities 
against the Tuan Ch'i-jui government, and I hated to give them up. 
I had taken part in the May Thirtieth (1925) Movement, the May 
Seventh National Shame March, the Capital Revolution, and the 
March Eighteenth Incident of 1926. I was deeply involved in all of 
these activities and had come close to death several times while par-
ticipating in them. For I was one of the leaders of the student move-
ment in Peking at that time. I was a member of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Student Association of the National University of Political 
Science and Law. At the same time, I was the secretary of the CCP 
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fraction in the All-China Student Association, the headquarters of 
which was in Peking. It was our secret fraction in that association 
which, behind the scenes, directed the activities of the huge national 
student organization, a device often used by Communist movements 
in the non-Communist world. 
CCP members in Peking in late 1924 and early 1925 numbered only 
about 180, and there were only about 2,000 KMT members, exclusive 
of Communists. But membership in both parties increased dramatically 
after the arrival of Dr. Sun Yet-sen in Peking, and especially after his 
death. 
The Chinese Communist committee for Peking and surrounding 
areas (Pei-ching ti-fang wei-yuan-hui) had as its secretary Liu Po-
chuang, a Szechwanese who had studied in France in the early twenties. 
He had worked in Peking for several years and later was to be a 
delegate to the Sixth Congress of the CCP in Moscow. The director 
of the Organization Department of this committee was Ch'en Wei-jen, 
a veteran Party member from Hunan whose wife subsequently became 
a student at Sun Yat-sen University. The committee's Director of 
Propaganda was Li Pu-hai. I was the executive secretary of the latter 
department, and I worked with Li, who was the son of a large land-
holder in Shantung Province. In 1927, after I had left, he was arrested 
in Peking. Under threat of execution, Li Pu-hai revealed the details 
of the Party's organization in and around Peking and the names of 
the Party's cadres. More than sixty Party members were arrested and 
executed as a result of Li's betrayal. But Li survived, and eventually he 
gravitated to the service of Chang Hsueh-liang, where, under the name 
Li T'ien-ts'ai, he became Chang's chief aide.5 Later still, he was 
credited by the KMT with being one of the leading instigators of 
the Sian Incident in December, 1936, in which Chiang Kai-shek was 
kidnapped by Chang Hsueh-liang. After Chiang Kai-shek was released 
and had returned to Nanking accompanied by Chang Hsueh-liang, a 
KMT organization summarily executed Li without trial. It is my 
understanding, however, that the KMT did not know at the time 
that Li T'ien-ts'ai was in fact Li P'u-hai. Yet I am sure in my own 
mind that the Chinese Communist leadership at the time of the Sian 
Incident did know who he was. K'ang Sheng, for example, had been 
a close friend of Li's, both of them having come from Shantung 
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Province. But I shall suppress my inclination to speculate about the 
implications of this state of affairs with regard to the Sian Incident. 
While Li P'u-hai was Director of Propaganda in the Communist 
Party committee in Peking, the two of us edited a magazine entitled 
something like The Voice of Labor, and I also went around to various 
Party cells lecturing on Marxism, using as my text the A B C of Com-
munism by Bukharin and Preobraschensky, which was our standard 
text in those days. It was my impression that my work favorably im-
pressed Li P'u-hai, and I would guess that it was he who recommended 
that I be sent to Moscow to study at Sun Yat-sen University. How-
ever, it was not Li who informed me that the decision had been made 
to send me to Russia. One day, Ch'en Wei-jen, director of the Orga-
nization Department, who was a graduate of Communist University 
of Toilers of the East (KUTV), made an appointment to meet me in 
an unoccupied classroom of the National College of Arts and Sciences, 
where we met and where to anyone who might have noticed us, we 
probably looked like a couple of students chatting. There he notified 
me that the Peking committee had decided to send me to Moscow to 
study. The decision came as a surprise. I asked Ch'en to allow me to 
complete my studies in Peking and to continue with the revolutionary 
work I was doing there. His flat refusal to grant my request came as 
a great disappointment to me, and I pressed for a reconsideration of the 
decision. If I had to give up my activities in Peking, I suggested, 
wouldn't it be possible to assign me to work in General Feng Yu-
hsiang's army?*3 But Ch'en Wei-jen, his face stern and cold, replied, 
as I recall, "This is the final decision of the Party committee. If you 
do not obey, you will be severely punished. Don't you know what 
'iron discipline' means ?" 
Faced with the dilemma of choosing between being punished or 
going to Moscow, I decided that study, after all, was perhaps not such 
a bad idea, even though it meant leaving China; and so I accepted 
the committee's decision. 
A week or so later, Ch'en Wei-jen made another appointment with 
me. This time we met in the ramshackle house of a rickshaw puller 
who was a Party member. There he gave me a train ticket to Tientsin, 
an address to contact in Tientsin, a ship ticket from Tientsin to Shang-
hai, pocket money for the trip, instructions as to the Shanghai hotel at 
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which reservations would be made for me, and the address in Shanghai 
that I was supposed to contact after checking in at the hotel. Every-
thing, as usual, was brilliantly organized. In parting, he told me that 
Liu Po-chuang wanted to talk to me, and he gave me the time and 
place of the meeting with Liu. When I met with Liu, he told me that 
the Party attached great importance to Sun Yat-sen University. He 
assured me of the Peking committee's faith in my potential and told 
me that I was being given an opportunity to learn from the Bolshevik 
experience of the CPSU. 
On October 16,1926,1 left Peking alone. At Tientsin, I joined with 
a number of other students who were Communist Party members, 
with whom I went by ship to Shanghai. From Shanghai we went by 
ship to Vladivostok, and from Vladivostok we made our way to 
Moscow. 
No PASSPORT, NO VISA 
When I arrived in Shanghai on October 20, 1926, I was assigned 
to stay at the P'ing-an Hotel. Upon moving into the hotel I found 
that quite a number of students from different parts of the country 
had already arrived in Shanghai. Many lived in various hotels such as 
the P'ing-an, while others stayed in the Shanghai University hostel. 
Those who stayed in the hotels paid their own room and board, but 
those who lived in the hostel enjoyed free room and board, which 
was provided by the university. 
Among those students who had already arrived in Shanghai, I was 
delighted to find a number of familiar faces, two of which belonged 
to friends from my own province—Wu Chia-yu and Ho Sheng-yang. 
Wu, who is now a member of the Legislative Yuan in the Republic of 
China and a very learned gentleman, was being sent to Moscow by 
the KMT to study at Sun Yat-sen University. Ho was a classmate of 
mine in high school and was graduated in the first class of the 
Whampoa Military Academy. After his graduation he had been pro-
moted to the post of battalion commander. He was subsequently 
wounded during the Battle of Tung-kiang. Ho told me that he was 
being sent by the CCP to study at KUTV. At any rate, I was quite 
delighted that I would have company on the journey to the Soviet 
Union. 
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While the Soviet Union was generally quite cautious in granting 
visas, we had no difficulty at all. When we arrived in Shanghai, we 
were told that we were to go to the Pao-f a Photo Shop and have a few 
snapshots taken. At the same time we filled out a simple application 
form. These forms were collected by a fellow student who had some 
knowledge of Russian and were sent to the Consulate General of the 
USSR in Shanghai. Apparently filling out the forms and submitting 
photographs were mere formalities, as the consul had already received 
official notification from his government that we were to be allowed 
to enter the Soviet Union. Interestingly enough, we were also told 
not to bother about applying for passports from the Chinese govern-
ment. 
Some rather special circumstances applied to those of us who had 
come from North China, which might be sketched here, for we had 
been selected to go to Russia under trying conditions for both the 
KMT and the CCP in the North. On March 16, 1926, the diplomatic 
corps in Peking had issued an ultimatum to the Tuan Ch'i-jui govern-
ment there, demanding that the closure of Taku—the port of Tientsin— 
be lifted within forty-eight hours or the Powers would take military 
action to open it. The next day, students and others in Peking, out-
raged by the ultimatum, had clashed with the Northeastern Army 
troops which protected Tuan Ch'i-jui. On March 18, Li Ta-chao, who 
was in charge of Communist affairs in the North, and Ting Wei-fen, 
who was Li Ta-chao's counterpart in the KMT, led a huge demonstra-
tion from the T'ien-an Men to Tuan Ch'i-jui's headquarters. I 
marched in that demonstration. The demonstrators confronted the 
Northeastern Army troops protecting Tuan's headquarters, who after 
a time fired into the air and then fired point-blank into the demon-
strators. Forty students were killed, and a great many more were 
wounded or injured. I saw Li Ta-chao running before I was buried 
under an avalanche of fleeing students, which nearly resulted in my 
own death. On March 19, the turmoil increased. Thousands upon 
thousands of students, as though with one voice, demanded that Tuan 
Ch'i-jui and his government step down. But the upshot of these events 
was that Tuan Ch'i-jui outlawed the KMT, which had functioned 
more or less openly since Dr. Sun Yat-sen's arrival in Peking. The 
Communists, of course, had been outlawed all along. At the same 
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time, an order was issued for the arrest of Hsu Ch'ien, Li Ta-chao, 
Li Yu-yin, Yi P'ei-chi, and Ku Meng-yu, all of whom promptly either 
fled Peking or went deep underground. Li Ta-chao moved into the 
Soviet Embassy compound, and he became the only leader either of 
the KMT or the CCP who was able to carry on his duties, although 
naturally he did so secretly. Li Ta-chao, then, took charge of all 
KMT and CCP activities in the area from his sanctuary in the Russian 
Embassy. It was while he was in this sanctuary that he had approved 
the list of students recommended for study at Sun Yat-sen University 
and had passed this list to the Russians. Under the circumstances, had 
any of us on the list applied for passports, we would promptly have 
been arrested. And, in any case, the Russians knew who we were. 
Consequently, we did not have yellow books either, and the Russian 
authorities never asked for them. Of course, the Russian generosity 
toward us had political motives. It was part of the general plan of the 
CPSU and the Comintern to expand their influence to the Far East 
and to undermine the positions of the Western imperialist powers in 
China by inducing more Chinese youths to study in Moscow and 
thereby pouring more oil on the fire of the Chinese revolution. 
While in Shanghai, we were disgusted by the decadent luxuries 
and seamy sights of this colonial city, and thus we were quite anxious 
to depart for the Soviet Union. The Russian ship (after so many years 
I, unfortunately, cannot remember the name of this ship) on which 
we would travel to Vladivostok was unloading cargo at the Huang-pu 
dock. Some of us could not resist taking a look at the ship that would 
take us away from Shanghai. The police who were stationed at the 
dock to watch the Russian crews did not pay any attention to us and 
allowed us to board the ship as we pleased. 
A few days later, the KMT-CCP organization that was in charge 
of travel arrangements told us to board the Russian ship. When all 
were aboard, I was quite startled to see that there were some sixty 
male and female students going to Russia to study. The Russians, for 
purposes of security, ushered us to the stowage area before the customs 
officials came aboard for inspection. We were not allowed to leave that 
area until the ship left Wu-sung-k'ou. I can still recall the foul stench 
in this stowage area, which was to be our quarters until we arrived at 
Vladivostok. All the male students were assigned these quarters in 
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the stowage area because the very few passenger cabins were all occu-
pied by the female students. Fortunately, there was a good deal of 
space in the stowage area because there was not much cargo. There-
fore, we were able to spread out and choose an area for ourselves. 
When we were finally released from the stowage area, we felt as if 
we had just been granted some sort of reprieve. We were quite ex-
cited and went to the lower deck of the ship, where we shouted and 
sang the "Song of National Revolution" and the "Internationale." It 
was very moving. However, when the singing ended, a feeling of 
nostalgia engulfed us. Casting a last glance at our beautiful land, we 
could not help vowing: "Goodbye, dearly beloved country! We are 
determined to have you emancipated from semi-colonial status!" 
As the ship entered the East China Sea and moved toward Korea 
Strait, the sea was calm and the sky was deep blue. But these wonder-
ful weather conditions did not last for long. When the ship entered the 
Japan Sea, a wind came up and both the sky and the sea became dark. 
The ship was buffeted by the angry sea. Most of us became seasick, 
and I was no exception. I vomited many times, and for the moment, 
all my aspirations and ideals disappeared. 
Rough weather brought us other problems besides seasickness. 
Some of the students, seeking solitude, had taken the space under the 
ladder in the stowage area for their temporary sanctuary. One night 
when the sea was especially violent, we were suddenly awakened by a 
terrible boom. We discovered that the ladder had fallen down, due 
to a loose lock. Naturally, we were quite worried about the safety of 
those who slept under it. Fortunately, as if directed by the warning of 
the gods or by instinct, the students who usually slept there had al-
ready moved elsewhere before the accident. After this accident, the 
stowage area became a place of constant fear for us. In the daytime 
we stayed on the deck or chatted and sang in the lounge of the ship. 
Only after midnight, when we were exhausted, did we go back to the 
stowage area to sleep. The days passed like years. Finally, after three 
days and nights of struggle against the rough seas, seasickness, and 
the horrible stench of the stowage area, we landed at Vladivostok. 
Vladivostok had once belonged to China and was still quite Oriental 
at the time we were there. Its famous Millionka, or Chinese section, 
was somewhat like some old Chinatowns in the United States. Res-
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taurants, tearooms, gaming houses, theaters, and opium dens could 
all be found there. But upon our arrival, we did not have a single 
penny left. Therefore, the representatives of the Comintern gave each 
of us an allowance of four rubles per day, which we spent eating 
Chinese food in Millionka. 
About one hundred thousand Chinese lived in Vladivostok. Most 
of them were either merchants or laborers. And while we were in 
the city, the trade union for overseas Chinese laborers held a welcome 
party in our honor at their May First Club. The atmosphere was 
quite gay and cordial. 
During our stay in Vladivostok we were also given physical ex-
aminations. Those students who had tuberculosis or other commu-
nicable diseases were detained in Vladivostok to await a boat bound 
for China. I have always thought it was strange that we were not 
given physical examinations in Shanghai before leaving China. 
Leaving Vladivostok for Moscow early in December, 1926, we 
traveled on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. It was winter, and as the 
coaches were not heated, it was terribly cold. While it was almost nine 
years after the 1917 Revolution, coal was still in very short supply. 
The Siberian train on which we rode was still operated by burning 
wood. This wood was piled in heaps in every railway station. Coal 
was reserved exclusively for the International Express, which was the 
only train on this route that had a dining car. Though the train moved 
slowly and steadily along, it took a fortnight to travel the more than 
7,400 kilometers from Vladivostok to Moscow. 
The trip was by no means comfortable. As there was no dining 
car, we were forced to eat hurriedly when the train stopped at one of 
the larger stations. Once the queue was so long that some three or 
four of my fellow students did not get their meal before the train left 
the station. They were driven to despair when they saw the train al-
ready gone. They went to a GPU officer stationed in the station and 
asked him to help. The officer, who had probably been notified by 
Moscow authorities about our trip, made quick arrangements with the 
station administration to put them on the next train to Moscow. In 
addition, the train's water tanks had frozen solid, and there was no 
water for the toilets or for drinking. To get a drink, one had to wait in 
long lines at the stations. Thus, we spent twelve miserable days and 
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nights on the train. We finally arrived in Moscow in the middle of 
December, 1926. 
This was my first long trip to a foreign land where, while the old 
regime had been overthrown by revolution, the new order did not 
always work without difficulties. Its imperfections were to catch one's 
eye everywhere, as we witnessed on the way to Moscow. We had 
bitter experiences and suffered on this trip. Nevertheless, our revolu-
tionary spirits did not sag an inch, and we still envisioned a glorious 
future for Soviet Russia, then the only ally of our country in its fight 
for independence and freedom. 
Notes 
1. Ching-jih ta-lu (Mainland today; Taipei), no. 96 (1959), p. 24. 
2. Ibid., p. 96. 
3. Ibid., no. 98, p. 32. 
4. A book privately published and distributed by Chiang Ching-kuo, the elder son of 
Chiang Kai-shek. The book was written when he served as the Foreign Ministry's special 
envoy in Northeast China in 1945. Unfortunately I have not been able to examine a copy 
of the book, and the quotation given was copied by a friend in Taipei and communicated 
to me in a letter. My friend, however, failed to supply the page on which the quotation 
appears. 
5. In Chiang Kai-shek's A Fortnight in Sian: Extracts from a Diary (Shanghai: Walsh 
Ltd., 1937, p. 57) Li T'ien-ts'ai is identified at the time of the Sian Incident as "head of in-
telligence work under Chang Hsueh-liang." His formal title is listed (p. 118) as Assistant 
Director of the Northwestern Political Training Department of the Military Affairs Com-
mission, under Chang Hsueh-liang. 
6. Feng Yu-hsiang had recently returned to China from the trip he had made to Russia 
in May, 1926. Feng had asked the CCP to supply him with one hundred political workers 
for his army, and the CC of the CCP had given the Party committee for Peking and sur-
rounding areas the task of recommending cadres to fill these posts. I already had made 
some recommendations of my own, and at this point I was merely recommending myself 
for one of the posts in Feng Yu-hsiang's army. 
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Chapter III 
The Opening of Sun Yat-sen University 
and Its Three Rectors 
TROTSKY PRESIDES OVER THE OPENING CEREMONY 
Sun Yat-sen University, which was established in September, 1925/ 
was located in a four-story building at 16 Volkhonka Street in Moscow. 
In front of this building, which constituted the campus of the univer-
sity, were a number of trees. On the left side of the building there was 
a volleyball court, and in back a basketball court which could be con-
verted into a skating rink in the winter. The entire building had one 
hundred rooms. The dining room was on the first floor; and the 
library, classrooms and study rooms, and administration offices were 
on the second, third, and fourth floors respectively. The library, which 
possessed thousands of volumes, was quite good. The first three hun-
dred students at the University were housed in this building, but later 
these quarters were needed by the university for classrooms, and so 
other buildings were taken over to serve as dormitories. 
Opposite the university was Moscow's Church of Christ the Savior, 
which was famed for its six gold domes. This church, which was 
dismantled in 1930 and replaced by Lenin Hall, had a beautiful square 
in which we did physical exercises every morning at eight. On each 
side of the church were beautiful gardens which we frequented in 
our leisure hours. 
Although Sun Yat-sen University was not a completely secret in-
stitution, it was not open to the public either. Activities inside the 
university were rarely reported in the newspapers. The government 
of the USSR did not wish to furnish the imperalists with information 
concerning the university nor to provoke them by spreading any news 
as to the revolutionary nature of the university. Moreover, at that time, 
with the exception of Kwangtung Province, all of China was still 
under the domination of warlords. Thus, for the safety of students 
upon their return home, it seemed better for the Soviet government 
not to disclose the students' activities at Sun Yat-sen University. 
From talks with students who attended it and from various other 
sources, I have learned that the opening ceremony was probably held at 
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the Trade Union Building in November of 1925.2 The official opening 
of Sun Yat-sen University was another mark in the "honeymoon" of 
close cooperation between Soviet Russia and the KMT. It was opened 
just a year and a half after Whampoa Military Academy, which was 
set up in May, 1924, in Canton with the assistance of the Russians. In 
any event, both the Russians who attended the opening ceremony of 
Sun Yat-sen University and the Chinese students were excited about 
the event. The hall was elegantly decorated. Portraits of Lenin and 
Sun Yat-sen hung on the right and left sides of the hall under their 
respective national flags. Many guests were present, including rep-
resentatives of the CC of the CPSU and the ECCI. The renowned 
statesman and orator Leon Trotsky presided over the opening cere-
mony. That evening many guests made speeches, but only Trotsky's 
speech won the students' admiration. After pointing out the im-
portance of the Chinese revolution, he urged his fellow Russians to 
reevaluate the importance of China and the Chinese people: 
From now on, any Russian, be he a comrade or a citizen, who greets a Chinese 
student with an air of contempt, shrugging his shoulders, is not entitled to be 
either a Russian Communist or a Soviet citizen.3 
Trotsky's appeal was not made without cause. The prejudice of 
the Russians against the Chinese had carried over from the days of 
Tsarist Russia.4 For example, we were often insulted on the streets 
when people asked us in Russian, "Friend, do you want salt?" At first 
we did not know what they meant. When we asked the instructors at 
the university, they looked rather embarrassed and did not answer our 
question. Only later did we find out that there was a legend to the 
effect that a Chinese was reported to have died in St. Petersburg in the 
summer. So that the body could be sent back to China for burial, a 
relative was supposed to have packed the body with salt to prevent it 
from decomposing. The customs officers who inspected the coffin at 
Vladivostok supposedly observed the salt-packed body and regarded 
it as a great joke. The story somehow spread all over Russia. Needless 
to say, whenever we were asked, "Do you want some salt," we became 
angry. And we were asked this question by all kinds of Russian people 
—adults, teenagers, once-prominent figures, and "new Soviet citizens." 
Still another thing which often irritated and angered us was that 
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wherever we went, there were always people who contemptuously 
asked us where we got the money to study in Moscow. We usually 
answered their question calmly, telling them that we were supported 
by the revolutionary government in Kwangtung. However, sometimes 
we could not bear their offensive manner and told them bluntly that 
is was none of their business, but that they could be sure that it did 
not come from their pockets. 
Trotsky made his appeal to the Russians because he was far-sighted 
and wanted us to have a pleasant environment during our stay in 
Russia. He also hoped, of course, that upon returning to our native 
land, we would not retain any bitter memories of Russian prejudice. 
Unfortunately, his appeal did not achieve very much, as racial dis-
crimination and prejudice accumulated through the years are deep-
rooted and cannot be eliminated by a formal appeal. 
Perhaps some of Trotsky's sensitivity to the problem of discrimina-
tion was due to his Jewish origin and the fact that he had suffered as 
a result of Russia's anti-Semitism. Chiang Kai-shek's recollections of 
his trip to Russia in 1923 tend to substantiate this hypothesis: 
Most of the Russian leaders holding responsible party and government posi-
tions who expressed regard for Dr. Sun and sincere desire to cooperate with 
China in her National Revolution were Jews, the only exceptions being Kamenev 
and Chicherin who were Russians. . . . This aroused my special interest. I found 
that men like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Radek and Joffe were, comparatively speaking, 
more concerned with the question of cooperation between Kuomintang and the 
Russian Communist Party.5 
In addition he states: 
I had more talks with Trotsky than with other Soviet leaders. I found him to 
be the most forthright of them all. . . . He said to me in all seriousness: "Except 
direct participation by Soviet troops, Soviet Russia will do her best to help China 
in her National Revolution by giving her positive assistance in the form of 
weapons and economic aid."6 
It seems likely that Trotsky was invited to preside over the opening 
ceremony of Sun Yat-sen University because of his towering interna-
tional reputation and popularity, for he still was far better known than 
Stalin. At any rate, the great impression that Trotsky made upon the 
Chinese students, together with the appointment of the pro-Trotsky 
Karl Radek as the first rector of the university and the presence of a 
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large number of Trotskyite professors on the faculty, provided fertile 
ground for the dissemination of Trotskyism at Sun Yat-sen University. 
And from Sun Yat-sen University Trotskyism was transplanted to 
China, where it exerted a definite influence on the Chinese political 
scene, the details of which I shall discuss in a later chapter. 
THE THREE RECTORS OF SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY 
Sun Yat-sen University, in the short span of a little over five years 
from its establishment in 1925 to its closing in 1930, had three rectors 
of varying accomplishments. The first of the three was the interna-
tionally famous Karl Radek, who served as rector from 1925 until 
1927. He was born in Lwow (Lemberg), Poland, in 1885 and was 
educated at the University of Cracow and the University of Berne. 
In 1904 Radek joined the Social Democratic Party of Poland and 
Lithuania. Shortly thereafter he was taken prisoner and jailed for 
twelve months. Upon being released from prison, he participated in 
revolutionary activities in Germany and Poland. During the Russian 
Revolution of February, 1917, Radek crossed Germany with Lenin 
and Zinoviev. He was then sent to Stockholm as a representative of the 
Bolshevik Party. After the October Revolution, he participated in the 
Brest Litovsk peace negotiations with the Germans. 
When the German revolution broke out in 1918, Radek was smug-
gled into Germany, where as a representative of the CC of the CPSU, 
he played an active role in reorganizing the German Communist Party. 
He suffered a second imprisonment in February, 1919, and was re-
leased in December of the same year. Radek then returned to the 
Soviet Union and became a leading member of the Presidium of the 
Comintern. Finally, after being smuggled into Germany again, he 
was made a scapegoat for the failure of the German Communists to 
seize power in the autumn of 1923. 
Due to his support of the rightist faction of the German Commu-
nist Party, he was relieved in 1923 of his positions on the ECCI and the 
CC of the CPSU. Thereafter, he devoted his time to propaganda and 
educational activities, and he retained his high prestige and his reputa-
tion as a dazzlingly brilliant scholar. When Sun Yat-sen University 
was founded in 1925, he was made its first rector. Because of his in-
volvement in the power struggle between Trotsky and Stalin, he was 
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suspended as rector in the early summer of 1927. And when he was 
dismissed from the CPSU in December, 1927, for siding with the 
Trotsky opposition, he was formally dismissed as rector of Sun Yat-sen 
University.7 
The students of the university considered Radek to be a good 
rector. One of the first students to attend the university wrote an 
interesting essay on Radek. Part of this essay, which gives an excellent 
picture of Radek's personal manner and scholastic ability, follows: 
Radek was the first rector of Sun Yat-sen University, but two years later he 
was convicted by Stalin as a Trotskyite and lost the rectorship. He was a rather 
strange character. He had all the traits of a bookworm, but was a man of respon-
sibility. He was given only three or four months to establish Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity, and everything was quite well organized in that short time. Even the first 
group of students to come to the university felt at home when they arrived. He 
kept regular office hours and was at work at nine each morning. Whenever he 
met the students on campus, he not only greeted them, but also inquired about 
their classwork and their fields of interest. I remember telling him that Russian 
was a very difficult language to learn and that it had given me much trouble. 
His answer was extremely interesting. He said that the only one who had no 
problems was God and that both he and I had problems. I do not know whether 
this was a Western proverb, but I have often meditated over it. He had a warm 
personality, like that of a common man. He did not have the air of the high-
ranking official that he was. He was easy to get along with. Although he, as 
much as other Communist leaders, was guilty of plotting against China, every 
student at Sun Yat-sen University esteemed him highly. 
He did not have a big build. His face was rather unusual. His large skull 
and small jaw resembled those of a monkey, and his bald forehead made him 
look like Lenin. His speech was eloquent and sometimes funny. Both his coun-
tenance and his speech made people roar with laughter. He was very near-sighted 
and if he did not wear his glasses, he could not even walk. His hair was often 
uncombed and his beard left untrimmed. He never seemed to change the dark 
gray suit which he wore every day. In all, his appearance was sloppy, and he did 
not look at all like a rector. He always clenched a pipe in his mouth, whether 
there was tobacco in it or not. It was said that he was a scholar, a philosopher, 
and an expert on China. Word of his achievements spread quickly among the 
students, and he became an idol to all. It was also said that he spoke seven or 
eight languages, but no one knew for sure whether this was true. We did know 
that he spoke Russian, German, and French. He was always calm and precise in 
his reasoning. He was a great speaker. His speech was free and smooth. When 
he reached the climax of a speech, he always put his two thumbs in the pockets 
of his vest and flapped the other fingers against his chest like the wings of a 
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butterfly. At times he hung his head down and strolled left and right across the 
stage, and he never failed to hold the attention of his listeners. 
Radek taught a course entitled "History of the Chinese Revolutionary Move-
ment." It was a popular course at Sun Yat-sen University and the only course 
that brought students of different classes into the same classroom. He lectured 
two or three times a week, his lectures usually lasting two or three hours. The 
auditorium was always packed on the days of his lectures. Students from Eastern 
University [KUTV] and scholars and experts doing research on China came to 
attend his lectures. Still another group attended his lectures; they were not his 
bodyguards or intelligence agents, but his stenographer and people carrying refer-
ence books for him (he often used armloads of reference books). He walked 
surrounded by these people as the moon is surrounded by stars in the sky. He 
was a gifted person and had a good memory. Whenever he stated a fact, he knew 
which book to turn to for reference to prove his statement. His method of teach-
ing and his approach in analyzing Chinese history was accurate and scientific (not 
necessarily using dialectics). Hence he shed new light on the facts and fascinated 
his audience. On the whole, his knowledge of the political system far exceeded 
that of an ordinary historian or sociologist, not to mention those who mechanically 
applied dialectical materialism.8 
Radek began his course, mentioned above, on the history of the 
Chinese revolutionary movement in the spring of 1926. Its first part 
treated the latter years of the Manchu empire through the early years 
of the Chinese Republic. The second part of the course focused on 
revolutionary developments in China from the time of the Taiping 
Rebellion. Since I arrived in Moscow at the end of 1926, I was able 
to sit in only during the second part of this course. Fortunately, how-
ever, transcripts of his earlier lectures were available in the Sun Yat-
sen University library, and I read them with fascination. For Radek 
had made extensive use of Tsarist archives, and it was my first en-
counter with the secret diplomatic activities that had transpired be-
tween China and Tsarist Russia. Like many other Chinese students 
who took Radek's meticulously documented course, I felt that I was 
getting for the first time a tremendously revealing look at Tsarist 
imperialistic intentions toward China and at the shocking ineffectually 
of the Manchu government. I could not help thinking about the 
immense benefits that would be derived by everybody if all govern-
ments made public the documents and plans regarding China which 
they so carefully kept secret. 
Radek spent much time studying the problems of China. While his 
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viewpoint in general coincided with Trotsky's, he differed from 
Trotsky on many policies and tactics. For example, Radek opposed 
Trotsky's policy regarding the KMT. Trotsky himself provides suf-
ficient evidence of this fact: 
I personally was from the very beginning, that is, from 1923, resolutely opposed 
to the Communist party joining the Kuo Min Tang, as well as against the ac-
ceptance of the Kuo Min Tang into the "Kuomintern." Radek was always with 
Zinoviev against me.9 
Stalin noted, however, that on basic problems concerning China, 
Radek and Trotsky held the same point of view. Stalin stated that on 
the crucial point of the survival of feudal remnants in Chinese society 
both Trotsky and Radek were of the opinion that there were no feudal 
survivals in China and that even if there were, they were of no great 
significance. 
The differences of opinion between Radek and Stalin were one of 
the factors that cost Radek his rectorship and eventually his member-
ship in the CPSU. Without explanation or any ceremony at all and 
without even bidding us farewell, Radek suddenly left the university in 
the summer of 1927. He left without finishing his course, and I think 
many students felt, as I certainly did, that we had been deprived of a 
brilliant lecturer. His contributions to Sun Yat-sen University as its 
founder were not erased from our minds. We still admired him and 
greatly missed his original and profound arguments in the auditorium. 
The man who replaced Radek was the famed "nanny" of the "28 
Bolsheviks," Pavel Mif.# In the early 1920s Mif was of little im-
portance, and therefore there is little biographical data on him. He 
was born in 1901. In the early 1920s, soon after it was formed, he joined 
the Chinese Section of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, 
through which he apparently made his initial contact with the Chinese 
revolutionary movement. While Mif was hardly yet an old China 
hand, he became rather well known in the Far Eastern Secretariat. 
Thus, he was appointed vice-rector of Sun Yat-sen University when it 
was established in 1925. When Radek lost his job, Mif was the logical 
choice to fill the position vacated by Radek. His old position as vice-
* Although I have not personally investigated the possibility, many authorities, including 
Conrad Brandt, suspect that Mif, Russian for "myth," was a pseudonym. See Conrad Brandt, 
Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927, p. 103. 
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rector was filled by a very handsome and friendly man named 
Kuchumov. He came to the university more often than Mif and was 
well liked by the students. He was also known as an expert on China, 
but actually his specialty was Outer Mongolia. He was in charge of 
Mongolian affairs in the Comintern. During the 1920s, he also took 
various Sun Yat-sen University students on official tours of Outer 
Mongolia. 
Mif was young, inexperienced, and generally unpopular. While he 
was vice-rector, most of the students did not like him, for he seldom 
mingled with them. He maintained contact only with a handful of 
students who spoke fluent Russian and who were among those who 
later became known as the 28 Bolsheviks. He did not even teach a 
course at the university and only occasionally delivered speeches to us. 
In addition, he always had a long face and never smiled. Perhaps his 
relative youth made him self-conscious and caused him to try to act 
older than his age. In any case, students at that time, at least, had no 
way of knowing what substance there was to the man. What was clear 
to all was that he compared to Karl Radek as a drop of water to an 
ocean. 
The China Problems Research Institute, which will be discussed in 
chapter four, was Mif s greatest contribution while serving as rector of 
the university. His only other achievement was to issue walking papers 
to some very learned Trotskyite professors and to replace them with 
instructors strong on Partyism but poor in scholarship. Of course, he 
was not to blame in this case, for he was doubtless only carrying out 
the orders of those higher up in the Party. 
Despite being disliked by many students of the university, Mif was 
very successful in enhancing his position in the Party and the govern-
ment. With the rapid development of the Chinese revolutionary move-
ment after 1925, the situation in China naturally became more and 
more important to the Comintern. Consequently, Mifs post as rector 
of Sun Yat-sen University became an enviable one. Moreover, the 
power struggle between Stalin and Trotsky gave him the opportunity 
to improve his position even more. Mif supported Stalin and was in 
turn consulted by Stalin on the problems of the Chinese revolution. 
However, Mif did not find himself above correction on the prob-
lems of the revolution. At the ECCFs Seventh Plenum, held from 
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November 12 to December 16,1926, Mif proposed "Theses on the Prob-
lems of China." The theses submitted by Mif contained more mistakes 
and errors than any of the other reports. Stalin considered Mifs sug-
gestion that Soviets should be organized in the Chinese countryside 
to be especially inappropriate. But Mif did not fall into disfavor on 
account of his proposal. 
Mif was not one to stay in the Comintern building. On the contrary, 
he made frequent trips to China. One trip that I know about was his 
trip to China prior to the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI in November, 
1926. The apparent purpose of this trip was to assist the Chinese Com-
munists in setting up Communist Party schools. Moreover, in March 
or April of 1927, Mif, accompanied by his favorite student, Ch'en Shao-
yu, went to Hankow to take part in the Fifth National Congress of the 
CCP which was held on April 27, 1927. After taking part in the 
congress, he returned to the Soviet Union in August of the same year. 
At that time all the students of Sun Yat-sen University were taking 
a summer vacation at Trasovka, a resort not far from Moscow. One 
day Mif and Ch'en Shao-yu came to the resort to report on their recent 
trip to China and the state of the Wuhan government. Mif despaired 
over the worsening situation of the Chinese revolution, and his never-
smiling face seemed more serious than ever. What he told us made us 
quite uneasy. Everyone was quiet, yet deep in our hearts we were 
greatly perturbed. Finally Mif finished his speech and walked out 
amidst polite applause. It was a very depressing experience. 
Even though the Chinese revolution, was sliding into a period of 
decline, Mifs good fortune was in no way affected. Towards the end of 
1927 he was promoted to the directorship of the Chinese Section of 
the Comintern and shortly after that, as I have already mentioned, he 
was promoted to the rectorship of Sun Yat-sen University. He was 
also entrusted with organizing the Sixth National Congress of the 
CCP, which was held in a suburb of Moscow in June, 1928. 
However, trouble was brewing at Sun Yat-sen University, which 
was quite disturbing to Mif, for complaints were showered upon him 
from all sides. The Party dispute at the university put him on espe-
cially bad terms with the Chinese Communist representatives to the 
Comintern, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai in particular. Unwilling to bear the burdens 
of Sun Yat-sen University, he asked to be relieved of his job as rector 
39 
of the university in the summer of 1929. He used the excuse that he 
needed to devote all of his time to the more important matters of the 
CCP. Probably in November or December of 1930 he was sent on a 
mission to Shanghai. There he secretly met with many leaders of the 
28 Bolsheviks to plan an important coup in the CCP: the liquidation 
of the Li Li-san Line; the shattering of the united opposition of Lo 
Chang-lung, Ho Meng-hsiung, and Li Ch'iu-shih; and the establish-
ment of the "Wang Ming Empire." 
While Mif was a man of little personal substance, one should not 
overlook the important historical role he played. His origins were 
humble, and it was sheer luck that fate sought him out. With the 
backing of Stalin and the Comintern, he played an important role in 
trying to shape the Chinese revolution and CCP affairs at a time when 
Russia had many men that were more able than he. He may have 
been a small man with a large backing, but he played a leading role 
in the orientation of the CCP through the early 1930s. The numerous 
articles he wrote, moreover, remain useful source materials for the 
period. From a source who strikes me as reliable, I learned that he 
was finally purged by Stalin as a Trotskyite, although I have not seen 
proof of this information. In this connection, however, it is interest-
ing to note that works published by Chinese Communist historians 
never mention his name. 
When Mif left the university in the summer of 1929, he was re-
placed by Veger, who was chiefly an educator and definitely not a 
politician. Although he was a veteran Bolshevik, he had devoted him-
self chiefly to cultural and educational work. Before he was appointed 
rector of Sun Yat-sen University, he taught in a number of Moscow 
universities. When Sun Yat-sen University, under the pressure of in-
creasing numbers of worker and peasant students, was trying to make 
a radical shift in its educational program, Veger, an experienced educa-
tor, was assigned to do the job. He was very generous to the students, 
and students liked him much better than Mif. He was an excellent 
orator of the professorial type rather than in the style of a revolu-
tionary agitator. While he was rector of the university, he was named 
to the Editorial Committee of The Problems of China, a quarterly jour-
nal which began publication in Moscow in 1929. After that, he was 
counted among the famous China experts in Russia. 
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Veger accepted the position as rector of Sun Yat-sen University at a 
time when the university was in great turmoil due to the intensive 
Party purge. Veger, whom I considered to be a highly likable man, 
was placed in a very unpleasant situation—one which had no solution. 
In the autumn of 1930 Veger walked dejectedly out through the gate 
of the university for the last time, and Sun Yat-sen University was 
officially closed. 
Notes 
1. I could not locate the exact date of the founding of the university in the 1925 issue of 
Pravda, nor could any of my former classmates recall it. Probably the best estimate as to 
the date of the establishment and opening of the university is given by Eudin and North in 
Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927. They state that Sun Yat-sen University "was estab-
lished in Moscow during September of 1925 and opened its doors in November of the same 
year" (Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927 [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1957], p. 86). Moreover, Borodin in Canton announced the establishment of 
the university to the CEC of the KMT on October 7, 1925. 
2. According to a personal letter to me from a friend in Taipei who kindly discussed 
the matter with one of my schoolmates, Chu Mao-tseng, Mr. Chu arrived at Moscow in 
November, 1925, with the first group of students. Immediately after their arrival, classes 
started, without waiting for the official opening of the university. The opening ceremony did 
not take place until two months later, when several other groups of students arrived from 
China. But Mr. Chu said that he did not remember the exact date of the ceremony. 
3. I have not been able to locate the original text of Trotsky's speech. The library in 
Sun Yat-sen University, however, did have a Chinese translation of it, and a friend of mine, 
a Sun Yat-sen University student who attended the ceremony, took notes from the text in 
the library. It is from his notes, kindly made available to me, that I have taken this quo-
tation. 
4. During my more than six years' stay in Russia, I traveled to every corner within 
its domain. My impression was that the farther you went to the west or south—to the 
Ukraine and the Caucasus—the more friendly people were to us Chinese; the farther you 
went to the east, the less friendly. Particularly on the border areas between the two countries, 
contempt and prejudice deepened, perhaps because the two peoples had more frequent contact 
there than in Russia proper or in the west. Big-power chauvinism in Russia has not been 
rooted out despite half a century of Communist rule. Not only has the average Russian 
not been converted into a so-called internationalist, even the Communist leaders at all 
levels are not really proletarian internationalists. This is one of the reasons why Soviet Russia's 
reputation has gradually been tarnished and its influence has gradually declined even among 
other Communist countries. This is especially the case in Russia's relations with Asian and 
African countries. 
5. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 
1957), p. 22. 
6. Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
7. Radek was readmitted to the Party in 1930. However, Radek not only continued to 
communicate with members of the opposition, but he became a prominent member of the 
Rightist-Trotskyite bloc. In January, 1937, he was tried, together with fifteen other anti-
Stalinists, including Bukharin and Rykov, and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. 
However, he was released after serving only four years of his term, so that he might serve 
as a propagandist during his remaining years and thus contribute his "surplus value" to the 
Communist Party. However, many sources believe that he was executed about 1942 for 
allegedly being a German spy. Recently, I heard from someone who regarded his source 
as impeccable that Radek died in prison when, in an overcrowded cell, he quarreled with 
his cellmates, who beat him to death. 
8. Chin-jih ta-lu (Mainland today; Taipei), no. 99 (Oct. 15, 1959), pp. 33-34. 
9. Leon Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution (2nd ed.; New York: Paragon 
Book Gallery, 1962), p. 19. 
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Chapter IV 
The Internal Organization 
of Sun Yat-sen University 
THE FINANCIAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE UNIVERSITY 
Sun Yat-sen University differed from most public and private uni-
versities in that the source of the funds that supported the university 
was not disclosed to the public. In fact, the exact annual expenditures 
and their source still remain a secret. Sun Yat-sen University also dif-
fered from other universities in that it received no tuition from its 
students. Moreover, room and board were free to all students, and 
even clothes and pocket money were provided. Since the student body 
increased rapidly from 340 in the first class in 1925 to about 600 in 
1928, a substantial sum of money obviously was required to maintain 
the university. It was a sum of money beyond the means, surely, of 
individuals or private organizations, and I doubt that funds from 
China ever contributed substantially, if at all, to its support. It seems 
more likely, as I assumed when I was a student there, that the full 
burden of financing Sun Yat-sen University fell to the Russians, who 
took the initiative in establishing and staffing the university in the 
first place. After I left the university, but while I was still in Russia, 
I was told, in any event, that the primary funding of Sun Yat-sen 
University came from the Profintern, whose chief source of income 
was the Central Council of Labor Unions of the Soviet Union. 
It is my opinion that there may have been some symbolic contribu-
tions of some money by wealthy KMT members, but it would be 
erroneous to believe that these contributions were of great importance.1 
I hold to this belief for two reasons. First, I do not believe that the 
KMT had the financial resources to support the burden of maintaining 
Sun Yat-sen University. In 1924 the KMT did not even command 
enough capital to independently establish Whampoa Military Acad-
emy, whose importance far surpassed that of Sun Yat-sen University. 
In the end it was possible to establish that academy only because of 
material aid from the Soviet Union.2 Second, and perhaps more ob-
viously, if the KMT had been able to bear the burden of Sun Yat-sen 
University, why was it established in Moscow instead of Canton? 
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I once asked friends in Taipei to do some research on this subject, 
but they failed to obtain any results. The archives kept by the CEC of 
the KMT contained neither telegrams nor correspondence concerning 
financial aspects of Sun Yat-sen University. There seems to be 
absolutely no record of the KMT ever having provided any financial 
support to it.3 
An interesting point is that the subject of management of the uni-
versity was not brought up until it had already been established for 
six months. Sometime in early April of 1926, Hu Han-min4 sent a 
telegram from Moscow to Canton in regard to this point. The text 
of the telegram is as follows: 
Rector Radek of Sun Yat-sen University proposes that the university be placed 
under the Soviet Communist Central Executive Committee and the Central 
Executive Committee of Kuomintang.5 
This proposal was brought up at the 139th Session of the Central 
Political Committee of the KMT, which was held on May 5, 1926. 
At this session, it was decided to accept Radek's proposal and to in-
struct the CEC of the KMT to cable the resolution to Radek. That 
same day the secretary of the Central Political Committee drafted an 
official letter to the CEC of the KMT instructing it to act in compliance 
with the resolution. 
On May 11, 1926, the Twenty-seventh Plenary Session of the CEC 
of the KMT elected by the Second Congress recorded Radek's proposal 
as the sixth article on the agenda: 
The Central Political Committee passed the resolution to adopt Radek's pro-
posal that Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow be placed under joint administration 
of the Soviet Communist Party and the Central Executive Committee of the 
Kuomintang, and to notify Radek of our resolution.6 
After discussion and debate of this proposal, the CEC decided to accept 
the proposal and to notify Rector Radek of Sun Yat-sen University. 
The telegram of acceptance, which was sent to Radek on May 15, 
1926, read as follows: 
Rector Radek of Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow: In conformity with the 
recommendation and accompanying letter of the Central Political Committee of 
our Executive Committee, which stated: "The 139th meeting of the Central 
Political Committee passed a resolution of acceptance of the proposal made by 
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Rector Radek of Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow as reported to the Committee 
by Hu Han-min. The proposal that Sun Yat-sen University be placed under the 
joint administration of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Russian 
Communist Party and the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang is 
accepted. We hereby urge that your Committee cable this resolution to Rector 
Radek." In accordance our 27th session reached the following resolution: "Accept 
the proposition and cable reply to Rector Radek." We are pleased to inform you 
of the acceptance of your proposition. 
The Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.7 
This document seems to imply that Sun Yat-sen University had only 
two managers, the CPSU and the KMT, with the CCP and the Com-
intern being represented by the CPSU. 
One of the individuals responsible for watching out for KMT in-
terests at the university was Shao Li-tzu, who went to Moscow in the 
summer of 1926. Upon his arrival in Moscow, the university held a 
big reception in his honor and presented him with an honorary student 
identification card. Shao, who had come to Moscow as the permanent 
representative of the KMT to the Comintern,8 became a member of 
the Board of Trustees of Sun Yat-sen University. Soon, in addition to 
merely visiting the university, he began taking and auditing courses 
there. 
By taking courses at the university, he became a classmate of his 
son, Shao Chih-kang, who was a member of the CYC. This quickly 
became a popular topic of conversation among the rest of us. Presently, 
Shao provided us with yet another topic of conversation; for another 
student at the university then, a member of its first class, was Miss Fu 
Hsueh-wen, who had studied at Shanghai University when Shao Li-
tzu was its deputy director. Shao, who was a widower, wooed and 
won her in Moscow. Since male students were far more numerous 
than female ones, this took an attractive girl out of circulation, a state 
of affairs which was noted with dismay by the other males. 
Perhaps here I might be allowed to digress a bit to discuss the 
relationship between Shao Li-tzu and his young bride, Fu Hsueh-wen, 
for it is relevant to the affairs of Sun Yat-sen University. Fu Hsueh-wen 
was a member of the CYC when she married Shao in Moscow, and 
she remained a member of the CYC. When the KMT conducted its 
purge of Communist members beginning in April, 1927, Shao Li-tzu, 
as the KMT representative to the Comintern and a man closely 
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identified with Chiang Kai-shek, naturally returned to China. His 
CYC wife returned to China with him, which those of us in the CCP 
who remained at Sun Yat-sen University could not help noticing. 
Most of us assumed that she retained her CYC membership and that 
she was under Party orders to remain with her KMT husband. After 
all, Shao was expected to take an influential position in Chiang Kai-
shek's organization back in China, which he did, and what better 
source of information about this organization could the Party have than 
Shao's own wife. She never publicly renounced her membership in 
the CYC. Rightly or wrongly, then, I assume that she still retained 
her Party ties when, in 1949, both Shao Li-tzu and she abruptly deserted 
Chiang Kai-shek in favor of the Chinese Communists. 
Be that as it may, the relationship of Shao Li-tzu and of the KMT 
to Sun Yat-sen University changed after the April 12, 1927, anti-Com-
munist movement in Shanghai. Shortly after this incident, Shao 
silently packed his suitcase and left for home. His departure served 
not only as a prelude to the breaking off of relations between China 
and the Soviet Union, but it was also a prelude to Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity becoming completely Communist controlled. After Shao's de-
parture there was no longer a KMT member on the Board of Trustees 
of the university. 
On July 26, 1927, the CEC of the KMT made an official announce-
ment of the KMT's repudiation of Sun Yat-sen University and severed 
all ties with it: 
Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow illegally used the name of the party leader 
of the Kuomintang as protection while engaged in plotting conspiracy against the 
party. It is only proper that the university be repudiated. No organization is to 
send any more students to Moscow.9 
This strong resolution adopted by the CEC of the KMT was based 
on the proposal made by the Central Youth Department of the KMT, 
the text of which follows: 
It was found that Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow was originally Sun Wen 
University before a name change was adopted. The said university attracted 
members of our party and promising young people throughout the country under 
the banner of Kuomintang. The university has repeatedly disparaged the prin-
ciples and policies of the party. Borrowing the name of Kuomintang, the univer-
sity engaged in activities betraying the party. We hereby make known to all the 
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world our denouncement of the conspiracy of the university and our repudiation 
of the university. Furthermore, no organization in the country is permitted to 
send any more students to Moscow, so that our youth will no longer be deceived 
by its imposture. 
Chairman of the Central Youth Department of the Kuomintang 
Ting Wei-fen July 8, 192710 
Following this proposal a Plenary Session of the CEC and the 
106th Meeting of All Department Chiefs passed a resolution which 
read: 
Repudiate Sun Yat-sen University, and instruct the Political Bureau and the 
National government to issue a nationwide edict forbidding further dispatch of 
students to Moscow.11 
This edict was officially posted on July 26,1927. In accordance with 
the edict, all organizations under the KMT ceased to send students to 
Moscow. But Sun Yat-sen University's name was not changed simply 
because of the KMT's resolution. Not until the following year was 
the university renamed. However, Sun Yat-sen's name was retained 
in the title, as it was far too valuable a propaganda tool to be given 
up so easily. 
THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE BUDGET OF THE UNIVERSITY 
The internal organizational structure of Sun Yat-sen University 
was rather simple, since although it was called a university, it had no 
separate colleges or disciplines. The head of the administration, the 
rector, was a Russian, and he was assisted by two vice-rectors, both of 
whom at first were also Russians. Later, after the university was re-
organized in 1928, one of the vice-rectors was Chinese. This change 
was not brought about by any Russian desire to show Sino-Soviet 
equality. Quite the contrary, the Russian Communists at that time 
suffered from an acute superiority complex with regard to the 
Chinese, and nothing could have been farther from their minds than 
a Sino-Russian equal partnership. The move seems to have been dic-
tated simply by necessity. There were two main advantages in having 
a Chinese vice-rector. In the first place, it eliminated the very con-
siderable language barrier that existed between the administration and 
the student body and at the same time provided a buffer between ad-
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ministration and students. Second, the Chinese vice-rector was able 
to function as a liaison officer between Sun Yat-sen University and the 
CCP representatives to the Comintern. 
The first Chinese student to serve as vice-rector was a proletarian 
comrade named Wang Pao-li, who came from Nanking. While he 
was not well educated, he was of the working class and had served 
admirably as chairman of the Student's Commune. Unfortunately, 
proletarian though he was, Wang was found to be lacking in leader-
ship ability, and so in 1929, upon the recommendation of Ch'en Shao-
yu, Rector Mif appointed my good friend Li Chou-sheng to replace 
Wang.12 Li, who was a diligent student, an efficient worker, and good 
tempered, retained the post of vice-rector until the university closed 
in 1930. But as I have stated, the vice-rectorship was never intended 
as a gesture of equality or cooperation, and consequently Li possessed 
little actual authority. Some of the cynics among us commented dis-
paragingly that the Chinese vice-rector amounted to no more than an 
interpreter in the area of administrative affairs of the university who 
received higher pay and a larger desk than the other interpreters. 
Under the rector there were three departments: the Secretariat, the 
Business Office, and the Department of Academic Affairs. The Secretary 
General of the university was a man called Pogulyaev, who spoke only 
a little Chinese. He was a Machiavellian sort of person whom nobody 
liked. Pogulyaev's young assistant, Abramoson, spoke excellent Man-
darin, yet he was also intensely disliked by us because of his impudent 
attitude. 
The Secretariat was roughly the equivalent of a chancellor's office, 
for it had charge of all important administrative matters. The Secre-
tariat at Sun Yat-sen University, however, had yet another function, 
which derived from the unique status of Sun Yat-sen University itself. 
The university was not, after all, an "open door" institution, and the 
Secretariat was much preoccupied with affairs of security. It was 
responsible for transporting students from abroad, and for getting 
departing students to their destinations abroad, through secret channels. 
In this undertaking it worked closely with the relevant authorities in 
the Comintern and the GPU. The Secretariat also was responsible for 
conducting security checks on students at the university when in-
structed to do so by the Comintern or the GPU. The Secretariat also 
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arranged the secret nighttime arrests of "anti-Party" students. Some 
of these students were among those who had come to the university as 
KMT members but who had not returned to China following the 
rupture of KMT-Soviet relations late in 1927 and had drifted into 
supporting the Trotsky opposition. Others were members of a Trot-
skyite organization or elements of the "Second Line" group. 
Confidential organizational matters that did not directly involve the 
university sometimes were entrusted to the Secretariat. For example, 
handling the secretarial affairs of the Sixth Congress of the CCP was 
one of its functions. It recruited secretaries and interpreters from 
among the students, arranged for translations of documents, and so 
forth. 
In connection with its security functions, the Secretariat subjected 
all of us at the university to one altogether curious week, in the autumn 
of 1927 as I recall. The GPU was behind the move, I believe. For one 
whole week we were all physically measured in great detail, and the 
data was recorded in dossiers containing biographical and other infor-
mation about us. They measured our height; the dimensions of our 
heads; the size, dimensions, and relative positions of our eyes, noses, 
and ears; the length of our necks; and the delineation of our 
hairlines. They also recorded any particular identifying physical marks 
we might have, such as scars, warts, and so forth. Since the university 
already had on file photographs of each of us, the taking of our meas-
urements puzzled us and caused much resentment and suspicion 
among most of the students. A good many students wanted to refuse 
to be measured, but since such overt flaunting of authority would have 
singled them out for suspicion, they submitted to it. Non-Communist 
students were especially outraged, and read into the affair all sorts of 
possible sinister connotations. It was generally decided, I think, that 
photographs might eventually fade or get lost, and that from the 
measurements the Russians could reconstruct our appearances. The 
need for a permanent record of our physical appearances, though, was 
more alarming to some than to others. Would the Russians use this 
record to hound us for the rest of our lives, should they so desire, or was 
it merely a paternalistic gesture to better insure that in the case of 
mishap we could readily be identified ? Jokingly, we said that we had 
now given ourselves body and soul to the Russians. 
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The Business Office was purely a service department. Its head was 
a Russian named Visotii. The Business Office handled what might be 
called the logistics for the students: it was responsible for clothing, 
feeding, housing, and transporting us. Despite the NEP, economic con-
ditions still were rather grim in Russia then, and we at Sun Yat-sen 
University were looked after far better than Russian students. We, for 
example, had such luxuries as white bread, coffee, and cocoa, which 
were denied to our Russian counterparts. Nevertheless, complaints were 
endlessly directed at the beleagured Business Office. 
Yang Ming-chai, a Chinese immigrant to Russia who had gone to 
China with Voitinsky in 1920,13 worked in the Business Office. In 
1925, when Sun Yat-sen University was still in the preparatory stages, 
Yang, then in Shanghai, was responsible for the reception and coordina-
tion of Chinese students bound for Moscow. In November of 1925 he 
personally headed the second group of students going to Sun Yat-sen 
University, and upon his arrival in Moscow, he began to work in the 
business section of the university. Then, in the summer of 1927, while 
we were all at Trasovka, a larger summer resort outside Moscow, Yang 
Ming-chai visited the resort to say goodbye to student friends there. 
He had, he said, received a letter from Voitinsky to the CC of the 
CCP recommending that he be given a responsible position in the CC, 
and thus he was about to depart for China. I heard that when he ar-
rived at Shanghai, the CC scrutinized his record, evaluated his capabili-
ties, and assigned him to some minor local post in Tientsin. That is 
the last information I have been able to find about him. 
The work of the Department of Academic Affairs was the most 
complex. The selection of courses, professors, and instructors, the ar-
rangement of classes, and the preparation of educational material for 
a highly heterogeneous group was no simple matter. At first the de-
partment's work was divided into two parts: one dealt with the first 
graduating class—the groups of students arriving in Moscow in 1925 
and the beginning of 1926; the other with the second graduating class 
—the groups of students who arrived in Moscow in the latter part of 
1926 and the beginning of 1927. 
In 1928, when the Chinese revolution was at low ebb, droves of 
peasant and worker cadres were sent to Sun Yat-sen University. This 
sudden jump in enrollment complicated the university's academic 
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planning even more and forced an extensive revision of course and class 
arrangements which I will discuss in a later chapter. 
When I arrived in Moscow late in 1926 the director of the Depart-
ment of Academic Affairs was a Mr. Ignatov. He was an old Bolshevik 
of working-class origin, honest and responsible. Once he confessed 
to me with all candor that during the 1917 October Revolution and 
the long civil war that followed he had almost lost his faith in the cause 
upon seeing the complete destruction of industry, the famine, and the 
great human suffering. However, the end of "War Communism" and 
the introduction of the NEP saved his faith in the Bolshevik cause. 
Ignatov was a man who was not embittered by the hardships and 
sorrows he had endured, but rather one who was sweetened and made 
more compassionate to the sorrows and aspirations of others. To us 
he was especially kind and warm. His relationship with the faculty 
was also quite cordial. Wherever he went with his small thatch of a 
beard and his kindly, chubby face, he was greeted by the students with 
warmth. He was truly an unforgettable person and the finest of 
gentlemen. He is long dead now, but I am sure that I and the other 
students cannot forget him. 
Subordinate to the Academic Affairs Department was the Academic 
Affairs Conference, which was composed of the head professors of 
each course. This group met regularly to discuss teaching methods, 
student progress, and the improvement of courses. It functioned as 
a powerful advisory group to the Academic Affairs Department, and 
almost always the suggestions coming from this group were promptly 
executed by the department. 
In 1928 the personnel structure of the Academic Affairs Depart-
ment, as the vice-rectorship, was modified. Under the director of the 
department, who was a Russian, there was also a Chinese assistant 
director, who was chosen from the ranks of qualified students. The 
student selected to serve as assistant director of the Academic Affairs 
Department was Yin Chien, who was a native of Hupeh. He was a 
very modest and hard-working man. On returning to China, he first 
worked in the Shanghai Trade Unions. Later he was transferred to 
Tientsin and the coal mines at T'angshan, where he was arrested and 
executed. 
Now I would like to discuss briefly the budget of the university. 
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As I mentioned above, the budget of the university was veiled in the 
greatest secrecy. Only the handful of people in charge of this matter 
knew how big the budget really was. Outsiders, including the students 
of the university, were kept in the dark. However, it was said that the 
annual budget of the university was around one million tchervonetz 
(or ten million rubles), but confirmation of this was not available. 
The budget of the university was composed of three main items: 
(1) Administrative expenses of the university; (2) salaries of the staff 
and faculty members, and the allowances given to the students; and 
(3) expenditures for recruiting students from and repatriating them 
back to China or other countries. 
The first big item of the budget was administrative expenses. This 
included room, board, clothing, transportation, and summer vacations 
for about five hundred students, maintenance of the campus and li-
brary, and other expenses. 
The second item of the budget was salaries. A rather large staff of 
professors, instructors, administrative personnel, and maintenance staff 
(estimated at more than one hundred and fifty persons) created a big 
problem of payment. At that time the so-called salary-limit system for 
Party members was still in force in the Soviet Union. According to 
this system of maximum payments, the salary limit of Party members 
was set at 225 rubles a month. In other words, that was the highest 
salary for a Party member, no matter what qualifications he had or 
what position he held. A great many of the staff and faculty were 
Party members, thus a large amount of money was saved. But there 
were two exceptions to this policy. The professors or instructors who 
were not Party members were paid according to their qualifications, 
not being restricted by the above-mentioned maximum salary; and a 
few distinguished professors hired from abroad were paid still more. 
The students of Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow were recruited 
either from China or from among Chinese in other countries; and after 
the completion of their studies, they should be sent back to China or 
elsewhere to do revolutionary work. Their transportation expenses 
were provided by the university. It was a very complicated item in 
the budget, because the matter of foreign currency was involved. It 
was no secret that at that time the Soviet Union possessed very little 
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foreign currency. Therefore, the Russian authorities were not without 
pain in getting this job done. 
Another factor that made the budget of the university rather 
burdensome was that the university had to support both financially and 
materially three supplementary institutions: the China Printing House, 
the China Problems Research Institute, and the Translation Bureau. 
And finally, there was an unusual item in the budget—allowances 
given to poor students (mostly worker and peasant students) to support 
their families in China. The students in Sun Yat-sen University, as a 
demonstration of solidarity, organized a Mutual Assistance Fund. The 
university deducted a certain amount from the students' monthly al-
lowances for the fund, which was used as a relief fund to support the 
families of poor students. But the money from this fund was not ade-
quate, so the university had to contribute more than the students did. 
This was just one of the peculiarities of the budget of Sun Yat-sen 
University. 
The budget was supposed to be examined and approved by the Far 
Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern as well as the CPSU. Actually, 
however, the university's budget from the very beginning was ex-
clusively decided upon and adjusted, if necessary, by the CPSU. The 
KMT never actually entered into partnership with the CPSU, because 
it was not able to provide any financial support to the university. The 
KMT had no say in budget matters of the university even in the first 
years of harmony between the KMT and Soviet Russia. 
THREE SUPPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY 
Although Sun Yat-sen University survived for only five short years, 
three supplementary institutions of the university, with certain struc-
tural reorganizations, survived it. These three institutions were the 
China Problems Research Institute, the Translation Bureau, and the 
China Printing House. 
I do not remember the exact date of the founding of the China 
Problems Research Institute. I only remember that preparations for 
this organization were begun in 1928, soon after the defeat of the De-
cember 11, 1927, Canton Uprising. While the events of December 11 
at Canton constituted a "rear-guard action," the Comintern neverthe-
less lauded it as the harbinger of a new era—the Soviet phase of the 
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Chinese revolution—and felt that valuable lessons could be drawn 
from this revolutionary experience in order to prepare the next rising 
tide of revolution. It was with this thought in mind that the China 
Problems Research Institute was formed. The specific goals of this 
institute were to evaluate the experiences of the 1925-1927 Revolu-
tion, to set up guide lines for future action, and to study Chinese prob-
lems in depth. Thus, the China Problems Research Institute served 
to coordinate both scholarly and practical research. 
The proposal for the establishment of the institute probably origi-
nated in the Chinese Section of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the 
Comintern, and its formal establishment took place early in 1929. 
Volin, a professor at the university, was its director. Several "new 
generation" Chinese experts were also members of the institute. 
Among them were the famous Yollk and a gentleman named Oshanin. 
Yollk, apparently a Russian, was a student at the Leningrad School of 
Oriental Languages. He did advanced work in Chinese and spoke 
excellent Mandarin. In fact, he often gave speeches in Chinese to 
the university students. 
Oshanin was born in Harbin, Manchuria, and was educated in 
Peking. Consequently, his command of the Chinese language was even 
better than Yollk's was. Indeed, Oshanin's ability to translate from 
Chinese into Russian, or the other way round, was absolutely amazing. 
He had no party affiliations and did not concern himself in his work, 
in any event, with political issues. He was a linguist, and it was as a 
linguist that he worked at the institute. Among his notable publications 
was Kitaic\o-Ru$s\ii Slovary (Chinese-Russian dictionary), which he 
edited and which was published in Moscow in 1959. Besides these in-
dividuals, older Russian Sinologists such as Ivanov (his Chinese name 
was Yi Feng-ko) served the institute as consultants. Ivanov had been 
a professor at National Peking University in the early twenties, and 
possibly earlier, where he had taught Russian. His field, however, 
was Sinology, and he was an eminent man in that field. I remember 
that in 1923 Hu Shih held a symposium in Peking in commemoration of 
the great Ch'ing scholar Tai Cheng (Tai Tung-yuan). I was in the 
audience and heard Ivanov present his paper in impeccable Chinese. 
Back in Soviet Russia, he was a professor at the Leningrad School of 
Oriental Languages, which has produced a good many imposing 
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Sinologists. Another famed Russian Sinologist, Kolokolov, did re-
search at the institute. 
In addition to the Russian Sinologues and "China experts," over 
ten Sun Yat-sen University graduates were chosen as associate members 
of the institute. Most of the students chosen were members of what 
later became known as the 28 Bolsheviks. Among them were Ch'in 
Pang-hsien (Po Ku), Yang Shang-k'uen, and Ho Tzu-shu. Ostensibly, 
the criterion for selection was academic, however political considera-
tions were of the utmost importance. The emphasis upon political 
considerations stemmed from the fact that the Comintern was trying 
to train a group of future Chinese Communist leaders who would be 
loyal to the Comintern rather than striving for academic excellence 
in the institute. 
The research work of the institute was divided into two sections: 
fundamental problems of China and current problems of China. The 
first section was, in the main, academic and technical. Most of the 
older Sinologists were in this section. They concentrated on the study 
of such fundamental problems as reform of the Chinese language 
(Latinization of Chinese), the land problem in different periods of 
Chinese history, the social structure of ancient China, and so forth. 
They were also responsible for the compilation of a Chinese-Russian 
dictionary. The second section studied the most pressing problems 
connected with the development of the revolutionary movement in 
China. 
The institute's first contribution was publication of the first Russian-
Chinese dictionary, Russkp-Kitais\ii Slovary. This dictionary was a 
great boon to Chinese students of the Russian language, as the only 
dictionary previously available was the Russian-Japanese Dictionary 
published in Tokyo.* Russ\o-Kitais\ii Slovary was probably published 
in cooperation with Soviet Russia's National Foreign-Language Dic-
tionary Press, which was under the general editorship of Kolokolov. 
The institute was also responsible for the publication of a Russian-
* The matter of Chinese-Russian dictionaries was really a scandal. China and Russia 
have a boundary line thousands of miles long, and relations between the two countries had 
been intense. Yet, very few Chinese had ever sought to study about Russia and Russians 
in depth. There was not even a suitable Chinese-Russian dictionary. When we went to 
Moscow in 1925, we could not find a single Chinese-Russian dictionary, which forced us to 
buy the Russian-Japanese dictionary from Tokyo. This lack of a dictionary greatly hampered 
our progress in learning Russian. 
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language quarterly called Problemy Kitaia (Chinese problems), which 
first came out in 1929. The editorial committee was composed of 
Varga, Veger, Kuchumov, Madyayr, Mif, Strakhov, and Volin. Volin 
was head of the editorial committee. However, after the publication 
of his first article in the journal, "On the Role of the Chinese Bour-
geoisie," which was criticized for containing "right-opportunist mis-
takes," he was stripped of his position. From the second issue of 1930, 
Pavel Mif served as chief editor of the journal.14 
This journal was fairly representative of Russian Sinological studies 
in the thirties. It strikes me as useful not only for understanding the 
state of Russian Sinological studies but as a scholarly publication with 
merit in it own right. For example, in the second issue of 1930 there 
were such articles as "A Contribution to the Study of the Social Founda-
tions of Ancient China" by Yollk, and what may have been the first 
discussion of a Latinized Chinese alphabet by someone who signed his 
name Chu Bai-to, who I suspect, with no real evidence to support the 
suspicion, may have been Ch'u Ch'iu-pai. In other issues the journal 
treated a wide spectrum of Chinese topics, some of which might be 
described as essentially political but many of which were essentially 
scholarly. There were theoretical discussions of peculiarly Chinese 
manifestations of social-historical development; analyses of the eco-
nomic, philosophical, and sociological bases of Sun Yat-senism; reviews 
of works about China published both in Russia and abroad; and so 
forth. 
Besides the publication of a Russian-Chinese dictionary and the 
academic journal Chinese Problems, the institute was also concerned 
with contemporary China. As I have mentioned above, attention was 
especially focused upon the many questions raised by the Chinese 
revolution, such as "the land question and peasant movement," the 
path of Chinese economic development, the foreign domination of 
China, and so forth. By way of helping to provide materials for re-
search, the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern furnished the 
institute with a good many documents from and about China which 
had been received by the Comintern. In return, the institute committed 
itself to turn out periodic studies, which were confidential, for use by 
the Comintern. Most of the participants in political and economic re-
search were young Chinese and Russian members of the institute. In 
55 
addition to employing most of the younger institute members, this 
section dealing with contemporary problems also had a much larger 
number of individuals doing research. Consequently, the contributions 
of this section were a good deal more extensive than those of the sec-
tion of the institute dealing with academic problems. 
From its foundation until 1930, the China Problems Research In-
stitute was nominally subordinate to the Association for Research on 
National and Colonial Problems. However, in reality, it functioned as 
a branch of Sun Yat-sen University. After the university was closed in 
the autumn of 1930, the institute became a special branch of the Com-
munist Academy of Science in Moscow, which stood right beside Sun 
Yat-sen University on Volkhonka Street. 
Another institution connected with the university was the Transla-
tion Bureau. Translations from Russian to Chinese had always been 
important work at the university, but in the early years the translating 
work was geared primarily to the needs of the classroom. Initially, 
Stalin's Foundations of Leninism was translated by P'u T'ao-ming, 
while translations were also made of Engels's The Origin of the 
Family, Private Property and the State and of Karl Kautsky's The Eco-
nomic Doctrines of Marx. At the same time, translations were made 
of the lectures delivered in every course. It might be noted paren-
thetically that the translations made of the lectures in our seminar on 
economic geography were somehow sent back to China by a student, 
Han Liang-hsien, who published them under his own name, with an 
introduction by Hu Han-min, when he returned to China. Other stu-
dents did the same thing with the translated lectures of our courses in 
the History of Western Revolution and the History of Social For-
mations. Meanwhile the translation of important works of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin was left undone due to a lack of time and 
resources. To remedy the situation the Soviet State Publishing House 
(Gosizdat) cooperated with Sun Yat-sen University in a project to 
translate and publish the "sacred works" of Marxism-Leninism. The 
State Publishing House financed the project, while the university pro-
vided the necessary talent; so the first works in the translation of the 
collected volumes of Lenin got under way. After the dismantling of 
the university, the translators stayed in Moscow and continued their 
work under the Soviet State Publishing House. There were about ten 
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translators in all.* Among them were Liu Ch'i-feng, Hsieh Chien-
ming, and Sun Tsung-fan. Liu was originally from P'ing-hsiang, 
Kiangsi, and had studied at Peking Normal University. Liu's English 
was excellent, so he enrolled in the "English Class" at the university. 
Liu and I went to Moscow in the same group, and we worked together 
for a long time in the seminar on the History of the Evolution of 
Social Formations. I have heard that Liu died from some illness in 
Moscow. 
Hsieh Chien-ming was a fellow provincial of mine from Tse-li 
County, Hunan. Although his oral interpreting skill was not very 
good, his ability to translate written material was of superior caliber. 
But all of the translators, despite their undeniable talents, were 
hampered by an insistence upon their producing a literal word-for-
word translation between two such totally different languages as Rus-
sian and Chinese. The main reason for the choice of such an approach 
was the desire for accuracy. While the translation of the Marxist works 
was not completed by these translators and was finally taken over by 
Communist China's Bureau for the Translation and Editing of the 
Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, the translations done 
through the Translation Bureau were the standard ones used by the 
CCP for many years. On the whole, the influence of the Translation 
Bureau surpassed that of the corresponding American- and European-
educated Chinese students' attempts to translate and introduce into 
China the elements of science and democracy. The American- and 
European-educated Chinese students were the first to begin the modern-
ization of China, yet science is still undeveloped in China and democ-
racy has never been implemented, but Johnny-come-lately communism 
is firmly entrenched in China. 
The work of translating seems to be merely literary and technical 
in nature. Yet it contributed greatly to elevating the general level of 
* I was among the translators while I was at the university. In addition to interpreting 
in some of the classes, I translated special lecture notes, reference works, and two works 
by Engels—From Monkey to Man and Dialectics of Nature. In the spring of 1930, when 
the struggle against Trotskyites in Sun Yat-sen University had reached a climax, the uni-
versity authorities urged Yang Shang-k'uen and me to translate Stalin's large work On the 
Opposition in great haste. Working literally night and day, we managed to finish the job 
in a couple of weeks, for which we eventually were rewarded with a magnificent vacation 
at Yalta. During the Second World War, I saw copies of our translation on sale in Chungking 
in an edition published by the Hsin-hua Jih-pao under the Chinese title Lun Huan-tuei-p'ai. 
My name was not given as a translator. The translation was credited to a Chinese rendering 
of Yang Shang-k'uen's Russian name, which I have forgotten. 
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theoretical thinking of the members of the CCP; so much so that the 
apprentice has now outstripped the master, and the Chinese Commu-
nists are capable of waging ideological battles with the Russians. It is 
perhaps ironic, and perhaps to the infinite regret of the Russians, that 
it was they who made this possible by initiating the first really sound 
translations of the works of the Communist masters at Sun Yat-sen 
University.15 The fact that Mao Tse-tung, who did not have access to 
Marxist and Leninist classics except in translation, is now heralded by 
some as the greatest contemporary Marxist-Leninist is evidence of the 
far-reaching influence of the works of the Translation Bureau. 
Preparation for the China Printing House in Moscow began quite 
early, and it was officially opened in early 1928. It was responsible for 
printing the translated materials for the university proper, the transla-
tions of the Translation Bureau, and the Chinese edition of the Com-
munist International. The Chinese director of the Printing House was 
Ch'u Ch'iu-pai's second brother, Ch'u Yun-pai, who used the Russian 
name Karakhan. He was also responsible for recruiting skilled printers 
from Shanghai and for purchasing Chinese printing equipment. 
Some of the less academically inclined students were selected to 
work in the Printing House as proofreaders. Though they ceased to 
attend classes, they maintained their student status and, in addition, 
were paid very well. From the very beginning the Printing House was 
operated in cooperation with the Soviet State Publishing House and 
became directly affiliated with it after the closing of the university. 
Perhaps many of Russia's Chinese propaganda materials are still printed 
by this Printing House of Sun Yat-sen University. 
Notes 
1. Xenia J. Eudin and Robert C. North, in Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A 
Documentary Survey (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957, p . 86) stated that 
"Wealthy members of the Kuomintang and overseas Chinese provided the main material 
support for the university at first, but the Comintern and public organizations in the U.S.S.R. 
contributed money also. By the middle of 1927, when relations with the Kuomintang were 
severed, the institution was supported solely by Soviet Russia." 
2. The following excerpt from A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution sheds some 
light on this subject: ". . . at the time of the establishment of Whampoa Academy there were 
no funds, no ammunition, and no instructors. Guns and bullets were sent over by Soviet 
Russia. The main material support was provided by Soviet Russia . . . . The personnel assis-
tance as well as material support from Soviet Russia made possible the establishment of 
Whampoa Military Academy" (Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution 
[Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1957], p. 60) . Shen Yun-loong also reported that "while 
the National Assembly [of the KMT] was in session [January, 1924], he [indicating Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen] assigned Chiang Kai-shek to undertake preparations for the establishment of 
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Whampoa Military Academy. In the beginning Chiang had no access to any available funds. 
Sometime later, Liao Chung-k'ai sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek stating: 'I am in pos-
session of some money for the Academy. I will not ask for your expenditure report if you 
will not ask me the source of the money' " (Shen Yun-loong, The Origin of the Chinese 
Communist Party [Taipei: Free China Press, 1959], p. 40). Shen later said that the money 
came from the Russians as a result of their selling a large quantity of Russian kerosene on 
the Canton market. 
3. It is beyond any doubt that Soviet Russia took it upon herself to bear the whole 
burden. But owing to the domestic as well as foreign circumstances of Soviet Russia at that 
time, it probably was imprudent to disclose the real source of the funds for the university. 
Thus, the Russian authority purposefully claimed that the university was not solely supported 
and established by Russia, that the Chinese people themselves provided the main material 
support, which was not actually the case. 
4. Hu Han-min, an important figure in the CEC of the KMT and a long-time, close 
associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, had left China for Russia in September, 1925. He had come 
under a cloud in China when his brother had been suspected of being involved in the 
assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai, and it was thought that Hu Han-min himself may have 
been implicated. I understand that Michael Borodin had suggested that he visit Russia because 
of these circumstances. In Russia, among other things, he attended the Congress of the 
International of Peasants, to whose executive committee he was elected. He also attended the 
Sixth Plenum of the ECCI as the first KMT delegate to attend such a plenum, the KMT 
having been admitted to the Comintern. Hu Han-min arrived back in China on April 29, 
1926. The solution of the legal status of Sun Yat-sen University came at the time when the 
KMT was granted a special membership in the Comintern. As early as June, 1924, when the 
Comintern held its Fifth Congress, the KMT reportedly submitted its application for mem-
bership in the Comintern: "The KMT also applied for membership in the Comintern, but 
it was not accepted, not being a Communist organization" (William Z. Foster, History of 
the Three Internationals [New York: International Publishers, 1955], p. 347). But the 
KMT was not the least discouraged when her application was politely denied. The KMT 
steadily worked toward this goal as may be seen by the following: "The sixth enlarged 
plenum of the ECCI met from February 17 to March 15, 1926 . . . . Hu Han-min, a mem-
ber of the Kuomintang attended for that party, which had been admitted to the Comintern 
as a sympathizing party. In the meeting of the CPSU political bureau in March 1926 the 
decision to admit the Kuomintang was carried out against the vote of Trotsky" (Jane Degras, 
The Communist International 1919-1943, Documents [London, New York, Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1960], II, 245). 
5. Original text in the collection of historical documents in the KMT archives, Taipei. 
6. See note 5 of this chapter. 
7. See note 5 of this chapter. 
8. Shao Li-tzu, who at the time was closely associated with Chiang Kai-shek, attended 
the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI in November, 1926, as the representative of the KMT. On 
several occasions early in 1927 I heard him make speeches from the balcony of Comintern 
headquarters in Moscow. 
9. Kao Yin-tzu, ed., Chung-hua min-\uo ta-shih-chi (Chronicle of major events in the 
Republic of China; Taipei, 1957), p. 264. 
10. See note 5 of this chapter. 
11. See note 5 of this chapter. 
12. Both Li Chou-sheng and Wang Pao-li were members of the so-called 28 Bolsheviks. 
Li Chou-sheng, a favorite of Ch'en Shao-yu, returned to China during the summer of 1930, 
where he worked in Shanghai in the Organization Department of the CC of the CCP. 
According to the confession Hsiang Chung-fa made to his Nationalist captors before they 
executed him, Li was for a time in charge of the Organization Department. In 1932, when 
the Shanghai Bureau of the CC was created following the departure of the CC itself to 
Jui-chin, he became the first chairman of that bureau, in which I was in charge of propaganda. 
Because of his position in the Shanghai Bureau, the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth CC elected 
him a member of the CC and an alternate member of the Politburo. He was arrested on June 
26, 1934, in Shanghai—a day still vivid in my memory—for there were massive raids on 
Communist organizations in Shanghai that day, and I was nearly captured. As it turned 
out, though, I succeeded Li Chou-sheng as chairman of the Shanghai Bureau. 
13. Yang Ming-chai and Voitinsky first visited Li Ta-chao in Peking, and through Li's 
introduction they met Ch'en Tu-hsiu in Shanghai. In Shanghai they founded the School 
of Foreign Languages whose function was to select students for Moscow's KUTV. In 
Shanghai and Canton they organized the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps and also did organiza-
tional work in the Shanghai trade unions. 
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14. I have had an opportunity to examine 
University of Kansas Library. 
15. There were, of course, other Chinese 
mostly by Japanese. But these translations were, t 
several early numbers of this journal at the 
translations of some Marxist-Leninist works, 
y and large, not well done. 
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Chapter V 
The Educational Program and the Teaching 
Methods Used at Sun Yat-sen University 
THE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM AND CURRICULUM 
The educational objectives and curriculum of Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity took into consideration the following: 
1. The goal of the university was the successful training of highly 
skilled political workers, and not primarily the education of aca-
demic scholars or scientists.1 In view of this consideration, natural 
science courses were completely absent from the curriculum. 
2. In view of the rapid expansion of the Chinese revolutionary move-
ment, with its accompanying increased demands for skilled political 
workers and leaders, the training of political workers had to be 
swift and efficacious. Because of this, the period of training was two 
years, half that of a regular university. 
3. The emphasis was on both theory and practice. To be efficient 
political workers, the students had to be capable of wielding a pen 
to sway the masses and of wielding a sword to direct a campaign. 
4. Academic endeavor had to be supplemented by actual on-the-spot 
observations of Russian governmental structure and Party orga-
nization. 
In keeping with the above four considerations, the two-year cur-
riculum of Sun Yat-sen University was as follows: 
1. Language Instruction. There was intensive work in the Russian 
language, plus elective courses in a second language, such as English, 
French, or German. During the first semester, Russian was the most 
important and demanding course. It was also one of the most im-
portant factors in deciding whether a student passed or failed. This 
emphasis was carried through the second semester, but by this time 
some students simply dropped the study of Russian while others con-
tinued their struggle with Russian grammar. 
2. History. The history curriculum included the following courses; 
History of the Evolution of Social Formations, History of the Chinese 
Revolutionary Movement, History of the Russian Revolution, History 
of Eastern Revolutionary Movements, and History of Western Revolu-
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tionary Movements. The reason for this emphasis on history is quite 
clear. To the Marxists, traditional history, as a product of bourgeois 
historiography, is unorganized chaos, showing little awareness of order 
or of the objective laws that govern the historical development of 
human societies. 
The five history courses at the university were newly developed. 
The History of the Evolution of Social Formations was concerned with 
the processes and various stages of social evolution. This course was one 
of the most colorful and interesting at the university, and I was very 
much involved in it, for I was the senior assistant instructor in this 
course and did most of the interpreting for it, both from Russian to 
Chinese and from Chinese to Russian. 
The History of the Chinese Revolutionary Movement was taught 
by Karl Radek, the first rector of the university. This course included 
discussions of Chinese history in general; the emphasis, however, was 
understandably on modern revolutionary movements. Radek's views 
were strikingly similar to the views of the Chinese Communist his-
torian Fan Wen-Ian, and it is not impossible that the latter's were 
borrowed from Radek. Fan contends that the whole history of China 
is a history of agrarian revolutions.2 The two courses on the History 
of the Russian Revolution and the History of Western Revolutionary 
Movements, as can be noted from their titles, also focused upon revolu-
tionary movements. The instructor of History of Eastern Revolution-
ary Movements was also a celebrity, and his course, like Radek's, was 
taught in the auditorium. Unfortunately, I am not absolutely sure of 
his name. However, it was probably B. F. Shumiantsky, known also 
as Andrei Chervonnyi, an expert on Oriental affairs and, at that time, 
rector of KUTV in Moscow. 
The above is a summary of the history curriculum in Sun Yat-sen 
University. The courses had one guiding principle—to inculcate in 
the student the principle of "historical materialism," and "the concept 
of world revolution." To achieve this end, I am sure that the university 
administration must have worked zealously. 
3. Philosophy. Our philosophical education was supplied by a 
unique course entitled Materialism. The purpose of the course was to 
provide the student with a new world-view, and with a new method-
ology—dialectics. This course consisted of dialectical materialism and 
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historical materialism. Stalin, in his Dialectical and Historical Ma-
terialism, gives a clear indication of the content of these two aspects 
of materialism. He states: 
Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party. It 
is called dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena of nature, 
its method of studying and apprehending them, is dialectical, while its interpre-
tation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, 
is materialistic? 
On historical materialism Stalin writes: 
Historical materialism is the extension of the principles of dialectical material-
ism to the study of social life, an application of the principles of dialectical 
materialism to the phenomena of the life of society, to the study of society and of 
its history.4 
The above two definitions express the content of the course quite 
clearly. Most of the young Chinese intellectuals at Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity, of whom I was one, had only a weak background in traditional 
Chinese philosophy and very little knowledge of "bourgeois" or modern 
Western philosophy. We were instantly fascinated by the freshness 
of dialectical materialism. The novelty of dialectical philosophy, plus 
the fact that the course was taught in my class by a young and beautiful 
female instructor, made the course a very enthralling one indeed. 
4. Political Economy. Basically, this course involved studying 
Marx's Das Kapital. Since Das Kapital itself was a highly technical 
and difficult work, we used Karl Kautsky's The Economic Doctrine 
of Karl Marx as a textbook. Kautsky's work is truly remarkable, pre-
senting the thought of Das Kapital with a lucidity not found in other 
books. In the second year of the course we used Lapidus's and 
Ostrovityanov's An Outline of Political Economy, which was then a 
new book, as a text. In it they not only expounded Marx's economic 
theory, but applied it in analyzing actual Soviet experience in the con-
struction of a Socialist economy. The above, then, formed the basic 
content for our study of political economy. Great importance was 
attached to this course in political economy at the university. It was 
always a difficult course in the two-year curriculum, and was usually 
taught by renowned, first-class economists from Russia or Germany. 
5. Economic Geography. Although Marxists deny that geographical 
environment exerts a determining influence on social evolution, they 
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nevertheless cannot deny that "Geographical environment is unques-
tionably one of the constant and indispensable conditions of develop-
ment of society and, of course, influences the development of society, 
accelerates or retards its development."5 
After the Russian Revolution much talent was used on research in 
economic geography—an especially well developed branch of geogra-
phy then in the United States and the United Kingdom—and the re-
sults of this research made direct contributions to the Soviet national 
economy. Our years at the university coincided with this period of 
relatively intense research, and, consequently, such a course was taught 
at the university. Although the Russians did vast amounts of work in 
the field of economic geography during this period, the basic subject 
matter still followed the research and accomplishments of Western 
scholars, and many of the lectures were given in English. 
6. Leninism. During the early part of April, 1924, after Lenin's 
death in January, Stalin delivered a series of lectures at Sverdlov Uni-
versity in Moscow, systematically expounding his interpretation of the 
doctrines of Lenin. From these lectures "Leninism" was born. When 
these lectures were published in book form under the title Foundations 
of Leninism, they took on even greater importance. As one can 
imagine, "Leninism" was a very important course at the university. 
The textbook used was Stalin's Foundations of Leninism mentioned 
above. The instructors in this course were invariably reputable Com-
munist theoreticians. Of all the courses in Sun Yat-sen University, 
this course had the most impressive list of professors. 
7. Military Science. The study of military strategy was undertaken 
both because of the theoretical importance of the subject and because 
it was a practical necessity. The course was perhaps one of Sun Yat-sen 
University's most distinguishing features, as one doesn't usually en-
counter military science of this variety in a university. 
Lenin had said that important issues in history were all decided by 
force, and Stalin said in 1926, "In China the armed revolution is fight-
ing the armed counter-revolution. This is one of the specific features 
and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution. And therein lies 
the special significance of the revolutionary army in China."6 He 
further urged: 
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In the first place, the Communists in China must in every way intensify 
political work in the a rmy , . . . 
In the second place, the Chinese revolutionaries, including the Communists, 
must undertake a thorough study of the art of war. They must not regard it as 
something secondary, because nowadays it is a cardinal factor in the Chinese 
revolution.7 
The seriousness with which the courses in military science were 
conducted at the university was totally in keeping with Stalin's judg-
ment. During my stay at the university, from December, 1926, on, the 
director of military-science education was a division commander with 
the Chinese name of K'ung Chieh-chih, whose Russian name I have 
forgotten. At that time he apparently was commander of the garrison 
forces of Moscow, and at one time he had been a military adviser in 
China. In addition, there were some officers with the rank of colonel. 
Among them was the director of the university's military-research 
room, a wing commander called Akimov.8 
In the military-research room were exhibited various common fire-
arms such as cannons, rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, and howit-
zers, in addition to assorted topographical sand models. As a supple-
ment to regular classroom lectures, lectures were held in this room 
on the structure and use of the various weapons. In addition, we often 
toured the military academies near Moscow and visited nearby army 
garrisons to practice marksmanship. Starting in 1928, each summer 
the whole male student body of the university, with a few exceptions, 
put on military uniforms and were quartered in an army garrison near 
Moscow to receive field training. According to one of the students 
who participated in this training, most of the officers there had been 
officers at Whampoa Military Academy in China. At the end of the 
training session the students were told by one officer, "Your military 
training has been comparable to the military training received by 
Whampoa Academy cadets in classes one, two, and three; and you 
are now able to lead military campaigns." He was not boasting, for 
many students later did become famous generals, attesting to the suc-
cess of Sun Yat-sen University's combination of military and academic 
education. 
The above passage has outlined the educational plan and cur-
riculum of Sun Yat-sen University. Some courses, such as Economic 
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of a Russian-language work entitled A Study Of Sun Yat-sen s Teach-
ings were available free of charge. While no authorship was attributed 
to the book, it seemed obvious to us that it had been written by some-
one who knew a great deal about the subject. Its detailed analysis of 
Sun Yat-sen's teachings was severely critical of them. The author 
chiefly developed ideas which Lenin propounded in 1912 in "Democ-
racy and Narodnism in China." For in that article Lenin praised Sun 
Yat-sen as a progressive bourgeois democrat, while at the same time 
warning that underlying Sun's Socialist ideas was "petty-bourgeois 
'Socialist' reactionary" theory.10 The ready availability of this volume 
at Sun Yat-sen University was ironic indeed. It demonstrated, of course, 
that the relationship between the Russian Communists and the KMT 
was not based upon any ideological affinity, but upon political con-
siderations and tactical expediency. 
From all that has been written above, one can draw some conclu-
sions: First, the usual four-year course was completed in two years' 
time. The work was so intensive that the students had to spend eight 
hours a day in the classroom. Second, from the nature of the courses 
one sees that the ambition of Sun Yat-sen University was no less than 
the complete molding of a student's thinking, starting from the very 
fundamentals of philosophy and world view. The final goal was to 
enable him, in whatever circumstances, to grasp the essentials and 
arrive at ready-made answers through a ready-made methodology. 
And, finally, while Sun Yat-sen University nominally was supposed to 
train KMT cadres, in fact it was designed solely to turn out students 
oriented towards furthering the Communist movement in China. 
SOME CLASS ARRANGEMENTS AND SPECIAL FACILITIES AT THE 
UNIVERSITY 
Sun Yat-sen University was a veritable catchall of personalities dif-
ferent from each other in education and in status. About five hundred 
persons made up the first and second graduating classes of the univer-
sity. My own student identification card was 527, which indicated 
that by the time I enrolled at Sun Yat-sen University at the end of 
1926, 526 students had enrolled previously, and there were, of course, 
enrollments which followed mine at about the same time. However, 
students left the university from time to time without having graduated. 
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For example, following the Plenum of the ECCI in November, 1926, 
about thirty Sun Yat-sen University students were drafted to join 
M. N. Roy's mission to China. Thus, allowing for such dropouts, an 
estimate of about five hundred students actually studying at the uni-
versity at the end of 1926 and the beginning of 1927 seems reasonable. 
A majority of these came directly from China; but some of them ar-
rived from the United States, Germany, France, the Philippines, and 
other countries. 
One alumnus of Sun Yat-sen University states: 
The group from China was the most diverse. There were dudes and belles, 
housewives and mistresses, soldiers, laborers, and farmers, although students pre-
dominated. According to Marxist classifications, ninety percent of them were 
petty bourgeoisie. This great diversity of backgrounds thus also explains the 
tremendous differences in their levels of education, ranging from nearly illiterate 
to scholarly graduate students or even professors. After the Communist revolts at 
Nanchang and Canton in 1927, the number of students of the university increased 
rapidly, although there was also a corresponding decline in their quality.11 
The above account is not exaggerated, for the academic plan and ar-
rangement of classes had to take this great diversity into account. 
The arrangement of classes was sometimes based on the linguistic 
qualifications of the students. For example, in the first and second 
graduating classes there were the so-called English Class, the Russian 
Class, and the Semi-Russian Class; and the students in these groups 
received most of their instruction in the foreign language that they 
already were able to understand. In the English Class, for example, 
lectures were delivered in English, and in it were people who either 
had studied in the United States or had otherwise acquired facility in 
English. Students in the Russian Class included people who had 
studied Russian in China or who had rapidly picked up the language 
in Russia. In the Semi-Russian Class an interpreter was used only 
part of the time. This procedure somewhat alleviated the chronic 
shortage of Russian-Chinese interpreters. It also facilitated commu-
nication between students and instructors, which the process of in-
terpreting made burdensome and time-consuming. 
On my arrival at the university in November of 1926,1 was enrolled 
in the tenth class of the second graduating class, all meetings of which 
were addressed through Chinese-language interpreters. Later I moved 
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up to the seventh class, which also depended on interpreters. There I 
met two friends of mine, Wu Chia-yu and Wang Ch'ung-wu. Wu had 
studied Russian for a while at Peking University, but had later majored 
in Chinese literature. Therefore he had to take up Russian anew in 
Moscow. Wang sat next to me in class. He was a very large gentle-
man from Shantung, candid, forthright, and impatient with conven-
tions. He was also a brilliant scholar. All in all, I must say that I 
benefited greatly from my close association with these two individuals. 
Unfortunately, however, I was soon transferred to the fourth class, the 
so-called Semi-Russian Class. 
Aside from linguistic considerations, the length of time of Party 
membership (CCP, of course) also seemed to be a factor in class place-
ment. The seventh group of the first graduating class was one that 
appeared to have been set up with this criterion in mind. We called 
it the "Theoretical Class." Most students in this class had been Party 
members for a long time and had lengthy experience in the revolution. 
Some were also professors. Many were already famous, like Chou 
T'ien-lu, Shen Tse-min, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Hu Chung, Li Chun-tse, 
Yu Hsiu-sung, Ch'u Wu, Tso Ch'uan, and Wang Pien (a woman). 
Yu Hsiu-sung had played an important part in the early history of 
the CCP. When the Comintern sent Voitinsky, who was accompanied 
by Yang Ming-chai, to China in March, 1920, Yu ably served for a 
time as Voitinsky's assistant. Yu was also instrumental in the prepara-
tions that went into founding both the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps 
and the CCP. In addition he helped to found the Foreign Languages 
School in Shanghai. Wang Pien served as director of the Shantung 
CYC. Shen Tse-min, brother of the famous Communist author Shen 
Yen-ping (Mao Tun), was also famous in Shanghai's literary circles 
in his own right. In 1923 he, along with Wang Ch'iu-hsin and Chiang 
Kuang-chih, fellow students at Shanghai University, led the "Revolu-
tionary Literature Movement." At Sun Yat-sen University he was not 
only a student, but also an interpreter and assistant instructor. He was 
one of the 28 Bolsheviks in the university. Upon Shen's return to 
China, he was sent later to the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Base as one of 
the representatives of the CC, where he died after a long illness. 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing, originally a "work and frugal study" student in 
France, went to Moscow from France. While a student at Sun Yat-sen 
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University he acquired the nickname "Little Cannon" because of his 
short stature and aggressive spirit. After his return to China he was 
stationed in Kwangsi Province, where he organized insurrections 
among KMT troops and was a founder of the Soviet district there. 
Subsequently, he did important political work in the Red Army and 
experienced a conspicuous and rapid rise in influence under Mao Tse-
tung. At the Eighth Congress of the CCP in 1956 he became secretary 
general of the Party's Secretariat. Among a great many other top-
level undertakings, Teng headed the CCP delegation to Moscow in 
July, 1963, which held, and then broke off, talks with the CPSU's 
leadership. Yet in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which 
began in 1966, he became a target of attack second only to Liu Shao-ch'i. 
Chou T'ien-lu broke with the CCP and subsequently became an im-
portant Trotskyite. He was very learned in Chinese history and litera-
ture and once served as an adviser to General Hu Tsung-nan. He was 
shot by an underground CCP agent in Shanghai in 1949 shortly before 
the CCP took the city. 
Ch'u Wu was the son-in-law of the deceased KMT hero Yu Yu-jen. 
At one time he left the CCP and was a member of the Nationalist gov-
ernment's Control Yuan. Since 1949 he has worked in Peking. 
Tso Ch'uan originally attended Whampoa Military Academy, and 
after his graduation from Sun Yat-sen University, he continued his 
studies at Moscow Military Academy. In 1930 Tso returned to China 
and went to the Kiangsi Soviet Military District as commander of the 
Fifteenth Army. 
One can easily see that this "Theoretical Class" was quite extra-
ordinary. While there were other groups in the first and second grad-
uating classes at Sun Yat-sen University, none contained such notable 
individuals. 
A class called the Special Class was formed sometime in 1928. It 
included among its members not only long-time Communist Party 
members, but also such KMT "founding fathers" as Wu Yu-chang, 
who had been a member of the Tung-meng Hui and a member of the 
CEC of the KMT. During the revolution of 1925-1927 Wu represented 
the Communist Party in the Wuhan government. After the failure 
of that revolution, Wu was sent to Sun Yat-sen University. When the 
university was closed down in 1930, he was sent to Vladivostok as an 
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instructor in the Soviet Party School there which was operated jointly 
by the local Soviet Party and the local government for young Chinese 
workers living in the Russian Far East.* The rector and all the faculty 
members of the school were former students of Sun Yat-sen University. 
Upon his return to China, Wu was concerned with CCP cultural and 
educational affairs. He was at the time of his death on December 12, 
1966, a member of the CC of the CCP and chairman of the State 
Council's Committee for the Simplification of the Chinese Language. 
Many of the measures for reforming the Chinese language have been 
due to his efforts. Even while he was still at Sun Yat-sen University, 
he had started to work on the Latinization of the language. While in 
Vladivostok, he was, along with myself, a member of the Soviet Russian 
Far East District Committee for the Promotion of the Latinization of 
the Chinese Language. Among his notable contributions were the 
writing of a Latinized textbook and a dictionary. 
Another senior member in this Special Class was Lin Tsu-han, also 
called Lin Po-chu. He joined the revolutionary movement while still 
a student in Japan, and he was one of Sun Yat-sen's early comrades and 
a member of the Tung-meng Hui. During the period of KMT-CCP 
cooperation in the nineteen twenties he was a member of the CEC of 
the KMT and one of the Communist Party's important representatives 
in the KMT administration. Like Wu Yu-chang, he went to Moscow 
in 1928; and again like Wu, he went to Vladivostok to teach in the 
Soviet Party School for young Chinese workers. Upon his return to 
China, he first became the Finance Minister of the Central Soviet Gov-
ernment in Kiangsi, and later chairman of the Communist government 
of the Border Regions during the Yenan period. Prior to his death in 
1960 Lin served as a member of the Politburo of the CCP. 
A third senior member of the Special Class was Hsu T'e-li, whose 
nickname was "Ole Grandma." He was a famous educator in Hunan 
Province. Among his students was Mao Tse-tung. In 1968 he was 
deputy chief of the Department of Propaganda of the CC of the CCP 
and a long-time member of the CC. 
Yeh Chien-ying, who became a marshal in the Red Army and a 
member of the CC of the CCP, was another member of the Special 
* At this time there were perhaps 100,000 Chinese in the Vladivostok area. 
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Class. At the time of writing, he holds a great many extremely im-
portant military and governmental posts in Peking. 
In the Special Class, too, were Chiang Hao, who had been a member 
of the Peking military government's Parliament in the early twenties,12 
and Fang Wei-hsia, who had served as Director of Education in the 
Hunan provincial government in the early twenties. Both were prom-
inent Communists who had played leading roles in the Nanchang Up-
rising of August 1,1927. 
Yet another member was Hsia Hsi, who attended the Sixth National 
Congress of the CCP in Moscow in June, 1928, where he was elected 
a member of the CC of the CCP. When he returned to China he was 
assigned to the Hunghu-Hunan-Western Hupeh Base to direct Party 
affairs. And lastly there was Ho Shu-heng, who, along with Mao 
Tse-tung, represented the Hunan Communist group to the First Na-
tional Congress of the CCP at Shanghai on July 1, 1921. He was also 
a delegate to the Sixth National Congress of the CCP. After his re-
turn from Moscow in 1930, he was assigned to work in the Kiangsi 
Soviet district. Ho attended the First National Congress of Chinese 
Soviets held at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, on November 7, 1931. At this con-
gress he was elected inspector general of the Central Soviet government. 
Ho also participated in the Second National Congress of Chinese 
Soviets held in Kiangsi on January 22, 1934. At this congress Ho Shu-
heng was elected a member of the CEC of the Central Soviet govern-
ment. 
After reviewing the records of these individuals, there can be no 
doubt that they were indeed a very "special class." All had extraor-
dinary careers, all were highly educated, and all were experienced 
revolutionary warriors. Their special qualifications naturally pre-
sented difficulties for the university's administration. For one thing, 
most of them were past the age of fifty, and their ability to memorize 
had declined. Therefore, their foreign-language hours had to be re-
duced correspondingly. In the second place, most of them were learned 
scholars, so the class had to be conducted on a much more sophisticated 
level than ordinary classes. Their class was conducted more like a 
graduate seminar than an ordinary lecture course. Third, as they had 
been leaders and would continue their leadership upon their return 
to China, special emphasis had to be put on leadership training. 
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With this special attention these "old students" showed great spirit 
in applying themselves. One of the most enthusiastic students was Hsu 
T'e-li. At that time, he was well past the age of fifty, and some of his 
teeth had already fallen out, causing him considerable difficulty in 
pronouncing the troublesome Russian sounds. But he was undaunted. 
Every morning he would wake up very early and practice his pro-
nunciation. 
Ho Shu-heng was another student who never tired of learning. Al-
though in appearance he was rather dull looking, he was actually quite 
quick-witted. In May of 1927, when General Hsu K'e-hsiang carried 
on the anti-Communist coup in Changsha, Hunan (this was the so-
called Ma-jih Incident), Ho Shu-heng was one of the persons captured, 
and of course he had little chance of escaping the death sentence. For-
tunately for him, however, the judge had no idea who he was and con-
cluded from his appearance that Ho was certainly not a rebel, but 
probably an old country scholar. The judge scornfully asked Ho's 
name and profession. Ho answered that his name was Chang, and 
that he was a private tutor. Then feigning naivety, he went on to re-
cite with gusto passages from the Analects of Confucius. The judge 
stopped him impatiently and continued with the questioning, "Do you 
know what the Kuomintang and the Communists are?" To this ques-
tion Ho answered with dignity, "I am a scholar! What things do I not 
know?" "Then tell what you know. Speak up, speak up!" To this 
Ho replied with an obvious air of satisfaction, "I know perfectly well 
that the Kuomintang is the Three Principles of the People and that 
the Communist Party is the sponsor of a 'Constitution of Five Rights.'" 
This marvelous theory was greeted with loud laughter, and even the 
judge could not keep from smiling. With a loud bang from the judge's 
gavel, Ho was dismissed from the courtroom. By the time that the 
authorities had found out who Ho really was, he had long since 
disappeared. 
There are endless interesting anecdotes concerning the students of 
the Special Class. After two years of intense study, the achievements 
of the Special Class were understandably great, and those who were 
not later captured or executed made considerable contributions to the 
Communist revolution. However, I must not digress further. 
The Preparatory Class, a special class for undereducated workers, 
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came into being in the following manner. In the 1920s the Comintern 
had complained that the composition of the membership of the CCP 
was faulty, that the majority of Party members were petty bourgeois in 
origin, and that the CCP hadn't assimilated laborers into the Party or 
trained proletarian cadres. The Comintern asked how such a party 
could ever hope to bring about the hegemony of the proletariat. For 
this reason, at the Fourth Comintern Congress of November-December, 
1922, Ch'en Tu-hsiu was chided by Karl Radek, who told him to get 
out of his Confucian ivory tower and start a labor movement. The 
Comintern was evidently quite dissatisfied with what it regarded as 
the overly academic character of the CCP's leadership, regarding it as 
not sufficiently proletarian. And indeed, after that the CCP did try to 
recruit more workers and to train proletarian cadres. 
In June, 1928, at the Sixth National Congress of the CCP, a former 
boatman from Hankow named Hsiang Chung-fa was elected secretary 
general of the CCP in keeping with the wishes of the Comintern, 
which inaugurated a "Proletarian Age" in the CCP. This step of elect-
ing a proletarian Party leader was unprecedented in the history of the 
CCP. In reality, however, the action was a mere formality, for from 
the time of his election to his capture and execution, Hsiang was never 
more than a puppet. 
During this same period of time the "Proletarian Age" was also 
heralded in at Sun Yat-sen University. After the 1927-1928 failure of 
the revolution, the Communist organizations in Shanghai, Wuhan, 
Canton, and other industrial and commercial centers were for the most 
part destroyed. It was the proletarian members of the Party who 
suffered the most. In order to save as many of the proletarian elements 
as possible, a group of selected proletarian cadres was sent to Sun Yat-
sen University in Moscow. 
Most of these proletarian comrades were illiterate. Their training 
and education thus presented special difficulties, and they were all 
enrolled in a special Preparatory Class. The primary objective of this 
class was the elimination of illiteracy plus the absorption of a limited 
amount of general knowledge. 
The main courses of this class were Chinese, history, geography, 
arithmetic, and "political common sense." There was also Russian-
language instruction. 
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I was honored to teach the political common sense course for this 
class, which made me quite apprehensive, because these were not 
ordinary students and because I knew that theoretically they would 
be the future leaders of the revolution. Many of the students had 
absolutely no educational background, and lecturing to them was very 
difficult. Progress was slow in this class, and their achievements were 
somewhat less than ideal. However, considering the almost complete 
lack of any educational foundation, one could not have expected any 
more of them. In the classroom the workers used Bukharin's The A B 
C of Communism as a text, while outside the classroom they learned 
the practical aspects of proletarian leadership by participating in Party 
and student organizations. 
In spite of their generally low scholastic level the proletarians were 
a powerful faction within the university. One episode involving pro-
letarian leadership, while it does not strictly fit into a description of 
the academic program, may illustrate the situation. A worker was 
elected chairman of the students' commune, and even the dining-room 
supervisor was of proletarian origin. This dining-room supervisor was 
an individual named Li Chien-ju, the hero of three Shanghai revolts 
(1926-1927). He had chronically bloodshot eyes and a very fearsome 
face. He was involved in one incident that I remember quite distinctly. 
A "bourgeois" student, Hsi-men Tsung-hua,13 was eating only the soft 
inner part of the bread and throwing away the crusts. This was ob-
viously an act of wanton waste, and Supervisor Li would have none 
of it. At first Li tried to persuade Hsi-men that his action was wrong. 
Hsi-men, however, felt that his honor was challenged, and he turned 
a deaf ear to Li, continuing to eat only the soft part of the bread. Li 
was so enraged that his bloodshot eyes lit up even more fearsomely 
than usual. He picked up a knife and advanced toward Hsi-men 
Chung-hua as if he were about to kill him on the spot. Hsi-men, how-
ever, retreated very hastily. Li watched him flee with a chuckle, and 
nothing more came of the incident. 
The seminars (Kafedra in Russian) were another important part 
of the academic setup at Sun Yat-sen University. These seminars were 
composed of the professors of a course, its assistant instructors, and its 
interpreters, who met regularly to discuss the daily progress of the 
course in question, and to prepare the lecture materials and translations, 
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The courses that had such seminars were Military Science, History 
of the Evolution of Social Formations, Political Economy, and Lenin-
ism. Each seminar had office space and special rooms allotted to it. 
In the Military Science seminar room there were various weapons 
and sand models on display, while in the History of the Evolution of 
Social Formations seminar room there was a small museum with vari-
ous charts on the evolution of human society and many historical arti-
facts. These seminars had a very stimulating effect on the students 
associated with them. 
I was appointed to the seminar for the History of the Evolution of 
Social Formations and was head of the Chinese staff for it. The course 
was a very broad one, drawing upon different fields such as arche-
ology, anthropology, and paleontology, each of which had a difficult 
technical vocabulary. For this reason it was the most unpopular course 
among the interpreters. However, I liked the course and enjoyed in-
terpreting for it. 
Other members of this seminar were Li Chou-sheng, Yang Shang-
k'uen, Wang Sheng-ti (Wang Hao), Hsiao T'e-fu, Liu Ch'i-feng, Fan 
Hui-chou, and a Mr. Hsu. Yang Shang-k'uen, as a member of the 
CC of the CCP and chief administrative official of the CC office, came 
under vitriolic attack in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 
the late 1960s. Wang Sheng-ti was a transfer student from the Univer-
sity of Paris. Wang, upon his return to China, was appointed propa-
ganda chief of the Kiangsu provincial committee of the CCP. Later 
he was captured and left the Party. Upon his release he became a 
professor at the Land Research Institute in Nanking. Still later he 
turned to administrative affairs and became director of the Land Affairs 
Bureau of Hunan and Hupeh provinces. In 1949, when the Commu-
nists occupied the mainland, he had just completed his term as mayor 
of Changsha, Hunan. He was taken prisoner and died in jail. Hsiao 
T'e-fu was another transfer student from France. Upon his return to 
China he became a professor of economics at the University of Peking. 
Li, Yang, Wang, Hsiao, and myself were all members of the so-called 
28 Bolsheviks. About the fate of the other three students mentioned 
above I know little. After the university closed, Liu Ch'i-feng stayed 
in Moscow and translated Marxist classics. Lastly, the fates of Fan 
Hui-chou and Mr. Hsu are a complete mystery to me. 
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In all, there were four professors for the course. The head profes-
sor was a bearded man named Levkovsky who loved to drink. I in-
terpreted for him. At that time I had only studied Russian for six or 
seven months; my fellow students frankly had no great faith in my 
ability, and I must say I had even less. Fortunately, Levkovsky was a 
very cooperative and understanding person, and he was a great help 
to me in the first few sessions. 
While the hours that I spent in the seminar room preparing transla-
tion materials or asking one of the professors on duty about some ob-
scure point in the lectures paid off handsomely, generally speaking, 
acting as an interpreter was more detrimental to me than helpful. This 
was due to the fact that preparation for the seminar took a great deal 
of time and delayed my own work. However, I was compensated for 
this loss of time by one hundred and seventy-five rubles a month—a 
considerable sum of money at that time. Among the students I was 
considered a "capitalist," and requests for loans and donations were 
numerous. I became known as the "Little Meng Shang-chun," Meng 
Shang-chun having been a prime minister in ancient times who was 
noted for his generosity. 
The Russian Consultation Seminar was another special facility to 
aid the students who were studying Russian. The Russian instructors 
took turns on duty, answering any questions that students might have 
in regard to the Russian language. I was a frequent visitor to this con-
sultation seminar, especially during my second semester at the univer-
sity when I had already become an interpreter myself. At this time I 
found that many Russian textbooks were still quite difficult for me. 
Each day I would spend several hours in the consultation room with a 
Russian text and a dictionary by my side, looking up new words, ask-
ing the instructors questions, and jotting down notes. After a semester 
of hard work I began to make headway and progressed to more difficult 
readings such as Lenin's The State and Revolution. 
The rapid progress I was able to make I owed naturally to my in-
structors, but certainly the unique consultation room was also a great 
help. Most of the language instructors were ladies, and their patience, 
responsiveness, and sense of responsibility I cannot forget even to 
this day. 
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THE UNIQUE TEACHING METHODS USED AT SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY 
The teaching methods employed at the university were quite 
singular and were praised by all of the students who attended, regard-
less of their affiliation. These methods were efficiently attuned to the 
intensive two-year curriculum. 
First of all, the teaching methods were functionally dependent upon 
the different levels of education of the students in the regular, special, 
and preparatory classes. The methods employed in regular and special 
classes were more or less similar to one another, while differing radically 
from the methods employed in the preparatory classes for laborers and 
peasants, where the main task was to do away with their illiteracy. 
Naturally the specific method varied also with respect to the particular 
subject matter of the course. For instance, courses such as Dialectical 
and Historical Materialism placed great emphasis upon theoretical 
thinking and discussion, while courses such as Military Science natu-
rally tended to emphasize practical application. 
I shall first discuss the teaching method employed in the courses in 
Russian language. With the exception of a very few students who had 
studied some Russian before coming to the university, most of the 
students were completely ignorant of the complexities of the Russian 
tongue. However, due to the fact that the university operated on an 
intensive two-year curriculum, we students were immediately plunged 
into intensive courses in Russian newspaper reading, Russian prose, 
and Russian grammar. These three courses accounted for four hours 
of class time daily, six days a week. While this was the regular number 
of class hours devoted to courses, they were insufficient to permit the 
rapid absorption of language skills that was expected in the intensive 
two-year curriculum of Sun Yat-sen University. Consequently a 
method was employed which I shall refer to as the "speed-learning 
method." 
The first Russian class I attended was "Russian Newspaper Read-
ing." The newspaper we read was Pravda, and our introduction to it 
was abrupt and somewhat unorthodox. Identical copies of this news-
paper were placed before us, while at the same time the woman in-
structor began to read her copy aloud. Judging from her facial ex-
pression, she was evidently enthusiastic about what she was reading. 
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However, we might as well have been deaf. This fact did not seem 
to bother her a bit, and she only kept pointing to the title page and 
saying, "Sevodinya V Nomere . . ." (Today in this number . . .) . At 
the same time she gestured that we were to repeat after her. It was 
months before we finally acquired an "ear" for Russian. After this 
initial period, however, progress was surprisingly rapid. It was only 
then that we came to appreciate the effectiveness of this direct oral 
method. 
The second Russian course was Russian Prose Reading. The selec-
tions in the text were chosen especially for us. The articles were usually 
theoretical and argumentative in nature rather than descriptive or ex-
pressive. Quite obviously the design of the course was not to provide 
us with an appreciation for Russian literature, but rather to provide 
us with the vocabulary in politics, philosophy, and economics that was 
necessary for revolutionary work. Student participation was required 
of all. Right or wrong, the student had to learn not to be embarrassed 
by his errors and to speak, speak, speak 
The last course was Russian Grammar. Russian grammar is, to say 
the least, a very complicated matter. Just the inflections of case are 
enough to drive one insane; however, these inflections must be 
memorized if one is to be proficient at either reading or writing. In 
this class we wrote very few compositions. Instead, we concentrated 
primarily on the syntax and grammar necessary for a competence in 
reading Russian. It was assumed that we would pick up composition 
and literature on our own. 
In spite of the efficiency with which the Russian language was 
taught, however, there was just so much that could be accomplished 
in a two-year course. Of the more than one thousand students who I 
would estimate attended Sun Yat-sen University from its inception in 
1925 through its closing in 1930, I would guess that perhaps about ten 
percent of them actually achieved a usable proficiency in the Russian 
language. For even if one had studied Russian and nothing else for 
two years, one would have been hard-pressed to become truly proficient 
in the language; whereas, one actually had a good many additional, 
non-language courses to cope with while studying Russian at Sun Yat-
sen University. Furthermore, the concentration of study was on 
political, economic, and philosophic vocabularies to the exclusion of 
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the vocabulary of Russian literature. This meant that we were cut off 
from the culture of Mother Russia, which is an impossible state of 
affairs for someone who seeks to truly be at home in the Russian lan-
guage. We read not a single piece of literary writing, not even Gorky, 
and none of us, except I suppose for a few rare individuals, could trans-
late Russian literary works. I remember struggling through Gorky's 
Mother on my own, but I found it a trying task, and my understanding 
of it most likely was superficial. Nor was the difficulty in reading 
Gorky one merely of not understanding the culture of Mother Russia, 
for Gorky wrote a fairly colloquial Russian, and the Russian we learned 
in class was bookish and stilted. Thus, when we mingled with or-
dinary Russians, we found communicating difficult, and we had to 
learn the language of the common man on our own—those of us who 
were motivated to learn it, that is. I suppose such problems are com-
mon to any intensive language-study program, however, and I would 
doubt that ours was less satisfactory than most. 
In the social sciences the method of study could be divided into 
four distinct stages. In the first stage the professor lectured in Russian, 
giving an overall view on a particular problem, delimiting it, and 
pointing out important points the students should note. At this time 
the professor handed out a study outline and notes, along with the titles 
of reference works, with the minimum and maximum required read-
ings indicated. In studying these notes and reference materials, the 
students came across many questions and confusing points. These 
questions and points were then raised during a period of class con-
sultation in which the professor gave answers to the questions. This 
class consultation constituted the second stage of the method men-
tioned above. In the third stage the professor of the course asked in-
dividual students questions which they were required to answer ex-
temporaneously. A conference constituted the final stage of the process. 
This conference was an attempt to sum up the material examined in 
the foregoing stages. The discussion was free, and violent debates often 
erupted. During this discussion of conclusions, the professor acted as 
moderator. At the conclusion of the conference he would point out 
which views were correct and which were incorrect, and he would 
summarize the correct position. Each stage of this teaching method 
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usually ran around two hours, and the grades were assigned almost 
completely on the basis of the student's participation in class. 
The students at the university were all greatly impressed by the 
above teaching method, which they felt was more stimulating and 
efficient than the usual lecture method. Personally, it seems to me that 
this method had several advantages. The most important of these 
being: One, it stimulated thinking rather than emphasizing rote mem-
ory. Two, the student had to be active rather than passive. He had to 
choose his own special topic and reference material from the outline; 
he also had to analyze and criticize the works he read and raise ques-
tions about them. Three, the student benefited immensely from the 
mutual discussions. He began to see problems where he had sus-
pected none before and to see old solutions in a new light. Four, the 
stress upon daily work and oral testing in the class, with the accompa-
nying elimination of formal examinations, gave a true measure of the 
student's worth.14 Five, learning was like a battle. When one put 
forth his arguments it was like charging forward on a battlefield. If 
the student was defeated, he still learned perseverance in the face of 
adversity. He also learned grace in accepting defeat and complying 
with the will of the majority. 
The weekly meetings of Communist Party cells, into which all of 
us who were Party or Youth League members were grouped, were 
conducted exactly as were the class conferences mentioned above. 
There usually were twenty or, at the most, twenty-five of us in each 
cell, over which a guide presided. After the abolition of the Moscow 
branch of the CCP, a Russian always acted as guide. At the cell meet-
ings we could say anything we wished, or thought prudent, but each of 
us was required to say something about the topic under discussion. One 
could not remain silent, and anyone who sought to do so would be 
called upon by the guide to speak out. Of course, one facet of this 
approach to cell meetings and class conferences was an attempt to in-
sure that everyone concerned adhered to acceptable views and to single 
out and deal with aberrant ideas. But another aspect of the approach 
was to develop in all of us the ability to express ourselves on our feet. 
The method was effective in both respects. Even semiliterate workers 
developed the ability, through repeated pressure to do so, to express 
themselves publicly. Thus, while one might not be able to write any-
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thing at all, or even to read, one generally became adept at making 
speeches, which was an important quality for a revolutionary agitator 
to have. Hsiang Chung-fa, for example, who had been a semiliterate 
boatman and who for several years was secretary general of the CCP, 
could not write effectively; he was nevertheless an orator of some 
ability. This pattern was the case more often than not. 
Turning from classroom methods of teaching, I will now discuss 
the more practical aspects of our educational experience. These prac-
tical aspects of our education consisted primarily of excursions, tours, 
and practical training at industrial units. In the summer of 1927, after 
my arrival in Russia, the university organized two touring parties—one 
to the Crimean Peninsula and one to the Caucasus. The object of these 
tours was to study the history and social structure of the various 
minority groups in these regions. 
I was with the group that went to the Caucasus. It was composed of 
six or seven students and was headed by the dean of the university, 
Ignatov. The professor of Western History, Wax, and a professor of 
the History of the Evolution of Social Formations also accompanied 
our group. We left Moscow in July, going south to Vladikavkaz by 
train, and from there continuing our trip by bus along the famed 
Voenno-Gruzinskaya Daroga (Military Gruzinskaya Highway). Mid-
way we stopped at Kasbek for two nights and a day, and saw the 
perennially frozen glacier and a volcano. We also visited a nearby 
tribal village. After leaving Kasbek, our bus climbed higher and higher 
into the mountains. 
Finally, we arrived at a place called Basanaur. On our second day 
there we scaled a mountain in order to visit the Hefsur tribe. This 
tribe numbered approximately five hundred. And, although these 
people lived in the mountains, they were not considered backward. We 
met the tribe's hoary sage, a man of one hundred and twenty-five years. 
Through the services of a young policeman of the tribe, we were able 
to conduct a very interesting interview with the old sage. The Hefsur 
people were very proud, brave, warlike, and exceptionally long-lived. 
They had resisted Tsarist Russian oppression, and they also fought 
against the Soviet regime. The Soviet government had tried to subdue 
the tribe by armed force, but the Hefsurs used the mountainous terrain 
to their advantage and fought off the Russians valiantly. The conflict 
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dragged on and on, and finally the Soviet Russians had to adopt a soft 
approach—exemption of the Hefsurs from taxation and the education 
of selected Hefsur youths. It was through this group of educated 
Hefsur youths that the tribe was eventually conquered. 
Leaving the Hefsurs, we went to Tiflis (now renamed Tbilisi), the 
capital of the Georgian SSR, where we were given a very warm wel-
come by the native people. We stayed in Tiflis for two days and learned 
a great deal. 
So far we had been traveling in the mountains. But then we arrived 
at a place called Chakow which was very near the Black Sea. Chakow 
was a tea plantation, at that time the only one in Russia. Bamboo was 
also grown there. There were Chinese tea farmers working on the 
plantation. They were training the Russians in the arts of tea-growing 
and processing. These Chinese were royally treated by the Russians. 
After staying in Chakow for half a day, we went to an important 
port of the Georgian SSR on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, Batum. 
Giant oil pipelines linked Batum with the Baku oil fields. Batum was 
a thriving city, and the scenery in the vicinity of the city was quite 
beautiful. Our leader, Ignatov, saw fireflies, tea plants, and banana 
trees for the first time at Batum. 
We boarded ship at Batum and visited resorts around the Black Sea 
such as Sukhumn, Sochi, Yalta, and Sevastopol. From Sevastopol we 
took a train back to Moscow. The entire tour lasted more than a 
month, and we traveled thousands of miles. We saw and heard a lot 
that interested us. It was like taking a course on the history of the 
minority races of southern Russia. 
In April of 1928 the university organized a Leningrad tour, which 
was open to the entire student body. We visited many famous sites on 
this tour, including the Summer Palace and the Winter Palace. We 
also inspected many factories and docks. And naturally we visited the 
Smolny Institute, from which the October Revolution itself had been 
directed. On its third floor, we inspected the three offices which had 
been assigned to the Military Revolutionary Committee under the 
Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies which had been 
responsible for carrying out the uprising on October 24, 1917, by the old 
Russian calendar—November 6 by the new calendar. We also viewed 
office number 86 on the second floor, where Lenin worked and lived 
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during the uprising. Thus, generally speaking, we became better 
acquainted with the history of Russia and especially with the history of 
the October Revolution. What left the deepest impression on me were 
the dank, pitch-dark dungeons in the Trubetzkoi Bastion of the For-
tress of Peter and Paul. It was here that intractable revolutionaries had 
been imprisoned, we were told. We tested out some of these dungeons 
for ourselves. With their massive oak doors closed, one was left in total, 
soundless darkness, which, we were told and I believed it, rather 
quickly could drive a prisoner out of his mind. Those hideous dun-
geons symbolized for me the dark ages of Tsarism. 
On touring the Winter Palace, we saw on display a vast quantity of 
Chinese antiques and treasures, many of which had been seized by 
Tsarist forces when they joined the foreign expedition that occupied 
Peking as a result of the Boxer Uprising. The students in our group 
demanded to know how these Chinese treasures came into Russian 
hands. Caught off guard, our guide was speechless. Finally, he told us 
that the items had been bought by various private and official collectors. 
This lie only served to enrage the students even more. It was indeed an 
embarrassing situation for the guide. 
Besides these extended tours, there were various Moscow city tours 
and practical training at industrial installations. In Moscow we visited 
such points of interest as the Museum of History, the Darwin Museum, 
the Lenin Museum, the Museum of the Red Army, and a historically 
important underground printing press.15 
Often we went to observe various factories in and around Moscow, 
especially to study the tripartite system of cooperation and leadership 
(that is, the management, the Party organization, and the trade union). 
Sometimes we were assigned to attend factory meetings, so that we 
could experience in person the basic workings of the industrial unit 
and come into closer touch with the proletarian spirit which was 
deemed necessary for us members of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. 
However, the language employed in the factories was radically differ-
ent from that which we had learned in class, so for the most part we 
students could neither understand or make ourselves understood. We 
sat for hours on end at the conference table, deaf and dumb. As a 
consequence, the training in industrial units was of little value, and the 
desired results of this practical program were seldom achieved. 
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From the above, one can see that the main objective of the teaching 
methods at the university was the effective correlation of theory and 
practice. In fact, Stalin sums up the philosophical foundations of this 
teaching method when he states, "Theory is the experience of the work-
ing-class movement in all countries taken in its general aspect. Of 
course, theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolu-
tionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not 
illumined by revolutionary theory. But theory can become a tremen-
dous force in the working-class movement if it is built up in indis-
soluble connection with revolutionary practice."16 
The authorities of Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, in working 
out the above-described teaching methods, probably had this statement 
as a guide. These methods had far-reaching influence. The similarity 
of teaching methods subsequently employed in some colleges and 
universities in Communist China is not coincidental. 
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Chinese Revolution. 
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9. He was also known as Lin Po-chu. He came back to China in early 1933 and was 
sent to Jui-chin, Kiangsi, to take the post of Finance Minister of the Central Soviet government. 
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12. On his way back to China, I believe in 1930, Chiang Hao became critically ill on 
the train and had to enter a hospital at Vladivostok, where he died. I was working in 
Vladivostok at the time, and it fell to me to organize his funeral and officiate at it. He was 
buried with full military honors on a hill in a suburb of the city, where a contingent of the 
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13. A member of the Chinese CYC while at Sun Yat-sen University, Hsi-men Tsung-hua 
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for the professor or instructor to record the student's daily performance grades. The final 
grade for a course was the total accumulation of the daily grades, which was both fair and 
very accurate. 
15. About the city tours, one fellow student of the university wrote, "Moscow has 
numerous and varied museums and famous buildings. These museums, numbering one 
hundred and sixteen in all, classify and display multifarious artifacts and charts. As to the 
historical landmarks preserved by the government, there were about eight hundred and 
seventy in all, most of them well preserved for the people to visit" {Chin-jih ta-lu [Mainland 
today; Taipei], no. 103 [Jan. 1, 1960], p. 13). 
16. J. V. Stalin, Wor\s (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), VI, 92. 
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Chapter VI 
Room, Board, and Recreation at Sun Yat-sen 
University 
From a material and recreational standpoint, we were very well 
taken care of at the university, a state of affairs which had not always 
prevailed for Chinese who had stayed in Russia during the earlier 
years of the revolution. Perhaps the exceptional treatment we received 
could be traced back to the experience that began to accumulate at the 
First Congress of Toilers of the Far East in January, 1922, when Russia 
was ravaged by famine. There was scarcely enough to eat anywhere in 
Russia, and in large areas of the vast country people were dying of 
starvation. Many Chinese delegates to the Congress of Toilers of the 
Far East, of whom Chang Ch'iu-pai was a KMT delegate, were quite 
unhappy about the food and lodgings made available to them. Their 
dissatisfaction, moreover, apparently was reflected to a degree in polit-
ical positions that they took as a result of having attended the congress. 
A Russian, writing from China about this situation some years later, 
observed that the Chinese delegates to the congress had been better fed 
than Russian workers or the Russians in general.1 Nevertheless, he 
noted: 
The devastation in Russia resulting from famine and war created a very bad 
impression on the delegates, particularly KMT members. . . . 
Many members of the delegation, especially KMT members, returned to China 
and declared that on the basis of the actual conditions observed, the treatment 
they received in Russia, and the experience of traveling with the Communists, it 
was doubtful whether the KCT [Chinese Communist Party] could be of benefit 
to the country.2 
Perhaps the Russians learned a lesson from this congress. When the 
executive board of the university was aware that the majority of the 
students were KMT members, it took great pains in preparing the daily 
menu for the university. Of course, it was impossible to have rare 
delicacies on the menu, but we were never short of chicken, duck, fish, 
and meat, all of which were not easily obtainable even in 1926. 
In fact, the administration of the university carried its fear of a 
repeat performance of the 1922 Congress to extremes. One student, 
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who was at the university in 1925, recalls, "We had five meals a day 
when we first arrived at the university. Sometime later we requested 
the university to cancel the afternoon tea and the night snack, since we 
were not accustomed to eating five times a day. Besides, we thought it 
wasteful to do so. Three meals a day were plenty."3 Just imagine, 
five meals a day! The Russians must have taken us for gluttons. In any 
case, by the time I arrived in 1926, we received only three good meals 
a day. 
Such generosity was indeed wasteful at a time when the Russians 
were getting by economically only by living frugally. Flour, meat, 
hide, butter, and other commodities were exported in order to acquire 
foreign exchange. Despite the economic difficulties, both the quality 
and quantity of each of our three meals were quite high. For example, 
for breakfast there were eggs, bread and butter, milk, sausages, black 
tea, and occasionally even caviar. I do not think rich people anywhere 
enjoyed a more abundant breakfast than we did. 
In addition, the officials of the university were so anxious to create 
a favorable impression that when we students grew tired of Russian 
food, they hastened to accommodate us by employing a Chinese chef. 
From that time on, we had a choice of either Russian or Chinese food. 
We students were also clothed quite well. I clearly remember that 
upon admission each student was given a suit, a coat, a pair of shoes, 
towels, washcloths, handkerchiefs, shirts, combs, shoe polish, soap, a 
toothbrush, toothpaste, and all else that one might need in everyday 
life. Our towels and shirts were laundered free, and about the only 
things we had to buy for ourselves were hats and ties. 
It seemed that the only person in Soviet Russia in those days who 
wore a European-style felt hat was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. All 
of the rest of the Russian leaders wore either civilian or military caps. 
Neckties were almost as rare as felt hats, and women dressed pretty 
much as the men did. By and large, we followed the prevailing fash-
ions. We usually wore high-buttoned Lenin jackets or the popular 
violet Ukranian-style shirts that buttoned up the left side, although we 
also were issued European-style suits. In winter, which was terribly 
cold, we were supplied with quite adequate overcoats and warm hats. 
We were also given boots for snowy or rainy weather and sandals for 
summer wear 
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Let us now turn to housing at Sun Yat-sen University. At the be-
ginning, since there were not too many students, they were accommo-
dated on the third floor of the main school building. After 1927, with 
the increase of students, all bedrooms were converted into classrooms. 
Dormitories were then scattered in three or four places. They were 
clean, neat, and comfortable. 
Upon my arrival at the university I was assigned to live in a dormi-
tory on Petrovka Street. The building had been the residence of a duke 
during the reign of the Tsars. To a young farm boy like me, it was no 
less than a royal palace. Beautiful chandeliers sparkled before my eyes. 
I was more than pleased with my lodgings. However, as this dwelling 
was soon converted into a women's dormitory, I was forced to move 
into more conventional lodgings. 
Housing for the married students created some problems in the 
beginning. At first the university ignored the marital status of the 
students and assigned each student to a dormitory according to sex. 
Husbands and wives were forced to live apart. The unhappiness of the 
young married couples caused a daring young man named Yu Kuo-
chen to suggest that the university set aside a "secret meeting room" 
for their use while the family dormitories were being constructed. At 
first his suggestion was severely criticized by moralists young and old. 
However, the university administration was extremely broad-minded, 
setting aside a "secret meeting room" and hastening to rent a family 
dormitory. This benevolent policy not only won the praise of the mar-
ried students but also encouraged many unmarried students to have 
love affairs. Hence, both legitimate and illegitimate members of a 
second generation rapidly appeared. The married-students' dormitory 
was constructed in the spring of 1928. However, the birth rate of "little 
revolutionaries" had been high since 1926. Someone had once asked 
the rector, Radek, what he planned to do with the newborn revolution-
aries. Rector Radek laughed and answered, "That problem should not 
be hard to solve. We can set up nursery homes, and a few years from 
now we can even establish a kindergarten for them." 
A discussion of the housing problems at Sun Yat-sen University 
inevitably reminds me of the shortage of housing in Russia at that time. 
It was very hard to get a single house or even a single big room. Some-
times a large room was divided into smaller ones to accommodate 
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more families, which provided a home without privacy, for one could 
hear the snoring of one's neighbors! It left much to be desired in being 
called a home. The married-students' dormitory at Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity was of precisely the same pattern. 
The problem of transportation at the university was handled in a 
very simple manner. The university did not have school buses or cars. 
At that time trams were the means of transportation in Moscow. The 
university supplied those students who lived beyond walking distance 
of the campus with monthly tram tickets. The tickets were quite in-
expensive and could be used only before eight o'clock in the morning. 
If we slept late, we had to buy a regular-fare ticket with our own 
money. Of course, those students who lived close to campus walked to 
classes. 
Walking to and from the university, though, could have its draw-
backs, which I will mention by way of giving a bit of the atmosphere 
of Moscow then. Students who lived in Ileinka dormitory, which was 
near the headquarters of the CC of the CPSU, had to go through 
Kremlin City Park, which was dense with trees. In the evening it was 
poorly lighted, and it was there that prostitutes plied their trade. Many 
of these prostitutes were great, hulking amazons compared to some of 
the more delicate male Chinese students, and many of them desperately 
needed money. Two of these muscular prostitutes literally kidnapped 
one Chinese student and robbed him before they freed him. After that, 
we avoided Kremlin City Park and, for good measure, walked in 
groups rather than singly to minimize the possibility of being robbed. 
Having discussed the basic problems of daily living, I will now 
examine the recreational activities and student welfare at the university. 
There were actually a multitude of recreational activities, including 
movies, plays, and musicals sponsored by the university. At consider-
able expense, some of the greatest ballet troops in Russia were brought 
to our auditorium, as well as concert artists and prominent actors and 
actresses. We could and did see the best artistic offerings that the Soviet 
Union possessed without having to leave the university, and we enjoyed 
them immensely. The numerous motion pictures which were shown, 
however, were less enthusiastically received. These tended to beat to 
death the same limited number of political themes, and after you had 
seen one of them, the others grew progressively less entertaining. 
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When famous operas were staged in Moscow theaters, we were 
given tickets to attend the performances. The Student Commune had 
numerous clubs, including music, volleyball, basketball, horseback-
riding, archery, swimming, photography, ice-skating, dancing, and 
sightseeing. Students were free to participate in any one or all of them 
with the opportunity of being instructed by experts in each field. 
The university also had facilities to deal with the financial welfare 
of the students and their families in China. A student whose family 
was in need could apply through the university to have a certain 
amount of money remitted to his family in China. This service demon-
strates the lengths to which the university went to insure the students' 
welfare, since at that time foreign currency was severely limited in 
Russia. 
One cannot talk about student welfare at the university without 
mentioning the summer-vacation system. According to the Soviet Con-
stitution and labor laws, all laborers who were engaged in heavy in-
dustry or whose work was in one way or another harmful to their 
health (for example, furnace workers and those in the chemical indus-
try) were entitled to one month of vacation annually. Those in light 
industries got a two-weeks' vacation, and the intelligentsia (scientists, 
professors, students, and so forth) were entitled to a two-months' vaca-
tion. All travel costs and room and board during the vacation period 
were entirely free. The students of Sun Yat-sen University were no 
exception in this universal system of vacations. 
During my stay of more than six years in Soviet Russia, I spent my 
summer vacations in various dom outdy\ha (rest houses) in different 
parts of Russia—from luxurious summer resorts on the coast of the 
Black Sea to those located along the shore of the Pacific. The food in 
all the rest houses was excellent. There were usually four meals a day— 
breakfast, lunch, afternoon tea, and dinner. It was also compulsory 
for everyone to take a nap for one hour after lunch. This hour was 
called meortvii chac (the dead hour). Anyone violating this regulation 
three times was ordered to check out of the rest house. The doctors 
inspected every dormitory after lunch to see whether there was anyone 
missing from his bed. 
On the day that one checked into the rest house, he was weighed 
and his record was kept on file. It was considered a failure of the 
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administration if the weight of the vacationer had not increased by the 
time that he checked out. A poor record in this respect for the whole 
season was a matter of grave consequence for the director of the house 
and could very easily cost him his position. As taking a nap was con-
sidered the surest way of putting on weight, the meortvii chac was 
strictly enforced. However, there were also sports and amusements of 
all kinds. A concert, movie, or special show was available every evening 
in the open-air club. These events were usually very well attended. 
We students had nothing to worry about, since the university took 
care of everything related to summer vacations. We enjoyed every 
summer both as foreign tourists and as members of the big "Soviet 
family." We always returned to the university happy and full of 
energy. In addition to my own impression of these vacations, let me 
give the recollection of Teng Wen-i, the prominent KMT member who 
has described himself as the first Russian-educated person to turn 
against Soviet Russia: 
In the summer, the university set up a summer camp in the countryside with 
woods and flowing rivers, close to the camps of Russian workers and students. It 
was a rare opportunity for relaxation. Facilities were not luxurious, but they were 
adequate and comfortable. No classes were held, and we were not allowed to read 
too many books. Instead, we were encouraged to go swimming, canoeing, sun-
bathing, or to participate in the many other available recreational activities. 
Thousands of young people mixed together to have fun, rest, and enjoyment, and 
to experience the thrill of falling in love. Everybody gained weight after two 
months of delightful experiences and happy times. I think the whole world should 
attempt to have similar summer-vacation programs.4 
The university provided health services to the students during the 
academic year, and it had a health clinic and a small hospital. Upon 
entering the university, each student was given a thorough medical 
checkup, and files of his medical history were compiled and kept at the 
health clinic for handy reference. The health clinic had two full-time 
doctors, one of whom was a surgeon. There were also nurses and 
maids. Sick students were generally treated by the health clinic. 
Patients with severe illnesses were sent for treatment to a hospital 
owned by the government. 
In the Soviet Union all medicine and medical expenses were free 
through an almost perfect insurance plan. Although as foreign students 
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staying temporarily in Russia we did not participate in this program, 
we enjoyed the same privileges that native Russians enjoyed. 
I have described some aspects of student welfare and recreational 
activities at the university. I will now examine extracurricular educa-
tion. The student organization at Sun Yat-sen University was the 
Student Commune. Its president and other officers were elected by 
popular vote. The duty of the Student Commune was to aid the uni-
versity in carrying out administrative policies, to assist in disciplinary 
functions, to aid the students in all recreational activities, and to ad-
minister student welfare. (For example, funds for needy students were 
sponsored by the commune. Under the commune there was a Fund 
for Mutual Assistance.) 
The commune also organized a publication committee, which was 
in charge of editing a weekly paper which was posted on the bulletin 
board. Special issues were posted whenever the occasion arose. This 
paper contained news reports, notes on university life, scholastic re-
search, and literature. Articles in the literature column were supplied 
by the students. Since we were all young and enthusiastic about the 
publication, we contributed so many articles that the paper was often 
quite large. Every time a new paper was posted, students swarmed 
around it, and some even jotted down notes as they read it. The influ-
ence of the paper was great, and it was a major part of the extra-
curricular education at the University. It was highly regarded by the 
university administration as well as by the Party. 
Another function of the Student Commune was the "comrades' 
court," which received and tried disciplinary complaints of all students 
and staff members. I remember two famous trials. The defendants 
were Chang Ch'ao and Li Hsieh-yuan, both of whom were CCP mem-
bers. They were accused of wife-beating, which is not permissible in 
any society, much less in a society where men and women are equal. 
The trials were dramatic and exciting. In addition to the plaintiffs and 
defendants, there were public prosecutors (in Russia they are called 
obschestvenyii obvenichel or prosecutors for society) and three judges 
who constituted the jury. Both the prosecutors and judges were stu-
dents at the university. The trial procedures were exactly like those of 
a real court, except that when the verdict was announced, a vote of the 
student body was taken, which either endorsed the verdict or rejected 
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it. It would have been quite exceptional, but had the student body 
failed to endorse the decision of the judges, the judges would have had 
to reconsider their verdict. 
Everyone present in the court had the right to vote, making the 
verdict a true public judgment. While the verdict did not have the 
same effect as one handed down in a real court of law, it did represent 
a check by the student society. However, it also represented a good deal 
more than this, since both the school administration and the Party 
organization usually backed up the decisions of the "comrades' court." 
For example, the verdict in Chang Ch'ao's case was "expulsion from 
the university." The university administration promptly acted in ac-
cordance with the verdict of the court and sent Chang Ch'ao back to 
China. 
Soviet assistance to the KMT and to Sun Yat-sen University was 
not, of course, devoid of a certain grim determination to further the 
"cause of world revolution." When Sun Yat-sen University opened in 
Moscow in 1925 Soviet Russia was still reeling from the earlier years of 
civil war, economic collapse, and social revolution. It had really just 
begun to show a few significant signs of recovering; and recovery, of 
course, continued throughout the years of Sun Yat-sen University's 
existence. In spite of its own terrible shortages and weaknesses, how-
ever, Soviet Russia had hastened to the assistance of the KMT in China 
as early as 1923. Students of the situation, both Chinese and Russian, 
found themselves wondering why it was that Soviet Russia, while 
facing huge unsolved problems of its own, should so readily give as-
sistance to such an organization as the KMT, which was at best a 
dubious ally. I know that the situation troubled me. For those of us at 
Sun Yat-sen University enjoyed luxurious treatment; we were wonder-
fully well fed and clothed. At the same time, I could not help but see 
the long, pathetic queues of Russians, standing all night long in front 
of shops from which they hoped, often unrealistically, in the morning 
to be able to get a tiny bit of meat. Nor could I ignore the Russian 
student from Moscow University who worked part time at Sun Yat-sen 
University carting wood for the stoves that kept us comfortably warm. 
In temperatures far below zero he wore only a threadbare cotton jacket. 
I could see him shivering in the cold, and I knew that he probably had 
an unheated home to return to. Every day, moreover, while we ate our 
94 
excellent meals, I knew that our professors could not dream of eating 
so well. I was not the only Chinese student troubled by this situation, 
and some of us asked one or another of our professors to explain why 
the Soviet Union was helping others at the expense of its own people. 
One professor, I remember, gave a far-too-glib reply. He said that a 
revolutionary party should not be stingy and that no revolutionary 
should be a miser. My professor of Leninism, Miroshevsky, gave a 
more realistic explanation. He said that any nation, large or small, just 
like an individual in society, needed friends. Nobody, he said, could 
afford to abandon the effort to establish friendly relations with someone 
with whom he could fight a common enemy today, even though that 
person might be his enemy tomorrow. Indeed, as our studies pro-
gressed, we recognized this position as one of Lenin's teachings. 
Notes 
1. C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism, 
and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p . 58. 
2. Ibid., p . 58. 
3. Chin-jih ta-lu (Mainland today; Taipei), no. 98 (1959), pp. 32-33 . 
4. Teng Wen-i, Yu-tsung wan-li (Around the world; Taipei: distributed by Pa-t'i Book 
Store, 1951), p . 27. 
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Chapter VII 
The Relationship of the Kuomintang 
and the Chinese Communist Party 
at Sun Yat-sen University 
Sun Yat-sen University was the product of the Chinese revolution-
ary movement's "united front" of the 1920s. This united front was, in 
fact, a synthesis of contradictions and not a resolution of conflicts. On 
the one hand, the KMT, after suffering setbacks both domestically and 
internationally, was forced to find some new path to keep the party 
from falling apart. On the other hand, the newly founded CCP was 
eager to form alliances to strengthen its position. Finally, Soviet Russia, 
anxious to break out of its isolation, turned eastward in search of 
friends. All of these developments hastened the formation of the united 
front. 
When the united front was first formed, not only did the KMT and 
the CCP fail to resolve the differences between themselves, but also 
within each of the two parties diverse opinions persisted. Although 
these two parties were brought together temporarily by necessity, their 
goals were far apart. The KMT hoped to get more Soviet aid to 
strengthen itself, and the Chinese Communists used the KMT as a 
cover to expand their own Party. The KMT subscribed to the slogan 
of National revolution but had little intention of carrying it out, much 
less of carrying out a social revolution. The Communists also clutched 
the banner of National revolution, but they actually wanted to expand 
it into a Socialist revolution. From the above, it is evident that the 
united front rested upon very fragile foundations. As events developed, 
the inherent conflicts intensified under the new circumstances. Indeed, 
as Lenin and other Marxists have said, development was the struggle of 
opposites. 
The motivation for this united front is to be found in the resolutions 
of the CCP's Third National Congress held at Canton in June of 1923. 
In accordance with a resolution adopted by the ECCI on January 12, 
1923/ and another directive from the ECCI to the CCP in May of the 
same year, this congress discussed policies toward the KMT and finally 
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passed a resolution to cooperate with the KMT.2 The main points of 
this resolution were: 
1. To cooperate with the KMT while maintaining ideological political in-
dependence. 
2. To absorb the progressive elements of the worker-peasant masses and to expand 
the Party organization. 
3. To help reorganize the KMT and to criticize and overcome its compromising 
and reformist tendencies.3 
This resolution of the Third Congress of the CCP not only determined 
the relationship between the KMT and the Communist Party in China, 
but it also determined the relationship between the two party organiza-
tions at Sun Yat-sen University a few years later. 
At the university there was a branch office of the CCP. The KMT 
also maintained a branch office there with the special permission of the 
Comintern. During the period 1925-1927 there were about five hun-
dred students at the university, and KMT members accounted for a 
little over half of them, while the rest were CCP or CYC members. 
Through the united front the Communists belonged simultaneously to 
the KMT and the CCP. In fact the Communists controlled the KMT's 
Moscow branch office, leaving the real KMT students very little room 
to maneuver. 
Before differences were outwardly manifest within the Chinese 
revolutionary camp, KMT and Communist students got along har-
moniously on the surface. However, this state of affairs did not last. 
As conflicts that had previously been hidden became more and more ap-
parent in China, the relationship between KMT and CCP members at 
Sun Yat-sen University became strained. This was natural, because all 
developments in China were quickly reflected at the university. 
The differences that developed within the KMT concerning that 
party's policies made it possible for the Chinese Communists to acceler-
ate the splitting process by seeking to divide the KMT into Right Wing, 
Left Wing, and fence-sitting Center. The Communists proliferated in 
the rising revolutionary tide in China and decided to ally with the Left 
to attack the Right, with as much help as possible from the Center. 
The Communist organization at Sun Yat-sen University dutifully 
adopted the same policy as the CCP in China. As a result, conservative 
KMT members, indignant over Communist control of their organiza-
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tion and Communist intrigue, secretly formed an informal organization 
of their own. 
The Communist students enjoyed the overwhelming advantage of 
being in a Communist country. But the KMT students, simply because 
they were in a sense besieged as a result of being in a Communist 
country, were more strongly united than would otherwise have been 
the case. There were many outstanding personalities among the KMT 
students, such as the brothers Ku Cheng-kang and Ku Cheng-ting, 
Cheng Chieh-ming, Teng Wen-i, Wu Chia-yu, Hsiao Tsan-yu, Liu 
Yun-yao, Wang Li-i, Ho Han-wen, Wang Shao-lun, Kang Tse, Chang 
Cheng, Tuan K'o-ch'ing, Wang Ch'i-chiang, Shen Yuan-ming, Chiang 
Hsi-chung, Liu P'an-chu, and T'ang Chieh-fei. They were all well-
educated men who had firm beliefs. Later, after returning to China, 
they all became key figures in the KMT. 
While at the university, their firm stand under adverse conditions 
was truly remarkable. Mao I-heng, in his Reminiscences of Russia and 
Mongolia, spoke highly of their outstanding performance: 
I noticed that those who came to see Feng were all Communist students, 
Kuomintang students never came to see us. Later I went to Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity to look for them. One day I met Ho Chung-han at the gate; he said that he 
was a student at the Military Academy in Moscow and only came to Sun Yat-sen 
University to take his meals. I also got to know a transfer student from Germany, 
Chou Chi-hsiang, who was a Kuomintang revisionist and anti-Communist and 
was said to go back to Germany soon. Finally I learned that the Kuomintang 
members of that university were closely united, firm in their beliefs and thor-
oughly anti-Communist. Because they did not know our position they therefore 
were reluctant to associate with us. . . . The Kuomintang students dared to be 
anti-Communist in such an adverse environment at Sun Yat-sen University in 
Moscow. One could not but marvel at these young people's courage!4 
A great deal of the KMT's organizational unity was undoubtedly 
due to the reorganization of the KMT and the great care exercised in 
the selection of the KMT students who were sent to the university. 
Also, one must consider that the KMT students living in the red capital 
had to unite in order to survive. However, Mao I-heng cites an addi-
tional factor, which was of considerable importance. He notes that the 
main factor accounting for the high degree of KMT unity was Hu 
Han-min, who was spending a seven-month exile in Moscow for his 
alleged part in the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai. 
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The actual theoretical struggle between KMT and Communist 
students at the university centered around a number of basic points. 
First of all, the Communist students maintained that Dr. Sun's Three 
Principles of the People were merely three principles and not a com-
plete theory. They also held that the three principles applied to a 
"bourgeois democratic revolution," not to a proletarian revolution. 
KMT students argued that the Chinese revolution should progress 
through two stages, the first stage consisting of a revolution against 
foreign domination for national independence and the second stage 
consisting of a social revolution within China. The second stage, they 
insisted, had to be postponed until after the first stage had been 
achieved. Communist students argued that the social revolution was an 
indispensable part of the revolution for national independence. For 
unless social revolution were offered to the masses—such social reforms 
as reduced land rentals, salary increases, and better working conditions 
—they held that the masses could not be expected to join in the fight 
for national independence, and that the revolution against foreign 
domination would thereby be emasculated. KMT students responded 
by claiming that the Communists gave class struggle priority over the 
revolution for national independence and that they were destroying the 
united front against foreign domination in the process. To this argu-
ment the Communists replied that the KMT's position was hypo-
critical, that the KMT merely wanted to ride to power on the backs of 
the people and that, once in power, the KMT would do nothing to 
improve the lot of the people. Around and around we went. And this 
argument precisely reflected the argument going on in China between 
the KMT and the Communists. It was an argument which, unresolved, 
led to the split between the KMT and the Communists in China and to 
severence of relations between the Chinese Nationalist government and 
Soviet Russia. 
A second bone of contention between KMT and Communist stu-
dents concerned Dr. Sun's "Principle of Livelihood." The dispute was 
both bookish and vehement, and both camps utilized passages from 
Sun Yat-sen's writings in attacking and in defending themselves. Com-
munist students kept harking back to Dr. Sun's statement that "Liveli-
hood is socialism, it is communism."5 They neglected to complete Dr. 
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Sun's curious sentence, which added, ". . . it is Utopianism."6 Another 
favorite quotation which they used was: 
I can put my distinction to-day between communism and the Min-sheng 
[People's] Principle in this way; communism is an ideal of livelihood, while the 
Min-sheng Principle is practical communism. There is no real difference between 
the two principles—Communism and Min-sheng—the difference lies in the meth-
ods by which they are applied.7 
KMT students, forced to respond to such challenging quotations, 
countered in the university's wall newspaper with an article entitled 
"The Principle of Livelihood is not Communism," by a student named 
Hsiao. Hsiao produced a passage from Dr. Sun's second lecture on the 
subject: "They [CCP members] do not realize that our Principle of 
Livelihood is a form of communism. It is not a form that originated 
with Marx but a form that was practiced when primitive man appeared 
upon the earth."8 
To further strengthen his argument, Hsiao added this quote from 
Sun Yat-sen: "So in working out our Principle of Livelihood, we can-
not use or apply in China the methods of Marx, although we have the 
deepest respect for his teaching. . . . Even Marx's disciples say that we 
cannot use his methods for the solution of all social problems in 
China."9 
Communist students counterattacked by recalling that Dr. Sun had 
written: "This proposal that all future increment shall be given to the 
community is the 'equalization of land ownership' advocated by the 
Kuomintang; it is the Min-sheng Principle. This form of the Min-
sheng Principle is communism, and since the members of the Kuomin-
tang support the San Min Principles they should not oppose com-
munism."10 
Indeed, there was an abundance of quotations in the writings of Sun 
Yat-sen to replenish the polemical arsenals of both Communist and 
KMT students, and the polemic went on and on. It was not surprising, 
of course, that both bodies of students could find what they sought in 
Dr. Sun's work on the "Principle of Livelihood." For Sun Yat-sen had 
written it at a time when he was striving to mobilize heterogeneous 
forces behind his movement. Disheartened by repeated lack of support 
from the West, he was seeking aid from the Soviet Union, while also 
seeking to make such use as he could of the fledgling CCP. At the same 
100 
time, he had to be careful not to alienate important elements within his 
own KMT. Thus there was a bit of something for everybody in his 
"Principle of Livelihood." Nevertheless, Dr. Sun's writing failed to 
appease either the anti-Communist-minded KMT members or the am-
bitious CCP. Certainly, Chinese Communist students at Sun Yat-sen 
University never dreamed of honoring Dr. Sun Yat-sen as a Marxist, 
which of course he was not. By quoting passages from Sun Yat-sen 
which described "communism as a good friend"11 and the CCP as "a 
very thoughtful group,"12 they aimed merely to strengthen their own 
position while weakening that of the KMT, which was, after all, a 
cunning strategy. 
A third dispute arose between KMT and Communist students at 
Sun Yat-sen University over the revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie in 
China, in particular, and in colonial and semicolonial countries, in gen-
eral. Communist students, quoting Engels, and KMT students, quoting 
Lenin, made the two eminent Marxists seem to be in disagreement on 
an issue about which they did not in fact disagree. Communist stu-
dents, distorting Engels's meaning a bit, argued that Engels had long 
since pointed out that the further east one went, the more fragile the 
capitalist class became and the more limited became the progressive 
role of the bourgeoisie, which was doomed to be a stumbling block to 
revolution in the East. KMT students, distorting Lenin's meaning a 
bit, countered with Lenin's comments on the Chinese revolution of 1911 
to the effect that the Western bourgeoisie was in a state of decay, while 
in Asia there still was to be found a militant, revolutionary bourgeoisie. 
The Communist students, besides attacking the KMT students on 
theoretical grounds, also attempted to harass and divide the KMT stu-
dents in a variety of ways. As I have mentioned above, they sought to 
split the KMT students into Right and Left. They then attacked the 
Right and tried to woo the Left with rumors, threats, and inducements. 
The KMT students were also placed under surveillance by the Com-
munists. However, the KMT students did not give up. They held 
"committee meetings" whenever three or four of them could get to-
gether. These "committee meetings" were usually held on Sundays 
when they strolled in Lenin Hill Park, sat on the grass, and talked. 
Further information on the nature of this struggle and its results 
have been supplied to me by Ku Cheng-ting, an important member of 
101 
the Legislative Yuan, who talked with a Sun Yat-sen University grad-
uate in October, 1964, in Taipei. Apparently, a group of ten students 
including the Ku brothers, Li Yu-chu, Wang Ch'i-chiang, Tuan K'o-
ch'ing, and Hsin Ping-chou left Germany on January 6, 1926, for Mos-
cow. After arriving at the university, these students learned that the 
Communist Party members were surrounding KMT students and try-
ing to force them to join the Communist Party. Hsin Ping-chou was a 
Communist at that time and did his utmost to convert the other stu-
dents. There were quite a number of heated debates, but the KMT 
students maintained their position. 
In addition, Ku went on to say, one day when he was at the univer-
sity both Stalin and Trotsky came to a KMT party meeting at the 
university to debate the problem of cooperation between the KMT and 
the Communist Party.13 Trotsky insisted that the Chinese Communists 
withdraw from the KMT and develop separately. Stalin maintained 
that the banner of national liberation was of paramount importance 
and that the Communists should hold this banner tightly in their 
hands. Therefore, he opposed withdrawal from the KMT but advo-
cated increased utilization of it. Loyal KMT members present at this 
meeting, apprehensive of Communist infiltration, all insisted on the 
withdrawal of the Communists from the KMT. Consequently, Ku 
Cheng-kang and some others were sent back to China in the fall of 
1926. 
Perhaps Ku Cheng-kang and those who returned to China with him 
reported the contentious relationship between KMT members and 
Communists at the university to the KMT authorities. Through one 
channel or another, in any event, the CEC of the KMT doubtless 
learned about it. For quite early in 1927, by which time I was studying 
at the university, a scholarly-looking man whom we knew only as Mr. 
Chang appeared in our midst and began popping up in one or another 
of our classes. At first we took him to be just another student. But his 
failure to attend classes regularly, and the way he frequently behaved 
in the classes that he did attend, suggested that he really was investigat-
ing the university. I still remember the embarrassment he caused the 
students when he stood up in two of my classes and argued with the pro-
fessors. After about a month he vanished as abruptly as he had ap-
peared. Later, I was told that this Mr. Chang was really Chang Ch'iu-
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pai, who had attended the Congress of Toilers of the Far East in Mos-
cow in 1922 as a KMT representative. Subsequent to the departure of 
Ku Cheng-kang's group, a group of ten, including Wang Shao-lun, 
Shen Yuan-ming, Ho Han-wen, and Liu P'an-chu, was also sent back 
to China. Finally, a group that included Chiang Hsi-chung was sent 
back. 
When Wu Chia-yu and his group arrived at Vladivostok, the Chi-
nese Communists were staging the Canton Uprising (December 11, 
1927), which caused the Chinese government to sever relations with 
Russia on December 15, 1927. All ships going to Shanghai were 
stopped. Wu and others hurriedly made arrangements with the Japa-
nese consul to return to China via Japan. When Chiang Hsi-chung and 
his companions arrived at Vladivostok three days after Wu, they were 
promptly arrested by the GPU and sent back to Moscow. They were 
tried by a revolutionary court composed of Ch'in Pang-hsien and other 
Communist students at the university. They were found guilty of 
"being lackeys of the national capitalistic class" and of "destroying the 
proletarian revolution" and were sentenced to forced labor in Siberia— 
chopping wood and digging coal. In the summer of 1928 Chiang Hsi-
chung was able to escape from his labor camp. After passing through 
many dangers, he made his way to Nanking and reported his experi-
ence to the KMT authorities. 
The students mentioned above were not the only KMT students who 
suffered privations at the hands of the Russians and the Communist 
students of the university. After China severed relations with Russia, 
many of the sons and relatives of prominent members* of the KMT 
who did not return to China in time or who were not absorbed into 
the Communist organization were arrested and imprisoned for a year 
and then released. Some were apparently detained permanently, and 
their fate is unknown. 
The remainder of the KMT Left Wing which remained at the 
university was finally absorbed into the CCP, and in 1928 the name of 
* The sons, daughters, and relatives of prominent members of the KMT who went to 
Sun Yat-sen University included: Chiang Kai-shek's son Chiang Ching-kuo; Shao Li-tzu's son 
Shao Chih-kang; Feng Yu-hsiang's son Feng Hung-kuo and daughter Feng Fu-lun; Li Tsung-
jen's brother-in-law Wei Yun-ch'eng, who later married Chiang Kai-shek's niece; Li Tsung-
jen's wife, Wei Shu-ying; Chang Fa-k'uei's brother Chang Fa-ming; Teng Yen-ta's brother 
Teng Ming-ch'iu; Ch'en Shu-jen's son Ch'en Fu; Yeh Ts'u-ts'ang's son Yeh Nan; and 
General Ku Cheng-lun's two brothers Ku Cheng-kang and Ku Cheng-ting. 
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the university was changed from Sun Yat-sen University for the Toilers 
of China to Sun Yat-sen Communist University for the Toilers of 
China. In the summer of that year the Chinese class of KUTV was 
incorporated into Sun Yat-sen University. 
In conclusion, I should like to stress that the relationship between 
KMT and Communist students at Sun Yat-sen University paralleled 
closely the relationship between the two parties in China. The relation-
ship might be described as having passed through three stages. The 
first stage lasted from 1925 to the latter part of 1926. The early part of 
this period consisted of a brief, giddy honeymoon which was badly 
jolted by Chiang Kai-shek's first overt anti-Soviet, anti-Communist 
coup, the Chungshan gunboat incident of March 20, 1926. The in-
creasingly vitriolic quarrel that followed reached a climax at Sun Yat-
sen University with the visit of Trotsky and Stalin. Still, both the 
CPSU and the Comintern sought to minimize the significance of the 
Chungshan incident in an effort to maintain a working relationship 
with Chiang Kai-shek. It was said, for example, that the incident was 
a fabrication of British intelligence. Some KMT hotheads were sent 
back to China. And presently a semblance of harmony, more or less, 
was restored between the two parties at Sun Yat-sen University. It was 
this period, during which efforts were made to patch up or, at any rate, 
play down the quarrel between the two parties, that constituted the 
second stage of the relationship between them. It lasted from the end 
of 1926 until the April 12, 1927, coup d'etat in Shanghai. Even the 
semblance of harmony at the university, which had been maintained 
only with great effort, disintegrated with the April 12, 1927, incident, 
which gave rise to contention between the two groups of students that 
was infinitely more destructive than the quarrel that followed the 
Chungshan incident of the previous year. "Lips became guns and 
tongues became swords," as an old Chinese saying has it. Thus began 
the third stage in the relationship between Communist and KMT 
members at Sun Yat-sen University, which ended by December, 1927, 
in a total rupture between the two parties in the university and between 
the KMT and Soviet Russia. Perhaps the most notable event at the 
university in this period was Stalin's visit on May 13, 1927, to answer 
questions raised by students there regarding the situation in China in 
general and the relationship between the KMT and the CCP in par-
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ticular. At this crucial juncture in the Chinese revolution, Stalin at the 
university still defended the KMT as "anti-imperalist, just as the revo-
lution in China is anti-imperialist."14 Even more startling for most of 
us was his characterization of Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin described him, to 
be sure, as a KMT rightist who had intrigued against the KMT Left and 
the Communists prior to the April, 1927, coup. Nevertheless, Stalin in-
sisted that Chiang was at the same time "warring—whether well or 
badly—against the enslavement of China, and was thus helping to 
weaken imperialism."15 It was in this speech, too, that Stalin overesti-
mated the potential of the KMT Left and its "Revolutionary Govern-
ment" at Wuhan, which two months later turned against the Commu-
nists. This rupture of relations between the KMT Left and the Commu-
nists in July, 1927, in fact marked the end of a united front between the 
KMT and the Communists. A circular of the CEC of the KMT dated 
July 26,1927, denounced Sun Yat-sen University for having named itself 
after Dr. Sun in order to betray the principles of the KMT. The circu-
lar forbade KMT members to attend the university. Thus, any pretense 
of KMT-Communist partnership in sponsoring the university officially 
ended, and in 1928 the name of the university was modified. 
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Chapter VIII 
Rule of the Moscow Branch of the 
Chinese Communist Party: The Dark 
Ages of Sun Yat-Sen University 
According to the principles of proletarian internationalism, a 
Communist, regardless of his nationality, was supposed to join the 
Communist Party of the country in which he resided. Nevertheless this 
principle was ignored at Sun Yat-sen University prior to 1926. Instead 
of being members of the CPSU, the Chinese Communist students at the 
university were members of the Moscow branch of the CCP. This situ-
ation was the result of the precedents set earlier in Japan and France, 
where branches of the CCP had been formed. Branches of the CCP 
had been formed in Japan because there was, at that time, no Japanese 
Communist Party, and in France because the French Party was only 
formed in December of 1920 and was relatively weak. 
I went to Moscow toward the end of 1926 after the Moscow branch 
of the CCP had been dissolved, so I had no firsthand ^experience with 
it. However, quite some time after my arrival I learned a good deal 
about the affairs of the Moscow branch in conversations with Berman, 
who, at the time that we talked, was secretary of the bureau of the 
CPSU in Sun Yat-sen University, the second man to hold that post. He 
told me that the only reason for the Comintern permitting the organi-
zation of a Moscow branch of the CCP was the language problem; few 
Chinese at KUTV or at Sun Yat-sen University knew enough Russian 
to participate in Russian Party affairs or meetings. Nor were there 
enough interpreters, either Chinese or Russian, available when the 
Moscow branch was formed in 1921. Thus, he said, the Moscow branch 
was formed as a matter of technical expediency rather than as a matter 
of principle. It seemed to me then, as it does now, that Berman offered 
a perfectly credible explanation for the formation of the Moscow 
branch of the CCP.1 
In any event, the Moscow branch started what many regarded as a 
reign of terror at Sun Yat-sen University when the university was estab-
lished in 1925. By the time of my arrival, many upper classmen who 
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were Communists still shuddered at the recollection of it. One student 
was subsequently to recall it this way: 
Under the reins of the rule by the Moscow branch of the CCP, the students at 
Sun Yat-sen University were filled with repressed anger and deep hatred which 
was carefully restrained. . . . The administrators of the Moscow branch appeared 
before the students as authoritative patriarchs and all-powerful leaders. Irratio-
nally abusing authority, they put the students under strict discipline and treated 
them as mechanized automatons instead of human beings. Everyday life as well 
as all matters, whether important or trivial, were all under their iron control. 
Consequently, everyone was in constant fear and terror, and suspicion abounded 
among the students. Everyone's life was in danger. . . . Many Communist 
students had nervous breakdowns and eventually joined the lines of mental 
patients, while in less serious cases many could not eat and still others suffered 
insomnia.2 
This kind of authoritarian control exerted by the Moscow branch 
was not unfamiliar to members of the CCP, as the Party was at that 
time under the authoritarian rule of Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Everyone looked 
to him for instructions, and democracy was a mere fiction. The leaders 
of the Moscow branch were among those who had been trained and 
educated in this unhealthy atmosphere, and they applied their authori-
tarian training to Communist students at the university and to the 
Moscow branch of the CYC. 
A leading figure of the Moscow branch of the CCP in Sun Yat-sen 
University was Jen Cho-hsuan, who later used the name Yeh Ch'ing. 
Active in Chinese Communist affairs in France, he had apparently 
gone to Moscow in 1925, where I would guess he was initially affiliated 
with KUTV before transferring to Sun Yat-sen University, perhaps at 
the time it was established. It is my recollection that students who were 
at Sun Yat-sen University at that time later told me that Jen was 
secretary of the Party branch there. 
A useful insight into the nature of the rule of the Moscow branch 
under Jen Cho-hsuan and others may be gained from one of its publi-
cations, Hsun-nien Kung-cho Chih-tao Kang-yao (A concrete guide to 
the work of training), which is not dated.3 Some of the more important 
points in this work are: 
4. We should destroy family, local, and national concepts—the proletariat has no 
family, no local or national limitations. 
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5. Destroy unity based on sentiment—sentimental unity is petty bourgeois unity 
—we build our unity on Party interests. 
8. We must employ in our work for the Party the same kind of interest we have 
in love and literature—love and literature are the foundation of romanticism.* 
11. We must studiously avoid academic-type study—academic-type study denies 
that theory is born of practice. 
13. We must pay attention to the Russian language aside from our studies—we 
absolutely must not maintain the erroneous idea that we should first study 
Russian before we study ideology. 
16. We must strive to eliminate the [bad habits of the] intelligentsia—the bad 
habits of university students and the entire petty bourgeoisie.. . . 
17. We must at all times and everywhere mutually correct each other's errors of 
thought and action. 
18. When we have opinions, we must express them—if we hide our opinions and 
do not express them, we would be standing outside the organization and en-
couraging counterrevolutionary [tendencies]. 
22. Every comrade must develop close relations with at least two other comrades 
(exclusive of comrades belonging to the same small unit) in order to achieve 
solidarity among our comrades. 
23. The organization's interest is the individual's interest. We must not obstruct 
the organization's advance because of individual interest.. . . 
24. . . . We must have the psychology of thoroughly trusting the organization—it 
is counterrevolutionary conduct not to trust the organization. 
25. Our lives and our will must not be based on individual beliefs or the individual 
will. . . . There is absolutely no such thing as individual life or individual 
free will. 
26. We must strictly criticize our comrades' errors and humbly accept our com-
rades' criticism . . . . Wherever he may be, every Communist must at all times 
criticize and supervise his comrades in accordance with the relations of mu-
tual supervision (the mutual relations of Communists mean mutual super-
vision). . . .4 
Articles four and five required that members of the CCP disown 
and denounce their parents, friends, and relatives, much as was the case 
in mainland China after the Communists came to power in 1949. The 
leaders of the Moscow branch stirred up a relentless struggle against all 
kinds of sentimentalism. 
Article eight denied the Party members love and literature, because 
* While this translation is impeccably accurate, the meaning of this article might be 
conveyed by the following paraphrase: "We must employ in our work for the Party the 
kind of enthusiasm tiiat we are now wasting on love and literature; and we must abandon 
our enthusiasm for love and literature, for they are the foundations of romanticism, which 
can destroy Party organization." 
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these were "the foundations of Romanticism" and they preached that 
"Romanticism is a condition which destroys organization." 
Articles eleven and thirteen were quite critical of the students of 
Sun Yat-sen University. First, they expressed the opposition of the 
leaders of the Moscow branch to any genuine interest shown by those 
students who really wanted either to acquire useful knowledge from 
books or to master the Russian language. The students of the university 
held two main theories in regard to the study of the Russian language. 
One group held that since Russian was quite difficult, it could not pos-
sibly be mastered in two short years. Therefore, they advocated that 
students should concentrate on the more practical aspects of their revo-
lutionary education, while spending as little time as possible on Rus-
sian-language study. The leaders of the Moscow branch, led by Jen 
Cho-hsuan, were prominent among those at the university who dis-
couraged the study of the Russian language. 
However, other students felt that since they had traveled thousands 
of miles to study the theories and experiences of the Russian Revolu-
tion, mastery of the Russian language was essential. While this stress 
upon Russian-language study made a good deal of sense to many stu-
dents, it was eventually suppressed by the authorities of the Party 
branch. While the students dared not openly show their dissatisfaction 
with this policy of mass ignorance in regard to the study of the Russian 
language and academic study, they never hesitated to disobey it when 
the backs of the leaders of the Party branch were turned. In doing so 
they ran the risk of being caught and subjected to severe public criti-
cism at the Party committee meetings. 
The net result of the restrictive academic policy of the Moscow 
branch of the CCP was that learning for the majority of the students 
was greatly hindered, while a small minority chosen by the leaders of 
the branch were allowed to attend classes in the Russian language. This 
select group consisted mainly of members loyal to the leaders of the 
Moscow branch of the CCP and some popular girls such as Chuang 
Tung-hsiao and Li Pei-tse. In this manner Jen and the other leaders 
were able to dominate the critical interpreting positions at the 
university. 
Articles sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, and twenty-six were also quite 
important. For example, what exactly are the "bad habits of university 
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students and the entire petty bourgeoisie" mentioned in article sixteen ? 
Any action of a student might be included under this vague term since 
no examples or concrete explanations were offered. Articles seventeen 
and twenty-six were to insure conformity in the student body and to 
insure that all the students would supervise each other. Everyone super-
vised the actions of his comrades and was in turn supervised by all the 
other students. Many showed eagerness in reporting others so that they 
might put themselves on good terms with the authorities. In this way 
an atmosphere of everybody for himself was created. Under this rule of 
terror even the few silent students who minded their own business 
found it difficult to keep out of trouble. By means of article eighteen 
even those individuals who remained silent might be stigmatized for 
"conceiving treachery within themselves." This article denied even the 
right to silence. Under the above articles one might, on the one hand, 
get into trouble by making one petty remark, while on the other hand, 
anyone with a mouth was forced to open it and utter something, even 
though he had no desire to speak. 
As one can see from the above articles, A Concrete Guide to the 
Wor\ of Training was carefully conceived and precisely phrased in 
order to guarantee complete authoritarian control by the leaders of the 
Moscow branch of the CCP. However, in spite of these dictatorial 
rules, the Moscow branch at Sun Yat-sen University and its leaders did 
not endure. The Communist students at the university finally reached 
the limit of their tolerance and revolted. They held a series of meetings 
in which the policies of Jen and the Moscow branch were denounced. 
These meetings alerted the Russian administrators to the severe damage 
done by the Moscow branch of the CCP. 
These meetings were held on four consecutive days in the summer 
of 1926, and Karl Radek attended every one of them. The issues appar-
ently were dramatized for him for the first time at these meetings, and 
at the last one he delivered a four-hour speech which condemned the 
orientation and activities of the leaders of the Moscow branch. He con-
cluded his speech by proclaiming the dissolution of the Moscow branch. 
All CCP members at the university attended this meeting, about which 
a classmate of mine later recalled: 
Although Radek's proposal was not brought up for an official vote, yet it was 
still considered as adopted without opposition. Thereafter, the Communist stu-
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dents of Sun Yat-sen University and Communist University of Toilers of the East 
were able to breathe the fresh air of freedom once again. Their joy was as great 
as that of prisoners released from jail; they felt so much at ease and no longer 
burdened that they imagined themselves floating in the clouds.5 
When the Moscow branch of the CCP was dissolved, some of its 
leaders, such as Jen Cho-hsuan, returned to China. A good many 
others, however, remained at Sun Yat-sen University. In any event, the 
committee of the CPSU for the Moscow district in which Sun Yat-sen 
University was located placed Party organizers in Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity who set about establishing a CPSU organization among students 
there. CCP and CYC members were screened for membership or as 
candidates for membership in the CPSU or the Komsomol. With this 
reorganization the acute dissatisfaction of Chinese Communists at the 
university began to subside. Nevertheless, they took every possible 
opportunity to continue to attack the leaders of the former Moscow 
branch who remained at the university. Wrangling over theoretical 
issues between the rival student groups continued intermittently even 
after I arrived. 
Because of the continuing student struggle, the Party bureau at the 
university invited Krupskaya, Lenin's widow, to speak at Sun Yat-sen 
University early in February, 1927. It was hoped that she would pro-
vide a Marxist-Leninist clarification of the issues which would end the 
quarreling. Krupskaya, of course, had a considerable reputation in the 
field of Soviet education, and if my memory serves me well, she was a 
member of the Collegium of the Commissariat of Education of the 
USSR when she came to the university that February. She was, at the 
same time, a member of the Control Commission and of the CC of 
the CPSU as well as a member of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR. The subject of her lecture, which I attended, was Com-
munist education. During the course of it she managed to touch upon 
several of the points raised in A Concrete Guide to the Wor\ of Train-
ing, which the former Moscow branch had produced, although she 
mentioned neither the work nor the branch. Everyone, I think, was 
tremendously impressed by her solicitous manner and by what she had 
to say. 
Krupskaya began her lecture, as I recall, by talking about love. 
Love was a fundamental in human nature, she said, and Communists 
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were, after all, human beings and not supermen. Communists were 
unique in that they fought for communism, but they had all the uni-
versal human needs, including love. A good Communist, she said, did 
not need to be a puritan. What must be avoided was merely playing 
with love, which could be very dangerous. 
It was my impression that she knew a good deal of the goings on at 
Sun Yat-sen University. Most of the student body were men, and they 
often contended with one another for the attentions of the few women 
students. Some of the women, on the other hand, encouraged the atten-
tions of three or four men at the same time. This state of affairs gave 
rise to all sorts of problems usual in such situations. In one case that I 
know of, which happened a bit later, one male student wounded an-
other male student with a knife as a result of a love affair. 
It was against this background, I suspect, that Krupskaya went on 
to stress that the abuse of love led people astray. Yet love, properly 
understood, could produce miracles, she said. A Communist couple 
who truly loved one another would be reinforced by the love of each 
for the other, and they could produce miracles. This, she said, was love 
which had a sense of responsibility about it. Thus, she concluded, love 
itself was not a crime; what was needed was responsible love. 
Then, I think, Krupskaya moved on to what connection there could 
possibly be between love and literature, on the one hand, and retro-
gressive human tendencies on the other. (Be it recalled that the authors 
of A Concrete Guide to the Wor\ of Training had stated that love and 
literature were the foundations of Romanticism. But, clearly, they had 
not understood the term "Romanticism" as it was used by Western 
writers in tracing Western intellectual currents. The authors of the 
Guide treated Romanticism as the sort of thing that one reads about in 
what now are regarded as perfectly acceptable novels, such as Dream 
of the Red Chamber, but which then tended to be regarded by many 
Chinese as fiction of the yellow press, which dwelt upon the lascivious 
relations between men and women, the stock in trade of what used to 
be called "penny dreadfuls.") She already had explained the construc-
tive role of love. Now she said that there did not need to be anything 
contaminating about literature. Indeed, she insisted, far from being 
avoided, there was much to be learned from literature. She said that 
Russian Communists respected Pushkin and many other classical Rus-
113 
sian writers, from whom one could learn about the old society, while at 
the same time they loved Maxim Gorky, from whom one could learn 
about contemporary society. Why, she then asked, should anyone say 
that Communists opposed literature in general or that all literature was 
a basis for lascivious thought. 
Krupskaya next talked about the family. (The Guide had said that 
we must destroy the family, that the proletariat had no family.) For a 
Communist working underground, she said, it might be necessary to 
cut off all contact with his family, especially if his family were a re-
actionary one that might obstruct his revolutionary activities. That did 
not mean, though, she said, that Communists should destroy families in 
general. Nor could it be said that the proletariat had no family. For 
the family was a human being's sanctuary, rather like the nest of a 
bird. Of course, she said, a Communist must not let his family occupy 
all of his attention; a Communist had great tasks to perform. Never-
theless, a healthy society was made up of many healthy families. She 
quoted Marx and Engels to the effect that capitalism destroyed the 
family. That was capitalism, she said, but why should Communists 
destroy the family ? 
The individual life and individual free will of a Communist, which 
the Guide had insisted did not exist, were Krupskaya's next theme. 
Why, she asked, should a Communist be deprived of personal free will 
and a life of his own ? A Communist was bound to work according to 
the instructions of the Party, she said. Beyond that, however, a Com-
munist had his own life to live. Moreover, the fact that a Communist 
had to submit himself to the will of the Party did not mean that he had 
no free will of his own, she said. In fact, she said, it was by the exercise 
of his free will that a person joined the Communist Party—he could 
not be forced to join it—and if he so chose, a person was free to leave 
the Communist Party. Free will, she observed, was quite incorrectly 
regarded by some as a manifestation of lack of discipline. Then 
Krupskaya went on to talk about Party unity. Party unity could not be 
achieved by the terroristic imposition of ideas on Party members, she 
said; Party unity could be achieved only by the conscious agreement of 
Party members to the issue involved. Moreover, to create an atmosphere 
of suspicion in one Party member about another could seriously dam-
age the individual as well as the Party as a whole, she said. Party unity, 
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she said, should be based on trust and understanding among Party 
members. 
Krupskaya spoke for about two hours. I cannot, of course, recall all 
that she said. After her formal talk, in any event, the hall was cleared 
of all men, and she met with the women students of the university, 
who, we were given to understand, had problems peculiar to women 
which they might not feel free to raise if men were present. As we were 
filing out through the lobby I overheard a classmate jokingly observe, 
"After this I guess we won't have to recruit Party members exclusively 
from the ranks of Buddhist monks and nuns." With the abolition of the 
Party branch, the organizational problem had been solved. Krupskaya's 
speech, however, provided a good many of us with an intellectual and 
emotional solution to the problem. 
A woman who, while she was a student, attended that gathering of 
women students with Krupskaya has kindly given me a verbal account 
of her recollection of this meeting. One of the problems presented to 
Krupskaya was the question of how a woman Communist ought to 
regard bearing children. Every now and then a girl student at the uni-
versity had become pregnant; some were married, others were not. All 
of them, however, had come under heavy fire from the Party branch. 
The Party branch had taken the position that Communist women must 
not bear children. To do so, the branch contended, turned them into 
mere housewives, petty bourgeois who gave a higher priority to raising 
a family than to carrying out the work of the revolution. Since 
abortions were legal in the Soviet Union then, some of the pregnant 
students, fearing the wrath of the Party branch, had had abortions per-
formed. And now Krupskaya was asked whether or not a Communist 
woman ought to raise a child; was there a contradiction between being 
a Communist and being a mother ? Krupskaya emphatically stated that 
there was absolutely no contradiction between being a Communist and 
being a mother. While abortions were legal, she added, they were not 
desirable either from the standpoint of the health of the girl concerned 
or from the standpoint of the long-range development of the commu-
nity. Having a child, she conceded, could make working in the under-
ground back in China difficult. But abortions were not the best solution 
to this problem. A girl could have her child, and while she was doing 
dangerous underground work, she could leave it in the care of a 
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nursery in the Soviet Union, Krupskaya said. In fact, the children of 
female students at Sun Yat-sen University already were cared for in a 
nursery located in suburban Moscow. Krupskaya's conversations with 
the women students at Sun Yat-sen University provided these students 
with a sense of intellectual and emotional relief similar to that which 
the men experienced. For, in a way, the women students had found the 
tyrannical behavior of the Moscow branch even more trying than had 
the men. 
The Russians at the time, as I recall, invariably referred to the Mos-
cow branch as "Raphaelschena"—which might be rendered "Raphael's 
regime." I would guess that Raphael was the foreign name for a cer-
tain Chinese Communist who was prominent in the branch. In any 
case, it was only we Chinese who called it yu-mo chih-pu, or Moscow 
branch. With its dissolution, and with the ideological reorientation of 
students which was then undertaken, there began an organizational 
regrouping of CCP or CYC members at the university. Thereafter, of 
course, the secretary of the Communist Party organization was always 
a Russian. All members of the CCP were transferred to the CPSU and 
the Russian Komsomol. But there was a certain degree of discrimina-
tion in this action, because members of the CCP and the CYC were all 
demoted to candidates for membership in the Party and placed on a 
waiting list. The status of an official member and that of a candidate 
in the CPSU differed greatly. Official members of the Party enjoyed 
full voting rights at Party meetings, while candidates could only exer-
cise a vote during discussions. Also, official members were permitted to 
pass freely into the Comintern building and the headquarters of the 
CC of CPSU, while candidates for membership had to fill out a form 
before being admitted. 
Many of the Chinese students who transferred to the CPSU or the 
Russian Komsomol remained on the waiting list for full membership 
during the entire period of their stay in the Soviet Union. However, if 
one was a laborer, there was a good chance of gaining full membership. 
As for a petty bourgeois or even someone from a landowning family, 
he had to patiently wait for an opening in the very limited monthly 
membership quota for nonproletarians in the local Communist Party 
organization. All in all, the matter of full membership in the CPSU 
was rather academic for the Chinese students, as they were soon to 
116 
return to China. In addition, they were not the least bit bothered by 
being put on the waiting list as long as they were forever free from the 
bondage of the Moscow branch of the CCP. 
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Chapter IX 
The Shanghai Coup of April 12, 1927, 
and Sun Yat-sen University 
On March 21, 1927, the workers of Shanghai launched their third 
armed revolt in support of the National Revolutionary Army, which was 
then advancing toward the suburbs of Shanghai. Bitter battles were 
fought in all sectors of Shanghai, and by the afternoon of the twenty-
first the workers and the Revolutionary Army had defeated the warlords 
and gained a glorious victory in six out of seven sectors of Shanghai. 
Thus Shanghai—the largest economic and industrial center of China— 
fell into the hands of the National Revolutionary Army. 
The news of the great victory of the Chinese Revolutionary Army 
spread like lightning to every corner of the world. At Sun Yat-sen 
University the news was like "a thunderbolt from a clear sky." We 
heartily congratulated ourselves, shook hands with one another, and 
embraced one another with joy and excitement. Our enthusiasm was 
such that sparkling tears ran down many happy faces. 
The secretary of the CPSU organization at the university walked 
toward a huge map of China and bowed in deep reverence. He then 
took down the little black flag, which was a symbol of warlord oc-
cupation, from the part of the map where Shanghai was located. He 
tore the flag to shreds and threw it to the floor. We all rushed to 
stamp on it with our feet. Within seconds there was hardly anything 
left of the flag. In a mood of wild celebration we thronged into the 
auditorium and held a jubilant meeting. The big hall reverberated 
with uproarious talk and loud laughter. The speakers' repeated at-
tempts to talk were drowned out by deafening applause. One of my 
classmates leapt to the podium, shrieked "Comrades," and then, 
literally, was so striken with emotion that he could not go on. He 
just stood there, his mouth frozen in an ecstatic grin. He looked 
rather like the beaming worker in the front-page cartoon in Pravda 
the next day, who proclaimed, "Shanghai is ours." Somehow, some 
order eventually descended on the meeting, and we voted to send two 
effusive congratulatory telegrams. One telegram was sent to the com-
mander of the Northward Expeditionary Force, Generalissimo Chiang 
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Kai-shek, and the other to the workers of Shanghai. After the meeting 
was adjourned we pushed through the gate of the university and 
quickly formed lines for a demonstration, which eventually included 
thousands of Moscow residents. Two stout northerners carrying huge 
banners led the march to the Comintern building. The students of 
Sun Yat-sen University marched in front of everyone else in the dem-
onstration. International Press Correspondence, in what strikes me as 
a reasonably accurate account of what happened, described the demon-
stration in the following manner: 
The news of the seizure of Shanghai by the insurrectionary workers spread 
this morning in Moscow and was received with the greatest enthusiasm by the 
population. 
After the close of work, meetings took place in the factories where speakers 
explained the significance of the new victory of the nationalist troops. 
At four P.M. a mass-meeting of many thousands of workers took place in the 
square before the Comintern building. The students of Sun Yat-sen University 
marched at the head of the demonstration. Comrades Murphy, Kolarov, Duncan, 
and a representative of the Communist Party of China spoke to the masses. The 
demonstrations lasted until late in the evening, workers streamed to them from 
the factories on the farthest outskirts of the town.1 
In the square in front of the Comintern building, people gathered 
by the thousands. Banners were flying high in the sky. After Murphy's 
speech the president of the university, Radek, spoke to the massed dem-
onstrators, among whom were five hundred young Chinese patriots: 
Shanghai is now in the hands of the Chinese, but when the revolutionary 
army marched into Shanghai they could still see the barbed wire set up by the 
British soldiers! The revolution in China is still in its embryonic stage; the 
counterrevolutionary forces have not been driven out. The troops of Chang Tso-
lin still threaten Wuhan. But the Chinese Revolutionary Movement is growing 
stronger every day, and no doubt it will be able to conquer all the obstacles and 
difficulties that lie in its future. The workers of Moscow received the news of the 
taking of Shanghai only this morning [March 21] at 10 A.M.; already they are 
streaming to you in celebrating this great victory. Moreover, they adopted reso-
lutions extending greetings and brotherly love to the Shanghai revolutionary 
proletariat. Let the imperialists be aware that in case of necessity, the proletariat of 
Soviet Russia will not hesitate to support the Chinese Revolutionary Movement.2 
His speech greatly moved us, and our spirits rose still higher. 
The marchers continued on toward the headquarters of the CC of 
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the CPSU. As we passed through the Ileinka zone, someone in the 
Soviet Department of Finance building waved to us and shouted at the 
top of his voice, "Long live the youth of China!" We became more and 
more exuberant. Finally we made a turn and halted in the old square 
in front of the building of the CC. CC member Andreev appeared on 
the balcony of the building to welcome us and to deliver a speech of 
encouragement and praise. Here the demonstration dispersed, and 
each group made its own way back home. On our way we were 
stopped by the crowds. They cheered us and some even seized some 
of my fellow students, threw them in the air, and caught them as they 
fell. Many Russian girls innocently threw us kisses and flirted with 
us coquettishly. 
After this memorable day our status increased rapidly. When we 
walked into theaters, Russian girls clustered around us. They seemed 
to know that these future revolutionary figures would soon return to 
China to hold high positions. They also paid us frequent visits at the 
university. Some of the more daring girls simply offered themselves 
as loving wives and asked to be taken back to China. 
Nor was jubilation over the Shanghai victory limited to Moscow. 
A wave of joy seemed to sweep across Russia. There were meetings 
of celebration in Leningrad, Kharkov, Odessa, Kiev, and many other 
cities, some of the congratulatory messages of which were published 
in Pravda. 
Leaders of the Comintern and the CPSU were all dazzled by the 
Shanghai victory. A Pravda editorial, "On the World-Historical Im-
portance of the Victory of Shanghai," made a bold prophecy: "The 
taking of Shanghai is without doubt a factor driving the Chinese 
revolution toward the Left, strengthening the role of the Chinese 
proletariat, and increasing its hopes of attaining the hegemony of the 
revolutionary movement." The prophecy of Pravda seemed to be based 
upon sound ground, yet before the ink of that editorial had time to 
dry, the Shanghai anti-Communist coup of April 12 took place. The 
Chinese revolution not only failed to take a leftward turn, but, on the 
contrary, made a radical turn to the Right. 
Many Russian Communist leaders and Comintern officials were 
utterly unprepared for the devastating turn of events in China. On 
April 5, 1927, one week before the anti-Communist coup at Shanghai, 
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for example, Stalin had insisted that there was no need to try to drive 
away the KMT rightists, that Chiang Kai-shek was submitting to 
discipline, and that the Communists needed the KMT rightists, among 
whom were capable military leaders.3 Through March, Pravda had 
drummed away at the theme that Chiang Kai-shek was forced to bow 
to the will of the revolutionary masses. Yet it is difficult to believe that 
Stalin and others did not have some prior information about the state 
of affairs in China, that they had not sniffed any of the odors of im-
pending disaster which were wafting out of China. Maybe events 
moved more rapidly than they had expected. Perhaps, meanwhile, 
because of the struggle with Trotsky, who had for some time been 
forecasting disaster, Stalin chose to suppress any information, even 
that which might have been privately circulated, that would have 
substantiated Trotsky's position. Certainly Stalin took great pains 
not to alienate Chiang Kai-shek. 
On April 12, 1927, in any case, the National Revolutionary Army 
began to massacre the Shanghai workers who had thrice supported 
the Revolutionary Army at the risk of their own lives. Like the news 
of the taking of Shanghai, this news quickly spread around the world. 
The events at Shanghai came as a sickening shock to Moscow and the 
students of Sun Yat-sen University. Neither the Comintern nor the 
university had any forewarning of the coup. On the evening of April 
12 we held another meeting. Instead of the celebration of some twenty 
days before, cold anger reigned in the assembly hall. No trace of a 
smile was visible on any of our youthful faces. With great fury we 
adopted a resolution to send a telegram to the Nationalist government 
at Wuhan, demanding severe punishment for the traitors of the revolu-
tion. The cable read: 
Present developments of the Chinese revolution have provoked counter-
attacks from the Imperialists and their loyal lackeys. Chiang Kai-shek and his 
colleagues, the pseudorevolutionaries, have violated the principles and discipline 
of the Party; they have betrayed our revolution, massacred the Shanghai revolu-
tionary workers, and have thus become the lackeys of the Imperialists. Now 
they constitute an obstacle on our revolutionary path. But we feel confident that 
the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and the Nationalist govern-
ment will, with the support of our worker-masses and revolutionary army, bravely 
and steadfastly pursue the struggle against the counterrevolutionary Chiang Kai-
shek and his colleagues. We are sure that we shall attain the final victory. From 
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all the members of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party at Sun 
Yat-sen University.4 
Before the telegram was approved, many students gave speeches, 
including those members of the KMT who were sons of KMT 
dignitaries. They mounted the speakers' platform and severely criti-
cized the Shanghai April 12 coup. Chiang Ching-kuo was one of 
them. He was then a member of the CYC. His eloquent speech won 
a thunderous ovation from all students. On April 16, 1927, Izvestia 
published an account of this speech in an article describing the reaction 
of Sun Yat-sen University students to the coup: ". . . son of Chiang 
Kai-shek urges the students to demonstrate in front of the Comintern 
building. Not long ago he said at a meeting of young Chinese: 'I 
speak here not as the son of Chiang Kai-shek, but as the son of the 
Chinese Komsomol.' "5 A few days later, Chiang Ching-kuo made a 
public statement denouncing his father, Chiang Kai-shek, whom 
he declared to be his enemy. This announcement was translated into 
several languages and widely distributed by TASS. The English 
translation of the full text ran as follows: 
The treason of Chiang Kai-shek is not unexpected. While he spoke eloquently 
about the revolution, he gradually began to betray the revolution, wishing to 
compromise with Chang Tso-lin and Sun Tsung-fan. Chiang Kai-shek has 
finished his revolutionary career. As a revolutionary, he is dead. He has gone 
over to the counterrevolution and is an enemy of the Chinese working masses. 
Chiang Kai-shek was my father and a friend of the revolution. He has gone over 
to the counterrevolutionary camp. Now he is my enemy.6 
His speech at the meeting of university students and his written 
statement denouncing his father were probably products of his youth-
fulness and of the pressing circumstances.7 However, this rejection of 
his father won him the respect of the students of Sun Yat-sen University 
as well as of the Russian people. After this proclamation, wherever we 
went, we met people who asked us with great concern, "Where is the 
son of Chiang Kai-shek?" He became a famous and celebrated figure 
overnight. But woe to those of us without such a father as Chiang 
Kai-shek; after the April 12 anti-Communist coup our stock dropped 
greatly. Not only did the Russian girls no longer flirt with us, but we 
were received with contempt by Russians everywhere. In addition to 
pointing at us and shouting, "Chang Tso-lin," the Russian people gave 
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us the new title, "Chiang Kai-shek," who had been praised not long 
before as a Chinese national hero and a revolutionary fighter, but now 
was downgraded as a counterrevolutionary warlord like Chang Tso-lin. 
I still remember very well that the Moscow Preparatory Committee for 
Celebration of May Day had planned to honor Chiang Kai-shek by 
displaying a huge effigy of Chiang in the Labor Day demonstration in 
Moscow. Sun Yat-sen University also made a full-length portrait of 
Chiang Kai-shek in celebration of the occasion. But the sudden turn 
of events drove the Russians and the students of Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity really mad, and both Chiang's effigy and portrait were burned in-
stantly upon receipt of the information about the April 12 coup. 
It might be pointed out that the resolution condemning Chiang 
Kai-shek as a counterrevolutionary was unanimously adopted by formal 
vote of both Communist and KMT students at Sun Yat-sen University. 
Perhaps many of the KMT students did not in their hearts truly endorse 
the resolution for which they voted, yet the atmosphere of that meeting 
was so emotionally charged with outrage that they would have felt it 
imprudent, to say the least, to vote against the resolution. After the 
meeting, I know, a number of them spoke with indignation about the 
attack that Communist students had carried out against Chiang Kai-
shek. The Shanghai coup, these students argued, was indeed anti-
Communist but not counterrevolutionary. Why, they asked, if the 
coup was a counterrevolutionary one, had the Comintern representa-
tive in China, M. N. Roy, cabled Chiang Kai-shek on April 13, plead-
ing with him not to break the unity of the revolutionary forces ? After 
all, they insisted, Chiang Kai-shek could not very well maintain the 
unity of the revolutionary forces if he were counterrevolutionary. 
That telegram of April 13 sent by Roy struck me then, and still 
strikes me, as evidence that the Comintern, even after the April 12 
coup, hoped to patch up the split with Chiang Kai-shek as Borodin 
had done following Chiang Kai-shek's March 20, 1926, anti-Commu-
nist coup. Borodin may have thought, to use a Chinese expression, 
that all of the birds were still in the same nest. But relieved of the total 
dependence upon the Russians that had prevailed while he still was in 
Canton, Chiang Kai-shek had flown the nest. When the Russians 
finally accepted Chiang's defection, Bukharin and others, as I recall, 
characterized the April 12 coup as a coup of the big bourgeoisie against 
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the KMT and its left wing, an eventuality which, they said, had rid 
the KMT of its right-wing saboteurs and traitors. Now, they said, 
the KMT would become a truly revolutionary mass organization. Their 
position was similar to that of someone watching the death of a man 
and shouting with joy instead of weeping. Leaders of the CPSU and 
of the Comintern assured us that now the Wuhan government headed 
by Wang Ching-wei was truly a revolutionary government. We must, 
they said, place our hopes in Wang Ching-wei, General T'ang Sheng-
chih, and Feng Yu-hsiang. Recalling Stalin's talk at Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity on May 13, 1927, indications were that Stalin placed a great 
deal of faith in Feng Yu-hsiang. Yet the headlong sweep of events in 
China once again contradicted all the assertions and predictions of 
Stalin and others. 
As developments in China undeniably moved from bad to worse, 
a sense of being in a hopeless quandary enveloped Communist and 
KMT Left students at Sun Yat-sen University. Many of us figuratively 
dashed about trying to figure out what in heaven's name had happened, 
and we spent a good deal of time in deep, gloomy thought. So many 
pressing questions needed answering. Perhaps the most important one 
concerned the disarming of armed workers in Shanghai—the workers' 
pickets—on the order of the CCP, which was presumably responding 
to Comintern instructions. If the workers' pickets had not surrendered 
their arms, or buried them, in order to avoid an open clash with KMT 
forces, was there any chance at all that they would have been able to 
repel the attacks of Chiang Kai-shek and get control of Shanghai? 
Various Russian leaders, some in the Comintern, others in the Party, 
assured us that the Shanghai pickets were hopelessly outnumbered, 
that the disiplined core of the armed pickets consisted of no more than 
two or three thousand men. Moreover, these pickets were inadequately 
armed. They had not had enough guns to go around in the first place; 
many of the guns they did have had been lost in the fighting which 
began on April twelfth; and of the guns which remained in their hands, 
many were not in working order. Furthermore, we were told, the 
Military Committee in Shanghai, which the CCP had organized to 
carry out the uprising there, had not been psychologically, politically, 
or organizationally prepared for the events that confronted it. The 
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committee simply had not expected the KMT's Revolutionary Army 
to become its most deadly enemy overnight. 
Perhaps the next most compelling question that was on the minds 
of many of us was why the revolutionary Wuhan government did not 
divert its troops that were marching northwards against Chang Tso-
lin to make an eastwards thrust against Chiang Kai-shek, who had, 
after all, openly betrayed the revolution. Stalin gave us a comprehensive 
answer to this question in his talk on May 13. The most important 
point he made was the need to avert a direct confrontation of the 
revolutionary forces with the forces of Western Imperialism. Let 
Chiang Kai-shek for the time being hobnob with the Imperialists at 
Shanghai, he said, while the Revolutionary Army moved north to 
unify the rest of China. For the Imperialists, he said, would not lightly 
relinquish their control of Shanghai, and the revolutionary forces were 
not strong enough to fight on all fronts at the same time. 
It seems to me that one theme ran throughout Stalin's policies 
towards China in this period: The fear of crystalizing a direct con-
frontation between Imperialist forces and the forces with which the 
Soviet Union was unmistakably linked. On March 24, 1927, British, 
U.S., French, Italian, and Japanese warships had bombarded Nanking, 
causing a heavy loss of life. On April 6, 1927, the diplomatic corps at 
Peking had permitted forces of Chang Tso-lin to enter the extraterri-
torial Legation Quarter and to raid the Soviet Embassy there. And 
at Shanghai, in April, 1927, armed forces of the Powers in the Foreign 
Concessions had coordinated their activities with those of KMT troops 
to suppress the Communist-organized uprising. To Stalin and others 
in Russia, such actions must have appeared to be clear warnings that 
the Powers would, if pushed too far in China, take retaliatory action; 
and Stalin had to weigh the possibility, from his standpoint, that they 
might retaliate against the Soviet Union itself. Yet the Soviet Union 
then was still a weak nation, and there were limits to the commitments 
it could realistically make abroad and to the dangers it could risk to 
its own territory. Viewed in this light, Stalin's policies towards China 
in this period seemed to emerge not so much from "opportunism" as 
from the weakness of the Soviet Union. 
Yet another question that haunted Communist and KMT Left 
students at Sun Yat-sen University was why we had not seized control 
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of Nanking when we had had a good chance of doing so, thereby 
making it impossible for KMT forces to carry out the kind of coup 
they carried out in Shanghai. Probably we lacked sufficient informa-
tion to conclude that we could have controlled Nanking. But we did 
know that the Second and Sixth armies of the National Revolutionary 
Army, which had been the first to march into Nanking, had had 
Communist leanings. It was not until the next year that some of us 
were able to learn all about the circumstances surrounding the events 
at Nanking. For it was then that Lin Tsu-han and Wu Yu-chang, who 
had been personally involved in the Nanking developments, and 
Chiang Hao, Hsia Hsi, and others, who had detailed knowledge of 
these developments, arrived at Sun Yat-sen University. Lin Tsu-han 
had been political commissar of the Sixth Army. Wu Yu-chang had 
been one of the most important members of the Wuhan government 
and was at the time a member of the CEC of the KMT. These men 
gave students at Sun Yat-sen University their versions of what had 
happened at Nanking. Later, too, I worked closely at Vladivostok 
with both Lin Tsu-han and Wu Yu-chang for nearly two years, and 
we talked off and on about the Nanking Incident. But it was mostly 
from Lin Tsu-han that I learned about Nanking. We came from ad-
joining counties in Hunan Province, and we had an especially pleasant 
personal relationship. 
As best I can recall, the following is Lin Tsu-han's version of what 
happened at Nanking. Li Fu-ch'un, a Communist, was political com-
missar of the Second Army, which was commanded by General Lu 
T'i-p'in, a Hunanese who was loyal to the KMT. There were many 
Communists among the commanders at middle and lower levels of 
Lu's army, and, for all practical purposes, Communist influence pre-
vailed among his troops. Lin Tsu-han himself was political commissar 
of the Sixth Army, which was commanded by General Ch'en Ch'ien, 
another Hunanese, whose KMT membership went back to the earliest 
years of that party. Considerably senior to Chiang Kai-shek in the 
KMT, Ch'en Ch'ien was at odds with Chiang, under whom he had 
no wish to serve. His uneasy relationship with Chiang caused him 
to lean towards the Communists, not as a matter of conviction but by 
way of strengthening his own position vis-a-vis Chiang. Lin Tsu-han 
utilized this state of affairs tirelessly in trying to induce Ch'en Ch'ien to 
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throw his lot in with the Communists. On many occasions, as a result, 
Ch'en Ch'ien did support the Communists, although he never whole-
heartedly joined the Communist movement as a whole. Thus, when 
on March 24, 1927, the Second and then the Sixth Army marched into 
Nanking, Lin Tsu-han redoubled his efforts to influence Ch'en Ch'ien. 
Lin pleaded with him to assert his personal control over Nanking to 
counter the growing power of Chiang Kai-shek. 
Just at this time the Central Political Committee of the KMT at 
Wuhan, of which Lin Tsu-han and Wu Yu-chang were members, was 
seeking to assert its own control over Nanking, and Lin Tsu-han went 
to Wuhan for a meeting of the committee. As a result of this meeting, 
at the suggestion of Lin and Wu, a Committee on Political Affairs in 
Kiangsu Province, of which Nanking was then the capital, was created. 
General Ch'en Ch'ien was named chairman of this committee. Of the 
ten additional committee members, six were Communists: Li Fu-ch'un, 
Hu Shao-ch'iu, Chang Shu-shih, Li Lung-chien, Chiang Tung-ch'in, 
and Ku Shun-chang. Ku Shun-chang was commander of the armed 
workers' pickets at Shanghai. His appointment to this Kiangsu com-
mittee obviously suggested the possibility of coordinating Nanking 
activities with the activities of the Shanghai workers' pickets. Another 
committee member, Liu Ya-tzu, was closely identified with the Com-
munists. Lin Tsu-han then rushed back to Nanking towards the end 
of March, 1927, to facilitate control of that city by forces hostile to 
Chiang Kai-shek. 
Chiang Kai-shek, meanwhile, was not unaware of what was going 
on at Nanking and Wuhan. He hurried from Kiukiang in Kiangsi 
Province to Shanghai on March 26, 1927, and summoned General 
Ch'en Ch'ien to meet him there. After their meeting, Ch'en Ch'ien 
proceeded to Wuhan. On April 6, 1927, while Ch'en Ch'ien was still 
away from Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek wired the Sixth and Second 
armies an order to immediately evacuate the city, cross the Yangtze 
River, and march northwards. An army loyal to Chiang had by this 
time entered Nanking. Ch'en Ch'ien's subordinates at Nanking wired 
Ch'en asking whether or not they should obey Chiang Kai-shek's 
evacuation order, and Ch'en replied that they were not to obey it. But, 
somehow, agents of Chiang Kai-shek managed to prevent Ch'en's 
telegram from reaching his subordinates at Nanking. Thus, the Sixth 
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and Second armies marched out of Nanking. Chiang Kai-shek per-
sonally entered the city on April 9. 
In Wuhan, as soon as Li Fu-ch'un notified Michael Borodin that 
Chiang Kai-shek had dashed off to Shanghai, Borodin apparently 
sniffed unfavorable developments in the wind. He called a meeting 
of Wuhan leaders at his residence on April 7, 1927. At this meeting 
the decision was made to move the CC of the KMT, which was at 
Wuhan, and the Nationalist government there, to Nanking. But, of 
course, the decision was not made in time. 
As Lin Tsu-han described it to me, the entire plan of forces hostile 
to Chiang Kai-shek to gain control of Nanking turned into a fiasco. 
In summing up, he said that neither the Comintern nor the CCP had 
a well-prepared plan for dealing with KMT generals who might turn 
against them. Second, the Wuhan government at the time was not 
strong enough to assert its influence over the Nanking-Shanghai area. 
Lastly, General Ch'en Ch'ien, on whom everything depended, was not 
himself sufficiently committed to the Communists and the KMT Left 
to insure Communist control over the Second and Sixth armies, even 
though those armies were under Communist influence. 
Back at Sun Yat-sen University during that spring of 1927, there 
often were no answers, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, to the questions 
that preyed upon our minds. And as we agonized over the adverse 
developments in China, those developments continued to move against 
the Communists. The Wuhan government, in which Russian leaders 
had urged us to have faith, switched over to the side of Chiang Kai-
shek. Feng Yu-hsiang, the warlord who had seemed especially de-
pendable to Stalin, threw his support to Chiang Kai-shek, too. Com-
munists by the tens of thousands were slaughtered. Our feelings of be-
ing depressed and in a quandary, which had been oppressing us, 
turned increasingly to outrage. A Comintern representative came to 
the university to meet with Communist students there—the KMT 
Left students having by then lapsed into silence, since in China the 
KMT Left had turned against the Communists. We bombarded the 
Comintern representative, whose name I have forgotten, with angry 
questions. Why had the Comintern, for example, not learned from 
the lesson of the April 12 coup at Shanghai that measures should have 
been taken to prevent a similar coup at Wuhan just three months later? 
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Surely it was on this point that the whole Stalin-Bukharin leadership 
was most vulnerable. It was, of course, difficult for the Comintern 
representative to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. He 
placed the entire blame for the debacle upon Chinese Communist 
leadership, and upon Ch'en Tu-hsiu's "opportunism" in particular. 
Chinese Communist leaders, he said, had not paid adequate attention 
to Comintern instructions, and they had sabotaged many Comintern 
instructions in the process of claiming that they were carrying them 
out. I think I can safely speak for most Communist students who were 
at this meeting when I say that we did not wish to minimize the 
responsibility of Chinese Communist leaders for the tragic events in 
China. Yet to place all the blame upon the Chinese leaders, while as-
signing no blame at all to the leadership of Stalin and Bukharin, stuck 
in our craws. We were not, I think, prepared, either, to believe that 
such men as Borodin and M. N. Roy were any less to blame than Ch'en 
Tu-hsiu. Yet when Borodin returned to Moscow in late August or in 
September, 1927, he was not publicly reprimanded, as Ch'en Tu-hsiu 
was publicly castigated, even though there had been a good deal of 
private criticism of his behavior. Indeed, he returned to Moscow a 
defeated man, and no one in Moscow, Russian or Chinese, seemed to 
have a good word to say for him. No doubt Stalin and Bukharin, 
not wishing to supply the Trotskyites with ammunition, spared Borodin 
from public condemnation. Nevertheless, to us at Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity it seemed obvious that he had fallen into disgrace so far as 
Stalin was concerned. Stalin, I understood, refused even to see 
Borodin. In contrast, General Vassily Blucher, who had been the chief 
military adviser to the KMT and had worked intimately with Chiang 
Kai-shek, received the highest military award the Soviet Union gave 
to its military men. Eventually, Borodin was given the insignificant 
post of editing the English-language Moscow News, a post which he 
held for years. 
When we at Sun Yat-sen University learned that Borodin had re-
turned to Moscow, we insisted that he visit the university to report on 
the situation in China and upon the role he and the Comintern rep-
resentatives had played in that situation. He flatly refused the invita-
tion on the grounds that it was not the proper time for him to speak 
on this subject and that the university was not the proper place for 
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him to make such a report. So many students were highly outraged 
by Borodin's refusal that there was a real chance that there would be 
violent student demonstrations. Trying to head off such an eventuality, 
the vice-rector, Kuchumov, took the initiative in trying to persuade 
Borodin to somehow do something that would placate the students. 
In the end, Borodin agreed to address the students on condition that 
the meeting not take place at the university, but at some place less 
emotionally roiled up, and that only a select group of students and 
professors, no more than one hundred in all, attend the meeting. 
Reluctantly, Borodin's provisions were accepted. The Party bureau 
at the university selected the students and faculty members who would 
attend the meeting, and I was among those chosen. 
As I recall, Borodin spoke to us for about one hour in the small hall 
of a one-story building not far from the university. His strategy seemed 
to be, as a Chinese expression has it, to avoid the heavy things while 
picking up the light ones. A Russian saying applied to another facet 
of his strategy—instead of hanging a dog around his own neck, he 
hung it around the necks of others. Thus, we learned nothing of any 
substance from his speech, which raised the tenor of our anger to a 
new pitch. To make matters worse, he concluded his speech by an-
nouncing that he had to leave to keep another engagement, where-
upon he hurried out of the building. We had no opportunity to ask 
him any of the questions that we had collected beforehand from school-
mates who were not invited to the meeting. 
Waiting eagerly for us at the university when we returned were a 
great many students who immediately jostled us into a hall, where 
several of us, myself among them, recounted what Borodin had said. 
They reacted to our report just as we had reacted to Borodin's report. 
Many unkind things were said about Borodin, to put it mildly. In 
retrospect, to be fair to Borodin, I suppose that he had been forbidden 
to make public utterances of any consequence on the subject of China. 
After all of these developments, few of the students at Sun Yat-sen 
University, I suspect, felt that the Comintern or the Soviet leaders 
could necessarily be relied upon to guide wisely the course of the 
revolution in China. The towering reputation that Stalin and Bukharin 
had acquired among many of us was badly shaken. This state of affairs, 
of course, created a favorable situation for students and faculty mem-
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bers whose sympathies lay with Trotsky. They could present Trotsky's 
positions, while criticizing Stalin and the Comintern, and only a hard 
core of Comintern loyalists had the heart to argue against them. Thus 
it was at this point that Trotskyism at Sun Yat-sen University achieved 
its initial thrust, and among those who pushed Trotsky's cause at that 
time was Chiang Ching-kuo. He appeared frequently at speakers' 
lecterns, usually with a pile of books from which he quoted, support-
ing Trotsky's positions. Speakers at such meetings were limited to 
five-minute presentations. Young Chiang, functioning like a machine 
gun, would frantically leaf through his books while speaking at a great 
rate, discover and read off the appropriate quotation at precisely the 
right point, and then continue speaking and searching out the next 
quotation. He was a brilliantly organized speaker and made maximum 
use of the time allotted him. At the same time he was the author of a 
good many effectively written essays which were posted on the uni-
versity's bulletin boards. 
We shall discuss the fate of Trotskyites at Sun Yat-sen University 
in later chapters. Here let me anticipate a bit by saying that Chiang 
Ching-kuo was not punished for his outspoken support of Trotsky, 
although less outspoken Trotskyites were harshly treated. Instead, 
Chiang Ching-kuo was sent on from Sun Yat-sen University to attend 
a military-political academy in Leningrad. At the time, some of us as-
sumed that the Soviet authorities chose to overlook his political in-
discretions because of his youth. Subsequently, though, I entertained 
the thought that Stalin may well have been keeping Chiang Ching-kuo 
up his sleeve, as it were, as a bargaining piece in possible future negotia-
tions with Chiang Kai-shek. Or perhaps Stalin merely hoped through 
Chiang Ching-kuo to have available some sort of a link with the boy's 
father in the event that such a link might prove useful in the future. 
During the years of the War of Resistance Against Japan and shortly 
afterwards, this latter consideration, in fact, did seem to be the case, 
although it is beyond the scope of this volume to go into the matter here. 
In any event, many of the students at Sun Yat-sen University who 
in this trying period came to sympathize with Trotsky's positions even-
tually became formal members of the Trotsky opposition. But it was 
the hope of those of us who, though our trust had been sorely tried, 
remained loyal to Comintern leadership that Comintern and Russian 
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leaders would, indeed, profit from their mistakes and grow more adroit 
in their assessments of Chinese revolutionary needs and developments. 
The anti-Communist coup of April 12,1927, marked a turning point 
in modern Chinese history. From that day on, the policy of the KMT 
again reverted back to the state that prevailed before the reorganization 
of the KMT in January, 1924. Sun Yat-sen's three major policies of 
uniting with Soviet Russia, uniting with the Chinese Communists, 
and supporting the workers and peasants were abruptly dropped. Also 
from this day on, events led the Chinese Communists to liquidate 
Ch'en Tu-hsiu's soft-line leadership and to adopt the hard line of armed 
struggle. The failures suffered by the Communists in Shanghai and 
in other large cities after April 12, 1927, a series of failures that con-
tinued for years, became a decisive factor in shifting Chinese Commu-
nist policy from organizing city workers as its main task to sponsoring 
armed agrarian revolution in the villages. They developed the military 
strategy of absorbing the cities by occupying villages. Much later it 
was this same strategy which they insisted should be adopted on a 
world-wide scale to win the world revolution! 
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Chapter X 
Feng Yu-hsiang—Honorary Student 
at Sun Yat-sen University 
The initial efforts of Soviet Russia to establish a foothold in China 
can be traced back to the early days following the October Revolution 
of 1917. But it was not until 1923, when the Russians established firm 
relations with Dr. Sun Yat-sen in South China, that they made any 
substantial headway in China. Michael Borodin left Moscow for 
Canton in September, 1923. On the way, he stopped off in Peking, 
where he had long conversations with Leo Karakhan, the Soviet repre-
sentative there. They discussed, among other things, the possibility of 
establishing a Soviet foothold in North China in addition to the one in 
the South. About the same time, Li Ta-chao and, later, Hsu Ch'ien, 
helped this undertaking by providing concrete suggestions as to how it 
might be implemented. Li and Hsu proposed to Karakhan that Gen-
eral Hu Ching-i, commander-in-chief of the Second Kuominchun, then 
based in Honan Province, was the most likely man in the North with 
whom the Russians might develop a useful working relationship. Hu 
Ching-i had long maintained close relations with the KMT and could 
almost be regarded as a KMT member. The Russians accepted this 
suggestion and began the lengthy negotiating and planning necessary 
to send a substantial military advisory group to work with Hu Ching-i. 
Before the advisory group actually was sent, however, Hu Ching-i died 
of an infection from an abscess in April, 1925. The Russians had no 
faith in his successor, Yueh Wei-chun. This time, Li Ta-chao, Hsu 
Ch'ien, and perhaps others suggested that the Russians work out a re-
lationship with the commander-in-chief of the First Kuominchun, 
Feng Yu-hsiang, who was stationed at Chiang-chia-k'ou. Again, the 
Russians accepted the suggestion. At Li Ta-chao's request, Mao I-heng, 
a professor in Peking, visited Feng Yu-hsiang and acquainted him with 
the Russians' interest in providing him with military assistance. Feng 
promptly named three subordinates, Liu Chi, T'ang Yueh-liang, and 
Pao Shih-chieh, to directly negotiate in his behalf with Karakhan. 
Meanwhile, the KMT appointed Hsu Ch'ien as its representative to the 
First Kuominchun. Then, in behalf of the KMT, Wang Ching-wei, 
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Sun Fo, and K'ung Hsiang-hsi, one after the other, visited Feng Yu-
hsiang at the headquarters of the First Kuominchun to strengthen 
political ties. Eventually, Borodin visited Feng Yu-hsiang at Chiang-
chia-k'ou, and shortly after that a large Russian military advisory group 
arrived.1 
Indications are that Borodin, at Karakhan's request, went to Peking 
in April, 1925, and that on April 21,1925, he went to Chiang-chia-k'ou, 
accompanied by the Russian military attache at Peking, A. I. Gecker. 
Presumably, since the groundwork already had been laid by Mao 
I-heng and others, Borodin and Feng Yu-hsiang readily reached an 
agreement regarding Russian assistance to the First Kuominchun. 
The Russian advisory group, headed by a Russian whose Chinese 
name was Jen T'e-chiang, probably reached Chiang-chia-k'ou in about 
May, 1925. The group consisted of twenty-nine military specialists, 
two political workers, one medical doctor, and four interpreters.2 
As I recall, Li Ta-chao at the time sent out a confidential commu-
nication to leading CCP organizations in North China informing them 
of these developments and suggesting that Feng Yu-hsiang might 
eventually turn completely to the side of the revolution. Li's commu-
nication instructed Party organs to prepare to address themselves to 
this new situation. Peking at that time was the cultural and political 
center of China, and the Peking Communist organization was the 
largest in North China. Li Ta-chao's communication instructed it to 
prepare capable, energetic young political workers for possible assign-
ment to Feng Yu-hsiang's army. Li's communication, I recall, caused 
a good deal of excitement among the Communist leaders in Peking as 
well as the rank-and-file Party members. Many of them, of whom I 
was one, were eager to be recruited to work in Feng's army. 
In October of 1925 Feng sent a military mission to Soviet Russia to 
examine Russian military education and to explore the possibility of 
getting more Russian military aid. The head of this mission was 
Hsiung Pin.3 Hsiung Pin, however, had at least one additional task— 
to prepare the way for a visit to Moscow by Feng Yu-hsiang himself. 
Feng left for Russia in March, 1926. He left P'ing-ti-ch'uan on March 
20 and arrived at Ulan Bator on the twenty-second, where he and his 
wife, Li Te-ch'uan, and the rest of his group stayed for more than a 
month. It was while they were still there that Borodin, leading a group 
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of thirty people, which included Yu Yu-jen, Eugene Ch'en, Ku Meng-
yu, Hsu Ch'ien, and Ch'en Ch'i-hsiu, arrived at Ulan Bator on April 3, 
1926. Borodin and his group discussed with Feng the details of co-
operation between the KMT and the Kuominchun. 
Feng finally arrived in Moscow on May 9, 1926. He was given a 
most cordial and enthusiastic welcome. The students of both Sun Yat-
sen University and KUTV were at the station to greet him with huge 
banners and placards proclaiming "Greetings to the leader of the 
People's Army—protector of the worker-peasant movement of China!" 
Besides the students, Pugachev, chief-of-staflf of the headquarters of 
the Russian Red Army; Melnikov, Narkomindel's Far East Director; 
and Yakovlev, commander of the Moscow garrison, were present.4 
Feng apparently was moved by the welcome accorded him. He 
held a press conference at the station, at which he stated: 
I have come to Soviet Russia to strengthen the ties of friendship that bind our 
two countries and to study the reconstruction of Russia and the Red Army. On 
the way from Verkhne-Udinsk to Moscow, I have already seen the successes of 
the reconstruction in the many bridges, highways, and apartment houses now 
completed. I am happy that here, in Russia, I have found a model of what the 
future of China can be. . . . What particularly impressed me in your country is the 
Red Army, especially the Red cavalry. While in Verkhne-Udinsk I joined in the 
May Day celebrations and saw firsthand the close unity and cooperation between 
the Red Army and the people. Many of the military barracks I visited were as 
orderly and clean as an academic institution.5 
He then went among the ranks of the welcoming students and 
thanked them for their kindness. For this gesture he was again re-
warded with thunderous cries of "Long live the leader of the Kuomin-
chun !" "Long live the warrior against Imperialism!" As a further 
gesture of his sympathy for the Socialist cause, he personally donated 
one hundred rubles for the relief of the striking English workers and 
asked for further donations from his group. Naturally, this gesture 
received front-page treatment in Pravda.Q Feng truly possessed diplo-
matic and acting talents. 
As Sun Yat-sen University students described it to me later, he 
made further use of his talents when, on May 10, he visited the tomb 
of Lenin and dramatically announced that he had decided to join the 
KMT and fight for the National revolution. While he made it appear 
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that his decision was based upon inspiration from the Communist 
saint, it was actually based upon the practical considerations entailed 
in the unfavorable military situation and the growing shortage of 
armaments which he faced in China.7 
Everywhere he went in the Soviet Union he gave stirring speeches 
proclaiming his revolutionary ardor. He fooled everyone, including 
the students at Sun Yat-sen University, who invited him to a special 
meeting. Mao I-heng, who accompanied him on his trip to the uni-
versity, wrote: 
On the third day of our stay in Moscow, Sun Yat-sen University invited Feng 
Yu-hsiang to give a speech to the students. Both Hsu Ch'i-lung [Hsu Ch'ien] 
and I were also invited to attend. The time was set for eight o'clock that night, 
but we arrived around half past seven. A group of students chatted with Feng for 
a while, among them some fellow provincials of Feng Yu-hsiang's from Anhwei 
Province. At the meeting eight students were chosen for the presidium. One of 
them was a girl named Chang Hsiu-lan, who is now a member of the Control 
Yuan in Taiwan. Rector Radek gave the welcoming and introductory speech in 
which he especially stressed the point that Feng came from landless farmers and 
that therefore he would be the best protector of the peasants' interests. He also 
stressed that North China needed a man like Feng Yu-hsiang. Feng then stood 
up and gave his speech, of which the first sentence was, "I shall always be a turn-
coat of the bourgeoise! I have also chased the Manchu emperor away from his 
palace, thus destroying the very roots of several thousand years of the Chinese 
Imperial system!" His opening sentences were very well received, as evidenced by 
the thunderous ovation he received. Everyone appeared to be enthusiastic. Feng 
spoke for approximately an hour and fifteen minutes and held the interest of his 
audience very well. This speech left a very good impression on his listeners. Later 
I was told that after the speech, during the Party group discussions held at the 
university as to whether or not aid should be given Feng, the majority were in 
favor of aiding Feng.8 
Another student who attended the meeting later told me that Feng 
started his speech by saying, "I am the son of a worker" and ended it 
by shouting, "Long live Leninism! Long live the proletariat! Long 
live the World Revolution!" 
Apparently in response to Feng's eloquent speech at the university, 
many students the next morning went to the Hotel Europa, where 
Feng Yu-hsiang was staying, to pay him a courtesy visit. It might be 
noted that, as Mao I-heng recalled it, students in this group included 
Ch'en Shao-yu, Wang Tung-yung, and others who came from Anhwei 
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Province, as did Feng. It seems apparent from Mao I-heng's account 
of the episode that Ch'en Shao-yu made a highly favorable impression 
on him as a pleasant-faced, intelligent young man whose command of 
the Russian language was noteworthy and whose knowledge of the 
teachings of Lenin and Stalin was impressive. Of this courtesy visit 
Mao I-heng also noted that a majority of the students were Commu-
nists, a circumstance which led Mao to speculate that the Russian Com-
munists encouraged Chinese Communist students to visit Feng by way 
of initiating a relationship which might lead to the young Chinese 
eventually working with Feng back in China.9 That may be the case, 
but after I got to Moscow I was told that Chinese Communists in the 
university had organized the visit to Feng's hotel with the intention of 
inclining Feng favorably toward the Communists while isolating him 
from the KMT. If this was their intention, it succeeded for a time. 
Most KMT students, I was told, treated Feng as though he already 
was a creature of the Communists; they only later made overtures 
towards him. In any event, where Communist interests were at stake, 
Communist organization was apparent, which could not always be said 
of the KMT. 
According to Mao I-heng, on the way to Moscow, at Feng's request, 
a Russian accompanying the party had lectured Feng and his entourage 
on Leninism. During his stay in Moscow, Feng made much of his 
"proletarian" background. He even asked Karl Radek to explain 
Leninism to him, which Radek did. It was as Radek's student that he 
received an official Sun Yat-sen University student identification card 
and was made an honorary student of the university, although he did 
not attend classes.10 Apparently to further demonstrate his sincerity 
with regard to the revolutionary cause, Feng summoned his son Feng 
Hung-kuo from Germany, where young Feng had been studying, and 
enrolled him at Sun Yat-sen University.11 He also enrolled his eldest 
daughter, Feng Fu-lun, in the university. Feng placed his second 
daughter, Feng Wu-lun, as a worker in a Moscow aeronautical plant, 
presumably to cement his ties with the proletariat. 
Before Feng Yu-hsiang left Moscow, he enrolled one member of 
his party, a close associate named Ch'en T'ien-ch'ih, as a student at 
Sun Yat-sen University. Somewhat later, on Feng's instructions, a good 
many of his officers who were studying in military institutes in Kiev 
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and elsewhere, were transferred to study at Sun Yat-sen University. 
With one of these men, Yang Nien-hsi, who used the Russian name 
Ivanov, I formed a close personal friendship. At about the same time 
Feng somehow enrolled one of his more senior officers, Chang Cheng-
ya, as a student at KUTV, which meant that Chang must have 
been a Communist Party member, perhaps a member of the CCP. 
While studying at KUTV, Chang seemed to spend much of his time 
at Sun Yat-sen University, where I got to know him. He always was 
a busy man. Rightly or wrongly, I assumed that he was a double 
agent whom Feng had planted in the Communist Party but of whose 
services the Communist Party made good use. He was not the only 
one of Feng's men in Russia who joined the Communist Party, of 
course. But the others, it seemed to me, maintained an unquestionable 
loyalty to Feng. 
Feng Yu-hsiang visited many important dignitaries in Moscow. 
Among them were Chicherin, Zinoviev, Kalinin, Radek, Voroshilov, 
Trotsky, and Madame Lenin. Feng did not meet Stalin, but Stalin 
was evidently quite impressed by him. According to Mao I-heng, 
Stalin originally promised Feng military equipment for fifty thousand 
troops, but later he decided to go all out and multiplied the amount of 
equipment promised by eight times.12 With such fruitful results Feng 
finally left Moscow on August 17, 1926. He was accompanied by Liu 
Po-chien, a graduate of KUTV who had been working with the 
Chinese Section of the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat. Upon 
arriving in China, Feng appointed Liu director of the Political Section 
of the Kuominchun. 
Feng Yu-hsiang got back to his headquarters at Wu-yuan in 
Suiyuan Province on September 15, 1926, where he was sworn in as 
commander of the united Kuominchun and where he formally pro-
claimed that he had become a KMT member. Now he had six armies 
under his command. On November 28, 1926, after considerable fight-
ing, he occupied Sian, the capital of Shensi Province. Yii Yu-jen, a 
native of Shensi, was made governor of the province. Sian thus be-
came a center of the revolution in China; at the time a saying went 
"Canton in the South, Sian in the North." 
At the same time, of course, Shensi Province became a felicitous 
place for Chinese Communist activities. In almost every field of activity 
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in the province, Chinese Communists quickly came to occupy sig-
nificant posts—in government, the educational institutions, the mass 
organizations, and so forth. Interestingly, in Sian, doubtless with Feng 
Yu-hsiang's consent, an organization comparable to the Russian GPU 
was created. It was called the Department of Political Defense (cheng-
chih pao wei pu). Meanwhile, at Sian the Sun Yat-sen Military 
Academy was established. Both the Department of Political Defense 
and the Sun Yat-sen Military Academy were headed by a Communist 
named Shih K'o-hsuan. Liu Po-chien, a Communist, was made head 
of the Political Department of the united Kuominchun, and the CCP 
rapidly expanded its political work within the Kuominchun. In addi-
tion to Liu Po-chien, such Communists as Liu Chih-tan and Li Lin 
were active in the Kuominchun. Liu Chih-tan was subsequently to be-
come a founder of the Shensi-Kansu Soviet area.13 
The young Party activists recruited by the Peking Chinese Commu-
nist organization specifically for work in Feng Yu-hsiang's army, about 
one hundred of them, were also by this time working in the Kuomin-
chun. I might digress a bit to reminisce about one of them, a close, 
lifelong friend of mine named Wu Chung-Ian. We came from the 
same village in Hunan, and we studied at the same university in Peking. 
It was I who convinced him that he should join the CCP and who 
sponsored his membership in the Party. It was I, too, who recom-
mended to the Peking Communist organization that he be assigned 
to work in Feng Yu-hsiang's army, and he left to undertake this work 
before I left Peking for Moscow. In 1927, when Feng Yu-hsiang turned 
against the Chinese Communists, most Communists working under 
him were dismissed, the others executed. Wu Chung-Ian was executed. 
With the rapid success of the Northward Expedition of the National 
Revolutionary Army, there was a swift growth of dissension in the 
revolutionary ranks. Starting with the anti-Communist coup in Shang-
hai, the conflict between the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary 
elements in the Wuhan government area was intensified. Even in the 
upper echelons of the Wuhan government there were signs of discord. 
Sensing danger for the Chinese revolution, the students of Sun Yat-
sen University passed a resolution on June 9, 1927, urging Feng Yu-
hsiang and T'ang Sheng-chih to hold the revolutionary line. The 
complete text of the resolution follows: 
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Through the CEC of the KMT in Wuhan and the Nationalist government we 
appeal to the commander-in-chief of the Wuhan Northward Expeditionary 
Forces, General Feng Yu-hsiang, the deputy commander, General T a n g Sheng-
chih, and all officers and soldiers in the front: The recent victory of the North-
ward Expedition launched by the Wuhan government and the armed threats of 
the Imperialists have demonstrated that only those revolutionary troops that oper-
ate with the support of the workers and peasants can be the fearful enemy of the 
Imperialists. The treacherous and inhuman actions of the new tool of the Im-
perialists, Chiang Kai-shek, can but make the people more revolutionary, 
strengthen the solidarity of the workers and peasants with the Nationalist govern-
ment, render the victory of the Chinese revolution more secure, and accelerate the 
fall of Imperialist domination in China. 
The arming of the workers and peasants and the agrarian revolution in the 
villages are the only guarantees of the victory of the Chinese national revolution. 
The Northward Expedition is victorious, and we predict that the demoralization 
of Chang Tso-lin's army and his fall are inevitable. This news makes us very 
happy. The proletariat and oppressed peoples all over the world, especially the 
workers and peasants of the Soviet Union, sympathize deeply with our national 
revolution and offer us every possible assistance. This is proof of the correctness 
of the Three Principles of our illustrious President. 
All members of the branch of the KMT in this university have vowed to work 
together with all of the comrades of our party and to fight to the end. 
The Community of the members of 
the KMT in Sun Yat-sen 
University, Moscow.14 
This resolution, full of high-sounding phrases, was, of course, in-
capable of changing Feng's mind. He did not reply to it, nor did 
General Tang Sheng-chih. All Feng really cared about was the en-
larging of his own domains; he could not have cared less about the 
revolution. 
On June 10, 1927, Feng, Wang Ching-wei, Tan Yen-k'ai, Hsu 
Ch'ien, Sun Fo, Ku Meng-yu, T'ang Sheng-chih, Chang Fa-k'uei, 
Teng Yen-ta, and General Blucher met in Cheng-chou to discuss re-
taliatory measures against Chiang Kai-shek. However, on June 19, 
Feng had met with Chiang and Hu Han-min to discuss the Northward 
Expedition and measures that could be taken against the Wuhan gov-
ernment. Feng analyzed the situation in the following manner: 
Chiang invited me to meet him in Hsu-chou. When I arrived in Hsu-chou 
we discussed the continuation of the Northward Expedition. So now the Wuhan 
government wants me to help them fight Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang wants me 
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to help him fight the Wuhan government. But if we were to squabble among 
ourselves, how could we acquit ourselves in the eyes of the Chinese people?15 
After his conference with Chiang Kai-shek, Feng's attitude toward 
the Wuhan government changed abruptly. On June 21, he sent the 
Wuhan government a telegram which indicated quite clearly that he 
had sided with Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, it was not surprising that 
on July 8, 1927, Feng officially started his "Party purge" against the 
Communists. All of the political workers in the Kuominchun who 
were stationed in Honan and Shensi were completely investigated, 
and all of those workers who had been sent by the Wuhan government 
or the Communist Party were discharged. The director of the Political 
Section of the Kuominchun, Liu Po-chien, who had returned to China 
with Feng, was among those discharged from their positions. Feng had 
no more need for Russian aid and was anxious to rid himself of 
Russian fetters. 
However, in turning against the Communists, he seemed to have 
forgotten his wife and children in Moscow. Feng Hung-kuo's reaction 
to his father's treachery is especially interesting, because he was placed 
in a situation quite similar to that of Chiang Ching-kuo. He hastened 
to issue the following scathing denunciation of his father's treachery:16 
Father: Now it is evident that by deserting the revolutionary front you have be-
come a leader of the counterrevolution. To me, because I was aware of your op-
portunism and your pretentious and pig-headed character, this shift was not 
unexpected. During the negotiations between the KMT and the Northwestern 
Peoples' Army on the conditions of affiliation of the latter with the KMT, you re-
jected the conditions by which the KMT would be granted the authority to punish 
officers of the Kuominchun [Peoples' Army] if they violated the discipline of the 
KMT. You argued at that time that this condition would mean a capitulation of 
the Peoples' Army and was not a condition for mutual cooperation. Judging from 
these words, it is obvious that you had no intention of carrying on the revolu-
tionary struggle under the leadership of the KMT, but that you only wished to 
make use of its flag and to seize more territory under the pretense of protecting 
the interests of the workers and peasants. Now, throwing down your mask, you 
have not only failed to defend the interest of the working class and the peasantry, 
but you have gone so far as to cooperate openly with Chiang Kai-shek, the 
butcherer of workers and peasants. 
I have learned that you issued an insolent statement saying that in the terri-
tory under the control of the Wuhan government the merchants, the owners of 
industrial enterprises, and the landlords were oppressed by the workers and 
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peasants. This is ridiculous! The time has not yet come when the Chinese 
workers and peasants can oppress the capitalists, merchants, and landlords. But 
even if this were the case, you should stand on the side of the majority of the 
people and help the workers and the peasants overthrow the yoke of the exploiters. 
You have become the enemy of the working class and the peasantry and a 
renegade of Sun Yat-senism. Formerly, when I was studying in an old-style 
school, I had no idea of revolutionary teachings. Now, after entering Sun Yat-sen 
University and studying the theory and practice of revolution, I know the line 
that the Chinese revolution should follow. While you have followed the counter-
revolutionaries, I have become a revolutionary. And as a revolutionary I care only 
for the interests of the revolution and not in the least for the relationship between 
father and son. Therefore, I am breaking all ties with a counterrevolutionary 
father like you. Starting today I regard you as belonging to the pack of Chiang 
Kai-shek, Chang Tso-lin, and other counterrevolutionaries. 
Now you and I belong to hostile camps. You are in the camp of the counter-
revolution. From now on I will carry on a resolute struggle against my own 
father who is an enemy of the working class and the peasantry. This is my last 
word to my father—a counterrevolutionary! 
August 15, 1927, Feng Hung-kuo, Moscow17 
The ever-suspicious Russians had been on their guard against 
Feng. But when he sent his wife and children to Moscow, they were 
lulled into a state of overconfidence. Also, early in 1927, Feng sent a 
group of military men to Russia. They were headed by the veteran 
General Lu Chung-lin. Besides being an excellent soldier, Lu was an 
excellent speaker. I remember that on February 7, 1927, KUTV held 
a fourth anniversary service in remembrance of those who died in the 
tragic strike of the Peking-Hankow Railroad workers on February 7, 
1923. The speakers at this meeting were Bukharin and Lu. Lu gave 
a very moving speech which was received with thunderous applause 
from the audience. In concluding his speech, Lu said, "I, Lu Chung-
lin, upon my return to China, will do my utmost to liberate the workers 
and peasants. If I should ever turn counterrevolutionary, I ask all of 
you to strike me down." 
This performance by Lu Chung-lin added further to Russian con-
fidence in Feng Yu-hsiang. They had so much confidence in Feng that 
after dissension appeared within the Wuhan government, Borodin and 
the other Russian advisers had planned to evacuate revolutionary ele-
ments to the part of Northwest China that was controlled by Feng. 
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However, their plans were destined to fail, and Borodin found no 
haven in Feng Yu-hsiang's territory. 
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Chapter XI 
Madame Sun Yat-sen and Other Visitors 
to Moscow and Sun Yat-sen University 
The years from 1925 to 1927 were eventful years in China, and the 
turbulence of the times was reflected in the number of KMT and Com-
munist dignitaries who journeyed to Moscow from China. Among 
the never-ending procession of pilgrims to Moscow, members of the 
CCP were the most numerous. Sun Yat-sen University often invited 
these Chinese Communists to the university to report on the situation 
at home. Among those we had the pleasure of listening to were Chang 
Kuo-t'ao, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Chung-fa, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Lu Ting-i, 
Teng Chung-hsia, Kuan Hsiang-ying, and others. Strangely, Sun Yat-
sen University never held receptions for any of these Chinese Commu-
nist leaders, nor did it present them with honorary degrees. Receptions 
and honorary degrees seemed to be reserved for visiting KMT dig-
nitaries. 
However, not all visitors to Sun Yat-sen University were KMT or 
Communist leaders. Among the more important non-Communist 
visitors was the internationally known scholar, Dr. Hu Shih, although 
Dr. Hu did not visit the university while I was there, nor do I recall 
hearing about his visit during my stay in Russia. Mao I-heng in his 
Reminiscences, however, mentions that during his trip to Moscow with 
Feng Yu-hsiang in May, 1926, he heard that Dr. Hu had visited the 
university earlier. According to Mao: 
Hu Shih paid a visit to Sun Yat-sen University while he was passing through 
Russia. Radek (rector of Sun Yat-sen University) asked Hu what impression he 
had formed of the Soviet Union. Hu answered with humor, "A group of people 
are working diligently according to their ideas!" As to the outcome of their 
efforts, Hu said that only the future would tell, and he was no prophet. This 
anecdote was told me by a student at Sun Yat-sen University, who denounced 
Hu as a product of capitalistic training. . . . Thereafter the Communists and their 
followers denounced Hu Shih on general principles. . . . The Communist attitude 
toward Hu Shih was not so hostile before his Moscow trip. Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity's gate was henceforth shut to all Chinese scholars who were not revolu-
tionaries. Mr. Chang Chun-mai [1] tried unsuccessfully to gain admittance while 
he was in Moscow.2 
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Hu Han-min was an especially important visitor at the university. As 
I have already mentioned, Hu was sent to the Soviet Union as an envoy 
for the Nationalist government in Canton. This was a result of the 
Liao Chung-k'ai assassination. He left Canton on September 23, 1925, 
and arrived in Moscow on October 18, 1925. He was accompanied by 
his daughter and several others including Li Yuan-fan, secretary gen-
eral of the Canton government; Chi Ho-chung, secretary of the Mili-
tary Committee; and two cadets from Whampoa Military Academy. 
In spite of Hu's connection with Liao Chung-k'ai's assassination, Mos-
cow accorded him a full reception. Apparently, whatever crime Hu 
Han-min was suspected of, his generalissimo's uniform and repeated 
references to world revolution impressed the Russians. He was given 
a post in the Kresintern and awarded an honorary degree by Sun 
Yat-sen University. 
However, the issue of Liao Chung-k'ai's assassination acutely em-
barrassed Hu Han-min during one of his early visits to Sun Yat-sen 
University. At a meeting there, some of the students, who, of course, 
had no way of knowing the circumstance of Liao's death, blandly asked 
Hu for a report on the particulars of Liao's death. Hu apparently 
blushed and was unable to utter a word. Apparently only an im-
promptu speech by someone else smoothed over a difficult situation.3 
Yet, as I have mentioned in a previous chapter, despite this embarrassing 
incident, Hu Han-min went on to render valuable support to the 
KMT organization in the university. 
Another interesting guest at the university was Yii Yu-jen, a veteran 
KMT member. According to Mao I-heng, Feng Yu-hsiang probably 
initiated the idea of having Yii Yu-jen come to Moscow, as Feng be-
lieved that Yu could help him get Russian aid; but Li Ta-chao prob-
ably made the arrangements for Yii's trip.4 Later, Yii Yu-jen's son-in-
law Ch'u Wu, who was studying at Sun Yat-sen University, told me 
essentially what Mao I-heng speculated above to be the case. Ch'u, 
however, added that Yii had an additional mission, which was to get 
Russian aid for the Second Kuominchun, with which Yii had close 
ties. 
Yii arrived in Moscow in late July of 1926. The August 4 issue of 
Pravda contained an interview with Yii which included a detailed 
account of his life and work, with special emphasis on his part in 
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the founding of Shanghai University in 1922, an institution which, for 
all practical purposes, was a training school for leftist and Communist 
cadres.5 The Chinese Communists were very fond of Yii. In the 
Pravda article Yii was described as the organizer of the Second Kuo-
minchun. That he occupied an important position in the Kuominchun 
and that he came to Moscow with a special mission are obvious from 
the text of his interview of August 4 in Pravda: 
Q: What is the future of Chang Tso-lin's alliance with Wu Pei-fu? 
A: Viewed from the entire experience of the Chinese civil war, this al-
liance is unstable; conflicts between them are inevitable. But it 
would be a grave mistake if we waited with folded hands for the 
situation to change; on the contrary, the Kuominchun should take 
immediate action and launch an attack. 
Q:What is the present strength of the Kuominchun? Is it greatly 
weakened after the recent setback ? 
A: Naturally the Kuominchun is weakened to some extent, yet its 
foundation has become stronger than ever. Those people who lived 
in the regions controlled by the Kuominchun came to hate the war-
lords even more after being subjected to their brief rule, and they 
desired the return of the Kuominchun. But the Kuominchun real-
izes more than ever before the urgent need to cooperate closely with 
the KMT. I hope that General Feng Yu-hsiang will take back with 
him the revolutionary experience he learned in Russia, and I am 
sure it will be of great value in improving the Kuominchun's combat 
capability. 
Q: Pravda, in its reports on the defeat of the Second Kuominchun, 
maintained that the reason for this defeat was the Army's failure 
to establish good relationships with the peasants. These reports 
also told of soldiers who robbed peasants of their property. How 
accurate are these reports ? 
A: These reports are correct. Due to the fluidity in the composition of 
the Kuominchun and the war conditions, the commander of the 
Second Kuominchun was not always able to exercise authority and 
control over the troops. 
Yii Yu-jen was quite busy during his ten-day stay in Moscow. On 
July 31, he visited the Soviet Agricultural Department. He was en-
tertained by the Kresintern on August 3 and was introduced to many 
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Russian scholars. He also received a warm welcome at Sun Yat-sen 
University. At a reception for him at the university, Yii, like Hu Han-
min and Feng Yu-hsiang before him, was awarded an honorary degree 
by Rector Radek. Thus Yii's name was added to the list of distin-
guished alumni. 
Besides receiving an honorary degree, Yii Yu-jen had relatives at 
the university. His daughter Yii Lun and his son-in-law Ch'u Wu 
were both students there. After her graduation Yii Lun returned to 
China, but Ch'u Wu remained in Moscow and attended the Moscow 
Military Academy. When Ch'u was ordered back to China after the 
completion of his studies, he resisted. He got off the train at some 
Siberian station and secretly returned to Moscow, hoping to continue 
his relationship with his Russian mistress. However, he was soon ar-
rested by the Russian secret police and sent to Siberia to be reformed 
by labor. Finally, after years of hardship, he was sent back to China; 
but instead of reporting to the Chinese Communist authorities for 
duty, he became a member of the Control Yuan of the Chinese Na-
tionalist government. He secured this position with the help of his 
influential father-in-law. 
Two other interesting personalities who visited Moscow during this 
period were Shao Li-tzu and Lu Chung-lin. Shao Li-tzu came to 
Moscow on an official mission soon after Hu Han-min, Feng Yu-hsiang, 
and Yii Yu-jen. According to the Russians, he represented Chiang Kai-
shek as the KMT delegate to the Comintern. I have already mentioned 
this fact in another chapter, but I have not been able to find out 
whether Shao's mission was based on a resolution of the CEC of the 
KMT or on Chiang's personal order. Also, I am not certain as to the 
exact date of Shao's arrival in Moscow. 
Some time around the end of 1926 or the beginning of 1927, Lu 
Chung-lin came to Moscow with the last group of Feng Yu-hsiang's 
officers, most of whom held the rank of division commander. Among 
the members of Lu's group were Li Hsiang-yung, Ch'en Hsi-hsien, 
Chang K'e-hsia, Ho Ch'ih-li, and P'u Hua-jen. All of these officers 
were young, inexperienced, and easily influenced by Communist 
propaganda. The only one of the group who might have been termed 
an intellectual was the Christian minister P'u Hua-jen, Feng Yu-
hsiang's personal chaplain, who was fascinated by communism. 
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Besides engaging in the usual sightseeing, Lu and his fellow 
travelers were enrolled in a short-term class set up especially for them 
at Sun Yat-sen University. In this course Rector Radek and others 
discussed Leninism and the principles of military affairs. 
Some members of Lu's group later became Communists. P'u Hua-
jen, for example, shifted his ardent faith from Christ to Marx and 
preached communism instead of Christianity.6 
Another guest in Moscow with whom we students at Sun Yat-sen 
University had contact was with Teng Yen-ta. The year 1927 had 
been a turning point in the course of the Chinese revolution, and 
after the April 12 anti-Communist coup in Shanghai, the Wuhan gov-
ernment became more and more unstable. The situation took an 
abrupt turn for the worse after Feng Yu-hsiang telegraphed the Wuhan 
authorities his ultimatum of June 21,1927. 
Due to this unfavorable turn, a July 13 TASS dispatch from 
Hankow reported that Teng Yen-ta had issued a statement saying 
that the KMT and Feng Yu-hsiang had betrayed the Three Principles 
of the People and that he, therefore, no longer wanted to remain as chief 
of the National Revolutionary Army's political department. Shortly 
after issuing this statement, he left Wuhan via Northwest China and 
arrived in Moscow in August. 
At the time of Teng's arrival in Moscow the entire student body 
of Sun Yat-sen University was vacationing at Tarasovka, a suburb of 
Moscow. As we were all anxious for news of China, the university 
authorities invited Teng to this resort to report on the revolutionary 
situation in China. Teng was a very learned man, and he impressed 
me most favorably. In a four-hour-long report, he discussed in detail 
the conflicting factions existing within the revolutionary camp. He 
severely denounced Chiang Kai-shek and the Wuhan leadership, but 
he also pointed an accusing finger at the Communists. Some of the 
Communist students in the audience were apparently angered by his 
denunciation of Communists and retaliated by snapping the lights off 
and on and by scuffing their feet on the floor. 
When we returned to school in early September, 1927, Teng pre-
pared a well-written, documented report for us. This report was printed 
by the university and distributed to various groups (each class was 
divided into groups) for discussion. The central problem of these 
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discussions was the relationship between national revolution and class 
struggle—a problem of life and death for the Chinese revolution at 
that time. Some maintained that all Chinese should form a united 
front to fight against Imperialism and that we should not indulge in 
class struggle. Others insisted that the anti-Imperialist, national revolu-
tion must have its foundation on the revolution of peasants and workers. 
Two other individuals who visited Moscow during the late 1920s 
were Eugene Ch'en, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Wuhan gov-
ernment, and Soong Ch'ing-ling, the widow of Sun Yat-sen. As I 
have stated, by July 20, 1927, an anti-Communist political storm was 
imminent at Wuhan, and the Communists and Nationalists were con-
fronting each other with daggers drawn. Under these circumstances 
Borodin left Wuhan for Russia on July 27. Leaders of the KMT Left 
Wing, who were no longer secure in their positions, also made prepara-
tions to leave Wuhan. Among these Left Wing leaders were Ch'en 
and Madame Sun. At the end of July they left Wuhan separately for 
Moscow. 
Previous to this time, however, it had been rumored at Sun Yat-sen 
University that Teng Yen-ta and Soong Ch'ing-ling were about to 
leave Wuhan, and we were quite disturbed. We gathered one day in 
late July to discuss the Wuhan situation and unanimously passed a 
resolution to telegraph Teng and Soong, asking them to remain at 
Wuhan. The text of this telegram was as follows: 
Appeal to Comrades Soong Ch'ing-ling and Teng Yen-ta. Having been 
acquainted with the statement of Comrade Soong Ch'ing-ling and the circular of 
Comrade Teng Yen-ta on the treason and betrayal by the top leaders of the party 
of the three policies (cooperation with Soviet Russia, cooperation with the Com-
munists, and support of the interests of the workers and peasants) laid down by 
our great leader, Sun Yat-sen, a general meeting of the student members of the 
KMT in Sun Yat-sen University wholly subscribe to the opinions of principle 
expressed in your statement and circular. We hold that the conciliation with the 
Nanking wing and the rupture of relations with the CCP are exact repetitions of 
the capitulationist policy of the Right during the revolution of 1911. This is a 
betrayal of the interests of the people in the present stage of the revolution. 
While resolutely condemning the treacherous policy of the so-called Sun Yat-
senist, the general meeting recognized that our party is experiencing an extremely 
grave crisis now. The only way out of this situation is to resolutely reverse the 
conciliatory, treacherous policies of the top leadership, to firmly pursue a course of 
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spreading the agrarian revolution as the main force of the democratic-liberation 
revolution in China, to resolutely broaden the worker-peasant movement, and to 
maintain unequivocally the cooperation with the CCP in order to guarantee a 
sound leadership for the revolution. In this grave moment, this general meeting 
is of the opinion that your departure from active duty is inadvisable, and we 
appeal to both of you and to members of the KMT who still remain loyal to the 
principles of our leader Sun Yat-sen. We urge you to be more active, energetic 
fighters than ever in the struggle against the treacherous leadership and the 
counterrevolution and to strive for the effective realization of the policies of our 
leader by rallying the workers and peasants around the Chinese national 
revolution. 
Down with the traitors and betrayals! 
Long live the genuinely revolutionary Kuomintang! 
The Community of members 
of the KMT in Sun Yat-sen 
University, Moscow7 
Unfortunately, Soong and Ch'en had left Wuhan before this telegram 
reached them. While they left Wuhan separately, they entered the 
Soviet Union at the same time, arriving in Moscow on September 7, 
1927. Soong Ch'ing-ling, on the strength of her late husband's name 
and her own revolutionary appeal, greatly impressed the students of 
Sun Yat-sen University. The day she arrived in Moscow, students 
from Sun Yat-sen University, of whom I was one, and KUTV, and 
representatives from Moscow's various factories and the Chinese Com-
munity all went to Yaroslavskii station to welcome her. When her 
train pulled into the station, the band was playing the "International," 
and there was thunderous cheering. 
After the train stopped, Karakhan, the representative of the Soviet 
central government, and Popov, the representative of the Moscow 
Soviet, entered her coach to welcome her personally. Then she got off 
the train and walked along the platform as those of us in the crowd 
applauded her wildly and shouted slogans. She responded with a 
broad smile, although it was easy to see that her face bore signs of 
strain. The scene reminded me of the previous time that I had seen 
her, which was when she and Dr. Sun Yat-sen had gotten off their 
train at Peking at the end of 1924 and I had been among the throngs 
that had shouted and clapped our welcome to them. On that occasion, 
too, she had obviously been delighted by the greeting of thousands of 
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youngsters who had stood for hours in the snow. But on that occasion, 
too, there had been evidence of strain in her face—strain because of 
the rapidly deteriorating state of Dr. Sun's health. She had smiled and 
waved to us as she had escorted Dr. Sun to the waiting car. Less than 
three months later she had lost her husband. In Moscow on the day 
of her arrival, a bit more than two years after Dr. Sun's death, the hint 
of sadness in her face no doubt reflected the loss of the Chinese revolu-
tion for which both she and her husband had worked. 
I was to see Madame Sun a third time under quite different circum-
stances. In 1924 at Peking and in 1927 at Moscow, I was a spectator in 
the audience and she was the star on the stage. But in the summer of 
1934 at Shanghai, when I saw her for the third time in my life, we met 
at my invitation. At that time I was chairman of the Shanghai Bureau 
of the CC of the CCP. We spent almost five hours together in an 
apartment building in the French Concession of Shanghai. The CC 
at Jui-chin had instructed me to arrange this meeting with Madame 
Sun to brief her in detail about the situation in the Kiangsi Soviet, 
which Chiang Kai-shek's Fifth Encirclement Campaign then held 
under attack. It was a critical time for the Red Army in Kiangsi, and 
I was instructed to seek Madame Sun's assistance in carrying out a 
campaign in the non-Communist areas which would relieve the pres-
sure on the beleaguered Soviet. Madame Sun expressed her deep con-
cern for the plight of the Soviet and promised to do everything in her 
power to assist us. That was the last time I was to see Madame Sun 
Yat-sen. All three encounters, however, etched themselves with equal 
clarity on my memory. 
But on that day in 1927 at Moscow, of course, I had no way of 
anticipating our subsequent encounter. I stood worshipfully in the 
crowd and listened while Popov and a number of Moscow's women 
and then several members of the Moscow Chinese community delivered 
speeches of welcome to Madame Sun Yat-sen. 
The following day Soong Ch'ing-ling made a statement to all of the 
newspapers through TASS, of which this was the third paragraph: 
By taking this trip to Soviet Russia, I am carrying out another, a third mis-
sion. Death caught Dr. Sun Yat-sen before he could fulfill one of his ardent 
desires, namely to pay a visit to Moscow and to consult with you, the staunch 
revolutionary friends of China. His death was precipitated by the hardship of 
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forty years of revolutionary struggle and by the frequent violation of discipline 
on the part of those who betrayed him while pretending to speak in the name of 
Dr. Sun's principles. Before his death Dr. Sun asked me to visit Moscow on his 
behalf. Therefore, I have come here to fulfill his wish. In the name of the revo-
lutionary masses of China, I assure the people of Soviet Russia that we have 
appreciated their cooperation with us in the past, and we are confident that this 
cooperation will be continued in the years of struggle to come.8 
Stalin and other Soviet leaders warmly received Soong Ch'ing-ling 
during her stay in Moscow, and of them all she asked that Russia con-
tinue to support the revolution in China. 
The students at Sun Yat-sen University, especially the women stu-
dents, brimmed with pride at her outstanding performance. At a 
welcoming reception held for Soong Ch'ing-ling and Eugene Ch'en 
at the university, her poise, beauty, and charm evoked waves of love 
and respect from all of us. A native of Kwangtung, Madame Sun's 
Shanghai dialect was impeccable, and she spoke to us that day in the 
Shanghai dialect. She expressed deep gratification, as I recall it, at 
visiting the first Chinese university named after her late husband to 
be established abroad. She told us the thrill she experienced at seeing 
so many fervent young people who were devoting their energies to the 
realization of the Three Principles of the People. Never forget, she 
admonished us, that we were disciples of Sun Yat-sen and that we had 
been trained in a university that bore his name. She urged us never 
to forget that Sun Yat-sen's most precious behests were the Three 
Principles of the People and the three policies: unite with Soviet 
Russia, cooperate with the Chinese Communists, and work for the 
workers and peasants. It was only after Dr. Sun adopted his "three 
policies," she said, that momentum towards the realization of the 
Three Principles of the People increased and the KMT gained new 
strength. She stressed, however, as she had done in her TASS state-
ment, that people who had betrayed Sun Yat-sen were pretending to 
speak in the name of his principles. She mentioned no names in this 
connection. In any event, she was an effective orator. Her crisp, clear 
voice was periodically drowned out by our applause. She made an 
indelibly warm impression upon her audience. 
Immediately following Soong Ch'ing-ling that day at Sun Yat-sen 
University, Eugene Ch'en spoke to us. He enjoyed great popularity in 
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Russia as well as among us students. For he was accepted as the author 
of the sentimentally cordial letter that Sun Yat-sen had sent to Soviet 
Russia just before his death.9 He was celebrated, too, as a revolutionary 
diplomat, the foreign minister of the Wuhan government. An over-
seas Chinese who apparently spoke little Chinese, Eugene Ch'en ad-
dressed us in English. He spoke mostly about his negotiations with 
the foreign powers during the period of his foreign-ministership. 
Soong and Ch'en were the last prominent members of the KMT to 
go to Moscow. The period of Sino-Soviet cooperation had ended. 
Antagonism now separated the two nations, and the campus of Sun 
Yat-sen University was no longer graced by the presence of visiting 
KMT dignitaries. 
Notes 
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first time and was impressed by his dedication to the Communist cause. 
7. Pravda, July 31, 1927. 
8. Pravda, Sept. 8, 1927. 
9. Eugene Ch'en (Ch'en Yu-jen) was indeed the author of Sun Yat-sen's letter. According 
to Lo Chia-lun (Kuo-fu nien-p'u; Kuo-shih-\uan shih-liao pien-chuan wei-yuan-hui; and 
the Chung-\uo Kuo-min-tang tang-shih shih-liao pien-chuan wei-yuan-hui [Taipei, 1958], 
p. 745) on Mar. 11, 1925, the day before Sun Yat-sen's death, after Dr. Sun had signed 
his will, Eugene Ch'en, his English-language secretary, presented Dr. Sun with an English-
language draft of a letter addressed to the Soviet Russian leaders. The letter, which was a 
long one, was read to Dr. Sun, who was terribly weak, by Sung Tzu-wen (T. V. Soong). 
After listening to it, Sun Yat-sen signed the letter. 
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Chapter XII 
Stalin and Sun Yat-sen University 
Joseph Stalin began to study the problem of nationalities early in 
his career. His first work on this subject was Marxism and National 
Problems, which was probably published early in 1913. Even now 
this work is considered a classic by most Marxists. 
In April, 1917, Stalin made a report on nationalities problems to the 
Seventh All-Russian Conference of Bolsheviks. On November 8 of 
the same year his position as an authority on the nationalities problem 
was confirmed by his appointment as commissar of the Peoples' 
Commissariat of Nationalities. 
In his article in the magazine Zhizn Natsionalnostei of November 
24, 1918, Stalin dwelt briefly upon the tasks of Communists working 
in the East: "It is the task of communism to break the age-long sleep 
of the oppressed peoples of the East, to infect the workers and peasants 
of these countries with the emancipatory spirit of revolution, to rouse 
them to fight imperialism, and thus deprive world imperialism of its 
'most reliable' rear and 'inexhaustible' reserve."1 
At the Tenth Congress of the CPSU in 1921, Stalin made another 
report, "On the Party's Present Tasks Concerning Nationalities Prob-
lems." Perhaps due to his report and influence, the Soviet government in 
April, 1921, established the University for the Toilers of the East under 
the auspices of the Commissariat of Nationalities. Stalin's personal role 
is emphasized by the fact that the literal translation of the university's 
name became the Communist University for the Toilers of the East 
Named after Stalin (KUTV). 
With Lenin's death in January of 1924 Stalin became increasingly 
involved in the running of the Comintern. Whereas KUTV had pre-
viously addressed itself chiefly to the nationalities within the Soviet 
Union, it now gave greater emphasis to the people of the colonial and 
dependent countries of the East.2 This was at just the time when the 
national-liberation movement, especially in India and China, was gain-
ing momentum. Hence, Stalin was brought face to face with the prob-
lem of the Chinese revolution. 
In 1925, the year of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's death, the Chinese revolu-
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tionary movement developed rapidly. This rapid expansion resulted 
in a great demand for revolutionary cadres; and although KUTV 
had a Chinese class,* admission to it was restricted to members of the 
Communist Party or the CYC. Besides, this class was too small to 
meet rapidly expanding needs. Hence a university specializing in the 
training of revolutionary cadres for China was established. This was 
Sun Yat-sen University. History does not record who was the originator 
of this university, but since Stalin was a sponsor of KUTV and, 
after the Eleventh Congress of the CPSU in 1922, had risen to the 
powerful post of secretary general of the Party, he may well have 
played a role in the establishment of Sun Yat-sen University. 
The power struggle between Stalin and Trotsky after Lenin's death 
was intensified by and involved in the problems of the Chinese revolu-
tion, and the newly formed Sun Yat-sen University was sucked into this 
struggle from the beginning. After the Chung-shan gunboat incident 
—Chiang Kai-shek's first anti-Communist coup on March 20, 1926— 
Stalin and Trotsky appeared at the university and held a heated debate 
on whether or not the Chinese Communists should withdraw from the 
KMT. It was evident that both Stalin and Trotsky were already seek-
ing the support of the young Chinese revolutionaries. 
From February 17 to March 15, 1926, and from November 22 to 
December 16, 1926, the ECCI held its Sixth and Seventh Enlarged ple-
nums at which the problems of the Chinese revolution were thoroughly 
discussed. On November 30, 1926, at the session of the Chinese Com-
mission of the ECCI, Stalin delivered his historic speech "The 
Prospects of the Revolution in China." The resolutions passed by this 
plenum concerning Chinese revolutionary problems were primarily 
based on Stalin's speech. At this time, the Stalin-Bukharin axis dom-
inated the Comintern. Bukharin had succeeded Zinoviev as Chairman 
of the ECCI. 
After the adjournment of the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI, Stalin 
* According to Stalin's address of May 18, 1925, to students of KUTV (Stalin, Wor\s 
[Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954], VII, 153), the university included 
in addition to students from the Soviet East, about ten different groups of students from 
colonial or dependent countries. No doubt the Chinese class constituted one of these groups: 
"The Chinese class at Communist University for Toilers of the East was initially assembled 
in the autumn of 1921 with, probably, about 35 or 36 students. Of these, apparently more 
than half were from Hunan Province, and most of the rest from other areas of South China. 
Most of these students were members of the Chinese Communist Youth League, only a 
few being CCP members." 
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and Bukharin sent M. N. Roy, as chief representative of the Comintern 
in China, together with a large number of Party workers to strengthen 
the Comintern's leadership of the Chinese revolution. At the end of 
1926, upon the instruction of Stalin, the Far Eastern Secretariat of the 
Comintern also selected a large number of outstanding students from 
Sun Yat-sen University to go to China with Roy. One of my fellow 
students, Teng Wen-i, who was among those who went with Roy, 
remembers that 
In the spring of 1927 it was rumored that the Third International wanted to 
send a delegation to China to direct the revolution and that Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity was to select forty outstanding students to go back to China to work with the 
delegation. The director of this delegation was a member of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Third International, an Indian named Roy. The Chinese repre-
sentatives included T'an P'ing-shan and others. Among the forty students there 
were thirty-seven Communist Party members and only three KMT members—Lo 
Fang-chun, Wen Chung, and myself.3 
As the National Revolutionary Army was advancing rapidly and 
conflicts in the revolutionary movement were becoming increasingly 
evident, Roy and his followers hastened their departure. Teng recalls: 
We started on our journey immediately after receiving notice. We were 
allowed to take all our personal luggage, books, and notes with us. This was a 
privilege granted to us counter to the regulation that forbade taking anything out 
of Russia. Aboard a chartered train, we left Moscow in great haste, and with 
unbelievable speed we hastened to our destination as soldiers speeding to the 
battlefield. Less than ten days later we arrived in Vladivostok. After a one-day 
stopover, we sailed for Canton aboard the S.S. Lenin. In less than seven days we 
were in Canton. About a week passed; then the delegation representing the Third 
International and the returning students from Moscow all went to Wuhan.4 
However, the Roy Mission could not change the trend of events. 
The internal conflicts and the dangers of the Imperialists' armed in-
tervention became more grave. When the Northward Expeditionary 
Army had captured Shanghai and Nanking, British, American, Jap-
anese, and French gunboats shelled Nanking on March 24, 1927, caus-
ing more than two thousand casualties among the military and civilian 
population. Stalin characterized this "Nanking massacre" as "a signal 
for a new demarcation of the contending forces in China. In bom-
barding Nanking and presenting an ultimatum, the imperialists desired 
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to make it known that they were seeking the support of the national 
bourgeoisie for a joint struggle against the Chinese revolution."5 This 
intervention of foreign powers, coupled with clashes within the united 
front, exerted all sorts of divisive pressures on the Chinese revolution. 
Shortly afterwards, on April 12, the anti-Communist coup broke out 
in Shanghai. 
After the April 12,1927, anti-Communist coup at Shanghai, Trotsky 
and his followers greatly increased their attacks on Stalin. At the same 
time, Trotskyite elements at Sun Yat-sen University also increased the 
tempo of their agitation. In order to alleviate the worsening situation 
and quiet the clamor of the opposition, Stalin published an article in 
the April 21, 1927, issue of Pravda, "Questions of the Chinese Revolu-
tion," which criticized the position of the opposition and especially 
that of Radek: "The fundamental mistake of the opposition (Radek 
and Co.) consists in not understanding the character of the revolution 
in China, in not understanding which stage the revolution is passing 
through at the present time, and in not understanding the present in-
ternational situation." 
At that time Radek still was nominally rector of Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity, but he seldom visited his office. However, behind the scenes 
he tried to instigate activities among the Trotskyite professors and 
sympathizers in the student body. The rest of the students, taking note 
of the rapidly worsening situation in China, also had doubts as to the 
wisdom of Stalin's leadership. In order to allay our doubts about the 
Chinese revolution, we asked that Stalin be invited to come to the uni-
versity to give us his analysis of the Chinese revolution and to answer 
questions. Our wishes, carried through the proper channels, met with 
Stalin's approval. He instructed the branch organization of the Party 
at the university to collect the students' questions and to present them 
to him in writing before his scheduled talk. 
We wrote down questions on those facets of the Chinese situation 
which had been bothering us and turned them in to the Party's branch 
office. Because many of the questions were vague, repetitious, or in-
coherently stated, several students from the higher classes, in addition 
to translating them into Russian, sorted and corrected them. 
After the questions were sent out, we anxiously awaited a reply. 
Finally, on the morning of May 13, 1927, a large bulletin appeared in 
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front of the library. It stated that an important member of the CC of 
the Party would address the student body at 2 P.M. that day. Who was 
the important member? The bulletin did not say, but we all guessed 
it must be Stalin. Our mood was one of anxiety mixed with excite-
ment. We rushed to the auditorium long before the appointed hour. 
Several hundred pairs of young, shining eyes were fixed upon the stage. 
At last the stage curtains went up, and Stalin appeared smiling on the 
stage. The auditorium was packed. Besides the chiefs of various de-
partments of both Soviet and Comintern organizations, a good many 
dignitaries from the Trotskyite opposition turned up, carefully taking 
note of Stalin's every word. While there were a great many Russians 
crowded into the auditorium, both Stalinists and Trotskyites, Rector 
Radek was not among them, and in his absence the secretary of the 
Party's branch office at the university served as host. 
Stalin was no orator. From the standpoint of elocution he did not 
compare to Trotsky or Radek. But he excelled in using simple vo-
cabulary and simple phraseology to express complex thoughts. Hence, 
while his speech did not possess great agitating power, it was quite 
convincing. He answered the questions one by one, pausing after each 
paragraph to permit the interpreter to translate. When the interpreter, 
Chou Ta-ming, told him that he could talk a little longer between 
pauses, Stalin smiled and said, as I recall, "I'd rather not talk too long 
in a stretch; then you will not forget so much in your interpretation." 
We all laughed on hearing this remark and were impressed by Stalin's 
thoughtfulness and thoroughness. 
Unfortunately, Chou failed to make a good showing that day. 
Because of either nervousness or excitement, his interpretation was 
none too good. We unanimously demanded that Chou be replaced 
with P'u Shih-ch'i (P'u T'ao-ming), in spite of the fact that Chou 
would lose face. At first Stalin thought that the shouts and catcalls 
directed at Chou Ta-ming were meant for him; but later when he 
learned that the disturbance was over the interpreter instead of an 
unfavorable reaction to his speech, he smiled. 
P'u Shih-ch'i was met with cheers when he appeared on the stage. 
His interpretation was much better, and we were able to grasp more 
fully the fine points of Stalin's important speech. His talk lasted three 
hours. Strangely enough, whether as a security precaution or simply 
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because of a desire to chat with his comrades, Stalin would disappear 
backstage while the interpreter was translating his answers. We really 
never knew the reason for this. 
After he had answered our tenth question and the interpreter had 
finished translating, we waited quietly for Stalin to come out so that 
we might ask some additional questions. But it was the Party secretary 
who appeared on the stage to state that Comrade Stalin, having some 
important affairs to attend to, had already left. We applauded to show 
our respect for Stalin, yet at the same time we were a little disappointed. 
We were left puzzled by the abruptness of Stalin's visit and his 
mysterious departure. 
A good many more questions than those Stalin chose to answer 
had been submitted to him, as Stalin had acknowledged at the start 
of his meeting with us, when he suggested that a second, perhaps 
longer, session at Sun Yat-sen University might be arranged. After 
the Wuhan government turned against the Communists, student 
tempers again flared up, and there was a general demand that Stalin 
make his promised second appearance at Sun Yat-sen University. But 
the Party bureau at the university refused to relay our invitation to 
Stalin, perhaps because events had demonstrated that a number of the 
prognostications he had made during his first appearance were tragi-
cally wrong. Thus, the second visit that Stalin had promised to make 
to Sun Yat-sen University never took place. 
I remember being surprised at the minimal security arrangements 
that prevailed on the occasion of Stalin's visit to Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity. There were some plainclothesmen here and there about the campus 
and in the buildings, but not nearly so many as I had assumed would 
appear. These rather relaxed security precautions contrasted dramati-
cally with the suffocating security measures that I saw in 1932 in connec-
tion with the funeral procession for Stalin's wife. On the latter occasion, 
all activity along the street that the procession took was banned, all 
windows facing the route had to be kept closed, and the route was 
lined with uniformed men, their backs to the procession as they 
ceaselessly scanned the buildings along the way and held their rifles 
at the ready. But in 1927 such security precautions in connection with 
Soviet leaders were unheard of. In any event, the Soviet security peo-
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pie clearly did not expect any violence at Sun Yat-sen University the 
day Stalin came. 
Among the ten questions Stalin analyzed for us, he touched on 
theoretical matters as well as upon immediate tactical issues; but, 
naturally, everything he said had policy implications. For example, 
his answers to our first and second questions were direct replies to 
positions that Radek had taken.6 Radek had maintained that, for all 
practical purposes, there were no feudal remnants in the Chinese coun-
tryside. Of course, this touched upon a fundamental issue concerning 
the very nature of the Chinese revolution, and Stalin had to handle it 
with great care. Stalin maintained that "if there were no feudal sur-
vivals in China, or if they were not of very great importance for the 
Chinese countryside, there would be no soil for an agrarian revolution, 
and there would then be no point in speaking of the agrarian revolu-
tion as one of the chief tasks of the Communist Party at the present 
stage of the Chinese revolution."7 Whereas Radek had insisted that 
the KMT was a petty-bourgeois political party, moreover, Stalin said 
that the KMT was not an "ordinary" petty-bourgeois party.8 
The positions that Stalin took that day at Sun Yat-sen University 
have been widely discussed, and I have no intention of going into 
them in any detail here. But I would like to mention the reaction of 
the students at the university to Stalin's speech. It seems to me that 
Stalin created a generally favorable impression among the students. 
This did not mean, however, that his answers to our questions satisfied 
all the different student factions or that everybody accepted all of his 
answers. For example, those students who sympathized with Trotsky 
were quite unprepared to change their views on many issues no matter 
what Stalin said. Even students who supported the Comintern's 
leadership experienced doubts about some of the things Stalin had to 
say. I, for example, did not find his analysis of the April 12, 1927, coup 
in Shanghai very satisfying. It could be said, I suppose, that the sun-
light of full clarity did not shine on Sun Yat-sen University after 
Stalin's appearance there; Stalin dispelled a good many clouds of 
misapprehension, but some clouds remained to darken the sky. 
In order to give Stalin's speech greater effect than it might other-
wise have had, however, the Party bureau at Sun Yat-sen University 
immediately named several Russian faculty members and Chinese 
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students to edit and translate it into Chinese. It was issued as a 
pamphlet in Chinese only two days after Stalin's appearance. Copies 
of the pamphlet were made available to all students and faculty mem-
bers of the university. Meanwhile, the Party bureau called a meeting 
of all the directors of Communist Party cells in the university—all of 
whom were Russians—and instructed them on ways of handling the 
discussions of Stalin's speech in cell meetings. At this meeting, the 
cell directors were instructed to handle their cell discussions so as to 
criticize the positions of the Trotsky opposition and thus to point up 
the correctness of Stalin's positions. In other words, in our cell meet-
ings we did not, then, discuss the Chinese revolution from the stand-
point of seeking valid answers to pressing issues. The Party bureau's 
strategy was merely to support Stalin in the power struggle within the 
CPSU and the Comintern. This state of affairs did not sit well with 
most students at the university. It was a tragedy that the Chinese 
revolution, instead of being the object of the best thinking of Party 
leaders, became a mere political football which they used in contesting 
one another's leadership. In such factional struggles, of course, each 
contestant explores only the weak points of his opponent, which he 
magnifies in an effort to discredit everything the opponent has to say; 
and in the process, whatever validity there might be in the opponent's 
arguments is drowned in a sea of vitriol. Not everything Trotsky had 
to say was wrong, obviously. Nor was everything Stalin had to say 
correct. 
In the meeting of the cell to which I belonged at the university, I 
was among those who expressed dissatisfaction with Stalin's discussion 
of the April 12, 1927, coup; and perhaps my attitudes may serve as a 
sample of student reactions. Stalin had maintained that the coup 
should not be appraised as a "decline of the Chinese revolution" and 
that those who so appraised it were in fact "siding with Chiang Kai-
shek" and were in fact in favor of receiving Chiang back into the 
Wuhan KMT.9 I remember asking our cell director whether the 
April 12 coup, if it did not represent a decline in the Chinese revolu-
tion, represented an upsurge in the Chinese revolution. He did not 
reply. So I pressed on. Stalin had said that the April 12 coup had 
resulted "in a partial defeat for the workers in a number of areas. But 
that is merely a partial and temporary defeat."10 Was it the case, I 
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asked, that a "partial and temporary defeat" was not a decline? 
Eventually, our cell director replied with Stalin's argument that the 
Chinese revolution had entered a higher stage of development with 
the April 12 coup, the phase of agrarian revolution. Yet Stalin had 
also said that "in a number of areas, such as Hunan, Hupeh, etc., the 
peasants are already seizing the land from below, and are setting up 
their own courts, their own penal organs and their own self-defence 
bodies."11 If this agrarian movement had already gotten under way 
by the time of the April 12 coup, I wanted to know, why had Comrade 
Stalin linked this new, agrarian phase of the Chinese revolution to the 
April 12 coup ? Again our cell director lapsed into embarrassed silence. 
So I poured oil on the flames. Could it be, I demanded, that the 
agrarian revolution had been overdone and that its excesses had caused 
the April 12 coup? I was, of course, not alone in pressing such ques-
tions. Nor was I the only one to question Stalin's statement that 
"Chiang Kai-shek's coup is one of those zigzags in the course of the 
Chinese revolution, one that was needed in order to cleanse the revolu-
tion of dross and to impel it forward towards a powerful agrarian 
movement."12 Did Comrade Stalin contend, a number of us wanted 
to know, that the April 12 coup was a necessary prerequisite to the 
agrarian revolution and that Chiang Kai-shek was a contributor to 
this revolution ? And so we wrangled in our cell meetings. In the end 
our cell director announced that the issues that Comrade Stalin had 
touched upon were so complicated that we would have to explore them 
in greater detail at a later time. With that he adjourned our meeting. 
Perhaps I should note here that, speaking strictly for myself, my doubts 
about some of the things Stalin said did not lessen my support for 
Comintern leadership of the Chinese revolution as a whole. 
Five days after Stalin's address at Sun Yat-sen University, on May 
18, 1927, the Eighth Plenum of the ECCI was held. Trotsky's address 
to the plenum, which included his theses on China, was not made 
available to the public. The Trotskyite opposition, nevertheless, again 
stepped up its bitter attacks on the Comintern's China policy. And the 
students and faculty members at Sun Yat-sen University who sym-
pathized with the opposition, after a brief period of restraint which 
followed Stalin's May 13 address at the university, also increased the 
tenor of their opposition to Comintern policy in China. Indeed, so 
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many people at Sun Yat-sen University eventually turned out to be 
strongly influenced by Trotsky that this was one of the reasons why 
the CPSU and the Comintern closed the university in 1930 with 
Stalin's approval. 
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Chapter XIII 
Sun Yat-sen University and the 
Transplantation of Trotskyism to China 
Leon Davidovich Trotsky (1879-1940) had been a dissenter from 
his early days. In the Bolshevik-Menshevik split, his position was 
somewhere in between the two. When the February, 1917, Revolution 
broke out in Russia, he managed to reach Petrograd from the United 
States shortly after Lenin reached Petrograd. At that time, he led a 
small party of Social Democrats who soon merged with the Bolsheviks. 
Thus it was not until July, 1917, that Trotsky became a member of the 
Bolshevik party. 
He was a remarkable person, well versed in military as well as 
civil matters, equally at ease on horseback or in drafting a diplomatic 
memorandum. After the October Revolution of 1917, he became the 
first Commissar of Foreign Affairs in the new Soviet government. 
Later, he became the People's Commissar of War, and from that time 
on, frictions grew between him and other Party leaders, so that pres-
ently he lost the post. Indeed, although in the October Revolution his 
fame was equal to that of Lenin, with whom he had had many past 
disagreements, and although he held in check the discordant political 
views he retained, given a chance, he became his old tempestuous self 
again. 
Trotsky became the central figure in the United Opposition as his 
differences with various other Soviet Communist leaders grew in-
creasingly strident. The Trotskyites maintained dissenting positions 
towards many Soviet domestic and foreign policies, including the 
China policy. From 1923 onwards, for example, Trotsky consistently 
opposed allowing the KMT to join the Comintern. Whereas by 1925 
Stalin was proposing Communist alliances with the petty bourgeoisie 
in such countries as Egypt and China, in which Communists and non-
Communists would be organized in a single party, Trotsky from the 
start opposed the idea of having the Chinese Communists join the 
KMT. The Trotskyites began to make their presence felt at the 
Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI, which met from November 22 
to December 16, 1926, at which Trotskyites savagely attacked the Com-
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intern's China policy. In September of that year Trotsky had de-
manded that the Chinese Communists withdraw from the KMT and 
independently carry out a "proletarian" policy. At the Seventh Plenum 
of the ECCI, Stalin, Bukharin, and T'an P'ing-shan all attacked 
Trotsky's position, even though on March 20, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek 
had carried out an anti-Communist coup at Canton. One can under-
stand why Trotsky was beside himself with rage. The struggle grew 
more tempestuous. At the Eighth Plenum of the ECCI, from May 18 
to 30, 1927, Trotsky presented his views in two speeches, and he 
supported Zinoviev's position, which called for an end to alliances with 
the bourgeoisie. By this time, of course, the anti-Communist coup had 
taken place at Shanghai on April 12,1927, and Trotsky attacked Stalin's 
position of maintaining an alliance with the bourgeoisie in China. 
He also castigated Stalin for rejecting the opposition's call for the 
establishment of Soviets in China. The month following the Eighth 
Plenum of the ECCI—June, 1927—saw the KMT Left organization 
at Wuhan turn publicly against the Communists. In view of the 
progressively deteriorating situation in China, the ECCI on July 14, 
1927, passed a resolution instructing the Chinese Communists to with-
draw from the Wuhan government but to remain within the KMT. 
This resolution condemned the Chinese Communist leadership for not 
properly carrying out Comintern instructions, thereby blaming the 
Chinese Communist leadership for the conspicuous Communist failures 
in China. Trotsky criticized both Stalin and Bukharin for saddling 
others with the blame for this state of affairs. The battle raged within 
the CPSU until its Fifteenth Congress in December, 1927, at which 
the Trotskyite opposition was made illegal and therefore subject to 
open suppression. The Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI, meeting 
from February 9 to 25, 1928, adopted a special resolution endorsing the 
action taken by the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU. 
Thus, by the end of 1927, the Trotskyite opposition had reached the 
end of its rope in the Soviet Union. It was no longer a faction within 
the CPSU. It was labeled an anti-Party, anti-Soviet, antirevolutionary 
organization. Generally in Russia, Trotskyites literally faced the choice 
of life or death. The wavering ones confessed their waywardness and 
surrendered to the Party's power center. The determined ones went 
underground, carried out their activities secretly, and were, more often 
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than not, eventually liquidated by Stalin. At Sun Yat-sen University, 
the Trotskyites proved, on the whole, to be a loyal and dedicated group. 
In August, 1928, they established their own Trotskyite underground 
organization within the university. It was they who transplanted 
Trotskyism from the Soviet Union to China. 
The members of this initial secret Trotskyite organization in Sun 
Yat-sen University, I know from having investigated it at the time, 
included, in addition to such well-known leaders as Lu Yen and Liang 
Kan-ch'ao, An Fu, Fan Ken-piao, Wang Wen-yuan, and Li Pin. An 
Fu, who was less conspicuously identified then with the Trotskyites 
than were Lu Yen and Liang Kan-ch'ao, ran the organization's ac-
tivities. This group received instructions from the Russian opposition, 
with which it had frequent contact, and it was responsible for translat-
ing the opposition's documents into Chinese and for distributing them 
among students at Sun Yat-sen University. 
By the time the secret Trotskyite organization at Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity came into being in August, 1928, of course, the first class of stu-
dents already had been graduated. A few of them had stayed on to 
serve as interpreters or teaching assistants, while others had entered 
Soviet military academies or other specialized institutions. But most 
of the first class had returned to China, and it seems likely that there 
were Trotskyites among them. For at that time the university made no 
effort to detain pro-Trotsky students, no matter how troublesome they 
were, preferring to send them home to find their own ways rather than 
keep them at the university, where they might contaminate others. 
It was this consideration which caused the university to send such well-
known Trotskyites as Liang Kan-ch'ao, Lu Yen, and others back to 
China in 1928. Lu Yen, a native of Yuyao County, Chekiang Province, 
graduated in Sun Yat-sen University's first class with an excellent 
scholastic record. Initially, he was kept on at the university as an in-
terpreter. By inclination more a scholar than an agitator, Lu Yen may 
well have been the most adept theoretician among the Chinese Trotsky-
ites at Sun Yat-sen University, although he was not especially active in 
practical matters. At the university Lu married a beautiful young 
Russian waitress named Anna, who worked in the university's dining 
room. We used to speculate that they were not well matched, for Lu 
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occasionally turned up with deep scratches on his face, which we took 
as evidence of connubial incompatibility. Be that as it may, his lusty 
Russian bride stayed in Russia when he returned to China. Liang 
Kan-ch'ao, a Kwangtung native who had graduated in Whampoa 
Military Academy's first class, went to Sun Yat-sen University in 1926. 
He had a stormy disposition and enjoyed controversy. He also had a 
resounding voice and a thick skin; and in meetings when statements 
rolled from his mouth in stentorian tones, there was the aura of a 
stereotype hero about him. The vice-rector of Sun Yat-sen University, 
Kuchumov, once good naturedly dubbed him "the leader of the op-
pressed peoples." Lu, Liang, and others went back to China, as I 
recall it, in the summer of 1928, and they doubtless began sowing the 
seeds of Trotskyism in China. The secret Trotskyite organization at 
Sun Yat-sen University, I know, entrusted them with this mission. 
The Trotskyite opposition's activities in China were strengthened 
when in September, 1929, the following members of the secret Trotsky-
ite organization returned to China from Moscow: Ou Fang, Chang 
Fang, Shih Shou-yun, Ch'en I-mou, Sung Feng-ch'un, Li Mei-wu, Hsu 
Chen-an, Fu Jen-lin, and others. About the same time, Liu Jen-ching 
returned to China from the Soviet Union, bringing with him a program 
for China drafted by Trotsky himself. By then, the Chinese Trotskyites 
who had returned to China ahead of Liu already had launched some 
organizational activities, however, and factions mushroomed in the 
Chinese Trotskyite movement in China proper. 
Indications are that the first general meeting of Chinese Trotskyite 
oppositionists was held in Shanghai in January, 1930. The meeting ap-
parently lasted for three days, during which it endorsed Trotsky's 
political platform and adopted, as its main policy, opposition to Stalin 
and to the "opportunist" leadership of the CC of the CCP. Presumably, 
then, from an organizational standpoint, the transplantation of Trot-
skyism to China was completed by January, 1930. The undertakings 
of this group opened a Chinese front for the world-wide Trotskyite 
war against the Stalinists; yet another foreign Buddha's shrine was thus 
erected in China. 
At this initial Trotskyite meeting in Shanghai, the Chinese opposi-
tion apparently elected a General Committee of Executives (Tsung 
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kan-shih hui).# The General Committee was made up wholly of 
people who had attended Sun Yat-sen University. Surely Stalin in his 
wildest dreams could not have imagined that Sun Yat-sen University, 
which he helped to establish, would generate so many disciples of his 
deadliest enemy—Trotsky. Yet these disciples of Trotsky were emperors 
in their own households only; they had no substantial popular fol-
lowing. 
The official title of the organization formed at the January, 1930, 
meeting was Chung-\uo Kung-ch'an-tang tso-p'ai huan-tuei-p'at (Left 
opposition of the CCP). A participant in the Trotskyite events of 
the time told me many years later that the Chinese Left opposition 
responded to instructions from Trotsky in setting up this organization. 
Trotsky's instructions were to remain within the organizational frame-
work of the established CCP, rather than to form a rival organization 
which would be isolated from the members of that Party. The Left 
opposition could, Trotsky reportedly said, operate more expeditiously 
within the established Party than from outside. This tactic failed, 
however, for the Trotskyites soon were expelled from the established 
Party. 
Among the slogans that the Chinese Left opposition that was 
probably formed in January, 1930, used were the following: 
1. To demand that the CC [of the established CCP] publicly dis-
cuss the issues raised by the Left opposition. 
2. To demand that the CC convene a National Party Congress to 
elect a new CC. 
3. To demand that the CC appeal to the Comintern to publicly 
discuss the China problem. 
4. To demand that the CPSU restore Trotsky to his former position 
in that Party. 
# The General Committee apparently included Liang Kan-ch'ao, Shih Shou-yun, Ch'en 
I-mou, Li Mei-wu, Sung Feng-ch'un, Chang T'e, and Lu Yen, who started using the name 
Lu I-yuan when he returned to China. The following people seem to have been elected alternate 
members of the General Committee: Hsiao Pin-yang, Ou Fang, T'ang Yueh-po and Hsu 
Chen-an. Shih Shou-yun was secretary general of the General Committee; Lu Yen was 
director of propaganda; Chang T'e was director of organizational affairs; Hsu Chen-an 
was in charge of activities in the Kiangsu-Chekiang area; Liang Kan-ch'ao was in charge of 
activities in southern China; Ou Fang was in charge of propaganda in southern China; Ch'en 
I-mou was in charge of organizational affairs in southern China; Sung Feng-ch'un was in charge 
of activities in northern China; Hsiao Pin-yang was in charge of propaganda in northern 
China; and Li Mei-wu was in charge of organizational affairs in northern China. 
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5. To demand that the CPSU reorganize its leadership and adopt 
Trotsky's platform. 
The Russian Left opposition, of course, had been condemned as an 
illegal organization by the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU in 1927. 
The so-called CCP Left opposition, seeking to function within the 
established Chinese Communist organization, used the above slogans 
for inner-Party consumption in an attempt to restore Trotsky in Russia, 
to overthrow the established CC of the CCP, and to institute its own 
leadership in a new CC. Needless to say, these goals remained as im-
possible to achieve as is the grasping of reflections of flowers in a 
mirror or the reflection of the moon on water. Indeed, even though 
the Chinese Left opposition had been given new vitality when 
Ch'en Tu-hsiu and P'eng Shu-chih formally joined the Left opposition, 
forming a "Trotsky-Ch'en United Front," it did not remain vigorous 
for long. 
Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his followers were formally expelled from the 
CCP on November 15, 1929. The charges against them in connection 
with their expulsion, as one might reconstruct these charges from 
Ch'en's "Letter to Inform Comrades of the Whole Party," apparently 
were that Ch'en and his followers not only disagreed with the policy 
of the CC of the CCP on the Chinese Eastern Railway incident of 1929, 
but that since the August 7, 1927, Conference they had stood in op-
position to the CC and had throughout that period criticized and 
sought to discredit the leadership of both the CCP and the CPSU. 
At some point, moreover, they had apparently begun to praise Trotsky 
and his political position on China. The CC, in any event, forced 
Ch'en to openly take a position on Trotsky when, on October 6, 1929, 
it ordered him to write an article against the Trotskyite opposition. 
Ch'en refused to write the article, for, as he stated in his "Letter to 
Inform Comrades of the Whole Party": "Now I have recognized 
fundamentally that Comrade Trotsky's views are identical with Marx-
ism and Leninism. How would I be able to write false words, con-
trary to my opinions P"1 
Ch'en Tu-hsiu's "Letter" is dated December 10, 1929, two whole 
years after Trotsky was expelled from the CPSU and, in effect, labelled 
a counterrevolutionary. Yet Ch'en called him "comrade," which in-
dicated the depth of Ch'en's agreement with him; and this was not 
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the first occasion on which Ch'en called him "comrade." "Because we 
spoke of Trotsky as a comrade," Ch'en wrote in the letter, "the CC 
accused us of 'having already left the revolution, left the proletariat, 
and gone over to the counterrevolution' and expelled us from the Party." 
Then early in February, 1930, the Comintern issued an instruction 
to the CC of the CCP. It urged the CC not to weaken its political 
struggle against Ch'en Tu-hsiu's "opportunism," on the one hand; but 
on the other hand the instruction asked the CC to transmit to Ch'en 
an invitation in its behalf to visit Moscow specifically to discuss all 
matters related to his expulsion from the Party.2 The Politburo of the 
CC of the CCP transmitted this Comintern invitation to Ch'en Tu-
hsiu on February 8, 1930, and asked Ch'en to reply within one week. 
Ch'en replied directly to the Comintern on February 17. In this com-
munication he restated his political views and repeatedly praised 
Trotsky. He flatly rejected the Comintern invitation, moreover. His 
open defiance of the Comintern and his firm refusal to conform to 
Comintern wishes greatly encouraged the Trotskyites in China as well 
as the Trotskyite students still at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. 
From that point on, Ch'en Tu-hsiu apparently cut all relations with 
the CCP and with the Comintern, and devoted himself wholly to the 
"Trotsky-Ch'en Opposition." 
But it seems most likely from the events described above that the 
CPSU and the Comintern regarded the decision of the CC of the CCP 
to expel Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his group from the Party as too drastic. 
For it sought to maintain negotiations with Ch'en months after the 
Chinese Party had already expelled him. Considering Ch'en's imposing 
reputation as a political figure as well as a scholar, they may well have 
hoped to keep Ch'en within the Party so as not to give the Trotskyite 
movement in China a well-known leader. Without Ch'en, the spread 
of Trotskyite influence in China would undoubtedly have been 
hampered. For the Trotskyite students who returned to China from 
Sun Yat-sen University carried no political weight. 
The leading figures around Ch'en Tu-hsiu had not attended Sun 
Yat-sen University, although some of them had studied in the Soviet 
Union. This was true, for example, of those people closest to Ch'en 
Tu-hsiu who signed the statement of the Chinese Left opposition 
dated, probably, some time in November, 1929: P'eng Shu-chih, Yun 
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K'uan, Cheng Ch'ao-lin, Kao Yu-han, Ch'en Pi-lan (the wife of Peng 
Shu-chih), Ma Yu-fu, and others. 
Whatever appearances may have seemed to indicate, however, the 
Chinese Trotskyite movement was far from united. Indeed, it was 
riven with conflicts. Its second general meeting seems to have convened 
at Shanghai in September, 1930, in an effort to iron out the differences. 
But the differences were so intense that the meeting adjourned without 
having resolved them. From 1929 onwards there emerged a prolifera-
tion of readily identifiable rival Chinese Trotskyite groups—as a 
Chinese saying has»it, it took three people to make a group and five 
people to make a party. There were four especially conspicuous groups. 
One was the "Our Words" group, led by Ou Fang, Liang Kan-ch'ao, 
Ch'en I-mou, and others. Presently a group split off from this one to 
become the "October" group led by Liu Jen-ching, an important CCP 
veteran who had visited Trotsky in Turkey. A third, small group, 
which called itself "Struggle," was formed by Wang P'ing-i,# Liu Yin, 
Huang Yuan-ming, and others. The fourth group, which was the 
most powerful one, called itself the "Proletarian" group. It was or-
ganized by Ch'en Tu-hsiu and P'eng Shu-chih, and it included among 
its leading figures Yun K'uan, Cheng Ch'ao-lin, Ma Yu-fu, and Wang 
Tse-k'ai. 
Of the four Trotskyite groups mentioned above, the first three 
were constituted chiefly of people who had studied at Sun Yat-sen 
University, KUTV, or Lenin Institute (Leninskya Shikola). The 
Proletarian group contained only a thin sprinkling of such people, 
one of whom was P'eng Shu-chih, who had studied at KUTV. While 
the four groups seemed to be unable to find sufficient common ground 
to unite, the first three groups did have one position in common—they 
were critical of the "Right Opportunism" of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and P'eng 
Shu-chih in the events of 1927. They held that Ch'en and P'eng had 
been discredited and were not fit to be followers of Trotsky. 
Eventually, Trotsky apparently personally took a hand in the affairs 
* I knew Wang P'ing-i well. He was a graduate of the University of the Toilers of the 
Far East who returned to China from the Soviet Union in the late summer of 1928. Having 
arrived in Shanghai, he worked there in the Department of Economic Struggle of the CC 
of the CYC, a department headed at the time by the Party veteran Wen Yu-ch'en. Eventually 
he went into Party trade union work, an activity in which he was engaged when, for some 
reason, he joined the Chinese Left Opposition. At the time of writing, he is a member of 
the National Assembly in Taipei. 
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of his disputatious Chinese followers by urging that they unite. Each 
group then named two delegates to form a committee, the purpose of 
which was to work out a united Chinese Trotskyite organization that 
would be acceptable to all. This committee's efforts achieved fruition 
with a unity congress, held in May, 1931, which brought into being 
"The Communist League of China." According to all accounts, the 
CC of the League that was elected by the unity congress included Ch'en 
Tu-hsiu, P'eng Shu-chih, Wang Wen-yuan, Sung Feng-ch'un, and 
Cheng Ch'ao-lin. While this congress may have achieved unity of 
sorts, it did not achieve stability, for within three months most of the 
CC members had been arrested and most of the League's organizations 
were shattered. 
Indeed KMT intelligence agents raided units of the underground 
Trotsky-Ch'en Tu-hsiu opposition relentlessly from 1931 through 1932. 
The first raid took place in May, 1931, shortly after the unity congress 
of the Communist League of China. Members of the organization's 
CC who were seized in this raid seem to have included Cheng Ch'ao-
lin, Wang Wen-yuan, Ch'en I-mou, and Chiang Ch'ang-shih. A 
second raid occurred in August, 1931, when another group of members 
of the CC of the opposition was arrested, including Sung Chin-hsiu, 
Yun K'uan, Chin Hung-t'u, and Sun Yu-chieh. A third series of 
raids, which constituted the fatal blow to the opposition, began on Oc-
tober 15, 1932, and continued to October 17, 1932. Arrested in those 
raids were, among others, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the opposition's leader, and 
such CC members as P'eng Shu-chih, who initially sought to disguise 
his identity by giving the name Chang Tze-nan to the police, Hsieh 
Te-p'an, and Sung Feng-ch'un. Other important functionaries of the 
opposition who were arrested at this time included P'eng Tao-chih, 
who was P'eng Shu-chih's brother, Wang P'ing-i, and Liang Yu-kuang. 
For all practical purposes, October, 1932, marks the end of Trotskyism 
as an organized, independent force in Chinese politics. Only a few 
individuals who managed to escape arrest carried out intermittent 
activities thereafter. 
Eventually, one after another, the arrested Trotskyites were re-
leased. Even Ch'en Tu-hsiu and P'eng Shu-chih, who on April 26, 
1933, had been sentenced to thirteen years' imprisonment, were released 
after the War of Resistance Agaihst Japan broke out. As for those 
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Trotskyites who had not been arrested, most of them eventually took 
the initiative by capitulating to the KMT, for had they not done so, 
they would have continued to be hunted. A good many of them gave 
up political activity altogether. But some once-dedicated Trotskyites, 
such as Liang Kan-ch'ao, Chou T'ien-lu, and others went to Sian and 
served under General Hu Tsung-nan, the general to whom Chiang 
Kai-shek gave the task of encircling and containing the Chinese Com-
munists after the Sian Incident of December, 1936. Liang Kan-ch'ao, 
Chou T'ien-lu, and others were of great service in this task of contain-
ing the Chinese Communists. As a result, they established a firm 
place for themselves under the umbrella of Hu Tsung-nan, which en-
couraged a number of their former Trotskyite colleagues to join them. 
Apparently they attempted to rekindle dead ashes. Yet other former 
Trotskyites, either on the recommendation of Hu Tsung-nan or by 
some other route, joined the KMT intelligence service of General Tai 
Li, where they fought the CCP. 
Chiang Ching-kuo, after his return to China from the USSR in 
1938, became a district commissioner in southern Kiangsi Province, 
where he undertook numerous reforms, and many former Trotskyites 
gravitated to him. After Chiang Ching-kuo was summoned to Chung-
king in 1939, however, these former Trotskyites seem to have dispersed. 
Over the years, as has been suggested, efforts of the Chinese Trot-
skyites to regroup failed. Some of the one-time Trotskyites died of 
illness or poverty. At least one of them, Chou T'ien-lu, was assassinated, 
presumably by underground Communist agents, in his Shanghai apart-
ment in April or May of 1949, on the eve of the Communists' capture 
of that city. Other former Trotskyites simply grew older and older 
and became increasingly passive politically the while, so that their 
backgrounds go unnoticed in China today. Some even today are em-
ployed in various KMT organizations; still others live abroad. 
When the Trotsky opposition, with students who had returned 
from Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow as its core, was first organizing 
itself in China, the golden age of what remained of Trotskyism back 
at Sun Yat-sen University was nearing its end. The Sixteenth Con-
ference of the CPSU, which met in April, 1929, ordered a purge within 
the Russian Party. The resolution concerning the forthcoming purge 
appeared in the May 1, 1929, issue of Pravda, whereupon a certain 
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nervousness prevailed throughout the Party. Certainly tension was 
evident in the Party organization at Sun Yat-sen University, and the 
Trotskyites at the university grew especially jittery, naturally. 
The Trotskyites at Sun Yat-sen University were knitted into an 
underground organization which had only vertical, but no lateral, or-
ganizational connections. That is to say, members of one cell did not 
know what other cells there were or who belonged to them; their 
organizational connection ran only up through the chain of command 
directly above them and not beyond. Thus, any cell member who 
wavered in his loyalty was in a position to betray only his own cell 
members and, possibly, one person at a higher level, but he could not 
betray members of other cells. They truly functioned underground, 
making use of assorted university outings to hold their secret meetings, 
passing communications in classrooms, dormitories, and elsewhere 
without outsiders realizing what they were doing. In short, the school 
was a cover for their activities; their operational methods blended in 
well with its routine; and their methods were successful. 
But the heyday for the Trotskyites at Sun Yat-sen University did not 
last long. Starting with the fall semester of 1929, purge commissars sent 
by the Central Control Committee of the CPSU descended upon Sun 
Yat-sen University. These commissars were veteran revolutionaries 
who had been toughened in numerous struggles; many of them had 
served in China or had been involved in Chinese affairs through Soviet 
military intelligence or other Soviet intelligence undertakings. A 
series of meetings was scheduled at which these commissars presided 
and at which every Party member at the university had to confront 
other Party members who might or might not denounce him. The 
bureau of the Party branch at the university carefully singled out Party 
members on whose loyalty it could count, of whom I was one, and 
these members were given a special briefing before they scattered them-
selves among those attending the meetings. They defended the ap-
propriate Party members against attacks by others and bombarded the 
Trotskyites and other "anti-Party" elements with telling accusations. 
These meetings were shattering experiences for the individuals being 
scrutinized, for the slightest possible blemish from the past was apt 
to be publicly questioned. Even one's family history going back to 
remote ancestors was thoroughly investigated. It was a cruel method 
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of inquiry. In the heavy crossfire of questions and charges, many of 
the weak people simply broke down. Even the most robust and strong-
willed among us were bathed in their own sweat at these inquisitions. 
Before a battery of iron-faced inquisitors, the Trotskyites at Sun 
Yat-sen University began to falter. One of them, who occupied a 
high post in their underground organization, finally turned himself 
in to the bureau of the Party branch and seemingly made a full con-
fession. I cannot recall his name, although I do remember that he 
came from Honan Province, where he had been a teacher and then a 
school principal. He was about thirty years of age, and he had an 
honest face. Four days before he was scheduled to be questioned, he 
suddenly came to see me. His face was shrouded in dark clouds; he 
appeared to be suffering immensely. He seemed to want to say some-
thing, but dared not for fear of some dreadful consequence. After I 
had consoled and encouraged him, he began to talk hesitantly, but still 
withholding information concerning the secret organization and its 
personnel. He told me frankly that his fellow Trotskyites already felt 
the change in him, watched him closely, and hinted that his life would 
be in danger if he dared to withdraw. After having said this, he stared 
at me fixedly as if he hoped that my response would give him some 
sort of guarantee of safety. I guessed his intention and told him smil-
ingly to have courage and not to surrender to threats. I further volun-
teered to accompany him to see Ignatov, secretary of the bureau of the 
Party branch, the next morning to discuss the matter. He agreed, and 
we parted. The next day we met at the appointed place and went to-
gether to Ignatov's house. When Ignatov received him warmly, he 
began to pep up and talked a lot; and Ignatov listened to his story with 
wonderment, taking note of everything he said. But after our in-
formant had finished talking, his countenance began to darken, and 
his spirits sagged. He said sadly that his position was both painful and 
dangerous. His fellow comrades wanted to destroy him, and the 
bureau of the Party branch did not necessarily believe him; being un-
able to please either side, his only solution was to commit suicide to 
end all these entanglements. Ignatov and I, greatly surprised by this 
suddenly expressed desire to die, tried our best to comfort him. Ignatov 
reassured him that the Party trusted him completely, that as long as he 
was willing to jump out of the fire, everything would be all right. 
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Upon hearing this, his sadness turned into joy and the clouds of doubt 
vanished from his face. We were all relieved. This took place on a 
Sunday. On Monday evening he came to see me again. He again 
looked pessimistic and wanted to have a chat with me in the garden 
of a church that faced the university. It was in the depths of winter, 
snow was piled over a foot high on the ground, but he was perspiring. 
He looked very agitated, and told me in a hoarse voice that he could 
not dispel his sufferings and was prepared to take his own life. I was 
stunned and asked him what was the matter. He shook his head and 
sighed, saying nothing. He looked as if he was experiencing great 
pressure from outside. I comforted him again and tried to explain 
things to him. My words began to cheer him up; he smiled, and quite 
naturally, at that. I thought everything was going to be all right. But 
the evening before his scheduled inquiry, before the students went 
back to their dormitories, he hanged himself in his room. His death 
brought me great sorrow and endless regret. Had I taken precaution-
ary steps, the life of this friend, who trusted me and came to me for 
help in his distress, might have been saved. I reproached myself for 
being so stupid and naive. 
His tragic death struck terror into the university. The entire stu-
dent body, faculty, and staff members all felt sadly insecure. At the 
purge meetings, gloom hung low and thick; those who were being 
questioned and those who were not being questioned all seemed to be 
nervous. To relax taut nerves, to lessen the sufferings of those Trotsky-
ites who were still wavering, and to avoid future tragedies, the bureau 
of the Party branch assigned me to report to a general conference of 
students the story of that Trotskyite student's suicide, and to hint that 
other Trotskyites need not hesitate any more, for everything had been 
exposed and it would be futile to try to hide. After my report, most 
students were pacified, but the hearts of the Trotskyite students, faced 
with a difficult choice, sank deeper. Whether to continue to struggle 
or to abandon the cause, this question caused great confusion in their 
ranks and no unanimous solution was found. Therefore, they began to 
act individually. The organ of highest command in the Trotskyite 
secret organization was first to split. A student by the name of Li P'in, 
who was responsible for secret organizational affairs, suddenly con-
fessed publicly during a meeting and submitted a list of names of some 
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eighty to ninety Trotskyite students. With that, the Trotskyite orga-
nization at Sun Yat-sen University completely collapsed. Some stu-
dents announced their withdrawal from the opposition, but there was 
no small number who fought to the end. Hence, the Russian GPU 
stretched out its hairy paws; it arrested all those suspected of being 
leaders of the opposition who had refused to confess, and put them in 
prison. The fate of many of them was not known. 
In this ferocious struggle against Trotskyites in Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity, I was deeply involved from start to finish. Throughout the purge, 
I was a member of the bureau of the CPSU branch in the university. 
Concurrently, I was the branch's secretary in charge of all translating 
and interpreting from Chinese into Russian and from Russian into 
Chinese at all bureau meetings. At the same time, I was deputy Party 
guide (hu tang chih tao yuan) for one of the class cells in the univer-
sity.3 
There were more than twenty students in my cell. With the ex-
ception of two or three cell members who were more or less loyal to 
the bureau of the Party branch, all of them were either Trotskyites or 
some other kind of "anti-Party element." It was the university's worst 
cell. Since "oppositionists" were in the majority, they more than once 
adopted resolutions demanding that the Party branch dismiss me as 
deputy guide and replace me with someone else. The bureau of the 
Party branch naturally ignored these demands, while giving me pep 
talks about the importance of my being a good fighter. Thus, at 
every meeting I was besieged from all directions by "oppositionists." 
With the stubborn determination of youth I fought off all of their 
charges, and in the process they not unnaturally came to hate me. 
Indeed, when the purge was reaching its climax and the oppositionists 
became frantic, a plot to assassinate me was uncovered.4 
Meanwhile, as the purge progressed, the most obstreperous Chinese 
Trotskyite students were arrested and held in the underground jail 
in the headquarters of the GPU on Lubyanka Square in Moscow, and 
it became necessary to interrogate them. GPU headquarters asked the 
bureau of the Party branch at Sun Yat-sen University to assign some-
one to help them with these interrogations. Unfortunately, the bureau 
assigned this odious job to me. I protested the assignment to Ignatov, 
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but he insisted that I accept it by announcing, "It is an order." There 
was nothing for me to do but reluctantly accept that order. 
As I recall, an official of the GPU presently came to the university 
one evening and visited me. He reminded me of the bureau's recom-
mendation. He had me sign a document which bound me to refrain 
from revealing to anybody at all any information that I learned as an 
assistant interrogator for the GPU. A few days later, after the evening 
meal, a GPU car picked me up at the university and drove me to 
GPU headquarters. 
We began an interrogation as soon as I arrived at GPU head-
quarters. The Russian interrogator whom I assisted was named, I 
think, Beremeny. He was the GPU official in charge of Chinese af-
fairs at the time. As was the case with other GPU officials, he worked 
at night. I accompanied him to the basement jail to get the prisoner 
he wished to interrogate. On the way down, at the entrance to the 
prison block, I heard the sounds of leg chains and hand manacles. 
Coming from the bright lights upstairs, the jail was so dark that for 
a time I could not see anything. The prison block consisted of nu-
merous small cells with only one prisoner to a cell, and Beremeny led 
me to one of these cells. He ordered the guard to open the cell, and 
we entered it. The prisoner I confronted was a Sun Yat-sen University 
classmate with whom I had had a friendly relationship. Automatically 
we extended our arms to shake hands. As we did so, a powerful hand 
abruptly forced my arm down, while another hand struck the prisoner's 
wrist. It was Beremeny, using both of his hands. As I looked up at 
him, shocked, he shouted at the prisoner, "You are a counterrevolution-
ary. You are a prisoner now. You have no right to shake hands with 
this comrade." I don't know which of us, the prisoner or I, felt the 
more crushed by Beremeny's brutal crudity; we merely looked at 
each other silently. There was much that needed saying, but we 
could say nothing. After a few minutes, guards took the prisoner up-
stairs to Beremeny's office. An armed guard stood by in the office, and 
the interrogation began, with me doing the interpreting. 
Beremeny ordered the prisoner to brace rigidly with his heels and 
shoulders tightly against the wall, to look straight ahead, and not to 
move. Many questions were asked. Hours passed; it was midnight, 
and I felt exhausted. I glanced at Beremeny, who looked utterly fresh 
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and alert. The prisoner, still braced against the wall, looked, it seemed 
to me, like a cadaver. Alarmed by his appearance and concerned about 
the fate of a fellow student, I asked Beremeny to halt the interrogation 
for the time being and to resume it at another time. Beremeny flatly 
rejected the idea. He told me, as I recall, "This method of incessant 
interrogation, giving the prisoner no rest, is the practice of the GPU. 
No one can stand up to it indefinitely; he will eventually tell you what 
you want to know. Desperate to get some rest, they will tell the 
truth." It was, he said, a method of torture; but he insisted that no 
other forms of torture were used or needed. We had, he assured me, 
just reached an important stage in the interrogation. The prisoner 
would deny everything during the first few hours. It was after that 
that he could be expected to begin talking truthfully. And so, 
Beremeny told me, we could not possibly adjourn the interrogation at 
the point at which I had urged adjournment. 
Beremeny told me to pull myself together and to be alert. He gave 
me a cigarette and a cup of coffee, and we resumed the interrogation. 
To my astonishment, precisely what he had said would happen did 
happen. The prisoner capitulated at last. The sun was coming up 
when we finished the interrogation. Beremeny ordered guards to re-
turn the prisoner to his cell. Then he asked me to sign as a witness 
the transcript of the interrogation which he had typed in triplicate as 
I had translated it. I signed all three copies; and as I did so, I asked 
him why he needed three copies. One copy, he said, went to the CC 
of the CPSU; one went to the Comintern; and the third was for the 
GPU files. 
I cannot now remember how long I continued to do this distasteful 
work. But I know that I spent a great many exhausting nights at 
GPU headquarters and that while the prisoners suffered terribly, the 
torment that this work caused me seemed scarcely less than that which 
the prisoners endured. I asked myself, "All this is being done for 
what?" 
In addition to the Trotskyite students who were arrested and in-
terrogated, some of the most active of the other "anti-Party elements" 
who allied themselves with the opposition to form the "Second Line" 
faction, which is described in some detail in chapter fifteen, were exiled 
to Siberia to undergo reform through labor at the Altai gold mines 
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and other labor camps. A few of them, I know, died in those camps; 
but the majority of them, after surviving terrible hardships, were sent 
back to China. But when these potential new recruits to the Trotskyite 
opposition movement arrived back in China, the opposition in China 
itself already had spent itself and was no longer capable of functioning 
at all. Trotskyism was transplanted to China; but due to unsuitable 
soil and climatic conditions, it withered before taking root. 
Various factors doubtless contributed to the failure of the Chinese 
Trotskyite movement. Among the more important factors surely was 
their assessment of the Chinese situation after 1927. Trotskyism, it 
will be recalled, was imported into China shortly after the defeat of 
the 1925-1927 revolution. The oppositionists recognized this defeat as 
an indisputable fact, which, of course, it was. But surely they erred 
in crediting too much significance to the military victory of the KMT, 
as one reads their position in Ch'en Tu-hsiu's "Letter to All Comrades." 
According to Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the military victory of the KMT had so 
strengthened the position of the "Chinese bourgeoisie" that it had 
produced a stable regime which would prevail for many years to come. 
Thus, the Trotskyites urged the Chinese people to conduct their 
political activities within the framework of "bourgeois democracy" 
and to "struggle for the convocation of a National Assembly."5 While 
the Trotskyites paid lip service to the establishment of Soviets, actually 
they concentrated their efforts on the convocation of a National As-
sembly, which, had it ever convened, could have accomplished little 
under the domination of one party. There was little general interest 
in a National Assembly because no one had faith in the newly estab-
lished government, which would have manipulated any National As-
sembly that might be convened. And, of course, there was widespread 
disappointment with the new government because it had not fulfilled 
the promises it had made prior to the Northward Expedition. 
The oppositionists were, of course, fully aware of the desperation, 
fatigue, and frustration that prevailed in China after the revolution's 
defeat. Yet they did not, apparently, realize that these reactions were 
merely one side of the coin, the other side of which was a deep, popular 
feeling of dissatisfaction with the status quo. This latter situation was 
so much the case that the Trotskyites' call for the convocation of a 
National Assembly struck many people as just one more political trap. 
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There was also, of course, a good deal of bewilderment as to how the 
revolution could reach a high tide solely by convening a National 
Assembly. 
Surely another important ingredient in the failure of the Chinese 
Trotskyites was the fact that they came into being just in time to be 
caught in the crossfire of the two armed camps of the KMT and the 
Chinese Communists; they had no real power of their own with which 
to fire back. For the Chinese revolution of 1925-1927 was followed by 
bitter political struggles and open military clashes between the KMT 
and the Chinese Communists. Eventually, a full-scale civil war resulted 
in China. The two contending parties constituted two hostile regimes, 
each relying upon its own internal and external resources, each having 
its own military establishment. Under these circumstances, it was 
nearly impossible for any kind of a third force, which was neither 
Communist nor KMT, to emerge. For example, the once-prominent 
Communist T'an P'ing-shan, who was expelled from the CCP in 
October, 1927, organized, with Teng Yen-ta's group, the Third Party 
(ti san tang). This new party quickly drew fire from both sides, from 
the Communists as well as from the KMT. Pinned down by barrages 
from both sides, its members encountered such great difficulties that they 
had trouble merely surviving physically, not to mention carrying out 
political activities. The Third Party soon collapsed. 
Another unsuccessful independent movement involved Li Chi-
sheng, Ch'en Min-ch'u, Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai, and others, who instigated 
a rebellion and proclaimed the establishment of the "People's Govern-
ment of the Republic of China" in Fuchow, Fukien Province, on 
November 20, 1933. At the same time, they organized their own 
political party, named the Production party (sheng ch'an tang). The 
government and the party were short-lived. Faced with heavy pressure 
from KMT government forces, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, the cold shoulder of the Chinese Communists, who treated the 
Fukien government with jealousy and suspicion, the "People's Govern-
ment" collapsed in January, 1934. 
The Trotskyites who returned to China from Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity, joined by Ch'en Tu-hsiu's group, represented another effort to 
organize a third force, following upon the heels of T'an P'ing-shan's 
attempt and preceding the effort by Li Chi-sheng and others. They 
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were no more successful than T'an P'ing-shan had been, and they 
were less successful than Li Chi-sheng and his colleagues. The 
Trotskyite opposition, of course, was acceptable neither to the KMT 
nor to the Communists. The Communists attacked them as renegades 
from Marxism-Leninism, while the KMT attacked them as followers 
of a branch of the Communist movement. 
It is useful to dwell briefly upon the fact that neither the KMT nor 
the CCP was a political party of the conventional type. Each had its 
own party army. Conventional political parties attack one another 
with verbal criticisms; but these two parties attacked one another with 
guns in addition to verbal criticisms, using guns as their weapons of 
criticism. How, then, could a third party—the Trotskyite opposition 
or any other—survive, standing in between the two and searching for 
a middle course, unless it became more radical than the Communists 
or more conservative than the KMT ? 
In conclusion I would like to say a little about the impact of the 
Stalin-Trotsky struggle on the Chinese revolution. As the Chinese 
revolution developed into an issue in the Stalin-Trotsky struggle for 
power, neither side concerned itself with the best interests of the Chinese 
revolution, but used the success or failure of this dispute as a means 
to gain (for the Trotskyites) or to retain (for Stalin) power. In 
retrospect, the leadership of the Stalin-Bukharin axis and its direction 
with regard to the Chinese revolution were far from being perfect, 
even taken at their face value. When put into practice, Stalin's and 
Bukharin's mistakes were numerous and grave; this was undeniable. 
The Trotskyite opposition's theories concerning the China problem 
contained many notable misconceptions; but the warnings that they 
gave during a particular period of the Chinese revolution and the poli-
cies that they suggested for some problems were not without merit. It 
was a pity that both sides were indulging in the power struggle; neither 
was willing to consider the other side's proposals calmly and to discuss 
them frankly. They each held on to their convictions (or prejudices), 
but it was China and the Chinese people who were the real victims. 
Now, they have both passed away: Trotsky was assassinated on August 
20, 1940, in Mexico; and in March, 1953, Stalin also reported for duty 
to Yen-Wang, the King of the other world. 
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The sages and idiots, after a thousand years, who knows for sure ? 
They all ended in the graves where tall grasses grow. 
As far as Stalin and Trotsky were concerned, their dispute about 
China was settled by death. But Trotsky was without an heir in China, 
and no one from China looked after his grave. Stalin can count on 
sacrifices offered by Mao Tse-tung and Company on such occasions 
as the New Year and other festivals, or a lonely wreath placed in front 
of his grave by visiting Chinese Communist dignitaries. From this 
viewpoint, Trotsky was really a loser to the end. 
Notes 
1. The Hoover Library has a copy of this document, a xeroxed copy of which it has 
kindly furnished me. 
2. Ch'en Tu-hsiu ta-ju \ung-ch'an \uo-chi hsin (Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Letter to the Comintern), 
a copy of which is in the Hoover Library. It is reproduced in Wang Chieh-min, Chung-\uo 
Kung-ch'an-tang shih kao (A draft history of the CCP; Taipei, 1965), II, 116-118. 
3. There were something like twenty classes in Sun Yat-sen University at the time. 
Communist and Komsomol members in each class were organized in a cell which met once 
each week. To each cell was assigned a Russian professor who was a Communist Party 
member; he was the guide during the cell's meetings. A Chinese who had knowledge of 
the Russian language and an acceptable political background was also assigned to each cell 
as the deputy guide. It was his function to assist the Russian guide in directing the meetings. 
4. Some Trotskyite students held a secret meeting in the theater on the second floor of 
the university's student club. It was late afternoon and dark at the time, and they thought the 
theater was deserted. But old Ho Shu-heng, a delegate to the founding congress of the 
CCP, happened to be napping in a seat in one corner of the theater. Unbeknown to the 
Trotskyites, he heard them make their plans to assassinate me. When they left, he immediately 
reported what he had heard to Ignatov, the secretary of the bureau of the Party branch. 
Ignatov promptly contacted a Russian general, whose Russian name I have forgotten but 
who had been an adviser in Canton, where he used the Chinese name K'ung Chieh-chih. 
At that time K'ung Chieh-chih was commander of the Moscow garrison and concurrently the 
chief professor of military affairs at Sun Yat-sen University. He acceded to Ignatov's request 
that Browning revolvers be supplied to me and to each of two bodyguards who were promptly 
assigned to guard me. These bodyguards were Chinese students at Sun Yat-sen University 
who were of working-class origin. They were trained gunmen who had worked in the 
Intelligence Department of the CC of the CCP in Shanghai. 
5. See note 1 of this chapter. 
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Chapter XIV 
Sun Yat-sen University and the Sixth 
National Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party 
Early in 1928 the Politburo of the CCP decided to convene the 
Sixth National Congress of the Party in March of that year. The con-
gress was to appraise the lessons learned from the failure of the 1925— 
1927 Chinese revolution and to regroup Communist forces. But the 
Politburo did not designate a site for the congress.1 Indeed, finding 
a safe site for a congress then was a difficult task because of the KMT's 
ruthless slaughter of Communists. Meanwhile, the Sixth Comintern 
Congress and the Fifth Congress of the Young Communist Interna-
tional were scheduled to convene in Moscow in the summer of 1928, 
and the Fourth Profintern Congress in the spring.2 To these congresses 
the CCP naturally would have to send delegates. And, as I was subse-
quently to learn in Moscow, the Chinese Politburo seized upon these 
three international congresses, for which its delegates would in any 
event be in Moscow, to propose to the Comintern that it hold its own 
Sixth National Congress in Moscow at about the same time. The 
Comintern, of course, agreed.3 
Holding the Sixth National Congress of the CCP in Moscow 
facilitated efforts by Russian Communists and the Comintern to func-
tion as advisers to the CCP, although it cost the Russians a sizable 
amount of foreign exchange to get the Chinese delegates to and from 
Moscow. Had the Comintern, however, not extended this timely 
helping hand in gathering up the badly battered forces of the CCP 
and getting them to Moscow, where they could have a bit of rest, 
revitalization, and encouragement, the Chinese Communists might 
not by themselves have been able to reassemble their forces. At the 
very least they would have experienced a long period of confusion and 
disorder within the Party, during which it would not have been pos-
sible to unify the will of its members or to build up the strength of 
the Party as a whole. 
For it might be recalled that the CCP had suffered extremely 
serious setbacks. Especially after the Nanching Uprising of August 1, 
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1927, the Autumn Harvest Uprisings in Hunan and Hupeh, and the 
Canton Uprising at the end of 1927, the Party's organizational structure 
pretty much collapsed, as did the armed forces under its control. Party 
members were slaughtered in the KMT's "White terror," others simply 
defected, while still others were lost in the turmoil and never found 
their way back to the Party. In any event, the CCP had about 57,967 
members at the time of its Fifth National Congress in April, 1927.4 
In the summer of 1928, at the time of the Sixth National Congress, 
membership had slumped to something like 20,000 or perhaps 25,000 
at the most. 
A defeatist mood ruled the Party then. The August 7, 1927, Con-
ference had removed Ch'en Tu-hsiu from Party leadership, although 
his influence within the Party naturally was not wiped out at one 
stroke. But if the "opportunism" identified with Ch'en Tu-hsiu had 
proved disastrous, the "putschism" that his successor, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, 
carried out was suicidal. Ch'u's policy seemed rather like that of a 
frantic man betting everything he had on one last, desperate gamble, 
which failed. What was called for, surely, was an organized, disci-
plined, and patient retreat in order to preserve such forces as remained 
and to sustain morale. But this minor scholar, whose chief claim to fame 
was his ability to read and write, through his leadership hastened and 
deepened the crisis of the CCP. Both structurally and psychologically, 
the Party showed alarming symptoms of deterioration by the summer 
of 1928. 
The dismal state of Party affairs was reflected in the mood of the 
delegates at the Sixth National Congress of the CCP. Delegates from 
areas of China that had endured especially severe anti-Communist as-
saults were noticeably more melancholy than other delegates. In 
private as well as in public they complained about the shortcomings of 
the CC's leadership. They were pessimistic, too, about the prospects 
of the revolution. Of course, some other delegates demonstrated some-
what better morale.5 Perhaps the muddled thinking of the delegates 
is aptly illustrated by a controversy that arose early at the congress. 
Some delegates maintained that a rising tide still prevailed in the 
Chinese revolution. Others, who contended that the revolution was ex-
periencing a low ebb, rebutted them. Still others, seeking a compromise 
between the conflicting positions, declared that while no rising wave 
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was in evidence, "a bit of foam" could be seen. The argument thus 
became a tiresome, cynical dispute over words which dragged on for 
several days. This dispute caused the already confused and dispirited 
delegates to become even more confused and dispirited.6 Later, when 
students at Sun Yat-sen University, myself among them, learned about 
the argument over whether China was experiencing a revolutionary 
wave or merely a bit of revolutionary foam, it became a stock joke 
among us. But because of such circumstances as that dispute, one 
person who attended the Congress concluded that had the congress 
not been held in Moscow, it probably would have turned into a disaster 
which would have led to an irreparable split in the Party.7 As things 
turned out, however, Bukharin eventually managed to pull things to-
gether and bring some sense of order into the proceedings of the 
congress. 
SELECTION OF DELEGATES TO THE CONGRESS 
Delegates to the Sixth National Congress of the CCP were not 
selected through an election participated in by the entire Party member-
ship. Some delegates were designated by the CC. Others were selected 
by Party organizations at various levels for approval by the CC. Mem-
bers of the CC itself were automatically entitled to be delegates if they 
were able to get away from their duties long enough to attend the 
congress. In addition, a certain quota of delegates was reserved for 
Party functionaries in various Chinese Communist-front organizations, 
such as trade unions.8 
The number of delegates from particular geographic areas was 
directly proportional to the number of Party members and to the 
strength of the Party in those areas. Larger delegations were selected 
to represent provinces that had powerful Party organizations, whereas 
remote provinces in which Party influence was minimal received only 
a limited quota of delegates. The three largest provincial delegations 
at the congress came from Kwangtung, Kiangsu, and Shung-chih 
(Hopeh). Next to them in size was the delegation from Hunan 
Province. Many provinces were represented by delegations of three 
to five persons, while some provinces, such as Shensi, Shansi, Shantung, 
and Honan, had only one or two delegates. It might be noted that 
some delegates to the Sixth National Congress of the CCP also were 
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delegates to the Fifth Congress of the Chinese CYC, which immediately 
followed the Party congress.9 
Chinese Communist historians have yet to publish a comprehensive 
list of delegates to the Sixth National Congress of the CCP, nor is 
documentation as to the delegates available. Students of the subject 
have been forced to piece together as best they could lists of known and 
probable delegates.10 The following list, alphabetically arranged, while 
of course not comprehensive, consists of people that Ch'ing Man-yun, 
after most careful consideration, remembers to have been full delegates 
present at the Sixth Congress:11 Chang Chin-jen, Chang K'uen-ti, 
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Chiang Hui-fang, Chou En-lai, Chou Hsiu-chu, Ch'u 
Ch'iu-pai, "Old" Chuang, Fang Wei-hsia, Ho Shu-heng, Hsia Hsi, 
Hsiang Chung-fa, Hsiang Ying, Hsu Ch'in-lan, Hsu Hsi-ken, Hsu 
T'e-li, Hu Chun-ho, Hua Shao-feng, Huang P'ing, Kuan Hsiang-ying, 
Li Li-san, Li Tzu-fen, Liu Po-chuang, Lo Teng-hsien, Meng Chien, 
Su Chao-cheng, Teng Chung-hsia, Teng Ying-ch'ao, Ting Chun-yang, 
Ts'ai Ch'ang, Ts'ai Ho-sen, Wang Chung-yi, Wang Jo-fei, Wen Yu-
ch'en, Yang Chih-hua, Yang Ying, Yu Fei, Yuan Hsiao-hsien, and 
Yuan Ping-hui. 
Of these delegates, none at the time was a student at Sun Yat-sen 
University. However, Ho Shu-heng, Hsu T'e-li, Fang Wei-hsia, and 
Hsia Hsi subsequently did enroll in the Special Class at Sun Yat-sen 
University. 
Comintern requirements in those days, as we generally understood 
them, indicated that as many delegates as possible should have work-
ing-class or peasant backgrounds, and that as many delegates as possible 
should be veteran Party members who had good political records. 
Apparently, though, it was not possible to check the qualifications of 
all delegates to the Sixth National Congress against these standards. 
It is likely that people with questionable backgrounds, and perhaps 
even some Trotskyites, managed to slip into the delegations—fish eyes 
among pearls. Li Ang, for example, writes that he and other members 
of a provincial delegation appointed by the CC were taken off their 
Moscow-bound train at Irkutsk and sent back to China, presumably on 
orders from Moscow. Subsequently they learned, he states, that this 
was done because there were alleged to be "oppositionists" among them, 
a state of affairs which he says was not the case.12 I would agree with 
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Li Ang that his delegation did not include "oppositionists" from China, 
for it was only later that the "opposition" appeared in China. But I 
am not sure that there were no Trotskyite-inclined people in his delega-
tion or at the Sixth National Congress. 
THE NUMBER OF DELEGATES 
One KMT source states that 176 delegates attended the Sixth Na-
tional Congress of the CCP,13 which undoubtedly is an inflated figure. 
Many Communist historians who treat the subject state that 84 voting 
delegates attended the Congress.14 One Communist historian states 
that 34 alternate delegates also attended the congress and that the 
various delegations represented more than 40,000 CCP members.15 This 
would bring the total number of delegates and alternate delegates given 
in the Chinese Communist sources I have consulted to 118. It is Ch'ing 
Man-yun's recollection that the number of people present at the con-
gress at no time exceeded 100, including delegates, alternate delegates, 
and the secretaries and administrative assistants recruited from Sun 
Yat-sen University and from KUTV.16 A figure of 84 delegates and 
alternate delegates combined struck her as a likely one. 
Subsequently I learned that the CC of the CCP and its provincial 
committees had selected a larger number of delegates than the number 
that actually attended the congress, for many designated delegates 
failed to reach Moscow. Delegates from the more remote provinces 
did not reach Shanghai in time to board the appropriate Russian ship. 
At that time there was no regular shipping service between Shanghai 
and Vladivostok, and it was not unusual to have to wait a month or 
two between sailings. So, naturally, delegates who missed their sailing 
were unable to reach Moscow in time for the congress. Then, too, 
some delegates, I understand, were arrested by KMT agents before they 
could depart for Russia. Also, some of the more important delegates 
to the congress could not get away at the last minute, because unfore-
seen developments required their presence in China. 
Thus, the exact number of delegates who actually attended the 
congress remains to be determined. But it seems to me that Ch'ing 
Man-yun probably has recalled all of the important delegates who 
attended the congress. A number of delegates, of course, she has for-
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gotten, but they probably were not well known and of only secondary 
importance at most. 
PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS IN Moscow AND AT 
SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY 
While the selection of delegates was taking place in China, prepara-
tions for the congress proceeded full speed ahead in Moscow. Sun Yat-
sen University had a share in the activities that made the congress 
possible. Many resolutions later adopted by the congress were drafted 
by professors at Sun Yat-sen University at the direction of the Comin-
tern, and secretarial work for the administrative services were mainly 
performed by students from Sun Yat-sen University. A few students 
from the Chinese Department at KUTV were also drafted to carry 
out these activities. 
Ch'ing Man-yun was among the students at Sun Yat-sen University 
who were recruited to work for the congress. Indeed, the secretariat 
of the congress consisted mainly of students from this university. Ch'u 
Ching-pai, the youngest brother of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, headed the group 
of Sun Yat-sen University students who served the congress. The 
designation of these students was made secretly. The rest of us were 
aware that suddenly some familiar student faces had vanished from 
the university. We assumed that they had been sent back to China. 
No one that I know of looked into the matter. For there was a rule 
that one always felt it best to follow in a Communist organization— 
that it is not a question of what a person is able to find out, but a 
question of whether or not a person ought to find out something. If a 
person discovered something that he was not supposed to know, then 
he was headed for trouble. 
Now let's return to the preparations for the congress. Ch'ing Man-
yun recalled: 
Toward the end of May and the beginning of June, 1928, a few students of 
Sun Yat-sen University and I were called to Secretary General Pogulyaev's office. 
He distributed some documents in Chinese and told us to copy them on steno-
graphic paper for printing. He gave us severe warnings against letting other 
students know about the contents of the documents or even the fact that we were 
in his office. Before the documents were distributed to us to copy, they had al-
ready been broken up into segments or short paragraphs. Some of us copied the 
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introduction, others copied the conclusion, still others copied parts of the main 
text. This precaution was taken to prevent any of us from getting a complete 
picture or idea of the documents, for we were not allowed to exchange the docu-
ments that were distributed to us. . . . These mysterious documents could not have 
been the lecture notes of the university nor the outlines of our Party group dis-
cussions. At that time no one had the faintest idea that they were the documents 
of the Sixth National Congress of the CCP! This mysterious work continued for 
a whole week. Then one day Pogulyaev told us individually to pack our suit-
cases. He said to us, "Tomorrow you will leave the university to go to another 
place, the storage room of the university is open today for you to find your luggage 
with your name tags on them. You need not bother about them further, they 
will be sent to you. As to your belongings in your dormitories and classrooms, 
you must leave them as they are, do not move them. All you have to do is to 
indicate by some kind of marking the items that you wish to take along with 
you. . . ." When we asked him whether we were going back to China, he hesi-
tated for a while and replied, "You need not ask now, you will find out in due 
time." Finally, he cautioned us not to show any signs of leaving the university. 
Before these "drafted" students boarded the same train for the 
designated destination, no one knew who was "one of the selected 
group." At the moment when they walked out of the gate of Sun 
Yat-sen University, sadness dominated their mood, for they could not 
help feeling attached to the university and were sorry to leave, and their 
hearts were heavy, not knowing what the future had in store for them. 
They could not bid farewell to their friends, and of course no one 
could see them off. Ch'ing Man-yun continued: 
Only after I boarded the tram to the railway station did I have a chance to see 
for the first time who the people were in the group. Among us was Li P'ei-tse, 
who held the number one student identification card at Sun Yat-sen University. 
She was the wife of Wang Jo-fei, a member of the CC of the CCP. Also there 
were Meng Ch'in-shu, the "sweetheart" of Ch'en Shao-yu, and Tu Tso-hsiang, 
the wife of Ch'en Ch'ang-hao.. The male students included Hu Hsi-k'uei, Ch'u 
Ching-pai, a brother of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, and others. 
After they got off the tram at the railway station, they were met 
by a Russian who gave each one of them a train ticket. They boarded 
a train which made seven or eight stops. But she could not recall the 
name of the station at which they got off. After all, it all took place 
almost forty years ago. However, she said: 
Apparently, it was not the Siberia-bound train. . . . After we got off the train, 
we rode by car for about half an hour and pulled to a stop in front of a white 
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building. Upon our arrival there, we met many old-time acquaintances, such as 
Chuang Tung-hsiao, who was among the first batch of students who studied at 
Sun Yat-sen University; her husband P'an Chia-ch'en, who was an interpreter at 
Sun Yat-sen University, was also there. I remembered that they had gone back 
to China in the spring of 1927. Both worked as interpreters in the CC of the 
CCP in Shanghai, since there was a need for interpreters due to the fact that both 
the Comintern and the Profintern and other Russian organizations had repre-
sentatives stationed in Shanghai and there were always important documents in 
Russian coming from Moscow which needed to be translated. 
Ch'ing Man-yun said that only after meeting them did her col-
leagues find out that they were to work for the Sixth National Congress 
of the CCP. As a student at Sun Yat-sen University at that time, I had 
some knowledge about what was going on. I recall, for example, that 
I helped to translate some of the documents that eventually appeared 
at the congress from Russian into Chinese, such as the Resolution on 
the Agrarian and Peasant Problem, which was written by Professor 
M. Volin of Sun Yat-sen University. Nevertheless, I did not know 
where or when the forthcoming congress would be held. 
THE ARRIVAL OF DELEGATES IN Moscow AND THE 
STRICT SECURITY MEASURES 
Although the Sixth Congress of the CCP did not begin until, prob-
ably, June 18, 1928, the first group of delegates arrived in Moscow at 
the end of May. They were followed by other groups. The important 
CCP leaders, such as Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and Chou En-lai together with 
Hsiang Chung-fa, who already was in Moscow, stayed in Moscow to 
discuss with Comintern leaders matters that were related to the con-
gress. All other delegates from China, however, went directly to the 
site of the congress, which was outside Moscow. When a train carrying 
delegates arrived in Moscow, the curtains on their compartment win-
dows were kept down. They had to wait on the train until all other pas-
sengers had left it. Then automobiles drove onto the station platform 
and drove the delegates directly from the train to the site of the 
congress. Curtains in the cars were kept drawn en route. After they 
arrived at the site of the congress, the delegates promptly changed into 
Lenin- or European-style suits to minimize their conspicuousness. Most 
delegates were scheduled to return to China shortly. A few of them 
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planned to stay on for a while to attend the forthcoming congresses of 
the Comintern and the Young Communist International, while others 
were scheduled to return to China as soon as the Sixth CCP Congress 
closed. And, of course, all these precautions were taken to protect the 
delegates from being identified before they could return to China. No 
news of the congress was made public while it was in session. Sun 
Yat-sen University in Moscow was not far from the site of the congress, 
yet only a few of its students, not to mention the general public, knew 
anything about the congress. I went to watch the opening session of 
the Sixth Comintern Congress on July 17, 1928, and it was there that I 
first saw some of the Chinese delegates who had attended the Sixth 
CCP Congress. Some of them I recognized, while others I did not. 
They sat in the delegates' section, whereas I sat in the audience. Only 
during intermissions did we speak to one another, and then we merely 
exchanged pleasantries. They kept their mouths shut about the Sixth 
CCP Congress. In his marathon report to this Comintern Congress 
Bukharin nowhere mentioned the convening of the Sixth CCP Con-
gress. Obviously the silence on the subject was maintained because not 
all delegates to the Sixth CCP Congress had yet returned to China. 
As Ch'ing Man-yun recalled, the delegates to the Sixth CCP Congress 
at no time appeared in public while they were at the congress—they 
did not even go on a sightseeing tour of Moscow. Some important 
CCP delegates to the Sixth CCP Congress who stayed in Moscow were 
invited to speak at Sun Yat-sen University, but not until early Septem-
ber, when Sun Yat-sen University resumed classes after summer vaca-
tion, about two months after the Sixth CCP Congress had adjourned. 
THE DATE OF THE CONGRESS 
Communist historians have not given the specific date on which the 
Sixth CCP Congress convened, although they are generally agreed 
that it took place in June, 1928. Pavel Mif, who was in charge of 
organizing the congress, said only that "The Sixth National Congress 
of the Communist Party of China was convened in the Summer of 
1928."17 All files of the congress were presumably available to him, yet 
he did not choose to disclose its precise dates even nine years later, when 
the congress had become history. No wonder non-Communist his-
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torians have experienced problems assigning exact dates to this 
congress. 
The historian P'ei Tung, who has shed more light on this subject 
than other historians in Communist China, however, states that the 
Sixth National CCP Congress opened on June 18 and closed on July 
11, 1928.19 Ch'ing Man-yun agreed with the dates in P'ei Tung's 
work. She recalled, in addition, that three days after the Sixth CCP 
Congress closed, the Fifth National Congress of the CYC opened on 
July 15, 1928, at the same site as the Party congress. Meanwhile, some 
delegates to the Sixth CCP Congress moved into Moscow for the Sixth 
Comintern Congress, which opened on July 17,1928. 
Sun Yat-sen University was closed for summer vacation when the 
Sixth CCP Congress met. Most of its students were sent to a summer 
camp in the suburbs of Moscow for military training. They learned 
about the CCP Congress only when they returned to the university 
early in September. 
THE SITE OF THE CONGRESS 
One student of KUTV who was present at the Sixth CCP Congress 
recalls that its site was Serebroe, a dacha not far from the town of 
Zvenigorod, near Moscow.20 This dacha had belonged to a landlord 
in Tsarist days. Its name means "silvery villa" and came from its 
white walls, which shimmered in the sunlight. The dacha had lovely 
gardens and a gymnasium. The building faced a road, and the garden 
lay behind it. Beyond the garden was a hill, densely overgrown with 
greenery. And beyond that flowed a stream, whose clear water and 
green banks made it a favorite resting place for the delegates.21 
Nikolai Bukharin, the Comintern representative to the congress, 
sometimes stayed at a neighboring dacha and sometimes commuted 
from Moscow. 
The "silvery villa" was a building of considerable size. Its first floor 
consisted of a dining room, a kitchen, and many other rooms. The 
offices of the secretariat of the congress, which transcribed and dupli-
cated documents by hand and kept the records of the congress, were 
situated in these rooms. On the second floor of the villa was a splendidly 
decorated hall which could hold seventy to eighty people. The former 
owner of the villa presumably entertained his guests in this hall, and 
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it was there that the sessions of the congress took place. Other rooms 
on this floor housed delegates and other functionaries of the congress. 
High-ranking CCP leaders whose wives accompanied them, such as 
Chou En-lai and his wife, Teng Ying-ch'ao, and Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and 
his wife, Yang Chih-hua, were assigned separate rooms for each couple. 
Others were grouped several to a room. Rooms on the third, which 
was the top, floor were made into dormitories. The "silvery villa" be-
came a Red headquarters. Who would have dreamed that a Russian 
landlord's resort would have hosted the Chinese Communist move-
ment ? 
I should like to say a few more words about Zvenigorod. It was a 
small town. Near it was a public rest resort. Most Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity students, including myself, spent a pleasant month in this 
resort, which was an old feudal castle—a fortress, really—of Tsarist 
times, built on a hill. This was in August, 1928, just twenty days after 
the Sixth CCP Congress closed. We were, however, unaware that 
there was a "silvery villa" in the area. 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS 
When the congress convened on June 18, 1928, the CPSU, the 
Comintern, the Young Communist International and the Profintern 
all sent high-ranking representatives to the opening ceremony. Ch'u 
Ch'iu-pai officially opened the congress in the name of the CC of the 
CCP. After the speeches of greetings from representatives of the various 
organizations at the opening session, the congress elected a presidium 
of fifteen. The election was conducted so as to insure that the Party, 
the CYC, trade unions, and other Communist-led organizations each 
was represented on the presidium. Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Chang Kuo-t'ao, 
and Chou En-lai represented the CC of the CCP on the presidium. The 
CYC was represented by Kuan Hsiang-ying. Representatives of the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions were Hsiang Chung-fa, Su 
Chao-cheng, and Hsiang Ying. Chou Hsiu-chu was the representative 
of Chinese women and women workers on the presidium. Miss Chou, 
the wife of Lo Teng-hsien, was of working-class origin. Both energetic 
and capable, she cut a striking figure at the congress. 
After the presidium was elected, the congress elected a committee 
to evaluate the credentials of the delegates. Then Chou En-lai was 
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unanimously elected executive general secretary of the congress, a 
post which made him the chief administrator of the congress. The 
congress then named the various committees and those responsible for 
calling them into session (chao chu jen). There were, for example, the 
Committee for Drafting Political Resolutions, the Workers' Movement 
Committee, the Youth Movement Committee, the Soldiers' Movement 
Committee, and the Women's Movement Committee. Drafts of all 
resolutions, formally speaking, were prepared by these committees 
and then presented to full sessions of the congress for discussion and 
adoption. Membership on these various committees was based on 
the kind of work that the members pursued in China. For example, 
those who were active in the workers' movement were put on the 
Workers' Movement Committee. Thus all committee members were 
supposed to be experts in their fields and in a position to make valid 
recommendations. 
Delegates from different parts of China often spoke dialects that 
were unintelligible to one another, which naturally hampered com-
munication. When a Cantonese spoke in his native dialect, other 
delegates could not understand him, and so a good many interpreters 
had to be used. Huang P'ing, a Cantonese who also spoke Mandarin, 
and Teng Ying-ch'ao, a Honanese who had learned Cantonese when 
she worked in Canton, were interpreters for the Cantonese delegates. 
Because of high-ranking Comintern people at the congress, such as 
Bukharin and others, P'an Chia-ch'en and P'an Wen-yu were desig-
nated as the congress's Russian-language interpreters. Chuang Tung-
hsiao, P'an Chia-ch'en's wife, and Li P'ei-tse, the wife of Wang Jo-fei, 
interpreted for the Women's Movement Committee. There were ad-
ditional interpreters. All Chinese who acted as Russian-language in-
terpreters either were Sun Yat-sen University students or had worked 
as interpreters at Sun Yat-sen University, such as P'an Chia-ch'en, who 
at the time of the congress was no longer associated with the univer-
sity. In addition to the Chinese, there were several Russian interpreters 
whose Chinese was fluent. These Russians had worked in the Oriental 
Seminar at Sun Yat-sen University and then had transferred to the 
China Problems Research Institute. Interpreting work at the congress 
was strenuous, for in addition to oral interpreting, much translating 
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work had to be done. All documents of the congress were prepared both 
in Chinese and Russian. Some of these documents had to be translated 
before the congress convened, others had to be translated on the spot, 
and many documents had to be revised. 
As mentioned above, the delegates were not unanimous in their 
assessments of the situation in China or in their ideas about who the 
Party leaders should be. Heated debates took place on a number of 
issues. Yet disparate as their views were, they were eventually unified 
under Bukharin's leadership, or so it appeared on the surface. As 
Ch'ing Man-yun recalled, Bukharin made a nine-hour speech at the 
congress. In it he discussed at length the international situation, current 
conditions in China, and the mistakes committed by the CCP. He 
singled out Ch'en Tu-hsiu as the main target for criticism and blamed 
him for the failures of the Chinese revolution. He also criticized the 
"putschism" of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai after the August 7, 1927, Party con-
ference. It was in this speech that he made his famous remark that 
"armed revolt is a refined art. It is neither as simple nor as easy as 
lighting a match." Many other CCP leaders were not immune from 
Bukharin's fire.22 
After nearly four weeks (the congress lasted twenty-four days) of 
debates and discussions, the congress passed a number of resolutions 
and elected a new CC. For the first time in the history of the CCP a 
proletarian leadership was established—Ch'u Ch'iu-pai was replaced 
as secretary general of the Party by Hsiang Chung-fa, who had risen 
from the ranks of the workers. But this Comintern insistence upon 
proletarian leadership, based on the dogmatic commitment that the 
working class was superior in revolutionary spirit and determination 
to any other class, turned out to be yet another of its mistakes in dealing 
with the CCP. Hsiang Chung-fa ascended the throne solely because 
of his working-class origin. In deciding to turn the helm of a ship that 
was sailing in turbulent waters over to a person who had never ex-
perienced a voyage at sea, but who had only plied the Yangtze on 
river boats, the congress, under Comintern pressure, truly took a reck-
less chance. It was this decision that permitted Li Li-san to wrest the 
real power from Hsiang's incompetent leadership and to sail off along 
the disastrous Li Li-san line. 
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NIKOLAI BUKHARIN AND OTHER RUSSIANS AT THE CONGRESS 
At that time Bukharin was chairman of the Comintern. He enjoyed 
fame equal to that of Stalin. Lenin, while recording observations about 
both Stalin and Bukharin in his last years, had praised Bukharin as 
"a most valuable and major theorist" who was "rightly considered the 
favorite of the whole Party."23 Indeed, he was as responsible as Stalin 
for the outcome of the 1925-1927 revolution in China. The fact that 
the CCP's Sixth National Congress took place under his personal 
guidance demonstrated that the Comintern and the CPSU considered 
the congress to be of the utmost importance. During my stay in 
Moscow, I had on several occasions listened to Bukharin's eloquence; 
on one occasion he spoke for six hours without notes. Physically, he 
did not resemble the average Russian. He was neither tall nor husky 
nor stout. His mustache gave him a pompous appearance, to my eyes, 
yet he was in no way aloof. Ch'ing Man-yun was much impressed by 
his oratorical ability. For, she recalled that while his nine-hour speech 
at the congress certainly was long, his eloquence riveted the total at-
tention of the delegates to what he was saying; no one seemed bored or 
gave evidence of drowsiness. After each session of the congress he in-
variably addressed individual Chinese delegates with a smile and warm 
greetings. Often he carried a hunting rifle with him, while a falcon 
rested on his shoulder, and at the first free moment he would go out 
hunting accompanied by two bodyguards. Apparently hunting was 
his favorite recreation. 
Another important Russian at the congress was Pavel Mif, who, 
as senior official in the Far Eastern secretariat of the Comintern, was 
then in charge of Chinese affairs. It will be recalled, too, that he was 
then the rector of Sun Yat-sen University. At the congress he was in 
charge of administrative affairs. These administrative affairs were not 
merely technical in nature, but also involved political and theoretical 
matters. For example, he was responsible for preparing notes for 
Bukharin's political report to the congress and drafts of the resolutions 
of the congress in addition to supervising those who took care of the 
reception and transportation of delegates, security measures, and so 
forth, jobs that were handled by Russians for the most part. Midway 
in the congress, moreover, Ch'ing Man-yun recalls that an additional 
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batch of students from Sun Yat-sen University was brought to the 
congress to assist the overworked students already there, and all such 
students were Mif s responsibility. 
Most of the time during the congress, Mif stayed in Moscow. He 
attended the congress only intermittently, apparently because he had 
to brief Stalin on the progress of the congress and carry out in Moscow 
such other undertakings as preparing the final drafts and amendments 
of the resolutions of the congress. Since he was able to come to the 
congress only infrequently, his assistant, Kuchumov, the vice-rector 
of Sun Yat-sen University, usually looked after the proceedings of the 
congress in his place. 
In addition to these Russians, some Comintern and Young Com-
munist International representatives in China returned to Moscow to 
participate in the CCPs Sixth National Congress and in the Fifth 
National Congress of the CYC. Ch'ing Man-yun recalls as being pres-
ent a Young Communist International representative in China, whose 
name she has forgotten, and a Comintern representative, a woman, 
known as "Old Grandma" (lao tzu mo), who had helped the CCP 
in organizing its women's movements. Both of them had returned to 
Moscow, apparently to attend the congresses. In China, Old Grandma 
had spent a good deal of time with Yang Chih-hua, the wife of Ch'u 
Ch'iu-pai, and Ts'ai Ch'ang, the wife of Li Fu-ch'un and sister of 
Ts'ai Ho-sen. Perhaps it was for security reasons that this woman 
Comintern representative was called Old Grandma, for she was a 
young lady in her thirties. The congress designated her a member of 
the Women's Movement Committee. 
As has already been mentioned, some Russians, such as Yollk, also 
worked for the congress as translators and interpreters. A Russian 
doctor and some Russian nurses were also stationed at the congress. 
Those in charge of food and weekend recreational activities were also 
Russians. Indeed, the Chinese functionaries at the congress who had 
been brought in from Sun Yat-sen University were impressed by the 
excellent cooperation and spirit of service shown by their Russian 
hosts. At that time the relationship between the Russian and Chinese 
Communist parties seemed quite cordial and harmonious. Who would 
have dreamed that thirty years later these two fraternal parties would 
be as antagonistic to one another as fire and water. In nature oceans 
198 
can be converted into paddy fields, but changes in human affairs and 
politics are much less predictable. 
CH'EN SHAO-YU (WANG MING) AND THE SIXTH NATIONAL CONGRESS 
Ch'en Shao-yu, also known as Wang Ming, was a member of the 
first class that Sun Yat-sen University graduated. After graduation in 
1927 he remained as a translator at Sun Yat-sen University, where he 
also assisted Mif in studying the reports and other documents that the 
CCP sent to the Comintern. When the Sixth National CCP Congress 
was scheduled for June, 1928, Mif assigned Ch'en as his aid to help 
organize the congress. Mif did not, however, give him any official 
title. Ch'en Shao-yu was neither a delegate nor an alternate delegate, 
and officially he was not even present at the congress. One source 
states that a faction of Russian-educated students headed by Ch'en 
Shao-yu, Ch'in Pang-hsien, and Yang Shang-k'uen was one of five 
factions of delegates to the congress and that it functioned in behalf of 
Mif in seeking to gain control of CCP leadership there.24 Yet none of 
the members of this alleged faction, except for Ch'en Shao-yu, appeared 
even briefly at the congress. Indications are that the authors have 
confused the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CC with this congress. They 
also seem to have mistakenly identified the so-called 28 Bolsheviks as 
members of this supposed faction. It was only later, though, that a 
group of students at Sun Yat-sen University, of whom I was one, came 
to be called the 28 Bolsheviks. At the time of the Sixth CCP Congress, 
the 28 Bolsheviks had not yet come into being. But I will discuss this 
matter in detail in subsequent chapters. 
Ch'en Shao-yu, as we have mentioned, was only one of Mif's as-
sistants in making preparations for the Sixth CCP Congress. It is 
naturally possible that Ch'en made suggestions about drafts of some 
resolutions and that Mif accepted some of his suggestions. But such 
activities constituted Ch'en's personal, behind-the-scenes activities; they 
did not represent the activities of a so-called faction of Russian-educated 
students. As I learned later, Ch'en Shao-yu was assigned some specific 
tasks connected with the congress, such as helping Russian receptionists 
with meeting delegates and seeing to their accommodations and, before 
the congress convened, distributing Russian-language documents to 
selected students at Sun Yat-sen University, of whom I was one, who 
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could translate them into Chinese. Ch'ing Man-yun recalls that Ch'en 
Shao-yu did visit the congress now and then to find out how it was 
progressing, on the one hand, and to visit his fiance, Meng Ch'in-shu, 
whom he subsequently married. Miss Meng, her bosom friend, Chu 
Tzu-shun, and Pan Wen-yu, who was an interpreter at the congress, 
were drafted for work at the congress on Ch'en Shao-yu's recom-
mendation. 
Mif may have had something up his sleeve when he brought Ch'en 
Shao-yu in as an assistant. Perhaps Mif sought to provide Ch'en with 
an opportunity to meet CC members and influential delegates from 
various provincial and municipal Party organizations. Perhaps, too, 
Mif hoped that Ch'en could find out the sentiments of the delegates, 
information which the Comintern could utilize in directing the con-
gress. It was no secret that Ch'en Shao-yu had been a favorite of Mif's 
since early 1927. 
It is beyond dispute that Ch'en Shao-yu was an ambitious young 
man. When Mif in 1927 replaced Radek as rector of Sun Yat-sen 
University, Ch'en made every effort to win Mif's confidence. From 
then on, Ch'en freely made recommendations to Mif on university and 
Party affairs. All of these undertakings of Ch'en's naturally prepared 
the way for his subsequent leap into prominence. But Ch'en Shao-yu 
played no significant role in the decisions of the Sixth CCP Congress, 
nor was he a person of any prominence in connection with the congress. 
THE FIFTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE CYC 
Ch'ing Man-yun recalled that the Fifth CYC Congress convened on 
July 15, 1928, and remained in session for a bit more than one week. 
Its delegates were fewer in number than those to the Sixth CCP Con-
gress. They were less divided in viewpoints than delegates to the 
Party congress, and they pretty much followed the general line adopted 
by the Party congress. Thus, this CYC congress proceeded smoothly. 
The head of the Young Communist International, Chitarov, a bright 
young man whom I knew, participated in the congress. The Young 
Communist International representative in China was summoned back 
for the congress, so he, too, was there. The congress, which, as men-
tioned, followed the political line of the Sixth CCP Congress, adopted 
many resolutions and elected a new CC, with Kuan Hsiang-ying as 
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secretary general. Kuan had been a student at KUTV in its early years. 
Hua Shao-feng, who became a well-known Chinese Communist his-
torian better known as Hua Kang and whose close friend I was to 
become, was elected to direct the propaganda department of the CC. 
Li Tzu-fen became director of the organization department. And Wen 
Yu-ch'en, a steel-factory worker from Shanghai, was elected director 
of the department in charge of the workers' economic struggle. 
After the congress closed, Li Tzu-fen returned to work in Shanghai, 
while Kuan Hsiang-ying, Hua Shao-feng, Wen Yu-ch'en, Hu Chun-ho, 
Yuan Ping-hui, who now lives in Taiwan, and others stayed on to take 
part in the Fifth Congress of the Young Communist International. 
A few students from Sun Yat-sen University attended the Fifth CYC 
Congress as observers. Others worked at the congress, of whom Ch'ing 
Man-yun can recall the names of only two—Li Yuan-ch'u and Wang 
Ho-shu. Li was to leave the CYC and the Communist movement when 
he returned to China, perhaps in 1929. But Wang Ho-shu remained in 
the Communist movement and is today a government official in Peking. 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONGRESS 
Because they were urgently needed in China, delegates to the Sixth 
CCP Congress and the Fifth CYC Congress had to be sent back there 
at the earliest possible date. Groups of five to seven of them departed 
separately and at staggered intervals, Ch'ing Man-yun recalled. As 
soon as one group had safely crossed the Russian border and reached 
a designated spot, the next group would depart from the site of the 
congress. While delegates awaited their turn to depart, Comintern 
authorities gave them, and the Sun Yat-sen University students who 
had worked at the Congress, military training. A Russian officer con-
ducted this military-training program. They learned how to use the 
basic weapons manufactured in each country, techniques of street fight-
ing, techniques of guerrilla warfare, and other practical facets of mili-
tary activity. The program lasted only one month, by which time the 
delegates, and all of the Sun Yat-sen University students who had 
worked at the Congress, had left for the real battlefields in China. 
At that time, travel between Russia and China was a highly danger-
ous undertaking for a Chinese Communist. Yet, because of careful 
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planning by the secret-service people of the Comintern, in close coopera-
tion with the GPU, everyone made it uneventfully back to China. 
Ch'ing Man-yun described the trip as follows: The delegates made 
the trip to China by way of three routes. The first route was through 
Europe. Those who went this way traveled in the guise of students or 
rich merchants. Needless to say, only a few delegates enjoyed this 
privilege because of the high cost involved. Chou En-lai and his wife, 
for example, took this route. The second route involved taking the 
International Express, a luxury train with a dining car, to Manchouli, 
just on the Chinese side of the Sino-Russian border in Manchuria, a 
trip that took nine days. The third route was to take the Siberian Ex-
press, a slower, plainer train with no dining car, to Sedanka station 
near Vladivostok, a trip of twelve days. At Sedanka they caught a 
train to Wuchan station on the Sino-Russian border. In both Sedanka 
and Wuchan the travelers were put up at a rest house. The rest house 
in Wuchan, however, had its doors and windows tightly shuttered, and 
the delegates were admonished to speak only in hushed voices. Security 
precautions were far stricter for the delegates who went to Wuchan, 
which was close to the Chinese border, than at Sedanka, which was 
well inside Russia. The Russians at both rest houses were experts in 
smuggling people back and forth across the border. The travelers 
stayed at both Sedanka and Wuchan for a day or two or more, de-
pending on circumstances. During these stopovers, Russians carefully 
went over their luggage and their clothing. If the clothes that the 
delegates wore were judged unsuited to their assumed travel identity, 
the delegates had to be suitably reclothed. Before the travelers passed 
the Russian scrutiny, they had to be appropriately dressed from head 
to toe. Most important of all, they were not allowed to carry over one 
sheet of paper, or anything made in Russia. When everything was in 
order, the travelers got in a horse-drawn carriage on a dark night and 
cautiously drove off. When they neared the Chinese side of the border, 
they went ahead on foot, nervously inching their way along as best 
they could, with a Russian guide leading them. Soon they had crossed 
the border illegally and stood on Chinese soil. Then they were taken 
to a small cafe, which was the cover for a communications center 
operated by Russian agents. "The moment we stepped in the cafe's 
door," Ch'ing Man-yun, who made this trip, recalled, "our tension fell 
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away, and we relaxed, feeling exhausted and hungry. A cup of steam-
ing coffee and a snack wonderfully revived us. There we rested our 
taut and weary bodies. When we were sneaking along in the darkness, 
I deeply felt that to take part in a revolution was an act of total self-
abnegation—a form of self-sacrifice. I cannot help feeling despondent 
when I recall that heroic attitude of my youth, and I wonder what 
that sacrifice accomplished in the end." 
The mission of the escorting Russian agents ended in the coffee 
shop. It was up to the delegates themselves to deal with the problems 
that lay ahead. Occasionally, some inept travelers inadvertently re-
vealed their identities or by their conspicuous nervousness attracted the 
attention of the Chinese police and were detained for questioning. 
Fortunately, bribes apparently were capable of solving any problem. 
Usually, the police gave free passage to the ones they detained as soon 
as their pockets were filled with money. 
When the travelers stopped over at Sedanka, Comintern agents 
there gave each of them some Chinese currency and some U.S. dollars. 
The amount was in direct proportion to the person's status; delegates, 
for example, received more than students. But even the smallest 
amount was adequate for the traveler to reach his destination. Also, 
each traveler received enough money to cover living expenses for one 
month, just in case he encountered difficulty in establishing contact 
with the Party at his destination, a distinct possibility under the "White 
terror" in China at that time. It was, of course, important that, should 
no contact be established, the traveler have enough money to go else-
where or, at least, to feed himself. It cannot be denied that the 
Russians were extremely prudent and that they thought of all eventuali-
ties and provided travelers with the means to cope with them. 
It was late fall when the last of the delegates had left for China, 
except for those who stayed on in Moscow in connection with Party 
work, such as Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Chang Kuo-t'ao, and others. 
Notes 
1. Chung-yang t'ung-hsun (Central correspondence), no. 13. In the hui-lu Collection, 
Taipei. 
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Chapter XV 
The Struggle Against the Second Line 
at Sun Yat-sen University and the 
Origin of the 28 Bolsheviks 
CH'EN SHAO-YU ATTAINS PROMINENCE IN A STRUGGLE 
BETWEEN T W O FACTIONS IN SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY 
In the early summer of 1927 conflicts and clashes within the united 
front of the Chinese revolution reached a new peak, and this was a 
factor in intensifying the power struggle between Stalin and Trotsky. 
Karl Radek threw his full weight behind Trotsky in opposing Stalin's 
leadership. His public hostility towards Stalin cost him the rectorship 
of Sun Yat-sen University. The CC of the CPSU appointed Agoor, 
as I recall, the dean of academic affairs at the university, as acting 
rector to replace Radek, because Pavel Mif, the vice-rector, was at that 
time in China on a special mission. Agoor was a very ambitious man. 
Taking advantage of the power vacuum in the administration of the 
university at the time, he sought to make himself rector. In order to 
strengthen his position, he won over some influential students to support 
him, such as Chou Ta-ming, Yu Hsiu-sung, and Tung Yi-hsiang, who 
were Party veterans with established reputations. Yu Hsiu-sung, for 
example, had worked with Gregory Voitinsky, the Comintern rep-
resentative, in establishing the Foreign Languages School and then the 
Socialist Youth League in Shanghai in August, 1920. Agoor, with 
men of such stature around him, quickly rallied a considerable number 
of students behind him and became a ruthless dictator at the university, 
completely ignoring the secretary of the CPSU branch, Comrade Sed-
nikov. Thus, there arose a bitter power struggle between Agoor and 
Sednikov. Sednikov in turn recruited to his side the former leaders of 
the Moscow branch of the CCP, such as H u Chung and Li Chun-che, 
and through them successfully courted Chang Wen-t'ien, Shen Tse-min, 
and Shih Shih. Thus, in the university two hostile camps were formed 
—the so-called Academic Affairs faction with Agoor at its head, and 
the Party Branch faction led by Sednikov. 
This power struggle reached a climax at the concluding conference 
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of the semester, which ended about the end of June, 1927.1 The two 
factions fought a "blood" battle at this conference, heatedly arguing 
about academic and Party affairs. The Academic Affairs faction con-
tended that Party affairs at the university were handled disastrously, 
and the Party Branch faction insisted that the university's academic 
affairs were in a shambles; and neither side would yield an inch in its 
arguments. This conference lasted for seven consecutive days and 
nights, recessing only for meals, without reaching any compromise. 
I was only one of a great many students who were not associated with 
either faction who were greatly annoyed by this tiresome power 
struggle. Thus a third force emerged, which further complicated the 
situation at the university. The internecine strife continued, so that 
when Mif returned, he found the university quite literally torn apart 
by factions. To combat the chaos, Ch'en Shao-yu, who had accom-
panied Mif to China and back, proposed a plan to Mif to end the strife. 
He suggested that Mif firmly grasp the third force and use it in 
collaboration with the Party Branch faction to defeat Agoor's Academic 
Affairs faction, thus paving the way for Mif to become rector of the 
university. Ch'en's plan was implemented, and it proved to be a sound 
one. Agoor's faction was completely defeated, and Mif was soon 
formally promoted to the rectorship. Ch'en Shao-yu, as one of the 
active organizers of this movement, became Mif's principal favorite. 
This struggle was the first occasion on which Ch'en Shao-yu entered 
into an alliance with Chang Wen-t'ien, Shen Tse-min, and the others, 
and it was out of this alliance that eventually the alliance known as 
the 28 Bolsheviks emerged, an alliance of far-reaching significance for 
Sun Yat-sen University and for the CCP itself. 
THE ANTI-TROTSKY STRUGGLE BECOMES ENTANGLED WITH THE 
STRUGGLE AGAINST THE SECOND LINE 
The struggle between the above-named factions had just subsided 
when the struggle against the Trotskyite opposition broke out at the 
university. This latter struggle was touched off by an incident during 
celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, on 
November 7, 1927. It had become a tradition, starting in 1918, for the 
people of Moscow to celebrate this anniversary with a big march 
through the streets, with the Red Square as their destination. A more 
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elaborate celebration than ever before was carried out to commemorate 
the tenth anniversary, and I was among the marchers from Sun Yat-
sen University. As the procession approached the entrance to Red 
Square, Russian Trotskyites among the marchers suddenly pulled cloth 
banners from their pockets, waved them, and shouted anti-Stalin and 
pro-Trotsky slogans. This provocation promptly touched off retaliation 
from other marchers who supported the CPSU leadership, and the two 
groups had a fistfight. A professor at Sun Yat-sen University, who 
taught Leninism there, Dogmarov, was badly beaten up by the Trotsky-
ites in this skirmish. His nose was bleeding and his face had obviously 
suffered numerous blows. But while this scuffle continued, the march 
also continued without pause into Red Square and past Lenin's 
mausoleum, on top of which stood Stalin and other dignitaries review-
ing the procession. Naturally, they also viewed the fisticuffs that took 
place before them. As the Chinese students approached the mausoleum, 
the Russian leaders, as they had on these occasions in the past, raised 
their arms and shouted slogans of support to them—"Long live revolu-
tionary Chinese youth," "Long live the victory of the Chinese revolu-
tion." It had been the practice for the Chinese students to respond to 
this greeting merely with a shout of "hurrah" in Russian (ypa). But 
on this occasion, to everyone's astonishment including my own, some 
Sun Yat-sen University students responded by shouting their support 
for Trotsky and for the beleaguered Russian Trotskyites in the proces-
sion somewhere ahead of them. They shouted at the top of their voices 
and seemed to make more noise than the Russian Trotskyites. This 
public insurgence of Chinese Trotskyites from Sun Yat-sen University 
was utterly unexpected. It could not have failed to shock the CPSU 
and Comintern leadership assembled there, and taking place, as it did, 
in front of visitors—many of them important ones, from all over the 
world—it must have seemed to Stalin as though someone had publicly 
spit in his face. 
This incident intensified the struggle against Trotsky and his sup-
porters within the CPSU. Earlier, on October 14, 1927, Pravda had 
accused the Trotskyite opposition of intending to form a new party; 
and on October 23, 1927, Trotsky and Zinoviev had been expelled from 
the CC of the CPSU. But one week after this incident, on November 
14, 1927, they were expelled from the CPSU itself. The case against 
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Radek, Kamenev, Rakavsky, and other oppositionists, moreover, was 
at this time referred for decision to the Fifth Congress of the CPSU 
to be held in December of the same year.2 
Meanwhile, Stalin angrily instructed Mif to conduct a thorough 
investigation of Trotskyite activities at Sun Yat-sen University and to 
report his findings promptly to the CC of the CPSU, which I know as 
a result of being in the bureau of the CPSU branch in the university at 
the time. This painstaking investigation lasted for several months. The 
more important students found to have shouted the pro-Trotsky slogans 
in Red Square, such as Lu Yen, Liang Kan-ch'ao, and others, were 
deported to China. Guilty students of lesser importance were either 
sent to work in factories to reform their thinking or put on Party 
probation. Professors and staff members who were found definitely to 
be Trotskyites or Trotsky sympathizers were fired. 
But the struggle against Trotskyism in Sun Yat-sen University was 
not limited to these organizational and administrative measures. When 
the investigation was launched, a simultaneous ideological struggle 
began. Those students, including Ch'en Shao-yu and myself, who had 
united in the previous struggle against the Academic Affairs faction, 
now rallied around the bureau of the Party branch against the Trotsky-
ites. But the further we pressed our struggle, the greater were the diffi-
culties we encountered. For we found that the Trotskyite opposition as 
such was not the only opposition to be reckoned with. The defeat of the 
Chinese revolution had raised all sorts of complex questions among 
students. Who, for example, should be held responsible for the defeat ? 
Many students both at Sun Yat-sen University and in the Chinese class 
of KUTV felt inclined to question the leadership of Stalin and of the 
Comintern as a whole. Disenchantment, skepticism, and frustration 
were widely prevalent. Such students were not Trotskyites. Perhaps, 
in fact, they had never even been attracted by Trotsky's positions. 
Nevertheless, they had something in common with the Trotskyites, for 
both were disaffected from the leadership of Stalin, of the CPSU, and 
of the Comintern. Their reaction to the struggle against the Trotsky 
opposition in Sun Yat-sen University was to take advantage of this 
opportunity to form an independent force of their own to oppose the 
leadership of the bureau of the CPSU branch at the university and Mif. 
They waged a vigorous struggle against those students who supported 
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the bureau of the Party branch. And the course they subsequently took 
was labeled the "Second Line," which could not truly be identified 
with Trotskyism but which could not easily be separated from Trotsky-
ism either. Thus, the struggle against the Trotsky opposition became 
entangled with a struggle against the "Second Line." 
THE SECOND LINE COALITION: 
THE ALLEGED KIANGSU-CHEKIANG COUNTRYMEN'S ASSOCIATION 
AND THE INTERFERENCE OF HSIANG CHUNG-FA 
The coalition that supported the Second Line was composed of 
three groups of students—the remnants of the Academic Affairs fac-
tion, the "vanguardists" of the CYC members, and the so-called 
Worker Oppositionists. 
The Academic Affairs faction had been defeated, and Agoor had 
been disciplined by being dismissed from the university. Yet students 
such as Yu Hsiu-sung and Tung Yi-hsiang, who had formed the 
Chinese elite of this faction, remained in the university. Being am-
bitious, they watched every new development closely and functioned 
tirelessly to benefit themselves. It was natural, then, that they should 
join the Second Line against a common enemy. Still, since they had 
only recently been discredited, they were active only behind the scenes. 
They sought to avoid detection, but they failed to do so. Ch'en Shao-yu 
and many others who later were to be listed as the 28 Bolsheviks 
quickly disrupted their activities. It might be noted that many students 
who were regarded as members of the Academic Affairs faction were 
natives of Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces. For example, Yu Hsiu-
sung's home was in Shao-hsing County in Chekiang. Tung Yi-hsiang 
came from Changchow in Kiangsu Province. Graduates of Sun Yat-
sen University who were sent to study in military colleges in Moscow 
and Leningrad on the recommendations of Yu Hsiu-sung and Tung 
Yi-hsiang, when they were influential, came from these two provinces. 
There were many rumors about the significance of this provincial 
cliquishness. There was speculation that the two had formed a 
Chekiang-Kiangsu Countrymen's Association. This alleged association 
provided Ch'en Shao-yu and his comrades-in-arms with a fine weapon 
to use against Yu Hsiu-sung, Tung Yi-hsiang, and their followers. 
Since the formation of such organizations ran counter to the rules of 
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Party organization, and since, in any event, this alleged organization 
could be branded as feudal, Ch'en Shao-yu and others demanded a 
complete investigation of it. In response to their demands, the bureau 
of the Party branch promptly initiated an investigation in which it 
invited the GPU to participate. Some slight evidence was uncovered to 
suggest the vague possibility that such an organization may have been 
formed, although at the time I did not believe that it existed formally. 
But the use of exaggeration as a weapon in power struggles is not an 
unusual undertaking anywhere, and perhaps this weapon is used 
within Communist parties more freely than elsewhere. 
If my memory serves me well, the investigation took place early in 
May, 1928. Hsiang Chung-fa had already arrived in Moscow to attend 
the Fourth Profintern Congress in April, 1928. In the hope of frighten-
ing the Second Line coalition, Mif, at the suggestion of Ch'en Shao-yu, 
induced Hsiang Chung-fa to speak against the alleged association at 
Sun Yat-sen University and at the other colleges and universities in 
Moscow and Leningrad that Chinese students attended. Thus, one 
day he came to Sun Yat-sen University and lectured, as a representative 
of the CC of the CCP, on the issue. In his speech he affirmed the ex-
istence of the Kiangsu-Chekiang Countrymen's Association as a fac-
tional organization among members of the CCP residing in the USSR. 
In the strongest terms he condemned those who, he said, had organized 
this association, which he characterized as an anti-Party institution; 
and he warned all members of it that the evidence already in hand 
enabled the Party to punish them. He went so far as to threaten 
leaders of the organization with execution. I can still hear his jarring 
Hankow dialect as he delivered this ultimatum. He had not, so far as 
I know, investigated the matter himself, but had accepted Mif's side 
of the case. Not unexpectedly, his speech aroused both indignation and 
fear among students from Chekiang and Kiangsu at Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity, KUTV, and elsewhere, who had long maintained a close rela-
tionship with Yu Hsiu-sung and Tung Yi-hsiang. Those who were 
united in their struggle against the bureau of the Party branch and Mif 
were naturally also disturbed. Beyond any doubt, Hsiang Chung-fa's 
speech greatly intimidated not only Yu Hsiu-sung, Tung Yi-hsiang, 
and their supporters, but also the Second Line as a whole. 
The psychological victory caused by Hsiang Chung-fa's blast, how-
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ever, was short-lived. The Second Line coalition, after its initial shock, 
began to pull itself together and to undertake countermeasures, de-
signed to destroy Hsiang's charges. They appealed directly to the CC 
of the CCP and to the Chinese delegation to the Comintern to carry 
out another investigation of the case. Their appeal did not consist of 
one petition signed by everyone. Instead they deluged the CC and the 
Chinese Comintern delegation with appeals, each of which was signed 
by a few individuals. Under the pressure of these numerous appeals 
from Chinese students in the USSR, the CC of the CCP instructed 
the Chinese Comintern delegation in Moscow to settle the controversy 
on the spot. By this time, the Sixth CCP Congress had convened and 
closed, and the chief of the Chinese Comintern delegation was Ch'u 
Ch'iu-pai, who himself was of Kiangsu origin. Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, more-
over, much resented Mif, who apparently had had a hand in his degra-
dation at the Sixth CCP Congress. At the same time, Ch'u was jealous 
of Hsiang Chung-fa, who had replaced him as secretary general of the 
CCP as a result of decisions of the Sixth CCP Congress. When, then, 
the CC instructed Ch'u Ch'iu-pai to look into the matter of the 
Chekiang-Kiangsu Countrymen's Association, he took advantage of 
the instruction to strike back at Mif and Hsiang Chung-fa. He 
formally summoned dozens of people who were supposedly mem-
bers of the alleged organization to his office, where he interrogated 
them. All of these suspects denied Hsiang Chung-fa's charges and 
assured Ch'u that it all constituted a plot of Mif and Ch'en Shao-yu and 
their followers. At least that was what some Chinese Comintern staff 
members reported to Mif. In the end, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai asked the suspects 
to present their arguments in written form to him, which they did. 
He also asked their opponents to submit evidence, in addition to the 
tenuous material revealed in the first investigation, to support their 
charges. But this request was ignored by Ch'en Shao-yu and the rest 
of us on the grounds that the existence of the association already was 
an established fact so that no additional evidence was needed. Un-
happily for us, our uncooperativeness merely strengthened Ch'u Ch'iu-
pai's hand in reporting to the CC that there was inadequate evidence 
for the existence of such an association. Ch'u's report further stated 
that the agreement on certain issues among some of the students of 
Chekiang-Kiangsu origin was not a criminal matter but a matter of 
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political disagreement, which should be dealt with as such. To clarify 
and strengthen his position, he pointed out, moreover, that Chang 
Wen-t'ien, Shen Tse-min, and many others of Kiangsu and Chekiang 
origin stood against the alleged Kiangsu-Chekiang organization. And, 
he wrote, not all of the supposed members of this alleged organization 
were from Chekiang or Kiangsu. Chou Ta-ming, for example, who 
was listed as a leader of the association, was a native of Kweichow. In 
fact, we could not deny that there was some truth in Ch'u's report. 
But what seemed important to us was not the alleged association itself, 
but the political course that those who were identified with it were 
taking, which was regarded as inconsistent with that of the Comintern 
and the bureau of the Party branch at Sun Yat-sen University. 
Ch'u Ch'iu-pai's report was sent to the CC of the CCP accompanied 
by the written statement of the suspected students. It was not, however, 
presented to any meetings of Party members as a whole at Sun Yat-sen 
University, nor was it published. But the contents of Ch'u's report 
were widely known among Second Line students at Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity and elsewhere, apparently because Ch'u had told them about it. 
For our part, on Mif's instruction, the bureau of the Party branch 
briefed a select body of us on the report. On the one hand, Ch'u's report 
encouraged students in the Second Line coalition to grow more riotous 
in their struggle against Mif and the bureau of the Party branch in 
Sun Yat-sen University. On the other hand, it intensified the conflict 
between Ch'u and Mif. Thus the struggle against the Second Line in 
Sun Yat-sen University became entangled with a struggle between Mif 
and the Chinese Comintern delegation headed by Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, 
which I shall discuss in greater detail later. 
VANGUARDISTS AMONG CYC MEMBERS IN THE UNIVERSITY CONSTITUTE 
A SECOND GROUP IN THE SECOND LINE COALITION 
From the very beginning of the struggle against the Second Line, 
many CYC members at the university demonstrated support for the 
Second Line. Some leading figures in the bureau of the CYC branch 
in the university even publicly advocated defiance of the bureau of the 
Party branch. Hsi-men Tsung-hua was the most outspoken of these 
CYC leaders, but Kao Ch'en-lieh, Lin Ch'i-t'o, and others were also 
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conspicuous.3 They criticized the bureau of the Party branch in the 
same destructive tones that other followers of the Second Line used. 
The struggle against the Second Line, indeed, revealed in all its 
stark gravity the lacerating divisions within Sun Yat-sen University in 
the late autumn of 1928. The bureau of the Party branch simply could 
not tolerate loss of control over the bureau of the CYC branch in the 
university. In the first place, the state of affairs ran counter to the 
basic organizational principle that was supposed to govern the relation-
ship between the Party and the CYC. The CYC, as an auxiliary 
Party organization, was supposed to act only in accordance with Party 
decisions. In the second place, the Hsi-men-Kao clique in the bureau 
of the CYC branch, because of sympathy for Trotskyism, was held 
responsible for the high percentage of Trotskyites among the CYC 
members at the university. 
In a general Party meeting of the university held in the autumn of 
1928, I made a major speech criticizing the Hsi-men-Kao clique. I 
characterized its course as "vanguardism," because its defiance of Party 
leadership had been demonstrated by its insistence that the line of the 
bureau of the Party branch be reversed. After that, they were known 
as "Vanguardists," and they became an important component of the 
Second Line coalition. It was to weaken this Second Line coalition 
that the university authorities, upon the recommendation of the bureau 
of the Party branch, began in October, 1928, to send the most trouble-
some members of the Second Line coalition to Siberia, where they 
worked at hard labor. Kao Ch'en-lieh, Lin Ch'i-t'o, and others were 
among those sent to Siberia. Others, such as Hsi-men Tsung-hua, were 
sent back to China the following year.4 
THE "WORKER OPPOSITIONISTS" As PART OF THE SECOND LINE COALITION 
The Worker Opposition faction, headed by Li Chien-ju and Yu 
Tu-san, constituted the main force of the Second Line coalition. It 
could be said that the Li-Yu faction supplied the manpower for the 
battle. Those who made up the faction were of working-class origin 
and came from Wuhan and Shanghai. Li Chien-ju, for example, was 
a much-honored hero of the three workers' uprisings in Shanghai in 
1926 and 1927. Yu Tu-san had been an important activist in the Wuhan 
workers' movement. As illiterates, both linguistically and politically, 
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they could not have played a significant role in the struggle at the 
university if others had not directed them from behind the scenes. 
There were, in fact, all sorts of people functioning behind the scenes, 
such as Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and Yu Fei, who had been a tram conductor in 
Shanghai and who at the time was a member of the CC of the CCP 
and a member of the Chinese delegation to the Comintern. Yu Hsiu-
sung, Tung Yi-hsiang, and Ku Ku-yi, all three from the former 
Academic Affairs faction, and Li Pen-yi and others from the group 
that had initiated the Second Line in the first place were active behind 
the scenes, too. All of these people played upon the discontent of the 
Li Chien-ju-Yu Tu-san faction with the university's academic policies, 
and they goaded them into opposing the bureau of the Party branch 
and the so-called 28 Bolsheviks. Hiding behind the impeccable mantle 
of the Chinese workers' movement, they were able to place the bureau 
of the Party branch and the university authorities in a highly un-
comfortable position. 
Why were some of the worker-students in the university dissatisfied 
with the university and Party administrations? It happened in this 
way: Prior to 1928, intellectuals had made up a majority of the student 
body at Sun Yat-sen University. During 1928, however, the number of 
students with worker and peasant backgrounds increased rapidly and 
suddenly. And the university administration was hard pressed to shift 
its educational machinery—which was primarily geared to the educa-
tion of intellectuals—to the education of generally illiterate workers and 
peasants. Many new faculty members and courses had to be added. 
A course in the Chinese language, for example, was added to try to 
bring literacy to the illiterate students. Also, instead of studying 
Marxism-Leninism as we had studied it, a course called "The Common 
Sense of Politics" had to be introduced for these newcomers, who 
simply could not cope with more sophisticated matters. Although the 
university was quite willing to provide courses that the newcomers 
needed, the administration also regarded its task of converting such 
students into polished proletarian leaders as an altogether impossible 
one. Consequently, the university pressed ahead as energetically as ever 
with intensive education of the intellectuals, especially in advanced areas 
of theoretical and technical work. It was this dichotomy in educational 
approach that led to the charge of discrimination by some of the 
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worker and peasant students. Although they had been given prom-
inent positions in Party and student organizations at the university, 
many posts still were held by intellectuals, such as those of vice-rector, 
deputy director of the Academic Affairs department, research associates 
in many of the seminars, translators, and so forth, for such positions 
were beyond the capacity of people who had no education at all. This 
state of affairs was, in a way, a manifestation of the difference between 
physical and intellectual labor which Marx had indicated would vanish 
only in the final development of a Communist society. The university, 
in truth, should not have been blamed for discrimination. Yet Ch'u 
Ch'iu-pai and others, to accomplish their own political ends, instigated 
worker and peasant students to make such charges as a way of attacking 
the university administration, Mif, and Mif s Chinese supporters in the 
university. 
The Second Line coalition, then, consisted of the initial group of 
the Second Line, the remnants of the former Academic Affairs faction, 
the "Vanguardists" among CYC members, the Worker Opposition 
faction, and the Trotskyites. 
WHO WERE THE 28 BOLSHEVIKS? 
Against the powerful Second Line coalition, the so-called 28 
Bolsheviks took a firm stand. They were supported by students who 
supported the leadership of the bureau of the Party branch and of the 
university. The 28 Bolsheviks were united more by their ideological 
position than by any formal organization. Nor did they need a 
separate organization of their own, for they controlled the bureau of 
the Party branch, and the Russian authorities supported them. The 
group, moreover, had no recognized leader. Most of them had good 
academic records and were efficient and active in Party, academic, and 
administrative affairs at Sun Yat-sen University. Their good command 
of the Russian language gave them extensive contacts with Russians 
both within the university and outside it, and caused the Russians 
in general to be favorably impressed by them. Nevertheless, except for 
Ch'en Shao-yu (Wang Ming), whom Mif had long regarded highly, 
none of the 28 Bolsheviks were members of a special elect group 
specifically selected by Mif until this struggle had begun. Mif did not 
create the 28 Bolsheviks. But because of their outstanding performance 
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in the struggle in Sun Yat-sen University, they came to Mif s attention 
as a disciplined force which could be useful to him. For these twenty-
eight people became the enemy of all "anti-Party" factions in Sun Yat-
sen University. They were, as a result, dubbed the 28 Bolsheviks, which 
implied that they were merely the tag-ends of the Russian Bolsheviks. 
Much nonsense has been written about who the 28 Bolsheviks were.5 
It was either my good fortune or my bad fortune to have been at Sun 
Yat-sen University at the time that the 28 Bolsheviks appeared, and to 
have been one of them, and so far as I am concerned, the list below is a 
definitive identification of the 28 Bolsheviks. But first it might be noted 
that the name 28 Bolsheviks was provided by "Oppositionists," and that 
there was some arbitrariness and flexibility as to which individuals 
were lumped together in the group. Thus, to one Oppositionist, perhaps, 
the people constituting the 28 Bolsheviks might conceivably be a bit 
different from those named by another Oppositionist. Nevertheless, the 
list below, I believe, is the valid identification of the 28 Bolsheviks. 
I have given the names in alphabetical order. 
Chang Ch'in-ch'iu (Mme. Shen Tse-min), Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo 
Fu or Szu Mei), Ch'en Ch'ang-hao, Ch'en Shao-yu (Wang Ming), 
Ch'en Yuan-tao, Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku), Chu Ah-\en, Chu Tzu-
shun (a woman), Ho K'e-ch'uan (K'ai Feng), Ho Tzu-shu, Hsia Hsi, 
Hsiao T'e-fu, Li Chou-sheng, Li Yuan-chieh, Meng Ch'in-shu (Mme. 
Ch'en Shao-yu), Shen Tse-min, Sheng Chung-liang (the author, Sheng 
Yueh), Sun Chi-min, Sung P'an-min, Tu Tso-hsiang (Mme. Ch'en 
Ch'ang-hao), Wang Chia-hsiang, Wang Pao4i, Wang Sheng-ti, Wang 
Sheng-yung, Wang Yun-ch'eng, Yang Shang-](uen, Yin Chien, and 
Yuan Chia-yung. 
I shall give biographical sketches of the above persons later. At 
this point, I shall present some general data about the twenty-eight. 
1. Only five of them had working-class backgrounds: one from 
Shanghai, three from Wuhan, and one from Nanking. The others 
were intellectuals. 
2. A majority of them were CCP members; perhaps three to five 
were members of the CYC only. It seems to me now that all of them 
were either CCP or CYC members. 
3. There were four women in the group, and they constituted 
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roughly 5 percent of the approximately eighty women students then 
at the university. 
4. Eight of the 28 Bolsheviks came from Hupeh Province, the 
largest number of persons from any one province. Five came from 
Anhwei Province, four came from Hunan, four from Szechuan, one 
from Kiangsi, and six from Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces. 
5. All of the 28 Bolsheviks came from the Yangtze River valley. 
6. Of the 28 Bolsheviks, about twenty had received higher educa-
tions and were fluent in one or two foreign languages such as Russian, 
English, French, or German. 
7. One of them—Hsia Hsi—was a member of the CC of the CCP 
before he returned to China, and ten—Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Shao-
yu, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Ho K'e-ch'uan, Shen Tse-min, Li Chou-sheng, 
Sheng Chung-liang, Wang Chia-hsiang, Wang Yun-ch'eng, and Yang 
Shang-k'uen—were elected members or alternate members of the CC 
of the CCP at one time or another after their return to China, three of 
them—Ch'en Shao-yu, Ch'in Pang-hsien, and Chang Wen-t'ien—be-
coming secretaries general of the CCP. Two became in succession 
chairmen of the Shanghai bureau of the CC of the CCP—Li Chou-
sheng and Sheng Chung-liang. Four—Ch'in Pang-hsien, Wang Yun-
ch'eng, Sun Chi-min, and Ho K'e-ch'uan—became members of the 
CC of the CYC, two of them—Ch'in Pang-hsien and Wang Yun-ch'eng 
—becoming secretaries general of the CYC. The rest of the 28 
Bolsheviks became Party leaders at the provincial level or became 
Front Army political commissars. 
8. Among the 28 Bolsheviks, four died of illnesses or in plane 
crashes. Three were captured by the KMT and executed. Eleven were 
captured by the KMT and left the Communist Party. Of these eleven, 
three were subsequently captured by the Chinese Communists when 
the Communists came to national power in China, and were executed. 
Of the rest of the eleven, seven stayed in mainland China when the 
Communists came to power there, and I know nothing about how 
they have fared except that indications are that Ch'en Shao-yu now 
lives in the USSR. I, too, have settled abroad. Seven of the 28 Bolsheviks 
remained in the CCP, four of them in the CC, prior to the advent of the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. But either prior to the Great 
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Proletarian Cultural Revolution or during it, these four all fell into 
disgrace with Mao Tse-tung. 
THE TEN-DAY PARTY MEETING AND CHANG KUO-T'AO 
The 28 Bolsheviks were born and grew up in the political struggle 
in Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. Although they and their sup-
porters engaged in a fierce fight with the Second Line coalition, the 
coalition elements greatly outnumbered them. Nevertheless, they 
pressed for a showdown with the Second Line coalition in the early 
part of the summer of 1929. As part of their "win a quick victory" 
strategy they made a series of proposals to the bureau of the Party 
branch, all of which were accepted. They proposed that a general 
Party meeting in Sun Yat-sen University be convened to carry out a 
comprehensive debate on the pertinent issues. They also proposed that 
Finkovski, secretary of the CPSU committee of the district in which 
Sun Yat-sen University was located, address the meeting. They pro-
posed, furthermore, that the Chinese delegates to the Comintern attend 
the meeting so that they could be exposed to public criticism in an 
effort to stop their behind-the-scenes activities—a strategy of "drawing 
them out and then beating them." While Finkovski accepted the in-
vitation with pleasure, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai politely refused the invitation, 
and Chang Kuo-t'ao came in his stead as representative of the Chinese 
Comintern delegation. The 28 Bolsheviks were disappointed by the 
absence of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, who was known to the Russians as Comrade 
Strakhov, for he constituted their principal target for attack. Clearly, 
Ch'u Ch'iu-pai declined the invitation so as to avoid a direct confronta-
tion with the 28 Bolsheviks at Sun Yat-sen University. Most likely, he 
did not wish to openly wager his prestige on what was, after all, a 
lost cause, for the weight of both the Comintern and the CPSU lay 
behind the 28 Bolsheviks. 
The meeting convened. Chang Kuo-t'ao was elected to its pre-
sidium, and the 28 Bolsheviks were among those who voted to put him 
there, where he could be publicly gotten at. Chang Kuo-t'ao then 
presided at the first session of the meeting, the chairmanship of the 
presidium rotating with each session. Finkovski was the main speaker, 
which was to our liking. For, as mentioned, Finkovski was secretary 
of the CPSU committee of the Moscow district in which the university 
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was located, one of twenty-six administrative districts in Moscow. This 
district was well known as a district of culture, rather than as a work-
ing-class district. Many important academic institutions such as the 
Marx-Engels Communist Academy of Science, the Military Academy, 
and KUTV were located in this district. Comintern headquarters, 
which was near the university, was in this district, too. Thus it was a 
district of senior intellectuals and veteran political figures, and its 
particular characteristics called for great sophistication and skill on the 
part of the CPSU secretary who presided over it. The CC of the CPSU, 
in fact, sought to insure that especially capable men filled the post. 
Finkovski, for example, was an old Bolshevik who was well educated. 
He was a beguiling and imposing orator and a well-known trouble-
shooter. His appearance at the meeting, and the fact that he planned 
to speak, was a threat which the Second Line coalition and its behind-
the-scenes supporters had to reckon with seriously. To their surprise, 
however, while Finkovski in his speech vigorously defended the polit-
ical line of the bureau of the Party branch at Sun Yat-sen University, 
he delivered himself only of gentle criticism of the Second Line coali-
tion, apparently in the hope that he might win some of them over to 
the side of the bureau of the Party branch. Indeed, his arguments were 
so persuasive that the leaders of the Second Line coalition apparently 
began to feel that if they did not silence him by violence right away, 
it might be impossible to prevent him from winning over the audience. 
In any case, when Finkovski was only about half way through his 
speech, from all over the auditorium there arose raucous shouts, catcalls, 
booing, and the thunderous noise of stamping feet. Students shook 
their fists at him. They completely disrupted the meeting. It became 
impossible to accomplish anything productive. The chaos reached 
a climax when two students of working-class origin leapt onto the 
rostrum and tried to drag Finkovski away. Naturally, such un-
precedented behavior infuriated the 28 Bolsheviks and all of the others 
who opposed the Second Line coalition. They demanded that the 
presidium do whatever was necessary to stop such disruptive activities 
and to keep the Party meeting going. Chang Kuo-t'ao was on the 
horns of a dilemma. As chairman of the presidium of that session, it 
was his responsibility to maintain order. But by doing so, it would be 
easy for him to slide into a position that would be undesirable both for 
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himself and for the coalition. Yet if he allowed the chaos to continue, 
he would lay himself open to a frontal attack by the 28 Bolsheviks and 
he would fall into utter disgrace with the Russians. Whatever he may 
have been thinking, he had no choice but to function as presidium 
chairman and as the representative of the Chinese Comintern delega-
tion on the side of order. And so, presently he stood up, and in a loud 
voice urged the audience to be orderly. The disturbance continued, 
however, and his appeal was ignored. In a still louder voice he re-
peatedly pleaded with the audience to listen to him. At last, the 
coalition elements, who must have realized that if they thwarted Chang 
Kuo-t'ao altogether they would force him into bitterly opposing them, 
quieted down. Chang then appealed to the audience to maintain order 
and to listen carefully to what Finkovski had to say. Everyone, Chang 
said, had the right to agree or disagree with Finkovski, but they must 
not take the floor to express their views until Comrade Finkovski had 
finished speaking. He admonished them to submit to the regulations 
governing a Party meeting and to behave like Communists. Nothing 
he said went beyond points of parliamentary procedure; he did not 
touch upon the substance of the dispute. Quite naturally, it would not 
have been proper for him to speak right out at the start, nor would 
it have been proper for him to involve himself openly in the dispute 
at the meeting. Surely, too, he must have been aware that he would 
lay himself open to a concerted attack from the 28 Bolsheviks if he 
favored the side of the Second Line coalition at the meeting. We were 
ready to attack anyone who did so. And he must have learned a good 
deal about the political situation at the university from his brother, 
Chang Kuo-shu, then a student there, who deeply sympathized with 
the Second Line coalition. 
During his stay in Moscow as a delegate to the Comintern after the 
Sixth National CCP Congress in 1928, Chang Kuo-t'ao acquired the 
alias Chang Piao. He was best known among the Russians as Comrade 
Chang Piao. At the meeting, while he was calling for order, two 
Russians moved close to me and asked me what song Comrade Chang 
Piao was singing. To the Russians, his way of chanting over and over 
again in Chinese, "Comrades, listen to me," sounded like some sort of 
musical rendition. I assured them that Chang was not singing, but 
speaking. They made some mocking remarks about his performance, 
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and then asked me to interpret what he was saying. Later I learned 
that those two Russians were staff members of the Chinese section of 
the Far East Secretariat of the Comintern. 
The meeting lasted for ten consecutive days. I cannot now recall 
whether or not Chang Kuo-t'ao, after his bitter experience that first day, 
attended the rest of the sessions. 
The wall newspaper at the university, which was an organ of the 
bureau of the Party branch and which I edited at the time, played an 
important role in the fight against the Second Line coalition. The paper 
gave a day-by-day account of the meetings and analyses of the debates, 
and it provided readers with directions as to what they ought to do at 
the meetings. 
This ten-day meeting was the most dramatic event in the political 
struggles that occurred at Sun Yat-sen University. It was ten days of 
wild storms, chaos, and purposeful disruption, which considerably sur-
passed the raucous tenor of the seven-day meeting held at the univer-
sity in 1927, which started out as a routine meeting on university affairs 
but which was converted into a forum for the heated debate of political 
issues. At the ten-day meeting, all "anti-Party" factions in the univer-
sity attacked the 28 Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, the 28 Bolsheviks survived 
these furious attacks by their mastery of Marxist-Leninist tactics and 
by their devotion to the Comintern line. They succeeded in stripping 
naked the Second Line coalition, even though the coalition was far 
from having been completely defeated at the meeting. Relying on the 
support of a great many students at the university and the encourage-
ment of the Chinese Comintern delegation, the coalition fought on 
after the meeting closed as stubbornly as ever. The struggle continued 
into the events of the CPSU purge, which soon engulfed the Soviet 
Union. Thus the struggle against the Second Line coalition became en-
tangled with the CPSU purge, which began in the autumn of 1929. 
THE 28 BOLSHEVIKS AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST DELEGATION 
Since the 28 Bolsheviks failed to lure Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and the rest of 
the Chinese Comintern delegation to the meeting, they promptly 
planned another battle against Ch'u and the delegation as a whole. 
Defeat of the delegation, they were convinced, was a prerequisite for 
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defeating the Second Line coalition. Let me briefly recount this 
development. 
The so-called Worker Opposition faction within the Second Line 
coalition could not find sympathetic ears among the Russians. Thus, 
they pleaded their case with the Chinese Comintern delegation, to 
which they presented their grievances. They detailed the injustices 
perpetrated against them by the university administration and by the 
28 Bolsheviks, and they said that the 28 Bolsheviks, under the wing 
of the Russians, functioned in defiance of the Chinese Comintern dele-
gation, which, of course, was a fact. This latter charge apparently 
struck an especially sensitive spot in Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and the rest of 
the Chinese Comintern delegation. For with the university under 
Mif s rectorship, the Chinese delegation in truth had little to say in 
the university nor was it consulted or advised about university affairs. 
The university was completely under the control of the Russians, a 
state of affairs which the Chinese delegation found odious, to say the 
least. 
Mif was a fast-rising young Communist who had little regard for 
the Chinese delegation. Although, for the sake of appearances, he did 
confer with Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and the others on CCP matters, it was 
not difficult to see that he was only half-hearted in his attitude toward 
such conferences. Often he held to positions that were radically dif-
ferent from those of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and others on the Chinese delega-
tion. Generally Mif heeded the opinions of men he regarded as 
Chinese experts, such as Volin and his favorite aid, Ch'en Shao-yu, 
rather than to those of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai. Mif's attitude toward Ch'u 
Ch'iu-pai, coming on the heels of Ch'u's demotion at the Sixth CCP 
Congress from secretary general of the CCP to a mere delegate to the 
Comintern, intensified Ch'u's feelings of humiliation. The conflict 
between Mif and Ch'u grew progressively worse. 
From the very beginning of the struggle against the Second Line 
in the university in 1928, Ch'u and other Chinese Comintern delegates 
seemed to feel that the time had come to revenge themselves against 
Mif's slights. They thus encouraged the Second Line coalition in its 
attacks on Mif. In fact, the behavior of this delegation provoked 
hostility among the 28 Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, for tactical reasons, 
the 28 Bolsheviks refrained from direct public attacks on the delegation 
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as long as the situation permitted. At the same time, though, the 28 
Bolsheviks missed no opportunity to criticize them without mentioning 
their names. However, this restraint ended when it was learned that 
Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and the others were growing more aggressive. The 28 
Bolsheviks began collecting evidence of their behind-the-scene activities. 
At the same time we began meticulously scrutinizing their utterances 
since the Sixth National CCP Congress for statements that were at 
variance with CCP and Comintern positions. There was a weekly, I 
think, Comintern publication which had a restricted distribution and 
which contained most of their statements; and we went through this 
publication with a fine-toothed comb. You might say that we made 
ideological preparations for a full-scale political offensive against Ch'u 
and the other members of the delegation. According to our plans, 
this offensive was timed to coincide with the Party purge at Sun Yat-
sen University. It had become traditional in CPSU purges that a dis-
cussion of the situation in the unit involved preceded the examination 
of each individual Party member in that unit. Thus we decided to 
begin the assault on Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and the rest of the delegation dur-
ing the first, general-discussion phase of the purge, since they would 
not come up for interrogation at Sun Yat-sen University in the sub-
sequent stage of the purge. 
The first Party-purge meeting at Sun Yat-sen University opened 
sometime, I think, in October, 1929. Guests from the Comintern, the 
CC of the CPSU, the district committee of the CPSU, and others at-
tended the meeting. After a brief speech outlining the procedure of 
the purge by General Pavel Ivanovich Berzin,* chairman of the Party-
purge committee assigned to Sun Yat-sen University and an old Bol-
shevik, who at the time, I believe, was chief of intelligence for the Red 
Army General Staff, I took the floor to deliver my second major speech 
in Moscow. I openly accused Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and his co-workers of be-
ing guilty of opportunism. Ch'u Ch'iu-pai was guilty of leftist oppor-
tunism, I said, and Chang Kuo-t'ao of rightist opportunism. I accused 
them all of having fostered the "anti-Party, Second Line coalition" at the 
* Berzin's real name was Jan Karlovich Berzin. At the age of fifteen he had joined the 
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1905, following the events in February. During 
the October Revolution, he had guarded the Smolny and Lenin's person, and Felix Dzerzhinsky 
had appointed him deputy chief of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army General Staff 
in 1921, and then named him chief of the department. (See New Times, Moscow, 1969, 
no. 41, pp. 23-24.) 
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university. To give weight to my charges, I produced a great array of 
quotations from their speeches and articles, and gave abundant evidence 
of their behind-the-scene activities. I spoke in Chinese, without having 
to pause for my words to be interpreted into Russian, for Wang Chia-
hsiang and another Chinese, whose name I have forgotten, provided 
a simultaneous translation in tandem fashion. Speeches were limited 
to five minutes, but I talked for about forty-five minutes, with Berzin's 
permission. 
My speech elicited varying reactions from the audience. There was 
clamorous applause from those loyal to the 28 Bolsheviks and angry 
shouts and catcalls from the students who belonged to the Second Line 
coalition. All Russians at the meeting, including the representatives 
of the Comintern and of the CC of the CPSU, applauded approvingly. 
It would, of course, have been more appropriate for the Russians to 
have maintained a show of neutrality. As it was, their applause clearly 
signaled their stand against the Chinese Comintern delegation. Because 
of my open attack and the numerous other open attacks of the 28 
Bolsheviks that followed, relations between the Chinese Comintern 
delegation and the 28 Bolsheviks grew rapidly worse. The political 
position of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and his co-workers was seriously threatened. 
Ch'u's younger brother, Ch'u Ching-pai, who attended Sun Yat-sen 
University, became so enraged that he turned back his CPSU candidate 
membership card to the Party's district committee. The day he turned 
in his Party card, he disappeared. We did not know whether he had 
been arrested or, as rumor had it, whether he had committed suicide.6 
Whatever happened to young Ch'u, it was a blow to Ch'u Ch'iu-pai; 
and from that day onwards the atmosphere in which the struggle took 
place became graver than ever. 
INTERFERENCE OF THE CPSU AND THE CCP 
The struggle against the Second Line had brought all university 
activities to a standstill. Finally, the CCs of both the CPSU and the 
CCP were obliged to intervene. The wife of the chairman of the 
CPSU's Central Control Committee, Mrs. Emelyian Mikhailovich 
Yaroslavsky—or Kirsanova, which was her own name—who was a 
member of the CC of the CPSU in her own right, was chosen to in-
vestigate the situation at Sun Yat-sen University. Her assignment 
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worried the 28 Bolsheviks. For she was friendly with Chou Ta-ming, 
Tung Yi-hsiang, and Yu Hsiu-sung, the leaders of the former Academic 
Affairs faction in the university who were supporters of the Second 
Line. She had made it abundantly clear on numerous occasions that 
she regarded Chou Ta-ming as a "Chinese Lenin." It seemed a strong 
possibility that Chou Ta-ming would be able to influence her views on 
the matter. Moreover, when she launched her investigation, it did 
indeed seem as though she was not gathering all the data that she 
needed to prepare an impartial report. She did not, so far as I remem-
ber, for example, consult any of the 28 Bolsheviks, although she did 
gather the views of some members of the Second Line coalition. We 
acquainted Mif with the special relationship between her and Chou 
Ta-ming. He used his influence with Stalin to induce Stalin to ask 
Mrs. Yaroslavsky not to submit a biased report. Because of Stalin's in-
tervention, no doubt, Mrs. Yaroslavsky in the end submitted a report 
which temporized a good deal. She recommended that the CC of the 
CPSU endorse the general political line of the bureau of the Party 
branch at the university. At the same time, though, she criticized the 
bureau for numerous shortcomings in its day-to-day Party work. The 
CC of the CPSU accepted her recommendation and instructed her to 
present her findings at a general Party meeting at the university, which 
was held sometime early in 1930. I remember that when she reached 
the point in her report at which she recommended support for the 
general political line of the Party bureau, the 28 Bolsheviks and their 
supporters greeted her words with enthusiastic applause, while the 
members of the Second Line coalition listened with bowed heads. 
Her statements represented nothing less than a recognition that the 
Party bureau and the 28 Bolsheviks were basically correct and a con-
demnation of the Second Line coalition as being basically anti-Party. 
The Second Line coalition and its backers, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and 
Chang Kuo-t'ao, suffered complete defeat. For shortly after the CPSU 
adopted its resolution endorsing the political line of the Party bureau 
in the university, Russian delegates to the Comintern introduced a 
similar resolution in the Comintern, which criticized the attitude of 
the Chinese Communist Comintern delegates in their struggle.7 This 
gave Mif and the 28 Bolsheviks an additional victory, while Ch'u 
Ch'iu-pai and Chang Kuo-t'ao were completely routed. Although Mif 
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advised the 28 Bolsheviks of this Comintern resolution, few of us had 
a chance to actually see the document. 
After the CC of the CPSU and the Comintern adopted the resolu-
tion, the CCP recognized the gravity of the situation. It sent a special 
envoy, Chou En-lai, to Moscow in the spring of 1930 to resolve the 
conflict. Chou En-lai, representing the CCP, formally accepted the 
judgments in the CPSU and Comintern resolutions, and he reorganized 
the Chinese delegation to the Comintern. Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Chang Kuo-
t'ao, Teng Chung-hsia, and Yu Fei, one after another, returned to 
China within a year or so.8 
The 28 Bolsheviks emerged victorious from this fray. In this 
struggle against the Second Line coalition, they laid the foundations 
for their future struggle for the leadership of the entire CCP. 
Notes 
1. It was the practice at Sun Yat-sen University to hold a concluding conference at the 
end of each semester to appraise the successes and deficiencies of the semester's work. Initially 
both faculty and students were supposed to attend and present their views. But after 1927 
students were excluded from the concluding conferences, for their presence had made the 
conferences unwieldy. 
2. Inprecorr, VII (Nov. 29, 1927), 117. "Extracts from a Resolution of the ECCI Presidium 
on the Opposition of the CPSU Adopted Nov. 23, 1927." 
3. Hsi-men Tsung-hua was a student in the first graduating class of Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity. After he graduated in 1927, he remained at the university as a translator until 1929. 
Sometime in 1929, as I recall, he was sent back to China. He arrived in Shanghai, where 
he did not report to the CYC center there. Instead, he went immediately to Nanking, where 
he turned himself over to the authorities of the Nationalist government and renounced his 
CYC membership. Shortly afterwards he joined the Foreign Ministry of the Nationalist 
government. In 1940 he was appointed an attache to the Chinese embassy in Moscow. 
Presently he was recalled to Nanking. Two or three years later he was designated Chinese 
Consul General of Khabarovsk. But the Russians refused to accept this appointment, taking 
the unusual diplomatic position that he was unacceptable for reasons of "personal character." 
Soon after that he resigned from the Foreign Ministry and accepted a teaching position in 
the American-sponsored Chinling University at Nanking. He is the author of numerous 
books on the USSR. Toward the end of 1948 he was one of the ten professors who signed the 
famous joint declaration urging peace talks between the Nationalists and Communists. So 
far as I know, he remained in mainland China when the Communists came to power, and 
I have heard nothing about him since. 
Kao Ch'en-lieh and Lin Ch'i-t'o both were overseas Chinese from the Philippines. Kao 
was well known among Chinese in the Philippines, I understand, as the publisher and editor 
of a Chinese-language newspaper in Manila. 
4. By one of those singular occurrences, Ch'ing Man-yun (see note 5 of chapter 14) who 
recalls leaving Moscow for China by train in October, 1928, discovered during the first train 
stop at which passengers got off to buy food that among the fellow passengers were Kao 
Ch'en-lieh, Lin Ch'i-t'o, and others who made up the group being sent to Siberia, many of 
whom were old friends. She and some Chinese with her, none of whom had any idea of 
the plight of Kao and his group, naturally began talking to them. But a Russian who was 
escorting Kao and the others walked up and bluntly ordered Ch'ing and those who were 
with her not to talk to the others, and so they moved apart. But at the next stop, when they 
all got off for a meal, Ch'ing Man-yun was able to talk to them. Kao and others with him 
told her that they were being sent to Altai, on the USSR-Sinkiang border, to work in the 
gold mines there. They got off the train either at Omsk or at Novosibirsk to proceed to 
their destination by a southward train, then by bus, and finally by dog sled, facts which I 
226 
learned years later when I met several of them back in China. Among those in the group 
with Kao Ch'en-lieh, whom Ch'ing Man-yun now recalls, were Yen Yu-chen, Wang Yu-chih, 
Hsiang Yu-mei, Lin Ch'i-t'o, and Ch'iu Tung-wan (Lin Ch'i-t'o's wife, who was an old 
friend of Ch'ing Man-yun's and who came from Tsinan in Shantung Province, as did Ch' ing) . 
After they had served their specified period of hard labor at Altai, they all, I believe, were sent 
back to China, where I met a number of them, or to wherever they had come from in the 
first place. Kao and Lin were sent back to the Philippines. Wang Yu-chih, it will be recalled, 
became prominent as an aid to the Nationalist General H u Tsung-nan. He was at one 
time head of the Shensi provincial committee of the KMT. 
5. For example, Wan Yah-kang (The Rise of Communism in China, 1920-1950 [Hong 
Kong: Chung Shu Publishing Co., n .d . ] , p . 23) states: "Among this group of new men 
there were the so-called Twenty-eight 'model Bolsheviks,' including Liu Shao-ch'i, Wang 
Chia-hsiang, Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Yun, Jen Pih-shih [sic], Ch'in Pang-hsien, Li Fu-ch'un, 
and Chao Yun." Five of the eight names he gives were not among the 28 Bolsheviks. Liu 
Shao-ch'i, Jen Pi-shih, Li Fu-ch'un, Ch'en Yun, and Chao Yun did not study at Sun Yat-sen 
University and, of course, could therefore not have been among the 28 Bolsheviks. None of 
them was even in the USSR at the time of the struggle in Sun Yat-sen University out of which 
the 28 Bolsheviks emerged. 
6. I never did learn what happened to Ch'u Ching-pai. 
7. It had become common practice for the Russian Comintern delegation to seek and 
get Comintern endorsement of all CPSU resolutions that in any way related to Comintern 
activities. 
8. Concerning this development, Hsiao Tso-liang has this to say: "Interviewed in Hong 
Kong in late October, 1959, Chang Kuo-t'ao disclosed the background of this factional 
struggle like this: Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and Chang Kuo-t'ao, as noted previously, objected to the 
educational policy of Pavel Mif as president of Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. Conse-
quently, there was no love lost between them and the Russian. The party unit in the university 
was then under Pavel Mif's control. Li Chien-ju and Yu Tu-san were both workers from 
Shanghai and were mere tools in the power struggle. It had turned out that Mif was victorious 
in the tussle. Accordingly, the Comintern passed a resolution in condemnation of the 
Chinese delegation. Chou En-lai was called to Moscow to take over the duties of a liaison 
officer between the Kremlin and the Chinese party. Both Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and Chang Kuo-t'ao 
fell into disgrace" (Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-1934: 
A Study of Documents [Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961], pp. 144-145). 
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Chapter XVI 
The 28 Bolsheviks and Their Struggle 
Against the Li Li-san Line 
During the one and one-half years from the Sixth National Party 
Congress in 1928 to January, 1930, the CCP, in accordance with the 
resolutions passed at the congress and with instructions from the 
Comintern, reasserted itself. It not only patched up the wounds that 
the Party suffered as a result of the failure of the revolution in the 
period 1925 to 1927, but also made real progress toward Party con-
solidation. For instance, its membership rose probably to at least 
65,528 in January, 1930/ possibly to 120,000.2 Compared with the total 
membership of some 57,900 at the Fifth National Party Congress in 
April, 1927, the increase in membership was impressive and important. 
It is to be noted that before the Fifth National Party Congress—from 
1924 to April, 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek initiated his anti-Commu-
nist purge, or coup, in Shanghai—the Communists had enjoyed free-
dom of political activities in KMT-controlled areas. Even after Chiang 
Kai-shek's anti-Communist coup d'etat in Shanghai, the Communist 
Party still had some freedom in the areas under the control of the 
Wuhan government. But as soon as the leftists of the KMT in the 
Wuhan cities rose against the Communists in June and July, 1927, the 
Chinese Communists were forced to carry on their activities under-
ground throughout the country. Under the "White terror," many 
Communists were brutally slaughtered. Many members withdrew 
from the Party in view of the danger that threatened them. Moreover, 
after the August 7 Conference in 1927, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai's putschism 
made matters worse and martyred many Party members. The orga-
nization of the Communist Party and its membership thus suffered 
many severe blows in succession. Probably at the time of the Sixth Na-
tional Party Congress its membership was less than half the 57,900 at the 
time of the Fifth Congress. Thus a great majority of the 65,528 Party 
members in early 1930 were newly recruited. Under the conditions of 
"White terror" and "underground activities," it was no easy matter for 
the Party's organizational structure merely to survive. It is therefore 
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truly remarkable that the Chinese Communists in this period were 
able to advance despite the adverse situation. 
But good things don't last. The Party regeneration was seriously 
handicapped by unstable leadership, and the CCP, like a convalescent, 
suflfered a relapse. From the Sixth CCP Congress until his execution 
in June, 1931, the Party's leader was a rustic fellow, Hsiang Chung-fa, 
whose power was quickly assumed by a revolutionary wild man, 
Li Li-san. When the situation became more favorable to the Chinese 
Communists in the summer of 1930, Li Li-san began to put into 
practice his madly adventurous revolutionary plan. 
Explaining the reasons for the formation of the Li Li-san line, 
Huang Ho, a Chinese Communist historian said the following: 
The Red Army and the revolutionary bases had brought about some con-
structive developments in the KMT-controlled areas, the Party organization work 
had been restored to a certain extent, especially in May of 1930, when the large-
scale outbreak of civil war between Chiang Kai-shek, Yen Hsi-shan, and Feng 
Yu-hsiang presented a situation highly favorable to revolutionary development. 
The "Left" radicalist remnant in the Party burst out again. The Party's Central 
Politburo under the direction of Comrade Li Li-san passed a resolution on June 
11, the leftist "New Revolutionary Rising Tide and Preliminary Successes in One 
or More Provinces." From then on, the Left line reigned over the Party center's 
leading organizations.3 
Mif considered that "Li Li-san's policy was based on the assumption 
that the Chinese and world revolution would soon break out. Exag-
gerating the maturity of the revolutionary situation throughout China, 
he led the Party to organize insurrection everywhere, including the 
principal centers of the country, which turned out to be mere putschist 
actions."4 He strongly opposed the Li Li-san line and regarded it as 
running counter to the line of the Comintern. He listed the main 
points of the Li Li-san line as follows: 
Li Li-san completely ignored the everyday struggle of the workers and peas-
ants. He dissolved the Red trade unions on the ground that they were superfluous 
during an insurrection. He strove to liquidate the partisan movement on the 
ground that guerilla warfare had become obsolete. He instructed the leaders in 
the Soviet districts to organize state farms and collective farms, and to prohibit 
free trade and the buying and selling of land. All these measures served to com-
plicate the economic and political situation in the Soviet regions.5 
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Li Li-san's putschism has been labeled "the second 'Left' line" by 
CCP historians, whereas Ch'u Ch'iu-pai's is labeled the "first 'Left' 
line." According to Mif, Li's blind revolt was far more serious than 
Ch'u's. Perhaps in jest, it could be said that Li's revolutionary mania 
combined explosively with his native Hunan ruffianism, while Ch'u's 
Kiangsu scholarly gentility contributed to his behavior. But it is to 
be noted that when Ch'u assumed leadership, the Party had just suffered 
a fatal blow. His efforts for survival in a distressing situation were 
desperate. But when Li rose to power in the summer of 1930, the 
situation was quite favorable to the CCP, which then possessed con-
siderable armed forces in the Soviet districts and well-functioning Party 
organizations in the cities. Besides, internal strife within the KMT at 
the time also presented a favorable opportunity for the Communists. 
But Li Li-san's putschism seriously impaired the Party's growth and, 
indeed, destroyed much of what the Party had painstakingly built. 
One KMT intelligence source describes the situation thus: 
Under the direction of the Li Li-san line, the entire efforts of which went into 
engaging in military radicalism and opportunistic activities, many party orga-
nizations outside of the Soviet districts were totally shattered. The Communist 
organization in Shanghai, which had been quite solid, consisting of eight district 
committees—Central, Western, and Eastern Shanghai, Cha-pei, the French Con-
cession, Pu-tung, Wu-sung, and the waterfront—had a membership of some 
three thousand at the beginning of the reign of the Li Li-san line. But as an 
outcome of Li Li san's leadership . . . the Shanghai organization was almost 
entirely destroyed, with seven of the eight districts eliminated. The Party 
members dropped from 3,000 to 700. All the mass organizations under the 
control of the CCP were destroyed. . . . The situation in other places was 
similar to that in Shanghai.6 
Chinese Communist historians treat the Li Li-san line as an ill-fated 
star for Chinese communism. For instance, Ho Kan-chih says, "The 
reign of Li Li-san's line in the Party was short-lived, lasting only from 
June to September 1930. Since the Party and the revolutionary forces 
invariably suffered losses wherever the line was put into practice, great 
numbers of Party members demanded its rectification."7 
The call to severely reprimand Li Li-san rose higher and higher 
among the Chinese Communists. Far away in Moscow the Comintern 
had noticed the serious situation in the CCP. Upon learning of the 
resolution entitled "The New Revolutionary Rising Tide and Pre-
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liminary Successes in One or More Provinces," passed by the CCP 
Central Politburo on June 11, 1930, and the upheaval in the Party 
caused by the strict implementation of the resolution by the Li Li-san 
leadership, the ECCI passed a resolution on July 23, 1930, which aimed 
at rectifying the drastic undertakings of the Li Li-san line. To im-
plement this ECCI resolution, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai was sent back to China, 
where he convened the Third Plenum of the Sixth CC; but Ch'u 
failed to carry out his mission. 
The so-called 28 Bolsheviks returned to China separately between 
1929 and 1932. Those who returned in the summer of 1930 constituted 
the main force of the 28 Bolsheviks, and they made Shanghai their 
headquarters. At the time of their return, Li Li-san was in control of 
the CC of the CCP and had just seen to it that the June 11, 1930, "Left" 
putschist resolution was passed by the Central Politburo. The 28 
Bolsheviks, as supporters of the policy of the Comintern, began to 
attack the Li Li-san line. Armed with Marxist-Leninist arguments 
and supported by the Comintern, they constituted a fatal threat to the 
reign of Li Li-san.8 
But the attack by the 28 Bolsheviks on the Li Li-san line did not 
always enjoy smooth sailing: 
In a meeting of staff members of the Central Committee held in late June or 
early July, 1930, Ch'en Shao-yu and others, who had just returned from Moscow, 
objected to the June 11 Politburo resolution. As a result, Ch'en Shao-yu was 
placed on probation as a party member for six months and Ch'in Pang-hsien, 
Wang Chia-ch'iang, and Ho Tzu-shu were reprimanded most severely.9 
However, they were not discouraged by the punishment that the 
Party inflicted on them. On the contrary, the resolution concern-
ing the China question passed by the ECCI on July 23, 1930, which 
censured the Li Li-san line, was no doubt a clear support for them. 
Greatly encouraged, they renewed their unrestrained attacks on the 
Li Li-san line. The Comintern sent Ch'u Ch'iu-pai back to China in, 
apparently, July or August, 1930; and the Third Plenum of the Sixth 
CC, which he called, convened in September, 1930. Chou En-lai also 
returned to China from Moscow to assist Ch'u in rooting out the Li 
Li-san line. But the Third Plenum did not accomplish its intended 
purpose because of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai's compromising attitude towards 
the Li Li-san line. One may wonder why Ch'u did not carry out the 
231 
mission that the Comintern gave him. According to his own statement 
of repentance he admitted that his compromising attitude at the 
plenum was not without cause.10 
Ch'u Ch'iu-pai admitted that his compromising position was not accidental 
but that it dated back before the Sixth National Congress of 1928. From his ad-
ventures in 1927 through the Third Plenum in 1930, he stated, he had shared 
many basic ideas about the Chinese revolution with Li Li-san. . . . In consequence, 
he admitted that he made the mistake of confusing Li Li-san's policies with the 
Moscow line despite the fact that he took part in the discussion of the Comintern 
directive of July 23, 1930, before it was adopted.11 
It seems apparent that although Ch'u was severely criticized for his 
putschism at the Chinese Communists' Sixth National Congress and 
was relieved of his position as secretary general, he did not give up his 
putschism. It thus appears quite natural that he should adopt a com-
promising attitude toward the Li Li-san line, which favored putschism. 
Furthermore, "Ch'ii confessed that his conception of intraparty fac-
tional conflicts was also absolutely wrong. During his stay in Moscow 
as representative of the CCP, he admitted, he not only failed to help the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union to eliminate the quarrels among 
the Chinese Communists in Moscow, but became involved in the 
quarrels himself."12 Ch'u was defeated in the factional struggle within 
the Party at Sun Yat-sen University and in his power struggle with Mif. 
His hatred of Mif and the 28 Bolsheviks was thus understandable. 
Therefore at the Third Plenum, he tried to compromise with the Li 
Li-san faction, on the one hand, and attempted to win the Party 
veterans to his side in order to prevent the 28 Bolsheviks from securing 
the leadership of the CCP, on the other. Doubtlessly this was his 
retaliation against Mif and the 28 Bolsheviks. It also reveals the fact 
that the factional struggle within the Party at Sun Yat-sen University 
in Moscow exerted a deep-rooted influence on the CCP. 
The Third Plenum in essence was a failure. And Ch'u Ch'iu-pai 
again became the target of attacks from the 28 Bolsheviks. They also 
criticized the resolution passed at the plenum. A Chinese Communist 
historian has some pertinent comments on the plenum: 
Thus in putting an end to the above-mentioned mistakes of the Li Li-san line, 
the Third Plenum achieved some positive results. . . . But since the Third Plenum 
and the Central Committee did not undertake to thoroughly criticize the Li Li-san 
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line, so at the session and for a time after it, the mistake of sectarianism con-
tinued in the Party and "Left" ideas and policies still found frequent expression.13 
The compromising attitude toward the Li Li-san line at the Third 
Plenum outraged many CCP members and sped up the formation of 
a strong opposing force with the 28 Bolsheviks in the lead. Their heroic 
bravery won Mif's unreserved tribute: 
A fight against Li Li-san's semi-Trotskyist policy was started in the Shanghai 
section of the Party under the leadership of Ch'en Shao-yu. The fight for a correct 
line was quite successful. Gathering the best forces of the Party around himself, 
Comrade Ch'en Shao-yu (Wang Ming), one of the most prominent and gifted 
leaders of the Communist movement in China, together with other leading mem-
bers of the Party such as Comrades Ch'in Pang-hsien, Wang Chia-hsiang, Ho 
Tzu-shu, Shen Tse-min and Ch'en Yuan-tao, fighting on two fronts, succeeded 
in securing the recognition of the correct Leninist-Stalinist line on questions con-
cerning the Chinese revolution.14 
The "best forces of the Party" glorified by Mif all belonged to the so-
called 28 Bolsheviks. While the struggle against the Li Li-san line 
and the compromising policy of the Third Plenum was reaching its 
zenith in the CCP, the ECCI wrote a 7000-word-long letter to the CC 
of the CCP, in which it reiterated that the Li Li-san line in essence 
was totally in opposition to the policy of the Comintern. The letter 
reached the CC of the CCP in Shanghai on November 16, 1930.15 The 
letter virtually vetoed the decisions of the Third Plenum, which pro-
claimed that Li Li-san did not err in line but in tactics. Moreover, the 
letter strengthened the political status of the 28 Bolsheviks in the CCP. 
In addition to accepting the instructions from the Comintern at an 
enlarged meeting of the CCP Politburo held on November 22,1930, the 
Central Politburo also passed a resolution rescinding the punishment 
of Ch'en Shao-yu, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Wang Chia-hsiang, and Ho Tzu-
shu.16 This resolution cleared the way for the 28 Bolsheviks to establish 
their leadership of the CC of the CCP. Even before the passage of the 
resolution, they had defeated Li Li-san, who was summoned back to 
Moscow for instructions. Now the position of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Chou 
En-lai, and others was weakened. This was particularly true in the 
case of Ch'u, whose efforts to get control of the CC of the CCP proved 
to be a complete failure. But this situation helped to inflame the ambi-
tion entertained by the faction of Ho Meng-hsiung and Lo Chang-lung 
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to control the CC. So a new power struggle between this faction and 
the 28 Bolsheviks or "The Returned Student Clique" grew sharp. 
Under the direction of Mif, who by then was in Shanghai, the so-called 
anti-"Right"-opportunist movement against Ho Meng-hsiung and Lo 
Chang-lung and against the remnants of the Li Li-san line began 
almost at the same time. 
To secure a CCP completely loyal to the Comintern, the Comintern 
dispatched Mif to China as its representative in November or Decem-
ber, 1930. Mif carried an important mission to China: to reorganize 
the CC of the CCP by introducing the 28 Bolsheviks into it and 
thus to expedite the "Bolshevization" of the CCP. In other words, his 
mission was to put the Chinese Communists under the absolute control 
of the Russian Communists. However, there are varying versions as to 
to the approximate date of Mif s arrival in China and the return of the 
28 Bolsheviks to China. For example, Benjamin I. Schwartz says, 
"Thus we find out when Mif was appointed Comintern Delegate to 
China in the spring of 1930, his young proteges accompanied him back 
to China."17 But Hsiao Tso-liang reports that Chang Kuo-t'ao told 
him in an interview: "He [Pavel Mif] arrived in China as Comintern 
delegate probably in June, 1930, and went back to Russia toward the 
end of 1930 or early in 1931. . . . Mif brought with him to China a 
group of young students centering around Ch'en Shao-yu."18 There 
is another version claiming that Mif arrived in China in November, 
1930, after the Third Plenum of the Sixth CC, which was held in 
September of that year. In this connection Hsiao Tso-liang states, 
again according to the interview with Chang Kuo-t'ao: 
Chou En-lai was sent by the CCP to Moscow in the spring of 1930 at the behest 
of Pavel Mif, chief of the Chinese Section, Eastern Department, Communist 
International. After his arrival in Moscow, Chou En-lai took over practically all 
the business of the Chinese delegation in Moscow, conducting negotiations on 
behalf of the CCP at the bidding of Mif. Both Ch'ii Ch'iu-pai and Chang Kuo-
t'ao were kept in the background by the Comintern on account of their hostility 
to Mif, which came to the fore in what was known as the Sun Yat-sen University 
case, in which they attacked the educational policy of Mif as president of that 
university and thus were punished.19 
My own experience in these matters was this: From the spring of 
1930 until August, when I went to the Vladivostok-Khabarovsk area, 
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I remained in Moscow. I was assigned at this time to help with the 
translation and evaluation of all documents sent by the CCP to the 
Comintern, the job Ch'en Shao-yu had held prior to his departure for 
China. I translated documents and then prepared brief analytical 
summaries of them for use by the Comintern. In this position, I saw 
Mif once or twice each week in his Comintern office. He was then 
talking with Chou En-lai about a settlement of the Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity case. Thus I know that Mif remained in Moscow at least 
through August, 1930. Ch'u Ch'iu-pai left Russia for China some time 
after the resolution on the China question was passed by the ECCI on 
July 23, 1930.20 For Ch'u returned to China to implement the July 23, 
1930, resolution, and he attended the Third Plenum of the Sixth CC 
of the CCP in September. It seems altogether unlikely, then, that Mif 
and Ch'u Ch'iu-pai went to China at the same time. For it would have 
been almost impossible for Mif to have reached China in time to attend 
the Third Plenum of the CC of the CCP which Ch'u attended. Further-
more, Mif and Ch'u Ch'iu-pai were practically at war with one another, 
and it seems improbable that they would have been sent to China to-
gether merely to transfer their battle ground from Moscow to Shanghai. 
At the same time, it seems improbable that the Comintern would have 
sent Ch'u to China unless it trusted him to carry out his mission. It is 
more likely that when Ch'u failed in his mission at the Plenum of the 
Sixth CC in September, 1930, his old antagonist Mif went to China to 
rectify the situation, probably arriving in October or November or 
possibly later. 
The next problem of concern to us here is how and when the so-
called 28 Bolsheviks returned to China. Most secondary sources in-
dicate that they all returned home with Mif in 1930. Nothing could 
be further from the truth. 
First, the so-called 28 Bolsheviks did not return to China together. 
Some of them went back at the end of 1929, but their impact was not 
immediate. For instance, Ch'en Shao-yu went to China before Mif 
had been appointed Comintern delegate to China. Upon his return 
from Russia, moreover, Ch'en was not immediately put into an im-
portant position by the CC of the CCP. He was assigned to be a 
Western Shanghai correspondent for Red Flag magazine. The editor-
in-chief of Red Flag then was a veteran Communist, Hsieh Chueh-
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tsai, who much later became Minister of Interior in the Chinese Com-
munist regime in Peking, a position from which he retired in the 
spring of 1965. Sometime between May and June, 1930, Ch'en Shao-yu 
was arrested while attending a mass rally in Western Shanghai. He 
was not recognized at the police station, where he was imprisoned as 
an ordinary law violator. In truth, Ch'en at that time was not im-
portant in the CCP. But Ch'en was anxious to get out of the prison. 
He disregarded elementary security measures and endangered his Party 
by writing to P'an Wen-yu, a graduate of Sun Yat-sen University, then 
secretary of the Propaganda Department of the CC of the CCP, for 
help.21 He bribed an Indian policeman to deliver the message to P'an. 
When P'an received Ch'en's letter, he was shocked. Because of Ch'en's 
stupidity most of the underground agencies of the Chinese Communists 
in Shanghai had to move to new locations, for Ch'en had sent a police-
man directly to one of them. Ch'en was soon released. He then wrote 
to Mif, and falsely claimed that he had been beaten in prison and 
complained that the CC of the CCP had ignored him. Mif was furious. 
He wrote to the CC of the CCP before its Fourth Plenum, praising 
Ch'en Shao-yu for his heroism and for being the best example of a 
brave revolutionary, and attacking the leadership of Li Li-san for 
failing to give Ch'en an important position. 
The above episode attests to the fact that the so-called 28 Bolsheviks 
did not return to China in a body with Mif, and that these returned 
"heroes" did not immediately rise to power upon their homecoming. 
Second, the great majority of so-called 28 Bolsheviks returned to 
China successively in the summer of 1930. Most of them chose Shanghai 
as the center of their activities, including Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu), 
Ch'in Pang-hsien, Shen Tse-min, Li Chou-sheng, Wang Chia-hsiang, 
Yang Shang-k'uen, Ho Tzu-shu, Yin Chien, Ch'en Shao-yu, Meng 
Ch'in-shu (Mme. Ch'en Shao-yu), Ch'en Yuan-tao, Ch'en Ch'ang-hao, 
Tu Tso-hsiang (Mme. Ch'en Ch'ang-hao), Wang Yun-ch'eng, Chu 
Ah-ken, Ho K'e-ch'uan, and Li Yuan-chieh. They were altogether 
seventeen in number, representing almost two-thirds of the whole 
group. 
Third, a small number of the so-called 28 Bolsheviks came back to 
China in 1931 and 1932. They had been assigned to work in the Far 
Eastern area of Soviet Russia in the fall of 1930. This was one of the 
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special personnel arrangements that the Russian Communist Party 
made in the Far Eastern area after the Chinese Eastern Railway In-
cident in 1929. More than twenty students from Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity, of whom I was one, were sent there to work, including the 
Communist veteran Lin Tsu-han (Lin Po-chu), who later became 
a member of the CC and the Politburo of the CCP, Wu Yu-chang, P'u 
T'ao-ming, and Li Yao-k'uei. Four of the 28 Bolsheviks were sent 
there. They were Sheng Chung-Hang (the name I used then), Wang 
Sheng-ti, Sun Chi-min, and Yuan Chia-yung. When I learned of my 
new appointment to Russia's Far East, I was quite upset. I went to 
see Chou En-lai at the Comintern building to request that he revoke 
the assignment and let me go back to China. Chou told me that he 
could not change the assignment because, as a representative of the 
CC of the CCP, he had already consented in writing to all of the 
appointments. He advised me to obey my instructions and go to the 
Russian Far East. I reluctantly took his advice and in August, 1930, 
went to work as a member of the propaganda group of the CC of the 
CPSU in the Vladivostok-Khabarovsk area, where I stayed until 
August, 1932. Then the Comintern summoned me back to Moscow, 
where I stayed until I returned to China at the end of 1932. 
Without question, the so-called 28 Bolsheviks were painstakingly 
cultivated by the Russians. The Russians' sole purpose in doing this 
was to control the CCP and transform it into a party with irrevocable 
loyalty to Soviet Russia and the Comintern. Upon their return to 
China, the 28 Bolsheviks became the main force against the Li Li-san 
line. With assistance from the Comintern, and especially from its 
representative Mif, they won an overwhelming victory in the Fourth 
Plenum of the Sixth CC in January, 1931. They continued to exercise 
complete control over the CC until the Tsunyi Conference in January, 
1935. At the Tsunyi Conference, Ch'in Pang-hsien was relieved of his 
job as secretary general. However, his successor, Chang Wen-t'ien, 
was also one of the 28 Bolsheviks, and he served as secretary general 
from the time of the Tsunyi Conference until 1940.22 Chang Wen-
t'ien's election in 1935 was probably dictated primarily by expediency 
and compromise, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Nominally, 
then, the 28 Bolsheviks may have retained their power even after 1935. 
In fact, though, Mao Tse-tung exercised the real power in the Party 
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then, which made more acute a continuing power struggle between 
Mao and the 28 Bolsheviks. 
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Chapter XVII 
The 2 8 Bolsheviks and Their Struggle 
with Mao Tse-tung for Leadership 
of the Chinese Communist Party 
The Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CC of the CCP convened in 
Shanghai on January 13, 1931. Mif attended the meeting in person 
to give instructions.1 At the plenum, the 28 Bolsheviks won an over-
whelming victory in their political struggle. They were fighting on 
two fronts: on the one hand they wiped out the remnants of the Li 
Li-san line and invalidated the qualifications of the members elected 
to the CC at the Third Plenum, on the grounds that they belonged 
to the Li Li-san line. They also terminated the memberships of Ch'u 
Ch'iu-pai, Li Wei-han, Li Li-san, and Ho Ch'ang on the CC of the 
CCP. On the other hand, they elected Ch'en Shao-yu a member of the 
CC, a member of the Politburo, and secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial 
Committee; Shen Tse-min, a member of the CC and director of the 
Central Propaganda Department; Chang Wen-t'ien, a member of the 
CC, director of the Rural Work Department, and chairman of the 
Editorial Board of the Central Party organ; Ch'in Pang-hsien, a mem-
ber of the CC and secretary general of the CYC. Chao Yun (K'ang 
Sheng) was elected to the CC and to directorship of the Organization 
Department, and Chou En-lai was reelected to the CC and to chairman-
ship of the Military Committee, a post he continued to hold—except 
for a brief period in 1931 while he was traveling to Jui-chin from 
Shanghai, during which time Li Fu-ch'un temporarily filled the post 
—until he relinquished it to Mao at the Tsunyi Conference in January, 
1935.2 The 28 Bolsheviks truly made a splendid show. With his 
mission successfully accomplished, Mif, in a jubiliant mood, paid his 
tribute to the achievements of the Fourth Plenum by declaring: 
Owing to its conciliatory position, however, the Third Plenum of the Central 
Committee held in September, 1930, did not yet bring the Party on to a correct 
road. It was only at the Fourth Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee, held 
in January, 1931, that the political line of the Party leadership was straightened 
out. The Fourth Plenum elected a new Party leadership, exposed the anti-Leninist 
character of Li Li-san's policy and repelled the attempt of the Right opportunists 
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to impose a defeatist program of retreat upon the Party. In doing this the Fourth 
Plenum played an extremely important part in the further Bolshevization of the 
Party.3 
Mif s label of "Right opportunists" here was directed against the 
"Ho Meng-hsiung-Lo Chang-lung group," which was in fact the 
"Real Power Clique," or "Labor-Union Faction," and was against the 
Li Li-san line. But this group was criticized by the 28 Bolsheviks for 
opposing the "Left" by way of the "Right," and by Mif for imposing 
"a defeatist program of retreat upon the Party." Therefore, although 
this group triumphed over the Li Li-san line, it did not enjoy the 
fruits of its victory. None of the members of the group secured mem-
bership on the CC. Infuriated, they hoisted their own banner and on 
January 17, 1931, established their own Kiangsu Provincial Committee 
in opposition to the CCP Provincial Committee. Wang K'e-ch'uan, a 
member of the Ho Meng-hsiung group, assumed the secretariatship 
of this splinter Kiangsu Provincial Committee. But quite unexpectedly, 
on the second day of the establishment of their provincial committee, 
Ho Meng-hsiung was arrested in Shanghai. Some thirty important 
members of the Ho Meng-hsiung group were also arrested on the 
same day.4 They were executed by KMT authorities on February 7, 
1931. Although Wang K'e-ch'uan escaped safely, he later repented to 
the CC of the CCP by withdrawing from the Ho Meng-hsiung faction. 
The splinter Kiangsu Provincial Committee naturally collapsed. After 
the death of Ho Meng-hsiung, Lo Chang-lung assumed the leadership 
of the "Right" faction within the CCP in Shanghai. Under Lo's direc-
tion, a "Central Extraordinary Committee" was organized on January 
31, 1931. Sun Cheng-i, a blockheaded workman, served as its secretary 
general. The Department of Propaganda was headed by Lo Chang-
lung himself. Hsu Wei-san was appointed head of the Central Orga-
nization Department; Liu Tzu-ts'ai, chief of the Administration of the 
CC; and Li Ta-han, secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee. 
During the early period after the establishment of this Central Ex-
traordinary Committee, the faction had agencies in Chekiang, Kiangsu, 
Hupeh, Hopeh, and Manchuria, and it created the sharpest and most 
conspicuous intra-Party struggle since the establishment of the CCP. 
But this committee, like its predecessor, Ho Meng-hsiung's Kiangsu 
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Provincial Committee, was short-lived. Its leader, Lo Chang-lung, soon 
gave himself up to KMT authorities, and the committee collapsed. 
In this way the Russian Returned Student Faction took over the 
leadership of the CC of the CCP. After the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth 
CC of the Party, they emphasized that the Right opportunists con-
stituted the greatest threat to the CCP. "They sent their representatives 
to various places over the country to strive for the so-called anti-Right 
struggle."5 Not only did they want to control the CCP's organs of 
the first echelon in the KMT-controlled provinces, but they attempted 
to control every Soviet district. Under their gigantic plan they first 
made Ch'en Shao-yu head of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee, which 
was of first importance in the CCP. Yin Chien, Wang Yun-ch'eng, 
and Chu Ah-ken6 stayed in Shanghai to take part in the workers' 
movements or in the CYC. Li Yuan-chieh was assigned to work in 
Shantung; Ch'en Yuan-tao in Manchuria; Ho Tzu-shu in Hopeh. 
Wang Chia-hsiang was transferred to Jui-chin, where he became di-
rector of the Political Department of the Chinese Red Army. Ch'en 
Ch'ang-hao became political commissar of the Fourth Front Army 
under the command of General Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien in the Hupeh-
Honan-Anhwei Soviet district. Later, Shen Tse-min and his wife, 
Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, were sent there to work towards strengthening the 
Party leadership. Hsia Hsi served as representative of the CC of the 
CCP at the Hunghu-Hunan-Western Hupeh Soviet district. There 
Hsia presided over a purge of alleged A-B Corps members and Trotsky-
ites in which a shocking number of Party and CYC members were 
executed, many of whom, I understand, were innocent. I knew Hsia 
fairly well. He was an ugly, sinister-looking man who viewed events 
in a narrow, oversimplified way and who apparently saw Party enemies 
everywhere, almost as though he were the only true Bolshevik in the 
Party. After I left the Party, I heard that the CCP executed him for the 
excesses of this purge. Sung P'an-min was sent there to take charge 
of the CYC. A brilliant young man at the time, Sung was of working-
class origin—his father was a worker and he too was a worker—and 
he came from Wuhan. Sometime later in the Hunghu-Hunan-West-
ern Hupeh district, during the purge for which Hsia Hsi had chief 
responsibility, in a truly terrible search for A-B Corps people and 
Trotsky ites, Sung was executed. It is my understanding that Sung was 
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innocent of the charges leveled against him. The area belonged to the 
Second Army Corps under Ho Lung's command, and strategically it 
was of considerable importance. Ho Lung, at that time, as I under-
stand it, was rather weak intellectually and obeyed the instructions of 
Hsia Hsi. Returned students from Sun Yat-sen University who had 
been dispatched there included Wang Lan-yin (the wife of Chang 
K'uen-ti, a member of the CC of the CCP), Chuang Tung-hsiao, and 
K'ang Yun-shun. Wang Lan-yin, a native of Canton, had gone to 
Moscow early in 1927 and had studied at Sun Yat-sen University. She 
worked in the secretariat of the Sixth CCP Congress. She returned to 
China in 1928 and was assigned to work in Tientsin with her husband, 
Chang K'uen-ti. At the end of 1929 she and Chang were summoned 
back to Shanghai to work in the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. 
Chang K'uen-ti participated in the Fourth Plenum of the CC in 
January, 1931. In the summer of 1931 she and Chang K'uen-ti were 
assigned to work in Hsiang-ho-hsi, the name by which the Hunghu-
Hunan-Western Hupeh district was commonly known. Wang Lan-
yin stayed in Hsiang-ho-hsi for only about a year. She became ill there, 
and in 1932 she left Hsiang-ho-hsi and went to Shanghai. Her mother 
came from Canton to Shanghai to visit her and took her back to 
Canton. Meanwhile Wang remained in the Party; and after she had 
recuperated at Canton, she was assigned to work in Hong Kong. 
Shortly afterward, British authorities arrested her in Hong Kong and 
deported her under guard, along with a man who was arrested with 
her, on a British ship to Shanghai. It was expected that she would be 
freed upon reaching Shanghai. The CC of the CCP at Shanghai 
learned of this deportation, and its intelligence department planned to 
meet her in Shanghai. K'ang Sheng was in charge of preparations to 
meet her at the dock; but contact was not made, for apparently the 
British had informally notified KMT secret agents of her arrival. 
Just as the ship entered the mouth of the Wusoong, KMT agents 
boarded the ship and seized her. Her fellow deportee escaped by leap-
ing overboard and swimming away. And while this was happening, 
CCP agents waited at the dock. She never landed. Presumably armed 
CCP agents on the dock could have started a serious fight. And so 
she was kept aboard and the KMT agents accompanied her back to 
Hong Kong when the ship made its return trip. When she arrived 
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back in Hong Kong, the British immediately deported her to Canton, 
where, at the end of 1932, after a brief period of interrogation, KMT 
agents executed her. Chuang Tung-hsiao, another woman who was 
sent to the Hunghu-Hunan-Western Hupeh district, had studied at 
Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in 1925 and was a member of its 
first graduating class. Her husband, P'an Chia-ch'en, was an inter-
preter at Sun Yat-sen University. Both of them returned to China in 
1927, where P'an served as a translator for the CC. In 1928 they both 
went to Russia to serve as interpreters for the Sixth CCP Congress. 
After the congress they entered the Lenin School in Moscow, an in-
stitution for foreign Communists, to take advanced study. In 1931 they 
returned to China, where they were assigned to Hsiang-ho-hsi. In 
1932 Chuang returned to Shanghai, where she was reassigned to work 
in Manchuria, and there my knowledge of her activities ends. K'ang 
Yun-shun, the other person mentioned above as having been sent to 
Hsiang-ho-hsi, joined the CCP in Paris, where, I think, he was a 
worker; and he went to Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow from 
France. He was a big fellow. I understand that K'ang Yun-shun was 
executed in the above-mentioned purge that claimed Sung P'an-min 
and so many others. The CC of the CCP especially appointed Kuan 
Hsiang-ying to be Political Commissar to the Second Army Corps. 
Kuan Hsiang-ying, who was just as much a Party veteran as Hsia Hsi, 
of course was administratively below Hsia Hsi. As I understand it, 
Kuan Hsiang-ying counseled moderation in the purge mentioned 
above, but his counsel was ignored by Hsia Hsi. Wang Lan-yin, 
Chuang Tung-hsiao, K'ang Yun-shun, and Kuan Hsiang-ying did 
not belong to the group called the 28 Bolsheviks, but they were devout 
supporters of the new CC, which was dominated by the 28 Bolsheviks. 
Kuan Hsiang-ying was a graduate of KUTV in Moscow. Another re-
turned lady student from Sun Yat-sen University, Li Han-fu, was sent 
to work in the Northeastern Kiangsi Soviet District. 
When in 1932 the CC of the CCP made its decision to move to 
Jui-chin in Kiangsi, it sent Yang Shang-k'uen, one of the 28 Bolsheviks, 
to the Central Soviet district to make preliminary preparations. The 
Central Soviet district in Kiangsi was the largest and the most promis-
ing of the Chinese Soviet districts. It naturally became the first target 
for the 28 Bolsheviks to conquer. Mao Tse-tung, who was in possession 
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of a large army, was their first rival. Although Mao was far away in 
Kiangsi when the 28 Bolsheviks took over the CC in Shanghai, he was 
no less interested in the leadership of the CC of the CCP after the 
Fourth Plenum. He seemed to have already foreseen the inevitability 
of a violent and long power struggle between himself and the returned 
Bolsheviks. This struggle, which started at the Fourth Plenum, was 
not fully exposed until after all members of the CC of the CCP had 
arrived at Jui-chin from Shanghai around November and December, 
1932. Then the 28 Bolsheviks faction, led by Ch'in Pang-hsien, and 
Mao Tse-tung headed for a direct confrontation in their power struggle. 
The situation inside the CCP at that time was as follows: First, the 
situation in Shanghai, the seat of the CC of the CCP, had deteriorated. 
Not long after the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CC, Ku Shun-chang, 
head of the CCP's intelligence networks, was arrested in the Wuhan 
cities, to which he had just escorted Chang Kuo-t'ao, who was on his 
way to the Hupei-Honan-Anhwei Soviet. Ku's arrest was accidental, 
K'ang Sheng later told me. Two days before his arrest, the garrison 
headquarters at Wuhan captured a Communist, whom they threatened 
with death unless he disclosed a secret CCP agent or agency in Wuhan. 
But any underground CCP addresses that the poor man might have 
supplied had been changed as soon as he was arrested. So, in hope that 
he might by chance encounter some of his colleagues, the garrison au-
thorities took him walking through the streets of Hankow. They met 
Ku on one of those streets. The prisoner immediately identified Ku as 
a Communist, and the garrison officials arrested Ku on the spot. That 
happened sometime in April, 1931. Ku had joined the CCP in 1924. 
He had long been a member of the CC, and Chou En-lai considered 
Ku to be one of his most capable assistants. Ku was in charge of the In-
telligence Department of the CCP in Shanghai. His long-time mem-
bership in Shanghai's leading secret society had been most useful to 
the Party, moreover, and he had managed to become an influential 
member of the Shanghai Municipal Police Department, too. Ku's 
spendthrift private life and conduct, which he carried on behind Chou 
En-lai's back, had become notorious; and Chou was criticized by other 
members of the CC for overlooking Ku's extravagance. Chou En-lai 
privately complained, I was told, that Ku was as hard to control as an 
unbridled wild horse. In any event, after his arrest, Ku immediately 
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capitulated to the KMT authorities, who sent him to Shanghai by 
special plane in the hopes that he could direct the simultaneous destruc-
tion of all secret CCP institutions there. But a secret CCP agency in 
Wuhan had reported Ku's arrest to Shanghai headquarters before the 
KMT could take any action. However, as a participant in the under-
world of Shanghai's secret societies, Ku nevertheless helped the KMT 
to raid many CCP secret organizations. His greatest "contribution" to 
the KMT was the capture on June 22, 1931, of Hsiang Chung-fa, sec-
retary general of the CC of the CCP, who was shot two days later in 
prison. Furthermore, on June 15, the Pacific Secretariat of the Profin-
tern had been raided. Its director, who used the name Noulens, and 
others were imprisoned. The case made international headlines. In-
deed, a succession of devastating raids on secret CCP institutions in 
Shanghai caused panic to, and shattered the morale of, higher-echelon 
CCP members. 
Ch'en Shao-yu was hastily elected secretary general of the CC to 
fill the vacancy left by Hsiang Chung-fa. Before Ch'en's promotion, 
he was secretary of the CCFs Kiangsu Provincial Committee, which 
directed Party work in the Shanghai area. The duties of this position 
left Ch'en constantly open to the threat of arrest. He was not so much 
threatened by KMT agents who might have infiltrated his Kiangsu 
Provincial Committee, for it seems to me that the KMT rarely was 
successful in infiltrating CCP organizations at the provincial level or 
higher. But KMT agents were quite successful in Shanghai at in-
filtrating CCP organizations below the level of the Provincial Commit-
tee; and Ch'en Shao-yu, as secretary of the CCP's Kiangsu Committee, 
had had to maintain constant contact with Party organizations at 
lower levels, any one of which might have been infiltrated by KMT 
agents. Ch'en had initially sought the leadership of the Kiangsu 
Provincial Committee when it was not such a risky job to hold; but by 
the time he actually got the position, it had become a most dangerous 
one, and he lived, with good reason, in constant terror. But his sudden 
promotion, although it diminished the danger to him, did not in any 
means lessen his fear. He seldom appeared at meetings of the CC. 
Like a bird frightened by the hunter's arrow, Ch'en dared not live 
in a hotel or an apartment or even in a secluded private house. After 
lengthy deliberation he decided to move into a sanitarium located in 
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the outskirts of Shanghai. He appointed K'ang Sheng to make the 
arrangements for him. Another member of the CC, Ch'en Yun, also 
became his aide-de-camp, since Ch'en Yun had been reassigned to 
directorship of the Intelligence Department of the CCP after Ku 
Shun-chang's arrest at Hankow in April, 1931. In this capacity Ch'en 
Yun had to obey Ch'en Shao-yu's commands. Ch'en Shao-yu and his 
attractive wife, Meng Ch'in-shu, soon moved into the sanitarium. 
For the sake of their safety, the Ch'en Shao-yu's wanted to rent a 
whole floor. They asked K'ang Sheng and Ch'en Yun to consult in 
this matter with the sanitarium authorities. Despite K'ang's and 
Ch'en's advice that this would only arouse suspicion and endanger 
their safety, Ch'en Shao-yu still insisted upon having his way. K'ang 
and Ch'en reluctantly rented a whole floor of the sanitarium. The 
rent, which was considerable, was paid by the CC of the CCP. After 
moving into the sanitarium, the Ch'ens never stepped through their 
door and virtually became hermits. Ch'en Shao-yu entrusted all 
matters, important or otherwise, to K'ang Sheng and Ch'en Yun. 
Without capable leadership, the work of the CCP was in fact almost 
suspended. The hermitry of the Ch'ens lasted until July or August, 
1931. Sometime in July an agency for the CCP Propaganda Depart-
ment and a secret printing house in Shanghai were raided. Some 
twenty-three important figures in the Propaganda Department, in-
cluding Lo Yi-yuan and Yang P'ao-an, were arrested. Afraid to stay 
in Shanghai any longer, Ch'en Shao-yu resigned as secretary general 
of the CC in July or August, 1931. Assigned to the post of CCP 
representative to the Comintern, Ch'en Shao-yu returned to Moscow, 
where he stayed until 1937, at which time he went to Yenan. 
Ch'en Shao-yu tried to return to China between the latter part of 
1933 and the spring of 1934. In the latter part of 1933 the Shanghai 
bureau of the CC of the CCP, of which I was a member, received in-
structions from the Comintern to make arrangements for getting Ch'en 
Shao-yu to Jui-chin, Kiangsi Province. The instruction said that Ch'en 
would arrive in Hong Kong via Europe, and that he was to be con-
ducted from Hong Kong to Jui-chin. Upon receiving the Comintern's 
instruction, the Shanghai bureau made two attempts to send personnel 
to Hong Kong to make arrangements, but failed. Once the man who 
was dispatched to make the arrangements was quickly arrested. The 
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next time, Li Chin-yung, who was director of an underground radio 
station and a former Sun Yat-sen University student who had had 
special radio training in Moscow, received the instruction about Ch'en 
Shao-yu from the Comintern, and he was arrested. In both cases, of 
course, security was compromised. Further attempts to get Ch'en to 
Jui-chin seemed just too risky, and so Ch'en stayed in Moscow for 
another four years. He did not reach China until 1937, when he went 
to Yenan. 
Ch'en Shao-yu exiled himself to Moscow, still entertaining, no 
doubt, the illusion that in due time he would be invited to become 
the helmsman of the Chinese revolution, as Lenin returned to Russia 
in April, 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution. But Ch'en over-
looked the possibility that "When the sun rises, there comes a Mao 
Tse-tung out of the east!" After having remained safely abroad and 
then having returned when it was safe to do so, he was confronted by 
the fact that Mao had recruited a strong crew both in the Party and 
the Army, and that Mao had already made himself known to the 
world. Indeed, Mao had seized Party leadership, and Ch'en had 
returned too late to effectively dispute that leadership. Ch'en's failure 
and defeat were the outcome of his own cowardice and opportunism.* 
When Ch'en Shao-yu left Shanghai sometime in July or August, 
1931, Lu Fu-t'an, a member of the Central Politburo, became acting 
secretary general of the CC. Lu, a mine worker by profession, joined 
the Party in 1926. He had, among other things, been secretary of the 
CCP's Tsingtao Municipal Committee, of the Shantung Provincial 
Committee, and secretary of the CCP faction in the All-China Trade 
Union. Though a veteran Communist, his capabilities as acting sec-
retary general of the CC left much to be desired. He was soon re-
placed, on September 1, 1931, by Ch'in Pang-hsien, a member of the 
CC and secretary general of the CYC, who now relinquished his CYC 
* One account of the relations between Mao Tse-tung and Ch'en Shao-yu in the early 
1930s has it that Mao, in an effort to curb Chou En-lai's power, tricked Ch'en Shao-yu into 
going to the Kiangsi Soviet, where Mao placed him under house arrest. It was only as 
a result of intervention by the Comintern representative, so this account goes, that Mao 
eventually released Ch'en, after which Ch'en went to Moscow. (See Wu Hsiang-hsiang, ed., 
Chung-kuo Kung-cti an-tang chih-t'u shih [A penetrating look at the Chinese Communist 
Par ty] , p . 158). 
This account obviously dramatizes the power struggle within the CCP. To my certain 
knowledge, however, Ch'en Shao-yu did not at any time visit the Kiangsi Soviet. The 
account, therefore, strikes me as wholly inaccurate. 
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post to become secretary general of the Party. That date marked the 
beginning of Ch'in's reign of three years and three months. At the 
time of Ch'in's assumption of his new position, the CC was in a sad 
state of disorganization: some members had been arrested, some had 
been dispatched to various Soviet districts, and some, like Ch'en Shao-
yu, had left the country. Not enough CC members were in Shanghai 
to form a quorum; so to cope with this dismal situation, the CC re-
cruited a few additional functionaries, who were not members of the 
CC. For longer than the past twenty years Chinese Communist publica-
tions have referred to this organization as a "provisional" CC. During 
the period of its control, however, it was not, so far as I can recall, 
referred to as a provisional body; nor did it issue documents as a 
provisional body. It was regarded as, and regarded itself as, the CC. 
Indeed, the Comintern acknowledged it as the CC. The label of 
"provisional" seems to have been appended by Mao Tse-tung as part 
of an effort to belittle the influence of the 28 Bolsheviks. But to my 
knowledge, in addition to Ch'in Pang-hsien, only Chang Wen-t'ien, 
K'ang Sheng (whose real name was Chang Yun, later changed to 
Chao Yung, and finally to K'ang Sheng), and Ch'en Yun came reg-
ularly to Committee headquarters to take care of Party affairs. Huang 
Wei-yung, who adopted the pseudonym Ah Chiang, was the tem-
porary chief-of-staff of the CC. It is unlikely that the local committees 
in the provinces were in better shape than the CC. 
This was the dreary state of the CCP's organizational affairs after 
the Fourth Plenum. It was the result of the "White terror" from 
outside and an "intra-Party struggle" which split the Party. 
However, the 28 Bolsheviks did not cease their struggle against 
the "Right" opportunism within the Party after the Fourth Plenum. 
Mao Tse-tung and his crew were not satisfied with the policy of the CC 
controlled by the 28 Bolsheviks, and Mao's and his people's evaluation 
of the Fourth Plenum was entirely different from Mif's. At that time 
—from January, 1931, to early 1933—it was not possible for the 28 
Bolsheviks to launch a nationwide attack on Mao Tse-tung by name; 
but attacks aimed at Mao were nevertheless carried on. For example, 
the CC resolution of May 9,1931, proclaimed the "Right" line to be the 
principal danger in the Party.7 The so-called Rich Peasant line men-
tioned in the resolution was aimed at the Central Soviet Area in 
248 
Kiangsi Province and at Mao Tse-tung. It was this CC position that 
Mao stigmatized as demonstrating "that the new 'Left' line was already 
being concretely applied and developed in practical work."8 The resolu-
tion was a prelude to the forthcoming open power struggle between the 
28 Bolsheviks and Mao Tse-tung. 
On September 1,1931, moreover, the 28 Bolsheviks again challenged 
Mao Tse-tung in "A Letter of Instruction from the Central to the 
Soviet Areas."9 This instruction was issued as a circular to all Soviet 
districts, but it actually attacked the Central Soviet area, which was 
under the direct control of Mao Tse-tung. The letter pointed out that 
the main problems in the Central Soviet Area were that a clearly 
defined class line did not exist and that work among the masses was 
insufficiently advanced, both of which sprang from the influence of the 
Li Li-san line. The grievous errors of Party and government leader-
ship in the Soviet areas, which were mentioned in the instruction, in-
cluded a list of serious strategic errors, particularly in the Central 
Soviet Area. For example, concerning the Red Army and the Soviet 
areas, the instruction pointed out the absence of well established, secure 
headquarters and insisted that it was necessary to liberate and occupy 
one or more of the larger cities and to use them as headquarters. In 
regard to the policy toward rich peasants, the letter objected to the 
distribution of fertile land to rich peasants. It also attacked the Red 
Army for unwisely engaging exclusively in guerrilla warfare and 
emphasized that its structure was unsuited to the large-scale warfare 
that could be expected. Although he far from accepted the instructions 
from the CC, Mao did not make immediate counterattacks. For the 
CC of the CCP was then in Shanghai, too far away to make it necessary 
for Mao to take its instructions altogether seriously. Moreover, Mao's 
position in the Party at that time did not allow him to have a direct 
confrontation with the 28 Bolsheviks. Mao knew that he had to 
tolerate them because of their powerful position in the Party. But as 
soon as the CC of the CCP moved to Jui-chin, starting around Novem-
ber of 1932 through early 1933, the situation changed. Then the power 
struggle between Mao and the 28 Bolsheviks headed by Ch'in Pang-
hsien entered a new phase. 
This raises the issue of when the CC moved to Jui-chin. An official 
Chinese Communist source gives the date of this move as early 1933,10 
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Other sources have given conflicting and confusing dates.11 My own 
information about the CC's move to Jui-chin, in addition to my own 
knowledge of the events, comes from discussing it with Ch'ing Man-
yun, who was a functionary in the CC from 1931 through the mid 
1930s. In the autumn of 1931 a few individual members of the CC, 
such as Chou En-lai, left Shanghai for Jui-chin. Teng Ying-ch'ao, 
Chou En-lai's wife, and her mother joined Chou at Jui-chin in the 
spring of 1932. Before Teng's departure for Jui-chin, she arranged 
personally with Ch'ing Man-yun to communicate with her by a 
secret code of their own. The bulk of the CC of the CCP began to 
move to Jui-chin more than a year after Chou En-lai's departure from 
Shanghai. From late 1932 through early 1933, these CC members and 
their staffs trickled into Jui-chin. The official CCP version, insofar as 
it designates the date by which the CC had arrived at Jui-chin, is 
therefore correct. 
Before the CC had finished moving to Jui-chin, it had decided to 
establish a bureau of the CC in Shanghai. The CC members who 
stayed in Shanghai to work in this Shanghai bureau were K'ang Sheng 
and Li Chou-sheng, who was one of the 28 Bolsheviks. Others who 
stayed in Shanghai to work in the Shanghai bureau, but who were not 
CC members, included Huang Wei-yung, better known as Ah Chiang, 
his pseudonym, and another returned student from Moscow's Sun 
Yat-sen University, Huang Wen-chieh. I joined the Shanghai bureau 
as chief of its Propaganda Department upon my arrival in Shanghai 
from Russia in January, 1933. K'ang Sheng, who had been in Shanghai 
for many years and was a figure known to too many people for his own 
safety, soon left for Moscow with his wife, Ts'ao Shu-ying, to replace 
Ch'en Shao-yu as the CCP representative to the Comintern. As has 
already been mentioned, though, Ch'en did not return to China as 
planned; so he remained in Moscow as head of the CCP delegation to 
the Comintern, while K'ang Sheng stayed in Moscow as a member 
of that delegation. Ts'ao Shu-ying was the real name of K'ang's wife, 
although in the CCP she used the name Ts'ao I-ou. She was a native 
of Shantung Province and had graduated from the Shantung Girls 
School at Tsinan in Shantung Province. She then entered Shanghai 
University, where K'ang Sheng was studying at about the same time 
and where I would guess that the two met. When I arrived in Shanghai 
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in early 1933, Ch'in Pang-hsien and others had just left for Jui-chin, 
and probably the Shanghai bureau of the CC was established shortly 
before my arrival. 
The move of the CC of the CCP to Kiangsi is an important event 
in its history. It marked a new phase in the power struggle between 
Mao Tse-tung and the 28 Bolsheviks. Viewed from one angle, the 
move of the CC of the CCP to Jui-chin somewhat weakened Mao's 
leadership in the Central Soviet area and placed him temporarily in 
an unfavorable position. But viewed from another angle, the move of 
the CC of the CCP from the largest city in China to an isolated area in 
inland China meant that the CC could not root its support in a workers' 
movement and therefore had to rely on the support of the armed forces 
led by Mao. Generally speaking, armed force is the most vital instru-
ment needed to establish or overthrow a regime. Without direct control 
of the armed forces, Ch'in Pang-hsien and his faction were helpless to 
oppose the rising power of Mao Tse-tung, who finally defeated them. 
Soon after Ch'in Pang-hsien and his crew arrived at Jui-chin in 
early 1933, they launched a campaign against Right opportunism. 
Ch'in and Chang Wen-t'ien wrote and published many articles in the 
Jui-chin journal Struggle, in which they attacked Right opportunism 
in general and the Lo Min line in particular.12 At the same time Ch'in 
Pang-hsien repeatedly appealed at Party meetings for the rectification 
of Right opportunism and the Lo Min line. It should be noted that 
the struggle against the Lo Min line in the Kiangsi Soviet area, which 
Ch'in Pang-hsien and Chang Wen-t'ien vigorously launched, was actu-
ally aimed at Mao Tse-tung. Indeed, most of Mao's close associates at 
that time, such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Mao Tse-t'an, Ku Po, Hsieh Wei-
chin, T'an Cheng-lin, Hsiao Ching-kuang, Ho Shu-heng, Teng Tzu-hui, 
and Lu Ting-i, came under fire and were subjected to various forms of 
disciplinary action. Some were formally tried in special courts. Thus 
the political threats and pressures directed at Mao Tse-tung became 
progressively heavier. 
In 1933 Chiang Kai-shek gathered some one million troops to 
launch his "Fifth Encirclement Campaign" against all of the Soviet 
districts. But against this overwhelming enemy superiority, the CCP 
showed not unity but dissension and confusion. How to defeat the 
Fifth Encirclement Campaign became the main point of the vigorous 
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debate between Mao Tse-tung and the so-called Third Left Line under 
the leadership of Ch'in Pang-hsien. In reality, beneath the surface of 
that debate lies the power struggle of Mao Tse-tung and the 28 
Bolsheviks. 
Mao Tse-tung's condemnation of the so-called Third Left Line 
may be seen in the following excerpt from his own account of it: 
The period from the establishment of the provisional central leadership headed 
by Comrade Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku) in September 1931 to the Tsunyi Meeting 
in January 1935 was one of continued development of the third "Left" line. . . . 
The Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, convened by the 
provisional central leadership in January 1934, marked the peak of the develop-
ment of the third "Left" line. . . . the Fifth Plenary Session blindly concluded 
that . . . the struggle against the fifth "encirclement and suppression" was a 
"struggle for the complete victory of the Chinese revolution" 
In the revolutionary base areas the most disastrous consequence of the third 
"Left" line was the failure of the campaign against the fifth "encirclement and 
suppression" in the area where the central leading body was located and the 
withdrawal from there of the main forces of the Red Army. In the military 
operations during the withdrawal from Kiangsi and on the Long March, a differ-
ent error, the error of flightism, was committed under the "Left" line, causing 
further losses to the Red Army.13 
The controversy between Mao Tse-tung and Ch'in Pang-hsien and 
Ch'in's supporters regarding the strategy for coping with the Fifth 
Encirclement Campaign of Chiang Kai-shek was a ferocious one. As 
a member of the Shanghai bureau of the CC at the time, I was to some 
extent involved in this controversy and had particular knowledge of 
certain aspects of it. 
Mao Tse-tung had the accumulated experience of having broken 
through four of Chiang Kai-shek's previous encirclements, and it was 
natural for him not to pay much attention to the unrealistic slogans 
of Ch'in Pang-hsien. Ch'in and his followers thus sought the support 
of the Comintern military adviser to strengthen their pressure against 
Mao Tse-tung. This military adviser, Albert List, and a political ad-
viser from the Comintern then stayed in Shanghai. Both were German 
Communists. When I arrived in Shanghai, they were already there. 
They used to confer with the other members of the Shanghai bureau 
and me once or twice a week. At these meetings we usually gave them 
radio communications concerning military matters which we had 
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received from Jui-chin.14 Upon receiving these messages from Jui-chin, 
List invariably wrote out a reply on the spot, which we then transmitted 
to Jui-chin using the Shanghai bureau's underground transmitter. 
In the summer of 1933, the Shanghai bureau of the CC received 
orders from the Comintern, assigning this young German military 
representative to Jui-chin, where he could make his advice available 
on the spot and thus avoid the misunderstandings and misjudgments 
inherent in being in Shanghai, remote from the battles. The Shanghai 
bureau promptly arranged a safe route for him. Its department which 
handled the network of underground communications beyond Shang-
hai supplied escorts who saw to it that List got safely to Jui-chin. In 
Shanghai he had known Ch'in Pang-hsien and other members of the 
CC; and when he arrived at Jui-chin, he worked with the CC. When 
the controversy between Ch'in and Mao occurred, he stood on Ch'in's 
side in opposition to Mao. But Mao had the stubborn temperament 
characteristic of the Hunanese, and he would not bow to Ch'in and 
his supporters. So Ch'in Pang-hsien, confident of Comintern support, 
sent a message to the Comintern in his capacity as secretary general of 
the CC, in which he outlined the main points of the controversy. This 
message to the Comintern was sent to the Shanghai bureau, and we 
transmitted it to the Comintern on the bureau's underground radio. 
After reading the text of the message and before it was transmitted 
to Moscow, another colleague and I in the Shanghai bureau discussed 
it with a newly arrived Russian who was the senior military representa-
tive in China from the Comintern. This senior military representative 
had been a brigade commander during the civil war that followed the 
October Revolution in Russia and had had practical experience in 
guerrilla warfare. He was a very learned man in the field of military 
affairs. At our meeting we handed him a copy of Ch'in's message and 
asked him to express his personal opinion of it. He said that it was 
unwise for the German military representative in Jui-chin to involve 
himself in the controversy by standing on Ch'in Pang-hsien's side, for 
his position should be strictly objective and his work should reconcile 
the diverse opinions of both sides. He thought that Mao Tse-tung's 
views on military affairs should be respected on account of Mao's 
military experience and his encyclopedic knowledge of the geography 
of the area, and that political issues should not be allowed to interfere 
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with military decisions. Since the lack of an air force and of sufficient 
heavy arms in the Red Army limited its ability to counterattack the 
huge, well-armed force that Chiang Kai-shek had mobilized against it, 
he agreed with Mao Tse-tung that a strategy of breaking through the 
penetration should be adopted as had been the case in the past four 
encirclements. He also said that on the battlefield, military decisions 
must be made in response to rapidly changing situations and not 
necessarily in response to political resolutions. He also pointed out that 
it would be inappropriate for Moscow to judge the situation in Kiangsi 
from a single message such as that from Ch'in Pang-hsien. Since the 
war in Kiangsi was in a crucial stage, as soon as we had relayed Ch'in 
Pang-hsien's message to Moscow, he transmitted to Moscow, on an 
underground Shanghai radio that his organization controlled, a mes-
sage of his own, in which I assume that he stated essentially the views 
that he had expressed to me. I also assume that, as the senior Comintern 
military representative in China, his message was intended to advise 
the Comintern on how to reply to Ch'in Pang-hsien's communication. 
In any event, he urged that Moscow reply immediately to the CC of 
the CCP. 
As I recall, another member of the Shanghai bureau and I sent a 
message to Ch'in a few days after Lunar New Year's Day, 1934. Since 
our message contained the views of the senior Comintern military man 
in China, we expected that he would carefully consider it. But instead 
he reacted with a furious reply, sent the same day he received our 
message, in which he told us to keep hands off military affairs in the 
Soviet areas and reminded us that the Shanghai bureau was supposed 
to direct CCP work only in the KMT-controlled areas. Ch'in's arro-
gance made us sick! Two days later we received the Comintern's reply 
to Ch'in's message. Not unexpectedly, the Comintern did not support 
Ch'in Pang-hsien; it took a stand against neither party in the dispute. 
Its instruction was to advise both parties to work out together a better 
defense plan. It also insisted that the Comintern, which was thousands 
of miles away, had no intention of curtailing the activities of com-
manders in the field by insisting that its instructions be followed to 
the letter. The Comintern, it said, could only offer guiding principles 
for the CC to consider. Details of the text, after the lapse of more than 
thirty years, are fuzzy in my mind, but its main points were roughly 
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as follows: (1) The Central Soviet area, as the headquarters of the 
Soviet movement in China, should be defended. However, in view of 
the overwhelmingly strong power of the enemy's forces, the Red 
Army should adopt a flexible strategy which would enable it to choose 
wisely between defending its headquarters and preserving its military 
strength. (2) The Red Army should take contingency measures for 
withdrawal in order to avoid the possibility of being totally annihilated 
while trying to defend its headquarters. (3) The Comintern suggested 
that one-third of the Red Army be dispersed around the Central 
Soviet base and its surrounding areas to conduct guerrilla warfare 
aimed at fragmenting the military strength of the attacking enemy; 
should the main force of the Red Army and the various Party and 
government organizations have to withdraw, this would hamper the 
enemy's pursuit. (4) To minimize losses in case of withdrawal, it ad-
vised selecting a spot in the enemy's line which was poorly defended 
as a possible break-through point. (5) In order to fragment the 
strength of the enemy's pursuing forces, the Comintern suggested that 
Red Army troops in other Soviet districts, together with scattered 
guerrilla forces, should harass the enemy by surprise attacks. The 
Comintern made no suggestion with regard to the place that the Red 
Army should go to in case of retreat. 
Although the Comintern's message avoided giving rigid instruc-
tions, its main emphasis obviously was on maintaining the Red Army's 
military strength, not on the blind defense of its headquarters. The 
spirit of the message complied with an old Chinese saying: "As long 
as the green mountains remain, one does not need to worry about 
lacking firewood." The Comintern message noted that the very vast-
ness of China made it impossible for the KMT to assert its authority 
over every part of the country, and that it would not be difficult to 
establish new base areas where the Party's military strength could be 
preserved. 
The total strength of the Red Army in the Central Soviet area in 
Kiangsi was less than one hundred thousand, while Chiang Kai-shek's 
troops that were attacking the Central Soviet area alone numbered 
about half a million. As to equipment, the Red Army could in no 
way be compared with Chiang's army. Nevertheless, the "Fifth En-
circlement Campaign" lasted almost one whole year, which is an 
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indication of the stubborn resistance that the Red Army put up against 
Chiang. Nevertheless, when the military situation deteriorated in 
October, 1934, the Chinese Communists had no choice but to give up 
their headquarters in the Central Soviet area and to start out on their 
famous Long March of twenty-five thousand li (a little more than 
8,000 miles). During this retreat many Communists died or ran away. 
Not until after they had crossed the Wu River and had occupied 
Tsunyi, Kweichow, were they able to chance a brief rest in January, 
1935. At that time, morale in the Party and the Red Army was low. 
At an enlarged conference of the Central Politburo held that 
January in Tsunyi, which is historically known as the famous "Tsunyi 
Conference," Mao blamed Ch'in Pang-hsien, quite rightly, it seems to 
me, for the reverses that the Party and the Army had suffered. Ch'in 
had energetically opposed placing primary emphasis upon guerrilla 
warfare and had put forward his military slogan "The Red Army 
must firmly hold its positions in the encirclement campaign and not 
yield one inch of Red territory to the enemy." Apparently Mao rallied 
a majority around his own position, for official Party history credits 
this meeting with having "inaugurated a new central leadership, 
headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung."15 Ch'in Pang-hsien, demagogically 
stubborn, not only infuriated most of the leaders at the conference, 
but was apparently not even able to win the support of all of the 28 
Bolsheviks who were there. Such important figures among the 28 
Bolsheviks as Chang Wen-t'ien, who had long harbored grudges 
against him, apparently backed Mao at Tsunyi. Thus, by uniting with 
Chang Wen-t'ien and by gaining the support of other leaders, Mao 
Tse-tung finally defeated Ch'in Pang-hsien. But while Mao may have 
held the real power, nominally he was not the Party's leader. Ch'in 
Pang-hsien was relieved of the post of secretary general, but Chang 
Wen-t'ien became the new secretary general. This strongly suggests that 
Chang Wen-t'ien was on good terms with Mao Tse-tung. It also is a 
sure indication that the 28 Bolsheviks were not, for the time being, 
a unified power. 
Mao Tse-tung established his de facto leadership of the Party at the 
Tsunyi Conference, but, for the time being, he let Chang Wen-t'ien 
hold the coveted position of secretary general. Why ? 
To begin with, Mao Tse-tung must have been fully aware that 
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Chang Wen-t'ien, a man of literary bent and a man of prudence and 
amiable disposition, was not at heart a political creature. He was 
therefore an ideal choice to nominally head the Party during the period 
of transition from Ch'in Pang-hsien's leadership until Mao felt able 
to formally proclaim his own leadership. 
Then, too, Ch'en Shao-yu, who, after a seven-years' sojourn in 
Moscow, had attained a considerable international reputation and the 
support of the Russian Communist leaders, still remained an im-
portant potential political rival to Mao Tse-tung. Besides, the 28 
Bolsheviks still exercised a considerable influence in the Party. Some 
of them were members of the CC of the CCP, while others were 
members of the powerful Central Politburo as well. In order to 
maintain a friendly relationship with the Comintern and the CPSU, 
while consolidating his own leadership in the Party, Mao Tse-tung 
did not want to undertake drastic measures against the 28 Bolsheviks, 
which might have alienated the Comintern and the Russians. Further-
more, an open assault on the 28 Bolsheviks might have offered an op-
portunity to the anti-Mao faction headed by Chang Kuo-t'ao, Mao's 
old rival, to form a united front against him with the 28 Bolsheviks. 
History proved the correctness of Mao's strategy. The 28 Bolsheviks, 
really, were no more than a handful of intellectuals who were better 
at writing articles and slogan-shouting than at practical work. Their 
threat to Mao Tse-tung was far less than the threat of Chang Kuo-t'ao, 
who was backed by troops. When the Red Army headed by Mao 
Tse-tung and the Fourth Front Army commanded by Chang Kuo-t'ao 
met at Mao-kung in western Szechwan Province on June 16, 1935, 
they both proceeded to move northward. But when they reached 
Mao-er-kai, southwest of Sung-pan, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Mao Tse-
tung had a serious dispute. Mao wanted to continue their march north-
ward, but Chang wanted to move westward. To dramatize his opposi-
tion to Mao, Chang formed a rival CC of the Party. As one Communist 
historian put it: 
A serious dispute thus arose between him [Chang Kuo-t'ao] and the CC of the 
Party. The CC held that the Red Army should march north and open up a base 
in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia area to coordinate with the daily growing nationwide 
anti-Japanese movement. But Chang Kuo-t'ao opposed this policy and advocated 
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instead the defeatist line of withdrawing to the areas of national minorities in 
Sikang and Tibet.16 
Although Chang later reluctantly followed Mao's policy, he never 
wanted to be under Mao's thumb. And it was precisely the deep-
rooted struggle between Mao and Chang that prevented Mao from 
taking severe measures against the 28 Bolsheviks, because of his fear 
that Chang might make common cause with the 28 Bolsheviks against 
him. For Chang had already won Ch'en Ch'ang-hao, one of the 28 
Bolsheviks, to his side. Although he relieved Ch'in Pang-hsien as 
secretary general of the CC of the CCP, it was politically prudent for 
Mao Tse-tung to show his magnanimity to the 28 Bolsheviks as a 
group. He waited another whole decade before he proclaimed the total 
defeat of Ch'en Shao-yu and his faction. 
At the beginning of 1937, Ch'en Shao-yu returned home. No doubt 
in his own mind it was a triumphal return. Both he and the Russians 
probably expected that he would lead the Party in its United Front 
policy against Japan and, in the process, would presumably regain the 
secretary generalship of the CC. He was a conceited man. When he 
arrived at Yenan, Ch'en started to work to build his influence within 
the Party. Seeing Ch'en's unquenchable ambition, Mao Tse-tung 
adroitly managed to have Ch'en and others sent to Wuhan and later 
to Chungking to serve as CCP representatives in conferring with the 
KMT on matters with regard to relations between the two political 
parties in strengthening the Anti-Japanese National United Front. 
Mao's sending Ch'en away from Yenan removed a strong political 
rival from the Party headquarters temporarily. It also suggested that 
Mao was keenly aware of Ch'en's international prestige. Chang Kuo-
t'ao's threat to him had by then been removed, but Mao Tse-tung must 
have felt that he had to be particularly ingenious in moving against 
Ch'en. A covert power struggle between Mao and Ch'en thus ensued. 
This power struggle can be characterized from Mao's standpoint by 
a Chinese Communist Party historian thus: 
But in 1937 after the Anti-Japanese National United Front was formed, some 
comrades who had committed "Left" opportunist mistakes, as represented by 
Comrade Chen Shao-yu, began to commit Right opportunist mistakes instead. 
These Right opportunist mistakes were the main danger at that time because 
they hindered the Party from struggling against reactionary forces and reactionary 
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trends in the united front and exposed the proletariat to the danger of losing its 
independence.17 
Ch'en Shao-yu and other prominent figures of the 28 Bolsheviks had 
been characterized by Mao Tse-tung and his crew as being "Left" 
opportunists from the time of the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CC of 
the CCP to the Tsunyi Conference in January, 1935. Now Ch'en was 
condemned as a "Right" opportunist on the issue of the united front! 
Yet indications are, so far as their published positions at the time are 
concerned, that Mao and Ch'en Shao-yu had few if any disagreements 
over the nature of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.18 And 
when in October, 1938, the CC at an enlarged plenum passed a 
resolution on the united front, both Ch'en Shao-yu, if my memory 
serves me correctly, and Mao Tse-tung were members of that Politburo; 
and while Chinese Communist historians tend to state that "Right 
opportunist mistakes" with regard to the united front were evaluated 
at this meeting, they do not state that there was a policy disagree-
ment at the meetings.19 
I have no intention here of defending Ch'en Shao-yu. I only want 
to point out that Chinese Communist official history is written strictly 
according to the "Resolution on Some Historical Problems,"20 which 
apparently was drafted by Mao and passed by the CC under the leader-
ship of Mao Tse-tung, by which time Mao had openly asserted his 
superiority over Ch'en Shao-yu and the 28 Bolsheviks and was pre-
pared to disparage all of their activities. This resolution enabled Mao 
Tse-tung and his followers to vindicate themselves and revenge the 
wrongs done them by the 28 Bolsheviks while they were in power. 
The resolution is an important document in the power struggle be-
tween Mao and the 28 Bolsheviks. Furthermore, it contains a good 
deal of indirect evidence of dissension between Russian leaders and 
the Comintern, on the one hand, and Mao Tse-tung, on the other. 
The Comintern hailed the Fourth Plenum of the CC of the CCP 
as a milestone in the Bolshevization of the CCP. And Mif and the 
Comintern praised the 28 Bolsheviks as genuine Leninists. In sharp 
contrast, Mao later castigated the CC elected at the Fourth Plenum as 
instigators of the "third Left line," and he characterized the 28 
Bolsheviks in the united-front period as "Right" opportunists, with 
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the main blame falling on Ch'en Shao-yu. There is evidence in all this 
of the deep-rooted dispute between the CCP under Mao Tse-tung and 
the CPSU. The remarkable independence of Mao Tse-tung as evi-
denced in the build-up of his power in the CCP has long been a worry 
to the Russian Communists, dating from as early as 1931. It often occurs 
to me to wonder whether relations between China and Russia would be 
as they are today if Ch'en Shao-yu or some other prominent members 
of the 28 Bolsheviks were still in power in Communist China. 
In any event, the struggle between Mao and the remnants of the 28 
Bolsheviks was not laid to rest in 1945 when Mao formally proclaimed 
their past waywardness and his own correctness. Ch'en remained on 
the Politburo. At the Eighth CCP Congress in 1956, however, Ch'en 
Shao-yu and his supporters were again castigated as Right opportunists, 
and this time indications are that Ch'en was utterly defeated. After 
the Eighth Congress, he vanished from the Politburo, holding only 
the lowest position on the CC. 
Yet while Mao's differences with the remnants of the 28 Bolsheviks 
were set to rest by the time of the Eighth CCP Congress, they, and 
others who had studied in the USSR, apparently continued to be some-
thing of a thorn in his flesh, for they came under attack during the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and during the prelude to it. 
On these latter occasions, however, there was a noticeable difference 
in the way Mao treated them as compared to his treatment of them 
in earlier battles. This time, there seems to have been no need to keep 
any of them in even nominal positions of importance. Chang Wen-
t'ien, Ch'en Shao-yu, Wang Chia-hsiang, Yang Shang-K'uen, Ch'en 
Ch'ang-hao, and Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, who married Ch'en Ch'ang-hao 
after Shen Tse-min's death, were the last of the 28 Bolsheviks left in 
mainland China in the mid 1960s. Some of them, such as Ch'en 
Ch'ang-hao, had lived politically secluded lives for years. But all of 
them have reportedly lost whatever official positions they had. One is 
tempted to speculate that Mao no longer feels the need to make even 
a gesture of approval to Chinese Communists who have been identified 
with Russian Communist policies. Indeed, indications are that the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution seeks, among other things, to 
thoroughly discredit all such Party members. 
Thus, it is not just the tag end of the 28 Bolsheviks whom Mao has 
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sought to destroy in the 1960s, but a good many other former students 
at Sun Yat-sen University or at other Soviet institutions as well. For a 
great many of the Chinese Communists who were subjected to merciless 
attacks in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had studied in 
Russia, a great many of them at Sun Yat-sen University. It might be 
noted that Chang Wen-t'ien, the temperate, literary Bolshevik, was 
among those publicly discredited during the recent events in mainland 
China. There is an exception which I cannot resist noting, that Ch'en 
Po-ta, a student of the second graduating class of Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity who generally is credited with being a chief architect of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution at one time, as I recall, was a member 
of one of the factions at Sun Yat-sen University. Ch'en is one of a 
few Russian-educated Chinese Communists who sided with Mao in 
his struggle against the 28 Bolsheviks. 
In any event, the struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Ch'in Pang-
hsien, Ch'en Shao-yu, Chang Wen-t'ien, and others who were identified 
with Russian policies at one time or another spanned more than a 
quarter of a century. And much of it began with a handful of us who, 
by chance, found ourselves at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. 
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